BOSEMAN v. UPPER PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM SIGNED BY HONORABLE RONALD L. BUCKWALTER ON 1/26/16. 1/28/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED. (va, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RACHAEL BOSEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
UPPER PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP and
OFFICER PATRICK REYNOLDS,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 15-2332

MEMORANDUM
BUCKWALTER, S. J.

January 26, 2016

Currently pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss and to Strike by Defendants
Upper Providence Township and Patrick Reynolds (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). For the following reasons, the Motion to
Dismiss is granted in its entirety and the Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rachael Boseman (“Plaintiff”) is a resident of Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 2.)

Defendant Upper Providence Township is a municipality in Delaware County, Pennsylvania that
owns, operates, manages, directs, and controls the Upper Providence Police Department, which
employs Defendant Patrick Reynolds as a police officer. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff is suing Defendant
Patrick Reynolds in his individual capacity. (Id. ¶ 4.)
At the time of the incident described in the Complaint, Plaintiff was twenty-nine years
old, worked as a financial consultant, and did not have a criminal record. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) On April
11, 2014, Plaintiff left her place of employment in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, shortly before

9:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 6.) After leaving her office, Plaintiff stopped at a Sunoco gas station across the
street and conducted a transaction at 9:03 p.m. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff traveled approximately twelve
miles north on Route 1, and at approximately 9:25 p.m., Defendant Reynolds initiated a traffic
stop of Plaintiff in Upper Providence Township. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that even though she
did not drink any alcohol that day and was not intoxicated as defined by 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802,
Defendant Reynolds arrested her and charged her with driving under the influence in violation of
75 Pa. C.S. § 3802. (Id. ¶ 9.)
According to the Complaint, Defendant Reynolds prepared police paperwork to support
the unlawful arrest by fabricating the actual facts of the encounter. (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendant
Reynolds prepared police reports which stated that he “detected a strong odor of alcohol
emanating from within the vehicle” and that Plaintiff had “glassy and blood-shot” eyes, as well
as a “red face, blank stare and slurred speech.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Reynolds also stated that
Plaintiff failed the field sobriety tests and refused to take a blood test. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff denies
all the facts in the police reports, but admits that she may have had a red face because she has a
skin condition that gives her “a rosy complexion,” especially when she is in a stressful situation.
(Id. ¶ 13 & n.1.)
After her arrest, Plaintiff was transported to the Upper Providence Police Department.
(Id. ¶ 14.) Once there, Defendant Reynolds gave Plaintiff a document, known as “the O’Connell
Warnings,” which described Plaintiff’s limited rights regarding the request for a blood test. (Id.)
Before Plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to review the O’Connell Warnings, Defendant
Reynolds took the document and declared that Plaintiff refused to take a blood test. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff then agreed to go to the hospital for a blood test, even though she was not permitted to
read the O’Connell Warnings, but Defendant Reynolds refused and then “fabricated police

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paperwork to state that Plaintiff had refused” the blood test. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) At Plaintiff’s
subsequent trial, Defendant Reynolds testified that he attempted to read the O’Connell Warnings
to Plaintiff in the police car, a fact which Plaintiff denies. (Id. ¶ 18.) Based on Defendant
Reynolds’s allegations, which Plaintiff asserts are false, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further denies any and all allegations
which form the basis of probable cause to arrest her and pursue criminal charges against her,
including all allegations in the police reports prepared by Defendant Reynolds and about which
he testified at Plaintiff’s trial. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Reynolds provided false information and/or reports to the
Delaware County District Attorney’s Office regarding Plaintiff’s conduct on the night of her
arrest. (Id. ¶ 21.) Defendant Reynolds was the sole source of information upon which the
District Attorney relied to make the charging decision. (Id. ¶ 22.) The District Attorney’s Office
elected to prosecute Plaintiff based on the information Defendant Reynolds provided, and he was
the only inculpatory witness against Plaintiff at her criminal trial. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff’s bail was set at $5,000/unsecured. (Id. ¶ 24.) Due to the arrest and conditions
of bail, Plaintiff’s ability to travel was restricted and she was required to appear in court on
multiple occasions, including but not limited to August 12, 2014; January 5, 2015; February 2,
2015; February 3, 2015; February 4, 2015; and February 10, 2015. (Id. ¶ 25.) On or about
February 3, 2014, Plaintiff formally rejected an offer for “ARD” and proceeded through a
criminal trial. (Id. ¶ 36.) On or about February 10, 2014, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the
charges against her. (Id. ¶ 37.) According to the Complaint, “PennDOT has already filed
paperwork attempting to suspend Boseman’s diving [sic] privileges for one year due to her
alleged refusal to take a blood test.” (Id. ¶ 38.)

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reynolds “has a history of making boilerplate allegations
against DUI suspects.” (Id. ¶ 26.) The Complaint lists twenty-one examples of other DUI
arrests by Defendant Reynolds between November 22, 2006 and May 3, 2011 where the arrestee
was described as having some combination of a strong odor of alcohol on breath and person,
glassy eyes, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a “flush face,” staggered gait, and using their vehicle
to keep their balance. 1 (Id. ¶¶ 26a–v.) The Complaint asserts that one individual was arrested
based on an odor of alcohol on breath and person, glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,
staggered gait, and reliance on the vehicle for balance, “even though he had dilated pupils that
indicated drug use.” (Id. ¶ 26i.) The Complaint also notes that another individual, “despite
being Hispanic, apparently had a flush face,” and that two other individuals arrested for DUI
were described as having flushed faces, in spite of being African-American and even though they
were arrested in the early morning hours. (Id. ¶¶ 26o, 26t, 30.) Plaintiff asserts that “[a]lmost all
of the boilerplate police reports prepared by Defendant Reynolds contain nearly identical
descriptions of each DUI suspect; to wit: a [strong] odor of alcohol; glassy, bloodshot eyes, flush
face; and slurred speech” and that “the observations are similar without regard to the actual
blood-alcohol contents of each driver.” (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.) Plaintiff notes that on more than one
occasion, Defendant Reynolds referred to suspects as having “blood-shoot” eyes, rather than
“bloodshot eyes.” (Id. ¶ 29.) According to the Complaint, “instead of generating new police
reports with each arrest and including his individualized observations of each suspect, Defendant
Reynolds was simply copying and pasting information from prior reports and thereby fabricating
observations of those he arrested, including Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Two of the twenty-one
individuals described in the Complaint later filed complaints against Defendant Reynolds and/or
1

Though Plaintiff included the full names of each of those individuals in the Complaint,
the Court has omitted them from the recitation of facts.
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filed civil lawsuits against Defendant Reynolds and/or the Upper Providence Police Department.
(Id. ¶¶ 26u, 26v.)
Fabrication of evidence is contrary to the written policies and procedures of the Upper
Providence Township Police Department. (Id. ¶ 32.) According to the Complaint, the “rote
recitation of the exact same symptoms, grammatical errors, and impossible allegations are
indicative of lack of training, but more directly [are] evidence [of] a lack of supervision at the
Upper Providence Police Department.” (Id. ¶ 33.) “Thus, decision makers from the Upper
Providence Police Department were aware of previous allegations against Defendant Reynolds;
despite this knowledge, no steps were taken to correct this illegal conduct, thereby creating a
culture within the department which encouraged, if not sanctioned, these types of illegal arrests.”
(Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff asserts that “[i]n the alternative, if no supervisors were somehow aware that
Defendant Reynolds was fabricating evidence, then a culture and custom existed at the Upper
Providence Police Department whereby officers could fabricate evidence and violated
individual’s constitutional rights.” (Id. ¶ 35.)
Plaintiff initiated the present litigation by filing a Complaint on April 28, 2015.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to Strike certain allegations on June 10,
2015. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2015. The
Motion to Dismiss and to Strike is now ripe for judicial consideration.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has

not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

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the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. Following
these basic dictates, the Supreme Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), subsequently
defined a two-pronged approach to a court’s review of a motion to dismiss. “First, the tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Thus, although “Rule 8 marks a notable and
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at
678–79.
Second, the Supreme Court emphasized that “only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
A complaint does not show an entitlement to relief when the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id.; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232–34 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that: (1) factual allegations of
complaint must provide notice to defendant; (2) complaint must allege facts suggestive of the
proscribed conduct; and (3) the complaint’s “‘factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). “A complaint that
pleads facts ‘merely consistent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 143792, 2016 WL 106159, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation

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and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Notwithstanding these new dictates, the basic tenets of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of
review have remained static. Spence v. Brownsville Area Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.08-626, 2008
WL 2779079, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2008). The general rules of pleading still require only a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and need not
contain detailed factual allegations. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233. Further, the court must “accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the
court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may
be entitled to relief.” Pinkerton v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Having considered the Complaint and the parties’ briefs, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Reynolds and against Defendant Upper
Providence Township fail as a matter of law and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The
Court also grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) with respect to Paragraphs
Twenty-Six through Thirty-One. The Motion to Strike is denied with respect to Paragraph
Thirty-Two.
A. Count One: Violation of Civil Rights
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reynolds violated “her constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, including
her right to a fair trial and due process of law, as well as the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to be free from” the following: (1) loss of physical liberty; (2) loss of property;

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and (3) malicious prosecution. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff asserts her claims in Count One pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶ 41.)
“Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 290 (3d
Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that ‘some person has deprived him of a federal right . . . [and] that the person who
has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.’” Id. (quoting Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
Based on Paragraph Forty of the Complaint, Plaintiff apparently desires to incorporate
claims based on violations of Pennsylvania state law into her § 1983 claim. As stated above, §
1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal laws by state actors, and therefore Plaintiff may
not seek relief pursuant to her § 1983 claims on the basis of state laws. Accordingly, the Court
addresses Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count One with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
pursuant to her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and analyzes her claims for loss of
physical liberty, loss of property, and malicious prosecution in accordance with federal law,
rather than Pennsylvania law.
1. Right to Fair Trial
Plaintiff alleges that she was denied her right to a fair trial and suffered violations of her
procedural due process rights. Defendant Reynolds argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that he lied
in his paperwork to accomplish her arrest and prosecution “does not provide any facts that
suggest that she was denied a right to a fair trial or that she was arrested without probable cause
[and] [t]herefore there is no viable claim for a due process violation or a violation of the right to
a fair trial.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 20.)

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Plaintiff’s fair trial claim must fail as pled. First, Plaintiff was actually acquitted at her
criminal trial. Second, Plaintiff does not support the conclusory allegation that she was denied a
fair trial with facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Connelly, 2016 WL
106159 at *4 (noting that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a
court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint . . . should identify allegations that, ‘because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’”) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to support her claim that she was denied a fair
trial, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that aspect of Count One is granted.
2. Due Process
With respect to Plaintiff’s due process claim, Defendants point out that Plaintiff does not
indicate in the Complaint whether she is claiming a violation of her substantive due process
rights or her procedural due process rights. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 18.) Plaintiff,
however, clarifies that she “is not raising a substantive due process claim.” (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n
Mot. Dismiss 16.) Accordingly, the Court will address Plaintiff’s due process claim using the
appropriate standards and case law for procedural due process.
“‘To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures
available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, Pa.,
706 F.3d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233–34
(3d Cir. 2006)).

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Plaintiff asserts that her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is based on Defendant
Reynolds’ fabrication of evidence, 2 and relies on the Third Circuit’s decision in Halsey v.
Pfeiffer in support of her argument that she may bring a stand-alone due process claim on that
basis. (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 26 (citing Halsey, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014)).)
Defendants argue that Halsey does not apply to Plaintiff’s case, both because she was not
convicted at her state criminal trial and because the Third Circuit particularly noted the
distinction between disputed testimony and fabricated testimony. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss 19–20.)
In Halsey, the Third Circuit held “that if a defendant has been convicted at a trial at which
the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under section
1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use
of that evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294
(emphasis added). The Third Circuit noted that, “[i]n reaching our result, we hasten to add that
courts in this Circuit should not permit a criminal defendant who later brings a civil action
against state actors who had been involved in his prosecution to use this opinion beyond the
scope of our holding.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295. The Third Circuit further noted that “testimony
that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out
to have been wrong.” Id. Thus, “Halsey stands for the principle that a procedural due process
claim exists if there is a reasonable likelihood that fabricated evidence led to an individual’s
2

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Reynolds prepared arrest paperwork containing
fabrications of probable cause, allegations which are distinct from an allegation that trial
evidence was fabricated. See Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2014)
(finding that the plaintiff had not adequately stated a substantive due process claim where, “even
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], . . . [he] has not alleged that the police
fabricated evidence of his guilt. Rather, his claim asserts only that the police fabricated evidence
to establish probable cause for his arrest.”) Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that
Defendant Reynolds fabricated evidence, however, for the reasons discussed below, Halsey does
not apply to Plaintiff’s claims.
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conviction.” Black v. Montgomery Cty., No. Civ.A.14-6702, 2015 WL 5568388, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 2015). Stated differently, “[a] defendant convicted at trial where the prosecution has
used fabricated evidence has a claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment, if
there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant would not
have been convicted.” Andrews v. Scuilli, No. Civ.A.13-1657, 2015 WL 5732101, at *8 (W.D.
Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (emphasis in original) (citing Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294).
Several courts within the Third Circuit have found that Halsey does not permit a § 1983
plaintiff who was not convicted to assert a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim on the
basis of allegations of fabricated evidence. See, e.g., Black, 2015 WL 5568388, at *4 (granting
motion to dismiss and stating that “[i]t is evident from Halsey that [the plaintiff] cannot succeed
on her Fourteenth Amendment fabricated evidence claims because she was not convicted at trial.
There is no need to wait until summary judgment to reach this conclusion—the fabricated
evidence could not have affected the outcome of Black’s criminal case because she was found
not guilty.”); Andrews, 2015 WL 5732101, at *8 (finding that “this particular cause of action
requires the criminal defendant to have been convicted at trial—the Third Circuit uses the term
twice in its holding. Additionally, the Third Circuit explicitly cautioned against extending the
holding beyond its intended scope . . . Thus, this Court declines to extend the Third Circuit’s
holding in Halsey to a situation where a criminal defendant was acquitted on all charges, as
Plaintiff was here.”). In accordance with the above interpretations of Halsey, the Court finds that
Halsey’s holding allowing for a stand-alone due process claim in certain circumstances does not
apply to Plaintiff’s case because she was not convicted at her state criminal trial.
Moreover, in setting forth her procedural due process claim, Plaintiff has not alleged
what form of process she was due, but which she was denied. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

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(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”); see also Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 174 (3d Cir.
2014) (affirming grant of judgment on the pleadings and observing that “[a]lthough procedural
due process may be a proper basis for a § 1983 claim, [plaintiff’s] brief merely recites the
elements of a procedural due process claim without explaining what process he was owed and
how that process was denied. Thus, he has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that
Defendant’s conduct deprived him of any constitutionally-protected procedural due process
right.”) (citation omitted). Here, not only has Plaintiff failed to support her procedural due
process claim with sufficient factual allegations, she has not even set forth the basic elements of
such a claim. For that additional reason, her procedural due process claim is insufficient and
must be dismissed.
3. Loss of Physical Liberty
“The Fourth Amendment forbids a state from detaining an individual unless the state
actor reasonably believes that the individual has committed a crime—that is, the Fourth
Amendment forbids a detention without probable cause.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 291 (citing Bailey
v. United States, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013)). “But this protection against
unlawful seizures extends only until trial.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 291 (citing Schneyder v. Smith,
653 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2011) (observing that post-conviction incarceration does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment)). “The guarantee of due process of law, by contrast, is not so
limited as it protects defendants during an entire criminal proceeding through and after trial.”
Halsey, 750 F.3d at 291 (citing Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“The initial seizure is governed by the Fourth Amendment, but at some point after arrest, and

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certainly by the time of trial, constitutional analysis shifts to the Due Process Clause.”) (internal
citation omitted)).
Based on the wording of Count One, it appears that Plaintiff wishes to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim based on a loss of physical liberty that is distinct from that aspect of a federal
malicious prosecution claim. Plaintiff has not supplied any authority to show that she may bring
a stand-alone claim on this basis. In addition, and as discussed more thoroughly below, Plaintiff
cannot establish that she suffered a deprivation of liberty that rises to the level of a Fourth
Amendment seizure, and therefore this claim must fail. See Washington, 552 F. App’x at 174
(finding that the plaintiff’s claim for “deprivation of right to liberty” lacked merit, and that the
court was not aware of any case of any court recognizing such a cause of action, and granting
judgment on the pleadings on that claim to the defendants). For both of these reasons,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this aspect of Count One is granted.
4. Loss of Property
Defendants do not specifically address this claim in their argument for dismissal of Count
One, but because it is identified in Defendants’ proposed order as one of the claims that should
be dismissed against Defendant Reynolds, the Court will discuss its merits. (See Defs.’ Mot.
Dismiss, Proposed Order.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege what property she lost
because of Defendant Reynolds. Likewise, in her Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiff neither addresses the Count One loss of property claim, nor identifies what property she
lost. The only reference to Plaintiff’s property appears in a section about the deprivation of
liberty claim, and concerns the unsecured bail “which she would be forced to pay if she did not
appear at any of her scheduled court dates.” (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 7.) Thus, as
Plaintiff has not alleged what property, if any, Defendant Reynolds caused her to lose,

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to the “Loss of Property” claim in Count
One.
5. Malicious Prosecution
As stated above, Plaintiff asserts a federal malicious prosecution claim against Defendant
Reynolds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the
elements of a federal malicious prosecution claim, as she merely asserts that Defendant
Reynolds’s version of events on the night of her arrest was fabricated, and that her version is the
correct one. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4–8.)
“To prevail on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, a
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the
plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept
of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296–97 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d
331, 349 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff was acquitted of the charges in her criminal court proceeding, and has therefore
established the second element of a malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the Court need
only discuss the first, third, fourth, and fifth elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim in addressing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
a. Initiation of Criminal Proceeding
“‘In most circumstances, a plaintiff cannot proceed against a police officer for a claim of
malicious prosecution because a prosecutor, not a police officer, ‘initiates’ criminal proceedings
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against an individual.’” Stango v. Rodden, No. Civ.A.00-5709, 2001 WL 1175131, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 21, 2001) (citing Harris v. City of Phila., No. Civ.A.97-3666, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12640, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1998) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)); accord Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir.
1996))). “‘However, a police officer may be held to have ‘initiated’ a criminal proceeding if he
knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the
prosecutor’s informed discretion, [because] . . . [i]n such cases, an intelligent exercise of the . . .
[prosecutor’s] discretion becomes impossible, and a prosecution based on the false information is
deemed procured by the person giving the false information.’” Id. (citations omitted).
Defendant Reynolds argues that Plaintiff’s assertions that he fabricated information in the
police report are inadequate to support a claim that Defendant Reynolds (1) initiated the criminal
proceeding without probable cause; (2) failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors;
(3) made false or misleading reports to the prosecutor; (4) omitted material information from the
reports; or (5) otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s ability to exercise independent
judgment in deciding whether to prosecute. 3 (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 7 (citing Telepo
v. Palmer Twp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 596, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).) Plaintiff responds that the Complaint
properly pleads a malicious prosecution case against Defendant Reynolds because it “alleges that
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Defendant Reynolds also asserts that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim must be
dismissed because on August 14, 2014, she, while personally present and represented by counsel,
waived her Preliminary Hearing, and that only then did the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania file
the criminal information. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4 (citing Ex. B, Criminal Docket for
Rachael D. Boseman).) Defendant Reynolds argues that, because “no testimony was taken at the
Preliminary Hearing, and Plaintiff did not challenge that there was a prima facie case of probable
cause sufficient for the case to move forward for trial, and indeed conceded such, no claim for
malicious prosecution may proceed against the arresting Officer.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss 5.) In support of that argument, Defendant relies on case law from outside this circuit,
as well as a case from the Middle District of Pennsylvania which considered a claim based on
slightly different facts. (See id.) Because Plaintiff’s federal law malicious prosecution claim is
being dismissed on other grounds, the Court need not address this argument.
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[he] provided false information to the prosecutor and withheld exculpatory information regarding
Plaintiff’s sobriety.” (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 9.)
Plaintiff asserts that (1) Defendant Reynolds provided false information and/or reports to
the Delaware County District Attorney’s Office regarding Plaintiff’s conduct on the night of her
arrest; (2) Defendant Reynolds was the sole source of information upon which the District
Attorney relied to make the charging decision; and (3) the district attorney’s office elected to
prosecute Plaintiff based on the information Defendant Reynolds provided, and he was the only
inculpatory witness against Plaintiff at her criminal trial. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–23.) These allegations
are conclusory. First, Plaintiff does not identify what information or which reports are alleged to
be false or fabricated, aside from her general assertion that Defendant Reynolds fabricated
probable cause for her arrest and lied about Plaintiff refusing to take a blood test following her
arrest. 4 Second, Plaintiff does not point to any factual averments for her contention that the only
source of information the prosecutor relied on in the charging decision was Defendant Reynolds.
Third, the fact that Defendant Reynolds was the only inculpatory witness who testified at
Plaintiff’s trial does not mean that he was actually the only person who provided information that
led to the decision to prosecute Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues in her Response that Defendant
Reynolds withheld exculpatory information, but she does not identify what, if any, exculpatory
information was withheld. Plaintiff’s bare bones allegations are therefore insufficient to
establish that Defendant Reynolds initiated the criminal proceeding against her for purposes of
the first element of a malicious prosecution claim.

4

As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that
Defendant Reynolds lacked probable cause to arrest her are insufficient to support her claim of
malicious prosecution.
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b. Probable Cause
“Probable cause exists when ‘the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s
knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense
has been or is being committed.’” Stetser v. Jinks, 572 F. App’x 85, 87 (quoting United States v.
Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9
(1979))). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn
from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). Where an officer
has established probable cause, he is “not required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in
order to validate the probable cause that, in his mind, already existed.” Merkle v. Upper Dublin
Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 790 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also Davis v. Malitzki, 451 F.
App’x 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[E]vidence that might exonerate a defendant does not defeat
probable cause.”). “While ‘the probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification,’ all interpretations of probable cause require a belief of guilt that is reasonable, as
opposed to certain.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 299 (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595,
602 (3d Cir. 2005) (additional internal citations and quotations omitted)). Stated differently,
“‘[t]he evidentiary standard for probable cause is significantly lower than the standard which is
required for conviction.’” Id. (quoting Wright, 409 F.3d at 602). “It is therefore irrelevant in a
probable cause inquiry ‘whether a person is later acquitted of the crime for which she or he was
arrested.’” Id. (quoting Wright, 409 F.3d at 602).
According to the Complaint, the police report stated the following: (1) prior to arresting
Plaintiff, Defendant Reynolds detected an odor of alcohol coming from within Plaintiff’s car; (2)
Plaintiff had glassy and blood-shot eyes, a red face, blank stare, and slurred speech; and (3)
17

Plaintiff failed the field sobriety test. (Compl. ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff admits that she may have had
a red face, but attributes it to a skin condition, and denies all other facts in the police report. (Id.
¶ 13 & n.1.) Plaintiff’s denial of the facts supporting Defendant Reynolds’s description of
probable cause to arrest her, as well as disputing his version of the facts surrounding the blood
test warnings and whether Plaintiff refused a blood test, is not equivalent to an assertion of facts,
which, if true, show that probable cause was lacking. It cannot be the case that a plaintiff’s bald
assertion denying the existence of probable cause, without more, is the only allegation required
to negate probable cause for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. The fact that Plaintiff
offers an alternative reason for possibly having had a red face when Defendant Reynolds effected
a traffic stop is also not enough to negate Defendant Reynolds’s reliance on that factor as part of
his probable cause calculus. Plaintiff does not indicate whether she informed Defendant
Reynolds of her skin condition at the time she was pulled over. Even if she had, as noted above,
once an officer has established probable cause, he is “not required to undertake an exhaustive
investigation in order to validate the probable cause that, in his mind, already existed.” Merkle,
211 F.3d at 790 (citation omitted); see also Davis, 451 F. App’x at 233 (“[E]vidence that might
exonerate a defendant does not defeat probable cause.”). Rather, for probable cause “the proper
inquiry is whether ‘the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge’ were
sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the offense was committed.” Livingston v.
Allegheny Cty., 400 F. App’x 659, 665 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Merkle, 211 F.3d at 788). In
Plaintiff’s case, that would include Defendant Reynolds’s other observations of Plaintiff’s
appearance, the odor of alcohol from her car, and the failed field sobriety test. Thus, on the basis
of the largely conclusory allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently support
the probable cause element of her malicious prosecution claim.

18

Plaintiff also sets forth the conclusory allegation that Defendant Reynolds “has a history
of making boilerplate allegations against DUI suspects.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) 5 Plaintiff apparently
bases this assertion on the twenty-one examples of other DUI arrests by Defendant Reynolds
between November 22, 2006 and May 3, 2011, where the arrestee was described as having some
combination of characteristics, including a strong odor of alcohol on breath and person, glassy
eyes, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a “flush face,” staggered gait, and using their vehicle to
keep their balance. (Id. ¶¶ 26a–v.) Plaintiff further asserts that “[a]lmost all of the boilerplate
police reports prepared by Defendant Reynolds contain nearly identical descriptions of each DUI
suspect; to wit: a [strong] odor of alcohol; glassy, bloodshot eyes, flush face; and slurred speech”
and that “the observations are similar without regard to the actual blood-alcohol contents of each
driver.” (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s conclusions, however, the fact that some of the
descriptors Defendant Reynolds used with respect to Plaintiff were also used with other people
arrested for DUI does not mean that Defendant Reynolds fabricated probable cause in Plaintiff’s
case. It is simply indicative of the fact that there are a finite number of physical attributes or
behaviors that describe someone under the influence of alcohol. That the observations are
similar “without regard to the actual blood-alcohol contents of each driver” does not support
Plaintiff’s assertion that probable cause was fabricated in her case, because individuals
experiencing varying degrees of drunkenness could nonetheless exhibit similar symptoms of
being drunk.
Plaintiff also notes that Defendant Reynolds sometimes refers to suspects as having
“blood-shoot” eyes, rather than “bloodshot eyes.” (Id. ¶ 29.) According to the Complaint,
“instead of generating new police reports with each arrest and including his individualized
5

As discussed more thoroughly below, Paragraph Twenty-Six is being stricken from the
Complaint. The Court nonetheless addresses the allegations therein in the context of Plaintiff’s
probable cause argument.
19

observations of each suspect, Defendant Reynolds was simply copying and pasting information
from prior reports and thereby fabricating observations of those he arrested, including Plaintiff.”
(Id. ¶ 31.) Even if it is true that Defendant Reynolds made spelling errors and/or copied and
pasted phrases from other police reports when preparing a new one, the mere use of word
processing tools or a careless failure to proofread does not support Plaintiff’s assertions that
Defendant Reynolds did not have probable cause to arrest her based on what he observed at the
scene of her traffic stop and arrest.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that one individual described in Paragraph Twenty-Six was
arrested based on an odor of alcohol on breath and person, glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred
speech, staggered gait, and reliance on the vehicle for balance, “even though he had dilated
pupils that indicated drug use.” (Id. ¶ 26i.) The Complaint also notes that another individual,
“despite being Hispanic, apparently had a flush face,” and that two other individuals arrested for
DUI were described as having flushed faces, in spite of being African-American and even
though they were arrested in the early morning hours. (Id. ¶¶ 26o, 26t, 30.) These facts do not
support Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Reynolds fabricated probable cause to arrest her. First,
it is entirely possible that an individual could use alcohol and drugs on the same occasion, thus
displaying symptoms of impairment due to both types of substances. Second, it could be
possible for an African-American or Latino individual, or an individual of any ethnic
background, to have a flushed face, depending on the skin tone of that particular individual.
Third, the fact that someone is arrested during early morning hours when it is still dark out does
not mean that Defendant Reynolds could not have relied on a flashlight, the headlights from his
own vehicle, or the interior lights of the car that had been pulled over in order to observe the
appearance of the driver. Simply put, those facts do not support Plaintiff’s allegations that

20

Defendant Reynolds fabricated probable cause in those cases, or that he fabricated probable
cause in Plaintiff’s case.
In light of the above, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support her claim that Defendant
Reynolds lacked probable cause to arrest her. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to establish the third element of a malicious prosecution claim.
c. Malicious Action or Action for a Purpose Other Than Justice
The parties did not specifically address this element in their arguments. As discussed
above and below, however, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim fails for
several reasons, and thus the Court need not address this element in order to rule on Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
d. Deprivation of Liberty
Defendants next argue that, because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that she was
subject to pretrial custody or that she had to post bail, she cannot show that she suffered a
“restriction upon liberty.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 7.) Defendants maintain that
Plaintiff’s allegations that her “travel was restricted” and that she had to attend pre-trial hearings
are insufficient to establish deprivation of liberty. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that “her liberty
interest was curtailed” based on the following facts: (1) she was pulled over for no legitimate
reason and subsequently handcuffed, arrested, and transported to the police station against her
will; (2) she was forced to appear in court with the threat of a $5,000 bond which she would be
forced to pay if she did not appear at any of her scheduled court dates; (3) following her arrest,
she was required to submit to fingerprints and photographing by the police department; and (4)
“Plaintiff was arrested on April 11, 2015 6 and her case was not resolved until February 10,

6

The correct date of Plaintiff’s arrest, according to the Complaint, is April 11, 2014.
21

2015.” (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 7.) Both parties cite Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161
F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998) in support of their arguments.
In Gallo, the plaintiff was arraigned and released on a $10,000 personal recognizance
bond, but was never arrested, detained, or handcuffed; as a condition of his release, he was
prohibited from traveling outside of New Jersey and Pennsylvania; and he was required to
contact pretrial services on a weekly basis. See Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 219 (3d
Cir. 1998), as amended (Dec. 7, 1998). Those restrictions remained in effect for a period of eight
months, from the time of his arraignment until his trial. Id. The Third Circuit stated that,
“[a]lthough it is a close question, we agree with Gallo that these restrictions amounted to a
seizure” for purposes of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 222; see also
id. at 225 (“We conclude that the combination of restrictions imposed upon Gallo, because they
intentionally limited his liberty, constituted a seizure.”).
Subsequently, the Third Circuit stated that “[i]f Gallo was a ‘close question,’” there was
“no seizure significant enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation in support of a
Section 1983 malicious prosecution action” in a case where the plaintiffs “were only issued a
summons; they were never arrested; they never posted bail; they were free to travel; and they did
not have to report to Pretrial Services.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603
(3d Cir. 2005). There, the Third Circuit held that “[p]retrial custody and some onerous types of
pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure” but that attendance at
trial did not constitute a Fourth Amendment “seizure” for purposes of a malicious prosecution
claim. Id. More recently, the Third Circuit further clarified its position, stating that “[w]hen the
state places constitutionally significant restrictions on a person’s freedom of movement for the
purpose of obtaining his presence at a judicial proceeding, that person has been seized within the

22

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 321–22 (3d Cir. 2011);
see also id. at n.12 (“We hold open the possibility that some conditions on pre-trial release may
be so insignificant as not to implicate constitutionally protected liberty interests.”) (citing
Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004), which “conclude[ed] that
conditions of release not amounting to a ‘significant deprivation of liberty’ did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment”)).
Numerous courts in this district have found that, absent “onerous” pretrial, non-custodial
restrictions, a seizure has not occurred for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. See, e.g.,
Black v. Montgomery Cty., No. Civ.A.14-6702, 2015 WL 5568388, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21,
2015) (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff was never arrested or placed in custody,
released on $50,000 unsecured bail, and required to appear at the police station for
photographing and fingerprinting, required to appear at pre-trial conferences, hearings, and trial
listings, and had no reporting requirements and was free to travel); Roberts v. Caesars Entm’t,
Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 575, 582 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (dismissing malicious prosecution claim where
plaintiffs were not held in pre-trial custody, had to seek permission to travel but where travel was
not restricted, and where no other limitations on freedom were placed); Lopez v. Maczko, No.
Civ.A.07-1382, 2007 WL 2461709, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2007) (dismissing malicious
prosecution claim where the plaintiff was required to post $10,000 bail, attend proceedings
related to the charges, and communicate with pretrial services, but did not have any travel
restraints and the criminal proceedings following the charges being filed did not include a trial);
Ankele v. Hambrick, 286 F. Supp. 2d 485, 497 (E.D. Pa. 2003) aff’d, 136 F. App’x 551 (3d Cir.
2005) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim to defendant where plaintiff
was in custody for thirty to forty-five minutes at a state police barracks, attended a preliminary

23

hearing, license suspension appeal, and criminal trial, and posted a $2,000 unsecured bond, but
was never incarcerated, restricted to a geographic area, or deprived of his driver’s license).
Here, Plaintiff was not subject to the type of “onerous” pre-trial conditions that rise to the
level of a deprivation of liberty constituting a Fourth Amendment seizure. There are no specific
allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff’s travel was restricted by a court, 7 or that she was
subject to pre-trial restrictions during the ten months between her arrest and her acquittal. The
Complaint alleges only that she was transported to the police station after her arrest, after which
time she was released; that she was not actually required to post a bond; and that she was
fingerprinted and photographed. Even if inconvenient, none of those conditions was “onerous.”
Accordingly, Plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding, and she has therefore failed to establish the fifth
element of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
e. Conclusion as to Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claim
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution because
she has not established three of the five required elements of such a claim: that Defendant
Reynolds initiated the criminal proceeding against her, that he lacked probable cause to arrest
her, or that Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Count One is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.

7

Plaintiff alleged that her “ability” to travel was restricted due to the arrest and
conditions of bail. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Nothing in the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff’s travel was
outright restricted by a court. Even if Plaintiff was required to arrange any travel around her
court dates in order to avoid posting the unsecured bond for missing any of those dates, that
would not be the sort of “onerous” restriction at issue in Gallo.
24

B. Count Two: Deliberate Indifference and Failure to Train
Plaintiff sets forth two categories of municipal liability claims, alleging that Defendant
Upper Providence Township “encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and has been deliberately
indifferent to”: (1) patterns, practices, and customs regarding various aspects of policing, which
led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) the need for more or different
training, supervision, investigation, or discipline in various areas of policing, which led to the
deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff makes these allegations
in connection with the following areas:
(1) Unlawful detentions and unlawful arrests by police officers;
(2) The proper exercise of police powers, including but not limited
to fabrication of evidence, unlawful arrest, and malicious
prosecution;
(3) The failure to identify and take remedial or disciplinary action
against police officers who were the subject of prior civilian or
internal complaints of misconduct;
(4) Police officers’ use of their status as police officers to employ
the use of unlawful arrest, or to achieve ends not reasonably
related to their police duties;
(5) Police officers’ use of their status as police officers to employ
the use of unlawful arrest, invoke the Code of Silence, or to
achieve ends not reasonably related to police duties;
(6) The failure of police officers to follow established policies,
procedures, directives and instructions regarding the use of
arrest powers under such circumstances as presented in this
case;
(7) The refusal of police officers to intervene when other officers
violate the rights of citizens in their presence; []
(8) Systemic review of police paperwork to ensure proper
procedures are followed; [and]
(9) The refusal of police officers to report or provide information
concerning the misconduct of other police officers, a custom or
practice known as the “Code of Silence.”
(Id. ¶ 43.)
Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendant Upper Providence Township failed to properly
sanction or discipline officers, who are aware of and conceal and/or aid and abet violations of
25

constitutional rights of individuals by other Upper Providence Police Officers, thereby causing
and encouraging Upper Providence police, including the defendant officers in this case, to
violate the rights of citizens such as plaintiffs.” (Id. ¶ 44.) According to the Complaint,
“Defendant Upper Providence Township is deliberately indifferent to the need to train, supervise
and discipline police officers. The Upper Providence Police Department, or its investigating
body, fails to provide an internal disciplinary mechanism that imposes meaningful disciplinary
and remedial actions.” (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Upper Providence Township,
“as a matter of policy or practice,” demonstrated deliberate indifference to the rights of its
citizens, including Plaintiff, by its failure to:
(1) Adequately hire, discipline, train, supervise and/or otherwise
direct its employees, including Defendants in this case,
concerning the rights of its citizens;
(2) Establish a system which properly identifies, reports and/or
investigates instances of improper conduct by its employees,
including Defendants in this case; and
(3) Adequately sanction and/or discipline its employees, including
Defendants in this case, for violations of the rights of citizens;
“hereby causing Defendants, in this case, to engage in the unlawful conduct described” in the
Complaint. 8 (Id. ¶ 46.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Upper Providence Township “has deprived Plaintiff of his
[sic] rights secured by the United States Constitution,” specifically the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that its conduct is not protected by
Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act because “it is a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice[,] or willful misconduct.” (Id. ¶¶ 46, 47–48.)

8

Only Defendant Reynolds has been named as an individual defendant in this lawsuit,
and Plaintiff is the only plaintiff in this case. It is unclear why Plaintiff refers to multiple
individual defendants and multiple plaintiffs in these paragraphs.
26

“[F]or there to be municipal liability, there [ ] must be a violation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Brown v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs.
Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003); see also City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual
police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of
constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”) As discussed above, Plaintiff failed
to sufficiently allege that Defendant Reynolds violated her Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot succeed on her § 1983 municipal liability claims against
Defendant Upper Providence Township. See, e.g., Black, 2015 WL 5568388, at *5 (granting
motion to dismiss § 1983 municipal liability claims by municipal defendants where plaintiff
failed to sufficiently allege constitutional violations by the individual defendants). Thus,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Two is granted.
C. Count Three: Malicious Prosecution
In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reynolds violated her rights under
Pennsylvania law when he intentionally, recklessly, and maliciously caused a criminal
prosecution to be initiated against her without probable cause. (Compl. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff asserts
that after she was arrested, she “had to endure the prospect of going to trial in order to prove her
innocence,” and that “Defendants acted with malice and furthered the prosecution of Plaintiff by
providing false information, and/or withheld truthful information, all of which if known would
have resulted in no prosecution of Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff was acquitted on all of the
criminal charges against her. (Id. ¶ 52.) As a result of Defendant Reynolds’s conduct, Plaintiff
alleges that she “suffered physical injury and pain, and continues to suffer emotional distress,
humiliation, mental pain and anguish . . . .” (Id. ¶ 53.)

27

Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] cause of action for malicious prosecution has three
elements. The defendant must have instituted proceedings against the plaintiff 1) without
probable cause, 2) with malice, and 3) the proceedings must have terminated in favor of the
plaintiff.” Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940,
941 (Pa. 1988) (citing Miller v. Pa. R.R. Co., 89 A.2d 809, 811 (Pa. 1952)). “Malice may be
inferred from the absence of probable cause.” Id. (citing Hugee v. Pa. R.R. Co., 101 A.2d 740,
743 (Pa. 1954)). “Usually, the existence of probable cause is a question of law for the court
rather than a jury question, but may be submitted to the jury when facts material to the issue of
probable cause are in controversy.” Id. “Probable cause is defined as ‘a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same
situation in believing that the party is guilty of the offense.’” Id. (quoting Miller, 89 A.2d at
811–12 .
As discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s federal law malicious prosecution
claim, Plaintiff sets forth conclusory allegations which do not adequately support her assertion
that Defendant Reynolds lacked probable cause to arrest her. For the same reasons discussed
above in connection with Count One, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that probable cause
was lacking for purposes of her state law claim. Plaintiff cannot, therefore, establish all of the
elements of a Pennsylvania law malicious prosecution claim, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Count Three must be granted.
D. Count Four: False Imprisonment
In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that, by “causing Plaintiff to be physically restrained,
handcuffed, taken into police custody and charged with criminal activity, all without legal
justification or cause, Defendant Reynolds caused and intended to cause Plaintiff to be

28

confined.” (Compl. ¶ 55.) As a result of that conduct, “Plaintiff was in fact arrested and
confined without probable cause, and without his [sic] consent and against his [sic] will.” 9 (Id. ¶
56.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants, jointly and individually, 10 without legal cause or
justification, used physical force, threats, and actual or apparent physical barriers to overcome
Plaintiff and effect a confinement.” (Id. ¶ 57.) As a result of that conduct, “Plaintiff suffered
physical pain and injury; and continues to suffer emotional distress, humiliation, mental pain[,]
and anguish.” (Id. ¶ 58.)
“Under Pennsylvania law, a false arrest is defined as ‘1) an arrest made without probable
cause or 2) an arrest made by a person without privilege to do so.’” Brockington v. City of
Phila., 354 F. Supp. 2d 563, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797,
799 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1997) (citing Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions
at 13.04)). “The ‘elements of false imprisonment are (1) the detention of another person, and (2)
the unlawfulness of such detention.’” Id. (quoting Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293
(Pa. 1994)). “Such detention is unlawful if it is a consequence of a false arrest.” Id.
“An arrest based upon probable cause would be justified, regardless of whether the
individual arrested was guilty or not.” Renk, 641 A.2d at 293 (citing Fagan v. Pittsburgh
Terminal Coal Corp., 149 A. 159 (Pa. 1930)). “Probable cause exists when ‘the facts and
circumstances which are within the knowledge of the police officer at the time of the arrest, and
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of

9

It is not clear why the Complaint repeatedly refers to Plaintiff as a male when she is, in
fact, female.
10

Despite Plaintiff’s reference to “Defendants” who acted “jointly and individually” in
Paragraph Fifty-Seven of the Complaint, according to the heading for Count Four of the
Complaint this claim is only asserted against Defendant Reynolds.
29

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.’” Id.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa. 1991) (internal citation omitted)).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant Reynolds lacked
probable cause to arrest her. Thus, any detention of Plaintiff in connection with an arrest based
on probable cause does not provide the basis for a false imprisonment claim under Pennsylvania
law. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim of false imprisonment, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Count Four is granted. 11
E. Count Five: Assault and Battery
In Count Five, Plaintiff asserts a claim for assault and battery against Defendant
Reynolds pursuant to Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff alleges that “by physically restraining and
handcuffing Plaintiff, and confining him [sic] in a detention cell, all without legal cause or
justification, Defendant Reynolds used unreasonable force and caused and intended to cause a
harmful and offensive contact with the body of Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 60.) Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendant Reynolds caused and intended to cause Plaintiff immediate and harmful
injury, and that as a direct and proximate result of that conduct, Plaintiff suffered “physical
injury and pain, and continues to suffer emotional distress, humiliation, mental pain[,] and
anguish.” (Id. ¶¶ 61–62.)
“Under Pennsylvania law, ‘assault is an intentional attempt by force to do an injury to the
person of another, and a battery is committed whenever the violence menaced in an assault is
actually done, though in ever so small a degree, upon the person.’” Glass v. City of Phila., 455
F. Supp. 2d 302, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Renk, 641 A.2d at 293) (additional citations
11

Defendant Reynolds argues that Plaintiff cannot present a viable claim for false
imprisonment, because “the claim is based upon Plaintiff being handcuffed and temporarily
detained but where Plaintiff waived the preliminary hearing and there is no allegation that she
was otherwise imprisoned.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 8.) Because Count Four is being
dismissed on other grounds, the Court does not address this argument.
30

omitted). “An assault requires both the actor’s intent to place the individual in imminent
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact and the individual’s actual imminent
apprehension.” Id. at 365–66 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21.) “If there is no
assault, then there can be no claim for battery.” Id. at 366. (citing Belcher v. United States, 511
F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
“‘A police officer may be held liable for assault and battery when [the factfinder]
determines that the force used in making an arrest is unnecessary or excessive.’” Id. at 366
(quoting Renk, 641 A.2d at 293). Thus, “[t]he appropriate standard for determining an officer’s
potential liability for assault and battery when making an arrest is whether excessive or
unreasonable force was used in effectuating that arrest.” Id. at 366. If there is no finding of
excessive force by officers, then there can be no claim for liability for assault and battery. Id.
“A police officer may use reasonable force to prevent interference with the exercise of his
authority or the performance of his duty. In making a lawful arrest, a police officer may use such
force as is necessary under the circumstances to effectuate the arrest. The reasonableness of the
force used in making the arrest determines whether the police officer’s conduct constitutes an
assault and battery.” Renk, 641 A.2d at 293.
Defendant Reynolds urges dismissal of Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim because the
assertions that she was handcuffed and otherwise detained, in the absence of a claim of excessive
force, do not state a viable cause of action for assault and battery under Pennsylvania law.
(Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 9.) Plaintiff argues that where an arrest is unlawful, an officer
loses the privilege to use reasonable and necessary force when making an arrest which would
otherwise shield them from liability. (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 10.) Plaintiff maintains
that, because her arrest was unlawful, Defendant Reynolds’s actions “in physically removing

31

Plaintiff out of her car, handcuffing her, and placing her in the back of a police cruiser were
unlawful and, therefore, unnecessary.” (Id. at 11.) Therefore, according to Plaintiff, “the act of
being unlawfully handcuffed is the very ‘body contact’ that would offend a reasonable person’s
personal sense of dignity, thus establishing the intentional tort of battery.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff
argues that, under Pennsylvania law, the necessity of the amount of force used in making an
arrest is a jury question, and “[t]herefore, a jury must decide . . . whether a police officer’s
actions in making an arrest were lawful, privileged, and protected by official immunity, or [were
instead] an intentional tort and ‘willful misconduct’ that exposes the officer to civil liability.”
(Id.)
As discussed above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant Reynolds lacked
probable cause to arrest her. Thus, based on the reasons Defendant Reynolds listed in the police
report that contributed to probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, as described in the Complaint, the
arrest was not unlawful. As a result, Plaintiff’s argument that being handcuffed and placed into a
police car was unlawful and unnecessary fails, and therefore she cannot state a claim for assault
and battery against Defendant Reynolds on that basis. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged that
any amount of force that Defendant Reynolds used to accomplish those actions was excessive.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Five is granted.
F. Defendants’ Motion to Strike 12
The final portion of Defendants’ Motion seeks to strike multiple allegations from the
Complaint, specifically Paragraphs Twenty-Six (a) through (v), as well as Paragraphs TwentySeven through Thirty-Two, which Defendants characterize as “scurrilous, immaterial allegations
that Officer Reynolds in 21 prior criminal cases fabricated observations and evidence and
12

As Plaintiff will be given leave to amend her Complaint, the Court addresses the
Motion to Strike so as to indicate which allegations may not be included in any amended version
of the Complaint.
32

engaged in illegal conduct of which his supervisors were alleged to be aware.” (Defs.’ Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss 9.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f). Content is immaterial when it “has no essential or important relationship to the
claim for relief.” Donnelly v. Commonwealth Fin. Sys., No. Civ.A.07-1881, 2008 WL 762085,
at *4 (M.D. Pa. March 20, 2008) (citing Delaware Healthcare, Inc. v. MCD Holding Co., 893 F.
Supp. 1279, 1291–92 (D. Del. 1995)). Content is impertinent when it does not pertain to the
issues raised in the complaint. Id. (citing Cech v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., No. Civ.A.96-2185,
2002 WL 31002883, at *28 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2002)). Scandalous material “improperly casts a
derogatory light on someone, most typically on a party to the action.” Id. (citing Carone v.
Whalen, 121 F.R.D. 231, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1988)).
“The standard for striking a complaint or a portion of it is strict, and ‘only allegations that
are so unrelated to the plaintiffs’ claims as to be unworthy of any consideration should be
stricken.’” Steak Umm Co., LLC v. Steak’Em Up, Inc., No. Civ.A.09-2857, 2009 WL 3540786,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009) (citing Johnson v. Anhorn, 334 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (E.D. Pa.
2004)). “The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and
avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.” McInerney v. Moyer Lumber and Hardware,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Although “[a] court possesses considerable
discretion in disposing of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f),” such motions are “not favored
and usually will be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and
may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case.”
River Road Dev. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., No. Civ.A.89-7037, 1990 WL 69085, at *3 (E.D. Pa.

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May 23, 1990). To prevail, the moving party must demonstrate that “the allegations have no
possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or [that] the
allegations confuse the issues.” Id. (citing 5C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 1382, at 809–10, 815 (1969)). Striking a pleading or a portion of a pleading “is a
drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.” DeLa Cruz v.
Piccari Press, 521 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (quotations omitted).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not included facts in support of the allegations in
Paragraphs Twenty-Six through Thirty-Two of the Complaint, and that in every one of the
referenced criminal cases discussed in Paragraph Twenty-Six, the disposition was either (a)
guilty after trial; (b) a guilty plea, or (c) acceptance into the accelerated rehabilitative disposition
program (“ARD program”). 13 (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 9.) Defendants further note
13

In support of their arguments, Defendants attach the docket reports for those cases
which have not been expunged. “As a general rule, when ‘matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.’” Geraghty v. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., 369 F. App’x 402,
407 (3d Cir. 2010). (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). Rule 12(d), however, only applies to
motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). Here, the records are being considered in
connection with Defendants’ Motion to Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f), and therefore Rule 12(d)
does not apply.
Even if the records were being considered in connection with Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, matters of public record may be considered without converting the motion to one for
summary judgment. Id. (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)
(noting that in deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “courts generally consider only the
allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and
documents that form the basis of a claim”) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Twombly v.
Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as recognized in In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618
F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Miller v. Cadmus Commc’ns, No. Civ.A.09-2869, 2010 WL
762312, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2010) (“However, evidence beyond a complaint which the court
may consider in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss includes public records (including court
files, orders, records and letters of official actions or decisions of government agencies and
administrative bodies), documents essential to plaintiff’s claim which are attached to defendant’s
34

that in two of those cases, a court found that the defendants had refused blood tests and, in
ancillary driver’s license suspension hearings, those same defendants were found not credible.
(Id. at 9–10.) Defendants argue that, as a result, the majority of the criminal defendants
referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint would themselves be barred from bringing claims against the
Defendants in this case because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.
Humphrey, 14 or would be collaterally estopped from bringing claims against the Defendants
because their testimony was found not credible in license suspension proceedings. (Id. at 16
(citing Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 466–87 (1984)).) According to Defendants, if this Court permits
Plaintiff to include the objected-to allegations, it would have to engage in mini-trials regarding
the other DUI cases, suggesting to a fact-finder that the state court dispositions were wrongly
decided, which would violate the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he results of [the] underlying prosecutions [referenced in
Paragraph Twenty-Six of the Complaint] are not dispositive as to the specific observations
allegedly made by Defendant Reynolds, that is, an individual can plead guilty to DUI or be
admitted into the ARD program even though they did not actually have slurred speech, a
staggered gait, a flush face, etc.,” and that criminal defendants may enter guilty pleas or enter
diversionary programs for reasons other than guilt. (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 11–12.)
motion, and items appearing in the record of the case.”) (emphasis added) (citing Oshiver v.
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1384, n.2 (3d Cir. 1995)). As the referenced
criminal dockets are matters of public record, this Court could also consider the facts therein in
without converting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
14

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for
damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is
not cognizable under § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. 447, 486–87 (1994) (emphasis in original).
35

Further, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Reynolds’s affidavits in other cases “are not only
relevant and material to the case against [him] to establish the boilerplate allegations made
against all DUI defendants, but [they] also establish the lack of supervision and training at the
Upper Providence Police Department.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff argues that “[w]hile the underlying
defendants in those cases are not permitted to file a civil action under § 1983 due to the
disposition of their cases, Plaintiff Boseman is permitted to cite to them, especially in light of the
prior complaints filed by [two of those individuals], 15 to support the Monell claim in this
matter.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Reynolds “has an established pattern of using
boilerplate observations to establish probable cause in what would otherwise be an unlawful
arrest,” which supports plausible claims that there is a custom of fabricating police reports in
Upper Providence Township, as well as a failure to train, supervise, or discipline police officers,
and that she should therefore be permitted to proceed through discovery on her Monell claim.
(Id. at 14.) Thus, according to Plaintiff, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is premature and should
instead be heard as the subject of a motion in limine. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff also asserts that
Defendants’ “mini-trials” argument is premature because she is entitled to engage in discovery
and because the determination of how any resulting relevant evidence may be used is an issue for
a later day. (Id. at 15.) According to Plaintiff, “if one of the individuals arrested by Defendant
Reynolds chose to testify that the allegations were not true, then the defense in this matter would
be able to cross-examine that individual regarding the disposition of their case.” (Id. at 15.)
Even if Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against Defendant Upper Providence
Township were not subject to dismissal, Paragraph Twenty-Six would still be appropriately
stricken from the Complaint as immaterial. Plaintiff’s arguments for including the allegations in
15

Again, the Court has chosen not to include the names of the individuals referenced in
Paragraph Twenty-Six in this Memorandum.
36

Paragraph Twenty-Six are not persuasive in light of the legitimate concerns raised by
Defendants. Allowing Plaintiff to essentially re-litigate the merits of other individuals’ criminal
trials, in which those individuals were convicted, in an effort to show that Defendant Reynolds
violated her rights in the manner alleged and that Defendant Upper Providence Township should
therefore be liable for her Monell claims, would not be appropriate in light of the principles
discussed in Heck. Plaintiff provides no legal support for her theory that she may bring a § 1983
lawsuit that, in order to succeed, would in large part require proof of the unlawfulness of
another’s conviction, where the convicted individual would be prevented from doing so by the
Supreme Court’s holding in Heck. 16 Accordingly, because the allegations in Paragraph TwentySix are immaterial and confuse the issues in the litigation, they are stricken from the Complaint.
Similarly, the allegations in Paragraphs Twenty-Seven through Thirty-One, which rely on
records related to those individuals’ convictions, are also stricken. The Court does not strike
Paragraph Thirty-Two.
G. Leave to Amend
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has made clear that if a
complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must ordinarily permit a curative
amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on grounds of
bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, and futility. Id. at 236. This opportunity to amend must be
16

According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck, the individuals Plaintiff identified
in Paragraph Twenty-Six of the Complaint would not be able to bring their own civil rights
claims against Defendant Reynolds, because they were convicted in their state criminal trials.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (“We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to §
1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.”).
37

offered, even if the plaintiff does not specifically make such a request. Id. at 235. Accordingly,
the Court will grant Plaintiff twenty days in which to file an amended complaint properly setting
forth a factual basis for her claims against Defendants. Plaintiff’s failure or inability to do so
will, upon proper motion by Defendants, result in dismissal of any deficient claims with
prejudice.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and Plaintiff’s

Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied
in part. Specifically, the allegations in Paragraph Twenty-Six, Twenty-Seven, Twenty-Eight,
Twenty-Nine, Thirty, and Thirty-One are stricken from the Complaint, but the Court does not
strike Paragraph Thirty-Two.
An appropriate Order follows.

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