STEVENSON v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE C. DARNELL JONES, II ON 1/12/2015. 1/13/2015 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(kp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOROTHY N. STEVENSON
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

WAL-MART STORES, INC.
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 14-4073

:

MEMORANDUM
Jones, II

I.

J.

January 12, 2015

Introduction

Plaintiff, Dorothy N. Stevenson, is an adult individual residing in Perkasie, Pennsylvania.
(Compl. & 1.) On January 1, 2014, Ms. Stevenson was a business invitee of the Wal-Mart
Supercenter located at 1515 Bethlehem Pike in Hatfield, Pennsylvania.

(Compl. && 4, 5.) Plaintiff

alleges that she tripped and fell over Aan empty black display shelf@ while inside the Wal-Mart
Supercenter.

(Compl. & 7.) Ms. Stevenson allegedly sustained severe injuries, Aincluding but not

limited to contusions to her left arm and left leg, a non-displaced fracture in her left femur, and a
fracture of her left hip.@

(Compl. & 14.) As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff alleges that she Ahas

been significantly inconvenienced and unable to attend to her life=s activities and has been deprived of
her previous ability to enjoy life=s pleasures.@

(Compl. & 17.)

Defendant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in
Pennsylvania.

(Compl. & 2; Removal Notice & 11.) Its principal place of business is located in

1

Bentonville, Arkansas.

(Compl. & 2.) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. operates and manages the Wal-Mart

Supercenter located at 1515 Bethlehem Pike in Hatfield, Pennsylvania.

(Compl. & 4.)

On June 12, 2014, Plaintiff commenced suit against Defendant via Civil Action Complaint in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. (Compl. && 10-18.) In said Complaint,
Plaintiff asserted a claim for negligence and sought damages Ain excess of $50,000.@

(Compl. & 18.)

Defendant asked Plaintiff to execute a Stipulation to Limit Damages to less than $75,000 on or
before June 30, 2014.

(Removal Notice, Ex. B.) Plaintiff did not respond to this request.

On July 3, 2014, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to this Court.

Id.

(Removal Notice && 1-20; 28

U.S.C. ' 1332(a)).
Presently before the court is the Plaintiff=s Motion to Remand to the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County on grounds that the Defendant has not met its burden of establishing that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

(Pl.=s Mot. Remand & 13.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '

1447(c), Plaintiff also seeks attorney=s fees in the amount of $1,000.00.

For the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff=s Motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Removal and Remand

AExcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.@

28 U.S.C. ' 1441.

District courts Ahave original jurisdiction

of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of

2

interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.@

28 U.S.C. ' 1332(a).

Corporations are citizens of their State or State(s) of incorporation and the State where its principal
place of business is located.

28 U.S.C. ' 1332(c)(1).

The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, P.L. 112-63,
standardized how courts evaluate the amount in controversy requirement for removal actions. 1 This
provision, codified at 28 U.S.C. ' 1446(c)(2), states that the Asum demanded in good faith in the
initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.@

28 U.S.C. ' 1446(c)(2). 2 If the

initial pleading seeks Anonmonetary relief@ or Athe State practice does not permit demand for a
specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded,@ then Aremoval of
the action is proper . . . if the district court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount
in controversy exceeds [$75,000].@

Id. (emphasis added).

AThe party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that at all stages of the litigation
the case is properly before the federal court.@

Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357

F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Packard v. Provident National Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d
Cir. 1993)).

AIf at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.@

1

28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c).

See Heffner v. LifeStar Response of N.J., Civ. No. 13-0194, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139176, at *10
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2013) (discussing Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act); Frank
Bryan, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civ. No. 13-363, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54300, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr.
15, 2013) (same).
2
Said provision applies to all cases filed after January 6, 2012.
3

Because Defendant removed this case to federal court, it bears the burden of establishing
jurisdiction.

Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 396. Defendant is a citizen of both Delaware and

Arkansas, its state of incorporation and principal place of business, respectively.
11.) Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania.

(Removal Notice &

(Compl. & 1.) The parties are therefore diverse. 3

However, Plaintiff contends that the Defendant has not satisfied the amount in controversy
requirement for removal.

(Pl.=s Mot. Remand & 11.) As previously noted, Plaintiff=s Complaint

seeks damages Ain excess of $50,000.@ (Compl & 18.) Additionally, Plaintiff rebuffed a request by
Defendant to stipulate that damages were limited to $75,000.

(Removal Notice

&& 3-4.)

Accordingly, Defendant asserts the amount in controversy is satisfied by Plaintiff=s refusal to stipulate
and Defendant=s subjective belief as to the value of Plaintiff=s claims.

(Def.=s Opp=n Br. at 3, 8-10.)

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure state that A[a]ny pleading demanding relief for
unliquidated damages shall not claim any specific sum.@

Pa. R. Civ. P. 1021(b).

Therefore,

Plaintiff=s failure to demand a specific sum falls within the exception provided in 28 U.S.C. '
1446(c)(2)(A)(ii), and Defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.

28 U.S.C. ' 1446(c)(2).

In doing so, a defendant must be

mindful that Aestimations of the amounts recoverable must be realistic.

The inquiry should be

objective and not based on fanciful, >pie-in-the-sky,= or simply wishful amounts . . . @

Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 403.
Plaintiff=s refusal to stipulate that her damages were limited to $75,000 does not satisfy the
amount in controversy requirement.

3

Courts within this District have refused to give conclusive

Plaintiff does not dispute that the parties are diverse.

(Pl.=s Mot. Remand at 2 fn.1.)
4

effect to a plaintiff=s refusal to so stipulate.

See Cardillo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 14-1586,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162900, at *4 (W.D. Pa. November 21, 2014) (recognizing that A[c]ourts,
including this one, have universally rejected the notion that a plaintiff's failure to stipulate that he is
seeking damages below the jurisdictional amount is, on its own, enough to create federal jurisdiction
C very often in cases involving Wal-Mart.@); Ricketts v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Civ. No. 13-7585,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75859, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2014) (concluding that for purposes of
assessing amount in controversy, Aa plaintiff's refusal to enter into a stipulation is not determinative as
to the value of damages.@); Martino v. Hartford Ins. Co., Civ. No. 14-1953, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57066, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014) (finding that A[t]he lack of stipulation does not undermine the
limited damages apparent in Plaintiff's complaint.@); Lewis-Hatton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Civ.
No. 13-7619, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15419, at * (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2014) (acknowledging that a
defendant cannot sustain its burden of proof regarding amount in controversy by relying upon a
plaintiff=s refusal to sign a stipulation regarding same); Fosbenner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No.
01-3358, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16695, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2001) (rejecting Wal-Mart=s
argument that a plaintiff=s failure to sign a stipulation limiting damages, coupled with their own
subjective assessment of the value of the injuries complained of, was sufficient to sustain their
burden); TJS Brokerage & Co., Inc. v. CRST, Inc., 958 F.Supp. 220, 222 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding
that there is no requirement that a Plaintiff stipulate to the amount in controversy).
Putting aside the stipulation issue, Defendant herein relies upon its own Aindependent
investigation@ regarding the nature of the injuries alleged in Plaintiff=s Complaint to conclude that
APlaintiff=s damages may exceed $75,000.@

(Def.=s Opp=n Br. at 3) (emphasis added).

5

However,

Defendant provides this Court with nothing specific from their own Ainvestigation@ and instead, puts
forth a subjective appraisal of Plaintiff=s claims based on what it attributes to be the Aseriousness@ of
her injuries.

This is simply not sufficient.

See Cardillo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162900, at *3-4

(finding Defendant=s statement that Ait is believed that the amount in controversy is in excess of
$75,000" to be insufficient proof by preponderance when Defendant failed to submit any actual
evidence to the court to establish same).
In Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff alleged negligence for a slip and fall injury she
sustained in a Wal-Mart store.
2000).

Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 557, 559 (D. N.J.

The complaint did not specify damages.

Id. Wal-Mart cited the serious medical injuries

sustained by the plaintiff in support of its contention that the amount in controversy was satisfied.

Id. at 560. Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, the court held that Ageneral
statements@ that the plaintiff suffered severe injuries did not satisfy the burden of proof.

Id. at 568.

The court in Fosbenner reached the same conclusion regarding very similar facts, finding in pertinent
part:
Wal-Mart has produced no evidence beyond the pleadings and plaintiffs= failure to
agree to sign an affidavit to support defendant=s contention that the jurisdictional
threshold has been reached. Wal-Mart=s argument rests on the assumption that
plaintiffs= refusal to sign the affidavit is an admission that the value of the claim
exceeds $75,000. The defendant also notes that plaintiffs have claimed serious,
permanent and severe injuries and that these injuries, with attendant medical bills,
suggest that the damages, if proven, will exceed $75,000. An allegation of severe and
serious injuries, however, does not automatically translate into the likelihood that the
damages will be more than $75,000. While Wal-Mart need not assume the task of
proving the entire extent of plaintiffs= damages, it must give the Court something more
than tenuous inferences and assumptions if it hopes to sustain its burden of proof.
Wal-Mart has simply failed to show that it is more likely than not that Ms.
Fosbenner=s negligence claim, Mr. Fosbenner's loss of consortium claim, or even the
aggregation of the two claims exceed $75,000.
6

Fosbenner, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16695, at * 7-8 (internal citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, Defendant=s speculation as to Plaintiff=s damages similarly does not
sustain the burden.

The Third Circuit has cautioned that Aremoval statutes >are to be strictly

construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.=@

Boyer v.

Snap-on-Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). To that end, A>if this
Court has to guess= at whether the jurisdictional threshold has been met, then the >defendant has not
proved its point.=@

Scott v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152817, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct.

23, 2013) (quoting Valerio v. Mustabasic, Civ. No. 07-534, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103030, at * 11
(D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2007) (internal citations omitted)).
In view of the foregoing, the instant matter shall be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County.
B.

Attorney=s Fees

Plaintiff additionally seeks attorney=s fees to compensate for the cost incurred in preparing the
instant Motion.

AAn order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.@

28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c).

AThe

appropriate test for awarding fees under ' 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter removals
sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party, while not
undermining Congress= basic decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter,
when the statutory criteria are satisfied.@ Lott v. Duffy, 579 F. App=x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
of the removal.@

In making this determination, the court considers Athe reasonableness

Id.
7

Although questionable, this Court cannot conclusively find that Defendant did not have an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.
presented to this Court on the same bases.

The same may not be said for future cases that are

However, for purposes of this particular case, Plaintiff=s

request for attorney=s fees shall be denied.

8

III.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Plaintiff=s Motion for Remand shall be granted and her
request for attorney=s fees shall be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ C. Darnell Jones, II

J.