CAMPS v. NUTTER et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE GERALD J. PAPPERT ON 6/27/17. 6/27/17 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PLAINTIFF AND E-MAILED. (jpd )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CALVIN CAMPS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 14-01498

v.
MICHAEL NUTTER, et al.,
Defendants.
PAPPERT, J.

June 27, 2017
MEMORANDUM

Pro se Plaintiff Calvin Camps brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that the City of Philadelphia, former Philadelphia Prison System (“PPS”) Commissioner
Louis Giorla and Warden John Delaney violated his constitutional rights while he was
incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility
(“CFCF”). Defendants filed a Second Motion to Dismiss Camps’s Amended Complaint.
For the reasons below, the Court denies the Motion.
I.
Camps filed his Complaint against former Mayor Michael Nutter, Giorla and
Delaney on March 12, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) His Complaint included detailed allegations
about the poor and unsanitary conditions to which he was allegedly subjected while
housed at CFCF as a pretrial detainee, see (Compl. ¶¶ 7–15), and some of the effects
those conditions had on him, see (id. ¶¶ 9, 10). His Complaint also alleged that Nutter
“promulgate[d] policies governing the PPS . . . including policies affecting conditions of
confinement” and that Giorla and Delaney were “charged with the managing and

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overseeing all daily operations at CFCF.” (Id. ¶¶ 3–5.) On June 11, 2014, Defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that Camps had failed to sufficiently allege their
personal involvement with the alleged constitutional violations. (ECF No. 8.) On
August 13, 2014, Judge Shapiro granted Defendants’ Motion, concluding that Camps
“failed to include any allegations that [the] defendants were personally involved” and
noting the Complaint “include[d] no allegations that even name the defendants” other
than the “Parties” section of the Complaint, which included only their names and job
responsibilities. (ECF No. 10, at 3.) She also stated that Camps failed to allege any
personal injury. (Id. at 2.)
Though Judge Shapiro granted Camps leave to file an amended complaint, he
did not do so. From August 2014 to February 2016, the only filings in the case were
submitted by Camps: notices of address changes, a request for copies of his Complaint
and various requests to appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 12–15, 19.) Camps was apparently
relocated to different prisons on several occasions. (ECF Nos. 13, 15, 25.) On February
23, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution. (ECF No. 20.)
On February 24, 2016, Camps filed an Amended Complaint, naming only Giorla,
Delaney and the City. (ECF No. 21.) The Amended Complaint responds to, and
attempts to correct the deficiencies pointed out by Judge Shapiro. It includes more
detailed allegations regarding both the Defendants’ personal involvement and the
personal injuries Camps suffered as a result of the alleged violations. See (id. ¶¶ 2, 3,
1–5). It does not, however, include any of the specific allegations regarding the
unsanitary conditions that were contained in his first Complaint. (Id.) Camps likely
did not realize that his Amended Complaint would supersede his first Complaint and

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should ideally contain the allegations therein in addition to those necessary to cure the
Complaint’s deficiencies.
In analyzing Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss, the Court will consider the
allegations in both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. Though an amended
complaint typically “supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,”
allegations contained in the original complaint maintain their legal effect if “the
amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.” See W. Run
Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d
1492, 1504 (3d Cir. 1996)). Camps’s Amended Complaint specifically refers to his
initial Complaint and relies on some of its allegations. See (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF
No. 21). Though his Amended Complaint does not contain as many details about the
unconstitutional acts and conditions alleged in his initial pleading, it refers throughout
to “those policies and customs” which “caused said unconstitutional acts and
violations,” clearly referencing the housing policies and resulting conditions alleged in
his first Complaint. See (id. at 1) (alleging Defendants approved “those policies and
customs, [w]hich has caused [him] to be subjected to unconstitutional conditions and
acts, injuries and punishments to all pretrial detainees, being housed in all said
Philadelphia Facilities”). Camps further alleges that the Defendants should have
known the policies “are unconstitutional as to those decisions, made by Commissioner
Louis Giorla, Warden John Delaney, City of Philadelphia, on said issues filed under
Complaint and Amended Complaint.” (Id. at 4 (emphasis added).)

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Particularly given Camps’s pro se status, these references contained in his
Amended Complaint are sufficient to permit the Court to consider the allegations
contained in both the Complaint and Amended Complaint for the purposes of analyzing
Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss. It is particularly appropriate to do so here
where Camps’s case has been pending since 2014 and the allegations contained in his
Complaint and Amended Complaint are more than sufficient to state a claim and put
Defendants on notice of the same.

II.
Camps contends that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of
CFCF’s inhumane prison conditions. He asserts what is commonly referred to as a
“triple celling” claim, alleging that as a result of “pervasive overcrowding in the PPS,”
he was housed with two other inmates in a seven foot by ten foot cell that is only fit to
hold two people. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 12.) This results in one person sleeping on a “boat,”
which is a plastic tray used as a bed. (Id.) The boat is located near the cell’s toilet and
exposes the detainee to urine and fecal matter. (Id.) Camps claims that “as a result of
overcrowding, the attendant security and safety problems it causes, and the City’s
deliberate failure to provide adequate staffing, the PPS population as a whole has
increasingly been subjected to extended periods of ‘restricted movement’ and
‘lockdowns,’” forcing prisoners into close physical proximity, creating a high risk for the
spread of infectious disease and violence and preventing prisoners from accessing
important programs. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) The “nearly continuous lockdowns” also allegedly
prevent adequate sanitation of the cells, which Camps describes as “infested with
insects and rodents.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11,14.) Camps further contends that the lockdowns

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prevent him from showering on a daily basis or otherwise maintaining a clean
appearance. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.)
Camps also complains of other poor and unsanitary conditions at CFCF,
including: showers “covered with black mold and in disrepair”; inadequate recreational
space; poor ventilation and air quality; damaged mattresses and sheets; inadequate
laundry access; and failure to train correctional officers to supervise the overcrowding.
(Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.)
In his Amended Complaint, Camps alleges that the City, Giorla and Delaney
“are involved” with, “participated” in, “have personal direction of policies” and “have
approved those policies and customs” which caused him to be subjected to the
unconstitutional conditions, acts, injuries and punishment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2) He
contends that Giorla and Delaney had knowledge of the relevant facts and housing
policies, including knowledge about the spaces where inmates are held and the number
of beds therein. See (id. ¶ 3).
As a result of the unconstitutional conditions, Camps has experienced physical
and mental suffering, sickness, loss of sleep, anxiety and emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 1–
5.) He also contends the overcrowded conditions have prevented him from receiving
adequate medical care, see (Compl. ¶ 9), and states that he suffers from a number of

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medical conditions including, inter alia, high blood pressure, headaches, fatigue, muscle
pain, chills and problems with his heart, lung and liver, see (Am. Compl. ¶ 5).1
III.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted examines the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). The factual
allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for relief more than just speculative.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether to
grant a motion to dismiss, a federal court must construe the complaint liberally, accept
all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d
943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead in detail
all of the facts upon which she bases her claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the
Rules require a “short and plain statement” of the claim that will give the defendant
fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. The
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997, et seq., “[n]o
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Third Circuit defines substantial physical injury as a “less-thansignificant-but-more-than-de minimis physical injury” and construes the requirement as applying
only to claims for compensatory damages. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533–36 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Thus, in order to recover compensatory damages for any injuries—physical, emotional or
otherwise—Camps must allege and prove a substantial physical injury. Construing Camps’s
pleadings liberally, his allegations are consistent with the types of physical injuries that other
federal courts have recognized as sufficient under § 1997e(e). See Hall v. Klemm, No. 15-20 E, 2017
WL 913954, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-20, 2017 WL
913803 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017) (allegations that plaintiff suffered weight loss, dizziness, fatigue and
headaches sufficient to satisfy physical injury requirement); see also Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087,
1089 (8th Cir. 2006) (headaches, cramps, nosebleeds, and dizziness were sufficient forms of physical
injury).

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“complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 564. Neither “bald assertions” nor “vague and conclusory allegations” are accepted
as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997);
Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
The claim must contain enough factual matters to suggest the required elements of the
claim or to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” those
elements. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court “may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations.” Brown v. Card Service Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
Courts construe a plaintiff’s allegations liberally when he or she is proceeding
pro se. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Bush, 367 F. Supp.
2d at 725 (“Courts are to construe complaints so ‘as to do substantial justice,’ keeping in
mind that pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally.” (quoting Alston
v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004))).
IV.
Defendants contend that Camps has failed to state a claim because he (1) failed
to allege an underlying constitutional violation and (2) failed to allege that Defendants
were personally involved with the alleged violations. (Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss, at
5–7, ECF No. 26.)

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A.
Pretrial detainees’ claims regarding conditions of confinement, including “triplecelling” claims, are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
534 (1979); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2005). Conditions of
confinement are unconstitutional if the condition is: (1) the result of an express intent
to punish or (2) not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Bell, 441
U.S. at 538–39. A district court must look to the “totality of the conditions” of the
specific prison at issue to determine whether triple celling is rationally related to the
legitimate government purpose of managing an overcrowded prison. Hubbard, 538
F.3d at 233. This analysis depends on the “size of the detainee’s living space, the length
of confinement, the amount of time spent in the confined area each day, and the
opportunity for exercise.” Id.
Camps’s Complaint alleges several unsanitary, unsafe or otherwise inadequate
conditions that give a glimpse of the totality of the circumstances he experienced. See
(Compl. ¶¶ 7–14). The facts alleged, construed liberally and taken as true, give enough
detail about the circumstances in the prison to survive a motion to dismiss. It is
plausible that these prison conditions were not rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose and therefore violated Camps’s constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Peele v. Delaney, No. 12-4877, 2017 WL 467347, at

*4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss CFCF inmate’s triple celling
claim under Section 1983); Lewis v. Nutter, No. 16-0528, 2016 WL 7028073, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016) (same); Pichalskiy v. Nutter, No. 15–4704, 2016 WL

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7018545, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); Cain v. Nutter, No. 15-5524, 2016 WL
7031891, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016); Petty v. Nutter, No. 15–3420, 2016 WL
7018538, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016).
B.
To establish a prima facie case under § 1983, Camps must demonstrate that a
person acting under color of law deprived him of a federal right. See Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). He must also show that the person acting
under color of law “intentionally” violated his constitutional rights or acted
“deliberately indifferent” in violation of those rights. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1998); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)
(citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1971)); see also Berg v. County of
Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). Camps sues the City as well as individual
defendants—Giorla and Delaney. See (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3).
i.
The Court analyzes Camps’s claims against the City under the standard for
municipal liability set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Generally, a municipality will not be held liable for the
misconduct of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a municipality can
only be liable under § 1983 when a constitutional injury results from the
implementation or execution of an officially adopted policy or informally adopted
custom. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. 658).

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A policy “is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or
edict.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citation and quotation omitted). “A course of
conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized by law, such
practices of state officials are so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute
law.” Id. (citations and quotation omitted). “In either instance, a plaintiff must show
that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480). “[A]
policy or custom may also exist where the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at
all, though the need to take some action to control the agents of the government is so
obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation omitted).

A successful Monell claim must therefore allege: (1) an underlying
constitutional violation; (2) a policy or custom attributable to the municipality; and
(3) that the constitutional violation was caused by the municipality’s policy or
custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. To show causation where the alleged policy or
custom does not facially violate constitutional rights, the plaintiff “must
demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to
its known or obvious consequences.” Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997). “A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will

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not suffice.” Id. In other words, custom “requires proof of knowledge and
acquiescence by the decisionmaker.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636,
658 (3d Cir. 2009).
In his Amended Complaint, Camps alleges that the City owns, operates and
controls the PPS. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3); see also (Compl. ¶ 3) (“Philadelphia is a
municipality which owns, operates, controls and promulgates policies governing the
PPS, including but not limited to policies affecting conditions of confinement for pretrial
detainees and convicts housed within the system.”). Construing Camps’s allegations
liberally, he contends the City created and maintained policies that created
unconstitutional risks, including a custom of housing inmates in overcrowded cells.
Camps states he experienced “pervasive overcrowding [in] the PPS” and that the “PPS
population as a whole has increasingly been subjected to extended periods of restricted
movement and lockdowns,” suggesting that all inmates suffered the same
circumstances—a fact that could establish a practice or custom. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (plaintiff’s complaint did not
“allege other inmates suffered similar deprivations . . . that might establish a custom”)
(citing Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850 (custom may be proven by showing that a specific
course of conduct is “well-settled and permanent,” even if that conduct is not expressly
endorsed by a written rule))). Finally, he alleges that Giorla and Delaney, official
policymakers, knew about and acquiesced in the policy in deliberate indifference of his
constitutional rights. His allegations are therefore sufficient to state a claim against
the City.

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ii.
“In order to sustain a § 1983 claim against an individual acting under the color
of state law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was personally involved in
the alleged violations of his or her federal rights.” Andrews v. Kenney, No. 16-1872,
2017 WL 2591931, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2017) (citing Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). While “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable [under
§ 1983] for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior,” there are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may
be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First. Corr.
Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds Taylor v. Barkes,
135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Supervisor-defendants may be liable if they were personally
involved in the constitutional violation, i.e. they participated in it, directed others to
commit it or had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in it. Id. Supervisor-defendants
may also be liable if “they, ‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional
harm.’” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572,
586 (3d Cir. 2004)).
To show that a supervisor is liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to an
unconstitutional policy or practice, “[t]he plaintiff must (1) identify the specific
supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that
(2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure
created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that
this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the

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underling’s violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory
practice or procedure.” Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)). “[I]t is not enough for a
plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if
the supervisor had done more than he or she did.” Id. at 216 (citing Sample, 885 F.2d
at 1118). A plaintiff must specifically identify the acts or omissions of the supervisors
that show deliberate indifference, and suggest to the Court a relationship between the
“identified deficiency” of a policy or custom and the injury suffered. Id.
Camps’s first Complaint alleged that former Commissioner Giorla and Warden
Delaney were “charged with the managing and overseeing all daily operations at
CFCF.” (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) Camps’s Amended Complaint further alleges that Giorla and
Delaney “are involved” with, “participated” in, “have personal direction of policies” and
“have approved those policies and customs” which caused him to be subjected to the
unconstitutional housing conditions. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) He contends that Giorla and
Delaney had knowledge of the relevant facts and housing policies, including knowledge
about the spaces where inmates are held and the number of beds therein. See (id. ¶ 3).
Finally, he claims that despite their “personal knowledge and involvement” of the
overcrowded conditions and the resulting risk of constitutional violations, Defendants
“did not take steps to prevent those illegal conditions,” and thus caused punishment to
all pretrial detainees, including Camps. (Id. at 1, 5.)
Camps has identified a policy, connected the Defendants to the policy and
connected the policy to the alleged injury or constitutional violation. His allegations
are therefore sufficient to allege Defendants’ personal involvement at the motion to

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dismiss stage and Defendants’ Motion is denied.2 See, e.g., Peele, 2017 WL 467347, at
*3–4; Cain, 2016 WL 7031891, at 2–4; Lewis, 2016 WL 7028073, at 2–3; Pichalskiy,
2016 WL 7018545, at *3–4; Petty, 2016 WL 7018538, at *2–4.
An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

Defendants also request that Camps’s claims be dismissed for failure to prosecute the case.
(Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss, at 8–9.) Defendants contend dismissal is warranted because Camps
failed to allege sufficient facts to support his claim and failed to comply with a Court Order directing
him to notify the Court whether he wished to proceed pro se after he was unable to obtain counsel
from the Prisoners’ Civil Rights Panel. (Id.) Camps, however, has alleged sufficient facts to support
his claim. And though he may not have formally notified the Court that he planned to proceed pro se
rather than withdraw his claim, he continued to remain responsive, filing with the Court various
affadavits and notices of change of address. (ECF Nos. 24, 25, 28–30.) Moreover, after Defendants
filed their Motion, Camps filed a request for additional time to respond and a response in opposition.
(ECF Nos. 32 & 34.) It is apparent that Camps wishes to proceed pro se and has attempted to
comply with Court Orders and deadlines to the best of his ability despite his continued incarceration
and frequent relocations. The Court therefore declines to dismiss his case for failure to prosecute.
2

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