JACOBS et al v. PALMER et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT THE ABOVE SANCTIONS WILL SERVE AS A BLINKING RED LIGHT THAT OTHER ATTORNEYS IN THEIR MOTION PRACTICE BEFORE THIS COURT MUST RECOGNIZE THE POST-TWOMBLY AND POST-IQBAL REGIME. UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT SANCTION WILL BE TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL TO ATTEND A CONTINUING EDUCATION PROGRAM WITHIN THE NEXT 6 MONTHS; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MICHAEL M. BAYLSON ON 4/23/15. 4/23/15 ENTERED AND E-MAILED.(jl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEN JACOBS and TIMOTHY
WILLIAMS,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiffs,
v.

NO. 14-5797

DELAWARE COUNTY DETECTIVE M.
PALMER, DETECTIVE WORRILOW,
UNKNOWN DELAWARE COUNTY
POLICE OFFICERS, THE COUNTY OF
DELAWARE, POLICE
COMMISSIONER JOSEPH BAIL,
CAPTAIN C. FELL, UNKNOWN CITY
OF CHESTER POLICE OFFICERS, and
THE CITY OF CHESTER,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Baylson, J.

April 23, 2015

In response to the complaint, defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12,
basically contending that plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficiently specific under the leading
Supreme Court cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In response, the plaintiffs failed to cite Twombly or Iqbal, and
exclusively relied on cases decided prior to Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiffs also ignored leading
Third Circuit cases following Twombly and Iqbal which further specified the pleading
requirements that must be met following the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal rulings.
Stated briefly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal tightened the concept of
“notice pleading,” by requiring a plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim and

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clarifying that a plaintiff cannot rely on mere conclusory allegations that the defendants violated
the law. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-84.
The Court ruled on the defendants’ motions to dismiss by Memorandum and Order dated
March 10, 2015 (ECF 16, 17), which granted the motions to dismiss in large part because
plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficiently specific.
In the Court’s Order, the Court required plaintiffs to show cause under Fed. R. Civ. P.
Rule 11(b)(2) & (c)(3) why sanctions should not be granted because of the plaintiffs’ failure to
acknowledge the Twombly and Iqbal pleading rules, and the Third Circuit case law. Instead,
plaintiffs relied exclusively on pre-Twombly and pre-Iqbal decisions which are no longer valid.
Plaintiffs’ response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF 19) does not respond to the
Court’s direction. In it, plaintiffs’ attorneys ignore the relevant issue of pleading requirements
under Twombly and Iqbal and discuss only the tangential issue of how Iqbal affected claims for
supervisory liability. Plaintiffs’ response to the Order to Show Cause is an implied concession
that plaintiffs’ brief in response to the motion to dismiss, defending the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint, were not “warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
The Court does not sanction plaintiffs’ counsel for the insufficiency of the complaint.
The violation of Rule 11 took place by the plaintiffs’ counsel filing a brief which attempted to
defend the allegations by citing case law that had been abrogated by Twombly and Iqbal and
subsequent Third Circuit decisions. The impact of Twombly and Iqbal on federal civil practice is
nothing new. Numerous Continuing Legal Education programs have emphasized the change in
pleading standards required by Twombly and Iqbal and subsequent lower court decisions.

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Plaintiffs’ counsel is certainly on notice of this change in the law; and, in filing a brief that
ignored these decisions, violated Rule 11. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s response to the Court’s Order to
Show Cause was non-responsive. The Court is put in an unpleasant position of either ignoring a
blatant violation of Rule 11 or imposing a sanction. If defense counsel in this case had filed a
reply brief, the Court could have easily justified, as a sanction, defendants’ counsel fees in
researching, writing, and filing a reply brief. However, no reply brief was filed.
The Court hopes that this sanction will serve as a “blinking red light” that other attorneys
in their motion practice before this Court must recognize the post-Twombly and post-Iqbal
regime.
Under all the circumstances, the Court sanction will be to require plaintiffs’ counsel to
attend a Continuing Legal Education program within the next six (6) months; which covers
Federal Civil Procedure, and to certify compliance.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Michael M. Baylson
______________________________
MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, U.S.D.J.
O:\CIVIL 14\14-5797 jacobs v. palmer\14cv5797.Memo.showcause.4.8.14.docx

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