DAVIS et al v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. et al
MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 2/3/16. 2/4/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(mbh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROSALIND DAVIS, et al.,
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,
February 3, 2016
Presently before the Court are Defendant Bank of America, N.A.’s Motion to Strike Class
Allegations Relating to Plaintiffs’ Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law Claim
(Doc. 103); Defendant McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C.’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 104);
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition (Doc. 110); Defendant Bank of America, N.A.’s Reply Brief
(Doc. 113); and Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply in Opposition (Doc. 116). Upon consideration of the
parties’ submissions and for the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS Defendants’
Plaintiffs Rosalind Davis and Harry Davis (“Plaintiffs”) filed an action on their own
behalf and on behalf of similarly situated homeowners against Bank of America, N.A.
(“Defendant BANA”); the law firm of McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C. (“Defendant
MWC”); and Terrance J. McCabe, Marc S. Weisberg, and Edward D. Conway, individual
partners at MWC. Plaintiffs’ action arises from the following:
On October 24, 2005, the Davises signed a promissory Note and Mortgage with lender
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”) to refinance their home in the amount of
$89,250. Am. Compl., Doc. 39, ¶ 2. Plaintiffs agreed to pay their Note, plus interest, in monthly
payments over a thirty (30) year period beginning December 1, 2005. Id. Plaintiff’s Mortgage
authorized Countrywide to transfer or sell the Note and Mortgage, and also provided for the
separate transfer of its servicing rights. Id. ¶ 13. Under the Mortgage, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) was designated as the nominee for Countrywide and
Countrywide’s successors and assigns; as such, MERS was authorized to act as the mortgagee.
Id. ¶ 16.
On September 24, 2010, MERS purported to assign the Mortgage as Nominee from
Countrywide to BNY Mellon, as trustee, however the assignment did not include assignment of
the Davises’ Note. Id. ¶ 17. On October 20, 2011, MERS purported to assign the Davises’
Mortgage and Note to BNY Mellon for a second time, however, this second assignment was the
first time that MERS purported to assign the Davises Note as well. Id. ¶ 18. Shortly after it
closed, Countrywide packaged the Davises’ Note with a larger pool of notes, which were then
transferred on a servicing-retained basis to BNY Mellon as Trustee for the Certificateholders of
the CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-13. Id. ¶ 19.
Countrywide was acquired by Defendant BANA in 2008 and was renamed Bank of
America Home Loans. Id. ¶ 8. From July 2008 until approximately October 2012, Defendant
BANA was the servicer of the Davises’ Mortgage. Id. ¶ 3.
As a result of a number of personal events, the Davises were temporarily unable to make
their monthly mortgage payments to Defendant BANA. Id. ¶ 33. On July 16, 2012, BNY
Mellon filed a Foreclosure Complaint against the Davises in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
through its debt collector, Defendant MWC (the “Foreclosure Complaint”). Id. ¶ 34. Defendant
BANA, BNY Mellon’s agent and servicer, verified the Foreclosure Complaint on July 10, 2012.
Id. The Foreclosure Complaint alleged that as of the pre-foreclosure date of July 16, 2012, a
total of $156,512.50 was due and owing, including $1,450.00 in foreclosure attorneys’ fees and
$655.00 in prior foreclosure attorneys’ fees. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiffs allege that neither attorneys’
fees were due nor owing as of July 16, 2012 because these amounts were anticipated/estimated
fees that had not been disbursed, incurred, or performed. Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that
part of the $655.00 fee was incurred before the Foreclosure Complaint was filed and, under state
law, no more than $50.00 could be charged at that time. Id. (citing Act 6, § 406(3)). Plaintiffs
further allege that as of July 16, 2012, the foreclosure-related fees and costs demanded in the
Foreclosure Complaint had not been incurred for work performed in its entirety, but were simply
a flat fee. Id. ¶ 36.
On April 28, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this Amended Complaint. Doc. 39. In their Amended
Complaint the Plaintiffs defined the putative class for certification as:
[Plaintiffs] and former or current homeowners (“Homeowners”) who obtained
financing secured by a first mortgage on residential property located within the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where Defendant MWC caused a foreclosure
complaint to be filed against Homeowners and where Defendant BANA was a
servicer for all or part of the time period within six years of the filing of this
Am. Compl. ¶ 48. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged four counts against the
Defendants. In Count I, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Terrence J. McCabe, Marc S.
Weisberg, and Edward D. Conway violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“RICO”). In Count II, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants BANA and
MWC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) in using deceptive and other
unlawful means in the collection and attempted collection of debt. In Count III, Plaintiffs
alleged that Defendants BANA and MWC violated Pennsylvania’s Act 6, an Act that regulates
homeowners/mortgagor’s rights, by charging and/or collecting prohibited foreclosure-related
attorneys’ fees and costs. Lastly, in Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants BANA and
MWC violated the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) by
misrepresenting and/or charging and liening unauthorized, illegal attorneys’ fees.
On August 11, 2014, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions to
dismiss. Doc. 58. Notably, this Court dismissed Counts I (RICO) and III (Act 6), thereby
dismissing the individual Defendants from the action. Id. Additionally, this Court dismissed
Count II (FDCPA) as to Defendant BANA but not Defendant MWC. Id. This Court also
dismissed Count IV as to putative plaintiffs whose claims were solely based on liens against their
homes. Id. Count IV remains for plaintiffs, including the Davises, who have alleged that they
made some form of payment and thus have an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPCPL. Id.
On January 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a preliminary motion to certify the class. Doc. 74.
After receiving the Defendants’ response in opposition, the parties entered a consent motion
which stated that the parties agreed that Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied without prejudice.
Doc. 76. On January 22, 2015, the Court entered an order that denied Plaintiffs’ motion without
prejudice. Doc. 79.
On October 19, 2015, Defendant BANA filed the instant motion to strike, which
requested that this Court strike the class allegations of Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claim. Doc. 103.
Shortly thereafter, on October 26, 2015, Defendant MWC filed a motion to strike and joined
BANA’s memorandum of law. (Doc. 104).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “[t]he court may strike from a
pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.” A court may strike pleading material sua sponte or on motion by a party. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(f). If requested by a party, the party must move “before responding to the pleading or, if a
response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.” Id. Nevertheless,
“[b]ecause [a court] may act on [its] own, or upon a party’s timely motion, [a court] may
consider an untimely motion to strike and grant it if doing so seems proper.” Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Small, 307 F.R.D. 426, 433 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion Eng’g Co., 299
F.R.D. 90, 95 (D. N.J. 2014)).
The “purpose of a motion to strike is ‘to clean up pleadings, streamline litigation, and
avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.’” Zarichny v. Complete Payment Recovery
Servs., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc.,
No. 11-1566, 2012 WL 4473228, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012)). Motions to strike under Rule
12(f) are generally disfavored as they are often seen “‘as a dilatory or harassing tactic.’” Id.
(quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1380 (3d
ed. 2014)). Accordingly, granting a motion to strike a pleading is seen as “‘a drastic remedy’”
that “should be used ‘sparingly.’” DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (E.D.
Pa. 2007) (quoting N. Penn Transfer, Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 154, 158 (E.D.
Pa. 1994)). Thus, courts will often deny such motions “‘unless the allegations have no possible
relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations
confuse the issues in the case.’” Dann v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 142–43 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (quoting Wilson v. King, No. 06–2608, 2010 WL 678102, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2010)).
Nevertheless, the Court may grant a motion to strike if the “‘[g]rounds for a motion to strike
[are] readily apparent from the face of the pleadings or from materials that may be judicially
noticed.’” Johnson v. Anhorn, 334 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Wailua
Assocs. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 183 F.R.D. 550, 554 (D.C. Haw. 1998)).
In addition to Rule 12(f), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(1)(D) provides that a
court adjudicating a class action may issue an order to “require that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate allegations about representation of absent persons.” Nonetheless, “courts rarely grant
motions to strike under Rule 23(d)(1)(D) prior to class discovery.” Goode v. LexisNexis Risk &
Info. Analytics Grp., Inc., 284 F.R.D. 238, 244 (E.D. Pa. 2012). However, similar to the standard
under Rule 12(f), striking class allegations prior to discovery under Rule 23(d)(1)(D) is
appropriate where “‘[n]o amount of additional class discovery will alter th[e] conclusion’ that the
class is not maintainable.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Merck & Co., Nos. 01-1004, 01-1328, 013011, 01-6029, 02-1196, 02-4176, 2004 WL 62710, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2004)).
Defendants’ main contention is that Plaintiffs’ class allegations under the UTPCPL, 73
P.S. § 201-9.2, cannot stand under the class certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. Thus, this Court must determine whether Plaintiffs can satisfy the class
A. Class Certification
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the class certification procedure and guides
this Court in its assessment of whether it is appropriate to strike the class allegations from
Plaintiffs’ Complaint at this stage of the proceeding in regards to the UTPCPL claims. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23 (outlining the requirements to sustain a class action). Rule 23 provides that “[a]t an
early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must
determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
However, the Court should certify the action only after conducting “‘a rigorous analysis’” and
determining “‘that the prerequisites’ of Rule 23 are met.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
161 (1982)). This “rigorous analysis” may require delving into the substance of a party’s claims.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011). Thus, the issue before the
Court is whether Plaintiffs could sustain their burden in meeting the requirements of Rule 23 for
a class action.
In order to obtain class certification, a plaintiff must satisfy four prerequisites under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition to these four prerequisites, a party seeking
class certification must also demonstrate that the class action fits into one of three forms of class
actions listed in Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule
23(b)(3). Am. Compl., Doc. 39, ¶ 48. In order to sustain a class action claim under Rule
23(b)(3), a plaintiff must show that “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Accordingly, “[t]he twin requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are known as
predominance and superiority.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 310.
In the instant case, Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy the four
prerequisites of a class action provided in Rule 23(a) nor do they contest Plaintiffs’ ability to
satisfy the superiority requirement. Rather, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy the
predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3). In order to satisfy the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), the party moving for certification must prove that “questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). However, the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement “is
significantly more demanding” than showing mere commonality, “requiring more than a
common claim.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 (3d
Cir. 2001) In order to satisfy the predominance requirement, the elements of the underlying
claim that a plaintiff seeks to certify must be “capable of proof at trial through evidence that is
common to the class rather than individual to its members.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d
at 311–12. Accordingly, “‘[i]f proof of the essential elements of the cause of action requires
individual treatment, then class certification is unsuitable.’” Id. at 311 (quoting Newton, 259
F.3d at 172).
Since the predominance requirement will implicate possible evidence at trial, “‘a district
court must formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to
determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case.’” Id. (quoting In
re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008)). Accordingly,
in order to make findings on the predominance requirement, this Court must address Plaintiffs’
underlying UTCPCL claim to determine whether common or individual issues will predominate
and whether the claim is capable of class-wide proof.
B. UTPCPL Claim
The UTPCPL declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-3. In
defining unfair or deceptive practices, the statute includes a catch-all provision that prohibits
“[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding.” Id. § 201-2(4)(xxi). To establish liability for deceptive conduct, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation or engaged in “conduct
likely to deceive a consumer acting reasonably under similar circumstances”, (2) that the plaintiff
justifiably relied on defendant’s misrepresentation or deceptive conduct, and (3) that the
plaintiff’s “justifiable reliance caused an ascertainable loss.” Montanez v. HSBC Mortg. Corp.
(USA), 876 F. Supp. 2d 504, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Seldon v. Home Loan Servs., Inc., 647
F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2009)). The private remedy for a UTPCPL violation is a
statutory award of “actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater.” 73 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2(a).
Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the catch-all provision of the UTPCPL when Defendants
sent them (and putative plaintiffs) foreclosure complaints containing attorneys’ fees that were not
actually incurred. As noted above, Plaintiffs define the putative class as follows:
Mr. and Mrs. Davis and former or current homeowners (“Homeowners”) who
obtained financing secured by a first mortgage on residential property located
within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where MWC caused a foreclosure
complaint to be filed against Homeowners, and where BANA was a servicer for
all or part of the time period within six years of the filing of this Complaint.
Am. Compl. ¶ 48. This Court limited Plaintiffs’ class “to all putative Plaintiffs who allege that
they have made payment(s)” and thus suffered an “ascertainable loss” as required by the
UTPCPL. Doc. 58, at 7–8.
Because the parties do not contest that there was an alleged misrepresentation or
deceptive conduct, this Court’s inquiry will begin with the second prong of an UTPCPL claim,
Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claim requires an affirmative showing of “justifiable reliance.” Hunt
v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that in accordance with
Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, “a private plaintiff pursuing a claim under the
[UTPCPL] must prove justifiable reliance”). In Pennsylvania, justifiable reliance requires more
than mere causation, more than “reasonable reliance”, and more than “reliance in fact.” See Toy
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 186, 201 (Pa. 2007). Accordingly, “[w]hether reliance on an
alleged misrepresentation is justified depends on whether the recipient knew or should have
known that the information supplied was false.” Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2002).
A plaintiff “is not justified in relying upon the truth of an allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation
if he knows it to be false or if its falsity is obvious.” Toy, 928 A.2d at 207. Thus, the very nature
of the justified reliance inquiry is highly fact-specific. Id. at 208.
In Markocki v. Old Republic National Title Insurance Co., the plaintiffs filed a class
action against the defendants for numerous violations, including the UTPCPL. Civil Action No.
06-2422, 2015 WL 3421401, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 27, 2015). Defendants challenged plaintiffs’
class status and moved for the court to “decertify the class on the UTPCPL claim because
individual issues related to proving justifiable reliance render this case unfit for class
adjudication.” Id. at *4. The court relied on the Third Circuit decision in Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco
Co., in addition to various district court decisions, when holding that “a private plaintiff alleging
a violation of the UTPCPL must affirmatively prove justifiable reliance in order to prevail.” Id.
at *6. As such, justifiable reliance could not be presumed and the court would need to examine
“each class member’s justifiable reliance on [defendant’s] or its agent’s deceptive conduct”
because it “overwhelms common issues.” Id.; see also Hunt, 538 F.3d at 227 (rejecting a
presumption of justifiable reliance based on Pennsylvania precedent). The court also cited
several cases where the justifiable reliance element proved fatal to class certification. Id. at *5
(discussing Cohen v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 06–873, 2013 WL 842706, at *4–*5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2013) and Slapikas v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 298 F.R.D. 285, 298 (W.D.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs argue that common evidence of any payment to BANA
following the foreclosure complaint is sufficient to prove justifiable reliance. In short, Plaintiffs
ask this Court to presume that any payment following the receipt of a foreclosure complaint
means that the putative plaintiff “justifiably relied” on the amounts contained in the foreclosure
complaint. This presumption may be appropriate in some class instances. See Newton, 259 F.3d
at 175 (finding a presumption of reliance appropriate in a fraudulent material misrepresentation
claim under Rule 10-b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 where the fraudulent acts were
part of a common course of conduct impairing the value of securities traded in an “efficient”
market). However, it is inappropriate in a UTPCPL claim and the justifiable reliance element of
Plaintiffs claim is unsuitable for class treatment.
Despite Plaintiffs’ contentions, an individual may or may not make a payment following
his or her receipt of a foreclosure complaint for various reasons. Therefore, this Court would
need to know whether the payment was made after service of the foreclosure complaint, assume
that putative plaintiff read the foreclosure complaint and believed it to be true, and further
assume that any partial payment made by the putative plaintiff was meant to be applied to the
attorneys’ fees listed and not to any other amounts. These are individual inquiries unsuitable for
class adjudication. Allowing certification to proceed on the mere proof of payment would, in
sum, amount to an outright presumption of justifiable reliance. This proposition cannot stand
under the holdings of Markocki and Hunt.
Ascertainable Loss and Damages
Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claim also requires an affirmative showing of an “ascertainable loss.”
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2(a); Benner v. Bank of Am., 917 F. Supp. 2d 338, 359 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
(requiring a showing of ascertainable loss or actual payment to sustain a UTPCPL claim). The
UTPCPL provides for a statutory award of “actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100),
whichever is greater.” 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2. Thus the Court must find whether actual
damages or $100 is greater in determining a remedy. Id.
In Glover v. Udren, the plaintiff, similar to the Plaintiffs in the instant action, alleged that
a foreclosure complaint included overstated attorney’s fees. Civil No. 08-990, 2013 WL
6237990, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013). The district court, after conducting a de novo review
of the plaintiff’s class UTPCPL claim and class allegations, denied the plaintiff’s motion for
class certification. Id. at *2. Magistrate Judge Mitchell concluded that because “Plaintiff does
not include an element of loss in the class as it is defined . . . the Court would need to conduct
mini-hearings as to each class member to determine whether Wells Fargo misrepresented the
amount owed on the mortgage, whether they paid that amount, whether the loan was misapplied,
and whether the class member suffered a loss because of it.” Id. at *21. The court reasoned that
“‘[s]uch a detailed factual analysis would be an unconscionable use of the court’s time and
makes the case unsuitable for class treatment.’” Id. (quoting Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 263
F.R.D. 252, 264 (W.D. Pa. 2009)).
This Court agrees with the Glover analysis of the highly individualized findings needed
to determine ascertainable loss under the UTPCPL. While it is valid that some form of payment,
on its face, demonstrates ascertainable loss for individual Plaintiff in this case, it may not be the
case for all putative class members. Likewise, some form of payment does not resolve the issue
of appropriate damages. This is especially true if only a partial payment was made following
receipt of a foreclosure complaint. In the case of partial payment, it would need to be shown that
the amount paid by the putative plaintiff was intended to pay the overcharged attorneys’ fees,
therein creating some recognizable loss under the UTPCPL. Further, even in the case of full
payment, it is clear that some attorneys’ fees would have been actually incurred at that point due
to the foreclosure process. Accordingly, this Court will not presume that each of these actually
incurred fees were the same for every class member. Rather, actual loss will vary based on
specific circumstances. In addition, determining the reasonableness of the actual fee will vary
from case to case. This Court, like the court in Glover, would need to conduct “mini-hearings”
for each putative plaintiff’s claim to resolve the issues of loss, the amount of the actual loss, and
damages. 2013 WL 6237990, at *21. This type of inquiry is highly individualized and will
predominate over the common class issues, failing the predominance requirement of Rule
Accordingly, based on the highly individualized nature of the elements of a UTPCPL
claim and its statutory award, this Court finds that Plaintiffs will be unable to satisfy the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) with or without class discovery.
For the reasons explained herein, proof of the essential elements of Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL
claim requires highly individualized treatment. The need to show each class member’s
justifiable reliance on the allegedly misrepresented foreclosure complaint will overwhelm
common issues, thus failing to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). In
addition, the highly fact-intensive inquiry required for the “ascertainable loss” element and
damages makes class certification improper. No amount of discovery could surmount this legal
obstacle and striking class allegations at this stage will go a long way in streamlining the
remaining litigation. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Allegations Relating to
Plaintiffs’ Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law Claim is GRANTED.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?