MINA v. HOGAN et al
Filing
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDWARD G. SMITH ON 2/10/15. 2/10/15 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED.(er, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY STOCKER MINA,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-MC-222
v.
DAWSON R. MUTH, GOLDBERG,
MEANIX, MUTH & MCCALLIN LAW
FIRM, JUDGE HOWARD RILEY, and
COURT REPORT HANDY,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
February 10, 2015
Smith, J.
This matter has come before the court on an application to proceed in forma pauperis
("IFP") and a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
the pro se plaintiff.
In the motion for relief, the plaintiff is essentially seeking relief from an
order and judgment entered in a state-court civil action. Although it appears that the plaintiff is
entitled to proceed IFP, his attempt to use Rule 60(b) to overturn a state-court civil order and
judgment is wholly improper and, as such, the court grants the application to proceed IFP but
denies the motion for relief.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action represents one of multiple actions filed by the pro se plaintiff, Anthony
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Stocker Mina, in September 2014. On September 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed an application in
this case to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for relief from judgment. See Doc. No. 1.
In the motion for relief, the plaintiff seeks relief from (1) a September 23, 2011 order entered by
the Honorable Howard Riley of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, and (2) a
1
His other actions are docketed at Civil Action Nos. 14-mc-221, 14-mc-254, and 14-mc-259.
November 15, 2011 praecipe for judgment of non pros.
& Ex. A.
2
See Motion for Relief from J. at�� 3, 4
It appears that the order and the praecipe generally relate to the plaintiff apparently
failing to file certificates of merit in an underlying state-court action, Mina v. Muth, No. 10-3366
(C.P. Chester), as required by Rule 1042 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at
Ex. A.
II.
DISCUSSION
As the plaintiff has sought to proceed IFP, the court will address the application to
proceed IFP before addressing the merits of the motion for relief.
A.
The IFP Motion
Regarding applications to proceed informa pauperis, the court notes that
any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an
affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the
person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). When addressing applications to proceed informa pauperis under section
1915, district courts undertake a two-step analysis: "First, the district court evaluates a litigant's
financial status and determines whether [he or she] is eligible to proceed informa pauperis under
§ 1915(a). Second, the court assesses the [action] under§ 1915[(e)(2)] to determine whether it is
frivolous." Roman v. Jejfes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Sinwell v. Shapp, 536
3
F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1976) (alterations added)).
2 Despite the explicit reference to these orders serving as the focus of the request for relief, the plaintiff references
and attaches documents relating to multiple other actions in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. See,
e.g., Mot. for Relief at iii! 6, 10 & Exs. B-D. Additionally, despite the reference to the order and judgment
complained of, the plaintiff uses a significant number of paragraphs in his motion to discuss occurrences in these
other cases. See, e.g., id at iii! 10-35.
3 The Roman court referenced the former version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which stated that "[t]he court may request
an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of
poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § l 915(d) (1990) (redesignated
as Section l 9 l 5(e) by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-135, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)). The portion of
2
Concerning the litigant's financial status, the litigant must establish that he or she is
unable to pay the costs of suit.
Cir. 1989).
Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d
Generally, where a plaintiff files an affidavit of poverty, the district court should
accord the plaintiff a preliminary right to proceed in forma pauperis.
F.2d 1203, 1203 (3d Cir. 1969) (citing Lockhart
v.
Lawson v. Prasse, 411
D'Urso, 408 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1969)).
Here, after reviewing the IFP Motion, it appears that the plaintiff is unable to pay the
costs of suit. Therefore, the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
B.
Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Because the court has granted the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court
must engage in the second part of the two-part analysis and examine whether this action is
frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (providing that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that
may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- ...
(B) the action or appeal-- (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted").
An action is frivolous under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it "lacks an
arguable basis either in law or fact,"
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and is
legally baseless if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory."
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995).
Deutsch v.
United
In addressing whether a pro se plaintiffs action is
frivolous, the court must liberally construe the allegations in the operative document. See Higgs
v.
Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing review of complaint).
Section 1915(d) which allowed the district court to dismiss frivolous
at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
See 28 U.S.C.
4
informa pauperis complaints is now codified
pauperis
§ l 9 l 5(e)(2)(B)(i) (stating frivolous nature of informa
complaint is ground for dismissal).
4
Regarding the analysis under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the standard for dismissing an action for failure to state a
claim pursuant to this subsection is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
See
1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure
to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Thus, to survive dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual
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As indicated above, the plaintiff seeks relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides as follows:
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively
is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies reliefl,]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Although Rule 60(b) provides the aforementioned grounds for relief from a final
judgment or order, this rule is inapplicable to state-court proceedings. See, e.g., Graham v. South
Carolina, CA.,
No. 6:11-595, 2012 WL 527606, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2012) ("Petitioner
misunderstands the import of Rule 60(b), which provides that a federal district court may provide
relief from its own civil judgments. Rule 60(b) does not authorize a federal district court to
review a state criminal conviction and judgment, as is the case here."). In particular, any such
attempt would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See, e.g., Reardon v. Leason,
408 F.
App'x 551, 553 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[B]ecause [the plaintiff] is effectively asking the District Court
to void a state court conviction, he is barred from doing so under the Rooker-Feldman
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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doctrine." (citing Great W Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d
Cir. 2010)); Burnett v. Amrein, 243 F. App'x 393, 395 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding district court
correctly denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate state-court civil judgment insofar as "Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b) does not authorize a federal court to relieve the [plaintiffs] of a judgment entered in state
court . ..because any such action would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
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Accordingly, because Rule 60(b) does not provide a vehicle
for the type of relief that the plaintiff seeks, i.e. the overturning or vacation of a state-court order
and judgment, this action is frivolous and, as such, the court denies the motion and dismisses this
action with prejudice.
III.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has established that, for purposes of this action, he is entitled to proceed IF P.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff may not use Rule 60(b) to attempt to overturn or vacate the order and
judgment entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Chester County. Accordingly, the court
denies the motion seeking relief under Rule 60(b) and dismisses this action with prejudice.
An appropriate order follows.
EDWARD G. SMITH, J.
5 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "established the principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that
Great W Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 165.
are essentially appeals from state-court judgments."
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