COCHRAN v. JACKSON

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE ROBERT F. KELLY ON 8/31/15. 8/31/15 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(kw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
:
PATRICIA COCHRAN,
:
CIVIL ACTION
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
No. 14-2165
:
TYSHWAN JACKSON,
:
:
Defendant.
:
____________________________________:

MEMORANDUM
ROBERT F. KELLY, Sr. J.

AUGUST 31, 2015

Presently before this court is Plaintiff, Patricia Cochran’s, “Motion for a New Trial
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 59,” and Defendant, Tyshwan Jackson’s, “Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial.” For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
The proceedings before this court are the result of an automobile accident involving

Plaintiff, Patricia Cochran (“Plaintiff”), and Defendant, Tyshwan Jackson (“Defendant”).
Compl. ¶ 5. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on October 2, 2012, while traveling by
vehicle near City Line Avenue, a vehicle driven by Defendant suddenly and without warning
entered Plaintiff’s lane and collided with her vehicle. Id. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff
asserts that she suffered serious injuries. Id.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on April 14, 2014. See Compl. Jurisdiction in this case is proper under
diversity of citizenship as Plaintiff seeks sums in excess of $75,000, and the parties are citizens

of different states. 1 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff’s suit alleges one count of
negligence, and seeks sums in excess of $75,000. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant filed an Answer with
affirmative defenses to Plaintiff’s Complaint on June 3, 2014. (See Def.’s Answer.)
The case was referred to arbitration on February 3, 2015. (Doc. No. 10.) An arbitration
hearing was conducted. (Doc. No. 11.) Defendant, subsequently, filed a Notice of Appeal of the
Arbitration Award and Demand for Trial De Novo with this Court. (See Doc. No. 12.) A jury
trial was held from July 13, 2015, through July 15, 2015. 2 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Defendant finding that he was not negligent. A jury poll was conducted and the verdict was
recorded on July 15, 2015. N.T. 7/15/2015, p. 20-22. On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed the
Motion for a New Trial, and Defendant filed his Response in Opposition on August 17, 2015.
(Doc. Nos. 32, 33.)
II.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed a motion under Rule 59 for a new trial arguing that the jury’s verdict was

against the weight of the evidence. (See Pl.’s Mot. for New Trial.) “The court may, on motion,
grant a new trial on all or some of the issues - and to any party . . . after a jury trial, for any
reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). “New trials because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
are proper only when the record shows that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice
or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.”
Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Klein v.
1

Plaintiff is a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Defendant is a resident of Mount Laurel, New Jersey.
Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.

2

Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude the expert report and testimony of Ryan K. Lee, M.D., who
was Defendant’s expert witness. (See Pl.’s Mot. in Limine.) Plaintiff’s Motion was denied; however, neither the
Motion nor the court’s ruling are relevant to the instant Motion. (Mem. Op. and Order dated June 8, 2015.)

2

Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff argues that the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented during trial established that Defendant was negligent. (Pl.’s
Mem. Law Support Mot. for New Trial at 5-8.) Plaintiff asserts that “there is no basis for the
jury to have determined that Defendant Jackson was not negligent.” (Id. at 5.)
Regarding the testimonial evidence, Plaintiff asserts that all three of the fact witnesses,
Plaintiff, Defendant, and Police Officer Carl Harper (“Officer Harper”), uniformly described
how the accident occurred. 3 (Id.) Acknowledging that Officer Harper did not witness the
accident, Plaintiff relies heavily upon his testimony asserting that he “confirmed that his
investigation revealed that [Defendant] had been travelling in the right lane and changed lanes
into the left lane causing the accident.” (Id.) Plaintiff points out that Officer Harper arrived at
his conclusion after examining the property damage to the two vehicles involved in the accident
and assessing the location where he found Defendant’s broken front light on the roadway. (Id.)
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Harper would have known exactly where the accident
occurred because Defendant testified that he did not move his vehicle before the police arrived at
the scene of the accident. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he property damage to both of the
vehicles involved in the collision corroborated how the accident occurred, i.e., [Defendant]
leaving the right lane to enter the left lane and colliding with [Plaintiff’s] vehicle that was
already occupying that lane.” (Id. at 6.)
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s testimony confirms that he was negligent
by stating that he had exited off the wrong exit, was late for his first day of work, was unfamiliar

3

Plaintiff testified that she was driving and felt the impact, but did not how the accident occurred. N.T. 7/05/2015,
p. 44, lines 24-25; p. 45, line 1.

3

with the roadway, and was lost. 4 (Id.) Plaintiff draws attention to Defendant’s testimony that he
last saw Plaintiff when she was behind him and he did not see her vehicle when it was occupying
the left lane immediately to his left. (Id.) She further focuses on Defendant’s testimony that he
was intending to change lanes and moved his vehicle out of the right lane and into the left lane
when the accident occurred. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that the jury could not have properly assumed that she was speeding or
improperly passing Defendant because there was no evidence of the speed of either vehicle or
that Defendant had his turn signal on when he attempted to change lanes. (Id.) Moreover,
Plaintiff asserts that the fact that she may have been behind Defendant and then to his left when
the accident occurred does not diminish the fact that Defendant moved his vehicle from the right
lane of travel and entered her left lane of travel. (Id.) Plaintiff states “[t]here is simply no
evidence that would exonerate [Defendant] for negligently causing this accident.” (Id.)
Defendant counters Plaintiff’s argument by stating that “there was conflicting evidence
presented to the jury on negligence, and the jury simply performed its functions of determining
witness credibility, giving weight to testimony and applying their common sense to the
evidence.” (Def.’s Response Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. for New Trial at 5.) Defendant goes on to state
that there is a significant amount of testimonial evidence supporting the jury’s finding that
Defendant was not negligent, including, “1) Officer Harper acknowledging that the accident
could have occurred when the Plaintiff attempted to pass the Defendant while the Defendant was
merging left, as reported at the scene by Defendant; 2) the Defendant seeing the Plaintiff behind

4

Defendant acknowledges that he was late running late for work, but points out that he was not in a rush because he
had informed his boss about the circumstances. (Def.’s Response Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. for New Trial at 2) (citing N.T.
7/14/2015, p. 26, lines 6-13.)

4

him before he merged left; and 3) the Defendant testifying that he moved to the left before the
roadway became two lanes.” (Id.)
Regarding the location where the accident occurred, Defendant points out that he
unequivocally disagreed with Officer Harper’s contention that it occurred where the roadway
was marked as two lanes. (Id.) (citing N.T. 7/14/2015, p. 30, lines 11-13.) Furthermore,
Defendant argues that the jury had sufficient reason to disregard Plaintiff’s liability witnesses
and find his testimony to be credible. (Id.) Defendant points out that Officer Harper was not
present when the accident occurred and had no recollection of it other than reviewing his three
year old report. (Id.) Focusing on Plaintiff, Defendant stresses that she did not know how the
accident happened and was cross-examined on at least four separate occasions with inconsistent
testimony. (Id. at 6) (citing N.T. 7/14/2015, p. 67-68, 68-69, 85-86, 86-87). Defendant points
out that he was never cross-examined with prior inconsistent statements. (Id.) Thus, according
to Defendant, the jury chose to believe, for good reason and in accordance with the Court’s
charge, his testimony that the accident occurred on a one lane road when Plaintiff attempted to
pass him on the left. (Id.)
Based upon the testimony elicited at trial, as well as the arguments by both parties, we
find that the jury could reasonably have concluded that Defendant was not negligent. The
testimony regarding how the accident occurred was not uniform as Plaintiff argues. Plaintiff
relies heavily upon Officer Harper’s testimony even though he did not witness the accident. She
argues that Officer Harper’s testimony establishes that Defendant was negligent by travelling in
the right lane and changing lanes into the left lane causing the accident. During direct
examination the following exchange between Plaintiff’s counsel and Officer Harper supports
Plaintiff’s contention:
5

Q

So, according to your report, Mr. Jackson was in the right-hand side, the righthand lane of the two marked lanes. And Ms. Cochran was in the left-hand lane of
the two marked lanes?

A

Yes.

Q

And then Mr. Jackson attempted to take his vehicle out of the right-hand lane into
the left-hand lane?

A

Yes.

Q

And then that’s how the accident happened?

A

Correct.

Q

Officer, as part of your normal routine, do you look at the damage that’s done to
both vehicles?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------A

Yes.

Q

And did you do that in this case?

A

I did.

Q

Did the damage that you saw to both vehicles corroborate what you believed to be
the case?

A

They did.

N.T. 7/14/2015, p. 17, lines 14-25; p. 18, lines 1-6. However, on cross-examination, Officer
Harper conceded that the accident could have been caused by Plaintiff attempting to pass
Defendant. Specifically, the pertinent exchange between defense counsel and Officer Harper is
as follows:
Q

All right and going back to the actual roadway, there is a portion of the roadway
near where this accident happened, where there’s no dividing lines, is that right?

A

Yes.

-------------------------------------------------------------------Q

And that’s immediately when they come off the ramp, is that right?

A

Yes.
6

Q

And then, then the dash lines begin?

A

That’s correct.

Q

And it was your determination that the accident happened beyond that area where
the dash lines were, is that right?

A

Yes.

Q

And it was your determination that the point of impact was to the passenger side
of Ms. Cochran’s vehicle and the front driver’s side of my client’s, is that right?

A

Yes.

Q

And that could be indicative of Ms. Cochran trying to – that’s what happened
when Ms. Cochran was trying to pass my client, could it not?

A

It’s possible.

Q

And that’s what my client reported to you at the scene, is that right?

A

Yes.

Id. at p. 22, lines 22-25; p. 23, lines 1-19. Clearly, Officer Harper’s testimony regarding how the
accident occurred is not as clear-cut as Plaintiff would have us believe. In fact, his testimony
establishes that Defendant’s contention that the accident occurred on a one lane road when
Plaintiff attempted to pass him on the left is indeed possible.
Plaintiff attempts to show that Defendant’s testimony proves that the accident occurred
when he was on the roadway with two lanes and he negligently moved into Plaintiff’s lane from
the right lane; however, this argument is belied by Defendant’s testimony that he saw Plaintiff
behind him before he merged left and that he moved to the left before the roadway became two
lanes. Id. at p. 31, lines 8-10, 20-23; p. 32, lines 8-21; p. 34, lines 9-17. The issue of how the
accident occurred, which was never conceded by Defendant, was a factual determination left for
the jury to decide.
In addition to the testimonial evidence, Plaintiff argues that the documentary evidence
admitted into evidence demonstrated that Defendant was negligent. (Pl.’s Mem. Law Support
7

Mot. for New Trial at 6-7.) Specifically, Plaintiff relies upon Officer Harper’s police report
stating that “I did find pieces of the broken front signal lens from Unit #1 [Defendant’s vehicle].
It was located several yards beyond where the lanes markings start, [sic] indicating Unit #1
[Defendant’s vehicle] had moved from his clearly-defined lane and struck Unit #2 [Plaintiff’s
vehicle].” (Id.) Officer Harper testified that the term “beyond” meant the accident occurred
where the two lanes were marked left and right. 5 (Id. at 7.) (citing N.T. 7/14/2015, p. 24.) She
also asserts that the scene and property damage also corroborated Defendant’s negligence. (Id.)
The jury was given a negligence instruction twice, and it found Defendant was not
negligent. The jury deliberated and considered all of the evidence under the negligence
instruction. It was perfectly capable of considering whether the documentary, and testimonial,
evidence established Defendant’s negligence. It found that they did not. The jury was
thoroughly instructed regarding the elements of negligence and Plaintiff’s burden of proof.
There is no evidence that the jury did not follow the instructions or did not consider the issue. In
fact, the jury’s only question for the court was requesting, once again, the definition of
negligence and negligence per se. N.T. 7/15/2015, p. 18, lines 1-22. The jury was instructed,
again, on the definition of negligence by the court. Id., p. 18-19. Clearly, the jury seriously
deliberated the issue of negligence in this case after hearing the court’s charge on negligence
twice. Furthermore, all of the jurors were unanimous in their finding that Defendant was not
negligent as evidenced by the jury poll conducted at the conclusion of the trial. Id., p. 20-22.
5

Regarding the exact location of the accident, Plaintiff notes that Officer Harper determined that Defendant had
violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309, which provides: “Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic the following rules . . . shall apply: (1) Driving within a single lane - A vehicle shall be
driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has
first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law Support Mot. for New Trial at 5-6)
(citing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309). Although Officer Harper determined that Defendant had violated the motor vehicle
code, the jury was free to find that he did not violate it based upon the evidence presented at trial. See Thompson v.
Austin, 272 F. App’x 188, 192-93 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).

8

The jury’s decision was reasonable and not against the clear weight of the evidence. The
jury’s verdict was not a miscarriage of justice and it does not shock this court’s conscience.
Based on all the evidence presented at trial, we are satisfied that the jury reached a reasoned
verdict supported by the evidence. There was evidence supporting a finding that Defendant was
negligent; however, the jury chose not to credit that evidence. 6 As the finders of fact, the jury
made its determination. Unless the jury’s verdict was a miscarriage of justice that shocks the
conscience, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The jury’s verdict in
this case was in accord with the great weight of the evidence. It was not a miscarriage of justice
and does not cry out to be overturned or shock our conscience. Consequently, the jury’s verdict
must stand. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 59 is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.

6

Focusing on defense counsel’s opening and closing arguments, Plaintiff argues that “[c]ounsel herself did not even
posit a theory of the accident that would have permitted the jury to decide that [Defendant] was not negligent.”
(Pl.’s Mem. Law Support Mot. for New Trial at 7.) (Id.) During the trial, defense counsel presented the theory that
Plaintiff may have caused the accident by passing Defendant on the left. Also, as part of the jury instructions, the
court informed the jurors that they must not consider the opening and closing arguments as evidence. N.T.
7/15/2015, p. 3, lines 11-13. While we have considered defense counsel’s opening and closing statements as they
pertain to the instant Motion, we conclude that they do now warrant the granting of a new trial when considered in
conjunction with Plaintiff’s other arguments.

9