WILLIAMS et al v. U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC. et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,U-HAUL CO. OF CALIFORNIA AND COLUSA QUICK SERVE MARKET MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; ETC.. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 1/14/15. 1/14/15 ENTERED AND E-MAILED.(jl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GARY WILLIAMS, et al.,
U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
U-HAUL CO. OF CALIFORNIA, COLUSA :
QUICK SERVICE MARKET, K&B
January 14, 2015
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”)
12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, a Motion for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), filed
by Defendants U-Haul International, Inc. (“U-Haul International”), U-Haul Company of
California (“U-Haul California”), and Colusa Quick Service Market (“Colusa QSM”). (Doc. 7.)
Upon consideration of the Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs’ response thereto, and for the following
reasons, Defendants’ motion will be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the Court writes primarily for the parties, it sets forth only those facts that are
relevant to its conclusion. Plaintiffs are Gary and Nina Williams, husband and wife, who are
citizens and residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. On or before February 28, 2012,
Plaintiff Gary Williams purchased a power adapter from a U-Haul store in Yuba City, CA, which
allowed him to use his sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) to tow a U-Haul trailer. He then went to
Colusa QSM and rented a 1994 U-Haul twin axle box trailer. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, Ex.
A, Doc. 1.) Colusa QSM is an authorized independent dealer of U-Haul California. (Fifth Am.
Compl. ¶ 5; Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, 2, Doc. 7.)
On or about March 2, 2012 at approximately 2:00am, Plaintiff Gary Williams was
driving his SUV, hitched to the loaded U-Haul trailer, on Interstate Highway 80 in Henry
County, IL during a trip from California to his home in Norristown, PA. While traveling in the
right eastbound lane, the SUV and U-Haul trailer “jackknifed” 1 and came to a rest across both
eastbound lanes. 2 The trailer’s lighting system was not functioning at the time and its visibility
to other motorists was impaired. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-27.) Meanwhile, a tractor trailer truck
owned by K&B Transportation, Inc. (“K&B”) was traveling in the right eastbound lane behind
Plaintiff’s vehicle. The truck collided with Plaintiff’s stopped vehicle, causing his SUV to
separate from the U-Haul trailer and pushing both into the center median. (Id. ¶ 28, 30.)
As a result of the collision, Plaintiff Gary Williams sustained serious, permanent injuries
including traumatic brain injury, subarachnoid hemorrhage, multiple fractures of the ribs, left
clavicle and lumbar spine, splenic laceration, and left hemopneumothorax. Plaintiff underwent
multiple surgical procedures and will require continued medical care. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 60.)
Initially, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court. 3 Upon the filing of Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended
Complaint, complete diversity existed and Defendants U-Haul International, U-Haul California,
Colusa QSM, and K&B removed the matter to this Court on November 24, 2014. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiffs alleged the following claims against U-Haul International, U-Haul California, and
To “jackknife” means “to have the back part slide out of control toward the front part.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Jan.
13, 2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jackknife.
The parties dispute why the SUV-trailer combination jackknifed: Plaintiff alleges that defective conditions in the
trailer’s design, manufacture, braking system, and stability caused the jackknife (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 22, 26);
Defendants contend that Plaintiff was making a U-turn on the highway (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss,
Plaintiffs also filed a related case arising from the same occurrence against General Motors, LLC, which Plaintiffs
allege was the manufacturer of the SUV that Plaintiff Gary Williams was driving. See Williams, et al. v. General
Motors LLC, No. 14-3891 (E.D.Pa.) (Tucker, J.).
Colusa QSM (“Moving Defendants”): strict product liability (Count I), negligence (Count II),
reckless conduct (Count III), personal injuries (Count V), and loss of consortium (Count VI). 4
Moving Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on December 3, 2014 and Plaintiffs filed a
timely response on December 17, 2014. (Docs. 7, 12.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court must accept as true all allegations contained in a complaint,
but need not consider legal conclusions contained therein. Id.
The Third Circuit has established a three-step analysis for assessing the sufficiency of a
complaint. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012); Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 73 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court determines the elements a
claimant must plead to state a claim. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365. Second, the court identifies and
strikes allegations in the complaint that are mere conclusions and thus not entitled to the
assumption of truth. Id. These include “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s], labels and conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,
or naked assertion[s].” Argueta, 643 F.3d at 72 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And third, the court should assess the plausibility of the remaining
Count IV alleges a negligence claim against Defendant K&B, who is not a party to the instant motion.
factual allegations to conclude whether they give rise to an entitlement for relief. Bistrian, 696
F.3d at 365.
Under Rule 12(e), a party “may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot
reasonably prepare a response.” The motion must “point out the defects complained of and the
details desired.” Rule 12(e) provides a procedural tool by which to obtain the factual basis of a
plaintiff’s claim when an initial pleading does not suffice. Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463
F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir. 2006). When proper, the court is to grant a motion and demand more
specific factual allegations about the conduct that forms the basis of a plaintiff’s claims. Id.
The Moving Defendants argue that the Fifth Amended Complaint does not meet the
pleading standard of Rule 8 because it has “no information whatsoever as to who negligently or
carelessly did what or the actual product defect(s) at issue.” (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, 6.) The Court construes this as a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6) to the sufficiency of
Plaintiffs’ strict product liability, negligence, and reckless conduct claims. Moving Defendants
also argue that the “collectivized pleading” of allegations violates Rule 8(a) and that claims for
punitive damages are unsupported. The Court will address each issue in turn. The Court will
also address Defendants’ Motion in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement under Rule
A. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Plead a Claim of Strict Product Liability (Count I)
Moving Defendants first argue that the Fifth Amended Complaint fails to allege any
“actual product defect(s)” to support Plaintiffs’ claim under a theory of strict product liability.
(Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, 6.) In Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania recently ruled on what evidence is required to prove a claim of strict
liability. 5 No. 17 MAP 2013, 2014 WL 6474923, at *62-68 (Pa. Nov. 19, 2014) (declining to
adopt the strict liability analysis of the Third Restatement of Torts and reaffirming the
application of Section 402A of the Second Restatement). A claim for strict liability is one that
“sounds in tort, i.e. the cause involves breach of duties ‘imposed by law as a matter of social
policy[.]’” 6 Id. at *63. Strict liability is presumed to be available with respect to any product as
long as the evidence sufficiently proves a defect. Id. at *44. A person or entity that sells a
product has a non-delegable duty to make the product without “a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.” Id. at *46; Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa.
1966). The manufacturer and all suppliers in the chain of distribution are subject to this duty.
Tincher, 2014 WL 6474923, at *45. To establish breach, a plaintiff must prove that a seller
placed a product on the market in a “defective condition.” Id. at *46. And to prove a “defective
condition,” a plaintiff must show either (1) the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the
average or ordinary consumer (“consumer expectations standard”) or (2) a reasonable person
would find that the risk of harm caused by the product outweighs the burden or costs of taking
precautions (“risk-utility standard”). Id. at *49-51, *63.
This Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a claim of strict product liability under
Pennsylvania law. Plaintiffs claim that Colusa QSM “was in the business of renting U-Haul
owned trailers and selling and installing U-Haul branded accessories,” which the Court accepts
as true for purposes of this review. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) Colusa QSM is therefore a “person
Since both parties cite Pennsylvania law in discussing substantive issues, this Court, sitting in diversity, likewise
applies Pennsylvania law and declines to conduct a choice of law analysis.
Though the Tincher court discussed the applicable strict liability standard in the context of a design-related claim,
it noted that its principles may have broader application. 2014 WL 6474923, at *47 n. 21. Accordingly, this Court
applies the standard set forth in Tincher to Plaintiffs’ products liability claim, which alleges design, manufacturing,
and failure-to-warn defects.
or entity that sells a product” with a duty to make and/or market a product without an
unreasonably dangerous defect. See Tincher, 2014 WL 6474923, at *46. Plaintiffs also aver that
“[Colusa QSM] was owned by, managed by and/or an authorized agent of defendants U-Haul
International and/or U-Haul California.” (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶5.) It may be reasonably inferred
that U-Haul International and U-Haul California are, like Colusa QSM, part of the distribution
chain of the allegedly defective power adapter and trailer. They too would be subject to the same
duty to make and market products without dangerous defects. See Tincher, 2014 WL 6474923,
at *64 (“[A]ll sellers in the distributive chain are legally responsible for the product in strict
liability.”); Reese v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that
plaintiffs need not show which entity in the distribution chain created the defective condition to
prevail in a strict liability claim).
The Fifth Amended Complaint also contains sufficient allegations of breach. About the
power adapter, Plaintiffs described a defective condition causing “inoperable or improperly
operating trailer lights.” (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) About the U-Haul trailer, Plaintiffs described
defective conditions in the “braking system, stability, reflectorization and lighting system.”
(Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) The Amended Complaint goes on to list specific “defects,” which the
Moving Defendants characterize as “bald allegations.” (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, 6.) The Court agrees that many of the averments are conclusory, but after striking those
statements, the Court finds just enough factual allegations to infer that a defective condition
existed. For example, Plaintiffs claim that the trailer had “brake lines and a master cylinder that
would permit operation without brake fluid or the proper amount of brake fluid,” the trailer’s
“lighting system was not properly operating,” and the trailer did not have “proper
reflectorization.” (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) Based on these allegations, it may be reasonably
inferred that, under the consumer expectations standard, the adapter and trailer contained defects
unknowable and unacceptable to an average consumer who would expect to use U-Haul products
with adequate safety features. It may also be inferred that, under the risk-utility standard, the
dangers of jackknifing and reduced trailer visibility outweigh the burden of protecting against
them. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint pleads a facially
plausible claim for relief under strict liability.
B. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead a Claim of Negligence (Count II)
The Moving Defendants also take issue with the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ negligence
claim. The Fifth Amended Complaint does not specifically allege which negligence theory or
theories Plaintiffs are pursuing. Based on their averments, Plaintiffs appear to bring their claim
under theories of negligent failure to test, negligent failure-to-warn, and negligent design and
manufacture. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action
for negligent failure to test, so the Court will only consider Plaintiffs’ negligence claim under
failure-to-warn and design/manufacture theories. See Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837
A.2d 534, 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he claim for ‘negligent failure to test’ is not a viable
cause of action recognized by our courts[.]”), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1262 (Pa. 2005).
To state a claim for negligence under a failure-to-warn, design, or manufacture theory, a
plaintiff must show that (1) the manufacturer owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the manufacturer
breached that duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Maldonado
v. Walmart Store No. 2141, Civil Action No. 08-3458, 2011 WL 1790840, at *16 (E.D.Pa. May
10, 2011) (citing Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845,
849-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)); see Salvio v. Amgen, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (W.D.Pa.
2011) (applying the same standard to claims of negligence under failure-to-warn, design, and
manufacture theories). A claim of negligent design “turns on whether an alternative, feasible,
safer design would have lessened or eliminated the injury plaintiff suffered.” Berrier v.
Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 64 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike
strict liability, negligence requires proof that the manufacturer was at fault. Maldonado, 2011
WL 1790840, at *16.
In stating a claim for negligent failure-to-warn, Plaintiffs include only one relevant
This accident was caused by the negligence, carelessness, negligence per se and
recklessness of U-Haul, both generally and in the following particular respects . . .
failing to properly display necessary warnings and instructions for the safe use of
the U-Haul trailer and 7 round to 4 flat adapter, which caused or contributed to the
jack-knife [sic] event and the reduced visibility of the trailer[.]
(Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs neither describe the alleged warning failure nor plead facts to
substantiate a causal connection between inadequate warnings and Plaintiffs’ injury. The Court
cannot give credence to such a conclusory, naked assertion. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
for negligent failure-to-warn.
In stating a claim for negligent design/manufacture, Plaintiffs list a number of acts, which
they present as breaches under a negligence standard. These include “designing the U-Haul
trailer in a manner that would lead to its operation without brake fluid or the proper amount of
brake fluid,” “designing the U-Haul trailer in a manner that permitted brake lines to become
detached during normal operation,” and “designing the U-Haul trailer with a defective lighting
system that prevented the lights from properly operating.” (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) These
allegations are identical to those made under Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim. As discussed, after
striking conclusory material, the Court is left with allegations that a defective condition existed,
which is sufficient to state a claim of strict liability. However, Plaintiffs provide no factual
allegations as to Moving Defendants’ fault, which is required in negligence actions. C.f.
Tincher, 2014 WL 6474923, at *64 (“Essentially, strict liability is a theory that effectuates a
further shift of the risk of harm onto the supplier than . . . negligence[.]”). Regardless, what is
ultimately fatal to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is their failure to identify anywhere in the Fifth
Amended Complaint a safer, feasible alternative design that would have lessened or eliminated
Plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for negligent design/manufacture.
C. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead a Claim of Reckless Conduct (Count III)
Moving Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs’ pleading of reckless conduct. For claims of
reckless conduct, Pennsylvania courts cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines
“reckless disregard” as follows:
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary
to make his conduct negligent.
Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., Inc., 47 A.3d 1190, 1200-01 (Pa. 2012) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)). “In other words, to establish a reckless state of mind, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant knew or had reason to know that (1) his conduct created an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and (2) that the risk created by his conduct was
substantially greater than the risk necessary to establish negligence.” Tayar v. Cambelback Ski
Corp., Inc., 957 A.2d 281, 290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 47 A.3d 1190
In alleging their claim of reckless conduct, Plaintiffs make general statements that
Moving Defendants knew or should have known that they were selling or renting defective
products and that they disregarded the known risks of jackknifing, reduced visibility, and
accidents associated with such actions. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-49.) Plaintiffs offer no facts to
support how or why Moving Defendants would have this knowledge. Neither do Plaintiffs
allege any facts to show that the risk created by Moving Defendants’ conduct was substantially
greater than that necessary to establish negligence. They argue that the adapter and trailer were
in defective and dangerous conditions “which could lead to accidents resulting in serious injuries
or death,” but without more, this argument is a mere conclusion. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 45.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for reckless conduct.
D. Plaintiffs Provide Fair Notice to Each Moving Defendant
Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiffs impermissibly used “collectivized pleading” by
making “generic and conclusory statements that ‘all defendants’ acted negligently, were reckless
or distributed a defective product.” (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, 8, Doc. 7.)
Moving Defendants contend that because they are “three (3) separate and distinct business
entities,” Plaintiffs must give “fair notice” of their claims as to each defendant and cannot resort
to collective allegations. (Id.) As support, Moving Defendants cite Garland v. US Airways, Inc.,
which dismissed claims against individual defendants when the complaint merely referred to the
defendants in the captions of each count or made generic and conclusory statements that these
defendants acted unlawfully. Civil Action No. 05-140, 2007 WL 921980, at *11 (W.D.Pa. Mar.
14, 2007). Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and reckless
conduct, it will consider Moving Defendants’ argument as it applies to the strict liability claim.
The Court finds that the Fifth Amended Complaint gives fair notice of Plaintiffs’ strict
liability claim to each of the Moving Defendants. Under strict liability, any supplier of a product
is subject to a duty to make and sell products free of defective conditions unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer. Tincher, 2014 WL 6474923, at *45, *64. Unlike the plaintiff in
Garland, Plaintiffs here provide more than generic and conclusory statements about the
defendant’s liability. The Fifth Amended Complaint states that, on or about February 28, 2012,
Plaintiff Gary Williams purchased the allegedly defective adapter from the U-Haul store in Yuba
City, CA. (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) He then rented the allegedly defective trailer from Colusa
QSM. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs further allege that Colusa QSM was an agent for U-Haul
International and/or U-Haul California. (Id. ¶ 5.) By identifying all three Moving Defendants as
suppliers in the distribution chain of either the adapter or the trailer, Plaintiffs provide fair notice
of their strict liability claim against them. See also Thomas v. Luzerne Cnty. Correctional
Facility, 310 F. Supp. 2d 718, 721 (M.D.Pa. 2004) (“Where the essence of the complaint against
multiple defendants is a scheme, plan or course of conduct, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) does not require
that each claim against each defendant be stated separately merely because all of the defendants
may not be involved in each transaction or occurrence.”).
E. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead a Claim for Punitive Damages
Moving Defendants seek dismissal of all Plaintiffs’ claims of punitive damages, which
appear in the ad damnum clause of each count of the Fifth Amended Complaint. In
Pennsylvania, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of
the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Hutchison ex rel.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005). In determining whether punitive damages
are proper, “the state of mind of the actor is vital.” Id. at 770 (quoting Martin v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1097 n. 12 (Pa. 1985)). A punitive damages claim must be supported by
evidence showing that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which
the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted or failed to act in conscious disregard of that risk.
Id. at 772. Moreover, a remedy of punitive damages is an “extreme” one available only in the
most exceptional cases. Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005).
For the same reasons that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of reckless conduct, they also fail
to state a claim for punitive damages. As discussed, Plaintiffs only make conclusory allegations
as to whether Moving Defendants knew or should have known that their conduct created an
unreasonable danger to Plaintiffs. The allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint do not
demonstrate that Moving Defendants had a subjective appreciation of harmful risk or that they
consciously disregarded that risk. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for punitive damages and
such exemplary damages are foreclosed.
F. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint is Not so Vague and Ambiguous that a More
Definite Statement is Warranted
Finally, Moving Defendants move in the alternative for a more definite statement
pursuant to Rule 12(e). Courts have ordered a more definite statement when the complaint does
not include enough basic facts for a defendant to prepare a response. See, e.g., Henderson v.
Edens Corp., Civil Action No. 09-1308, 2014 WL 7008449, at *1-2 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 11, 2014)
(ordering an amended complaint when the original complaint did not describe what happened to
the plaintiff, who was involved, or which rights were violated); Everly v. Allegheny Cnty. Exec.
Dir., 456 F. App’x 82, 83 (3d Cir. 2012) (agreeing with district court’s order for a more definite
statement when the plaintiff’s complaint “lacked essential information and was extremely
difficult to follow”); Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011)
(affirming dismissal when the complaint was “excessively voluminous and unfocused as to be
unintelligible . . . and it left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed
constituted deliberate indifference on their part[.]”). However, “Rule 12(e) motions are
‘generally disfavored’ and are meant ‘to provide a remedy for an unintelligible pleading rather
than as a correction for a lack of detail.’” Henderson, 2014 WL 7008449, at *1(quoting Frazier
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 868 F. Supp. 757, 763 (E.D.Pa. 1994)). “Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation
The Fifth Amended Complaint is not so deficient that this Court will order a more
definite statement. Plaintiffs set forth sufficient facts for Moving Defendants to know that their
claims rest on events that allegedly took place on or about February 28, 2012 and March 2, 2012.
The Fifth Amended Complaint also enumerates the legal claims asserted in Section III titled
“Causes of Action.” (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-54, 59-67.) Though Moving Defendants may
desire greater detail, the Fifth Amended Complaint is sufficiently specific to satisfy Rule 8 and
the Court will not require more.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, a Motion for More Definite Statement. An appropriate
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