BRADLEY v. POWELL

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE GERALD J. PAPPERT ON 4/7/16. 4/7/16 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(kw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT V. BRADLEY, SR.,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-04025

v.
ROBERT POWELL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
PAPPERT, J.

April 7, 2016

The Court’s September 18, 2015 Memorandum and Order (ECF Nos. 6–7) denied
without prejudice Powell’s first motion to dismiss (ECF No. 2) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack
of personal jurisdiction. See Bradley v. Powell, No. 15-04025, 2015 WL 5544507, at *1, *5
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2015). The Court, mindful that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
instructed that “[w]here the plaintiff’s claim is not clearly frivolous, the district court should
ordinarily allow discovery on jurisdiction in order to aid the plaintiff in discharging [his]
burden,” allowed Bradley one month to conduct jurisdictional discovery, after which Powell
could renew his motion to dismiss. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee v. L’Union Atlantique
S.A. d’Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1983). After Bradley conducted jurisdictional
discovery, Powell renewed his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on October 29,
2015. (ECF No. 8.) Bradley responded on November 10, 2015. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 9.)
I.
Once a defendant raises the personal jurisdiction defense, “then the plaintiff must sustain
its burden of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other
competent evidence” and may not “rely on the bare pleadings alone.” Time Share Vacation Club
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v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1982)). Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k), a district court typically exercises personal jurisdiction according to the law
of the state where it sits. See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d
Cir. 2007). Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction “to the
fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most
minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.”
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, two types of personal
jurisdiction exist: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Bradley argues that this Court
has specific jurisdiction over Powell. Bradley, 2015 WL 5544507, at *3. To establish specific
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test: (1) the defendant must have
“purposefully directed [his] activities” at the forum; (2) the litigation must “arise out of or relate
to” at least one of those activities; and (3) if the prior two requirements are met, a court may
consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise “comport[s] with ‘fair play and
substantial justice.’” D’Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94,
102 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also O’Connor, 496 F.3d
at 317.
The Third Circuit has stated that “communications sent by a defendant into the forum
either by mail or telephone [can] count toward the minimum contacts required to establish
personal jurisdiction.” Leone v. Cataldo, 574 F. Supp. 2d 471, 479 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Grand
Entm’t Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993)). Moreover, a
“single contact may be sufficient to subject a party to personal jurisdiction, particularly if the

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‘contacts evaluated are those that give rise to the litigation.’” Waimberg v. Med. Transp. of Am.,
Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 511, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citations omitted).
II.
Bradley’s revised affidavit, attached as an exhibit to his response, states that he was “in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” when he “received the call” from Powell “soliciting a loan
from [him] in the amount of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00.).” (Pl.’s Resp. at Ex. A
¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 9.) Furthermore, the affidavit states that “[p]ursuant to the Promissory Note, the
place for payment is 222 W. Plumstead Ave, Lansdowne, Pennsylvania 19050.” (Id. ¶ 7–8.)
Bradley alleges that Powell failed to reimburse him in accordance with their oral contract and
has brought two separate causes of action: breach of contract and unjust enrichment. (Notice of
Removal at Ex. A ¶¶ 5–6, 7–17, ECF No. 1.)
This is sufficient to find that the first two prongs for specific jurisdiction are satisfied, as
Powell’s phone call to Bradley in Pennsylvania gave rise to this litigation. See, e.g., Gentex
Corp. v. Abbott, 978 F. Supp. 2d 391, 399 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding personal jurisdiction where
“Defendant Abbott engaged in telephone contacts with an individual soliciting the allegedly
infringing products while Defendant was aware the individual as in Pennsylvania”); Waimberg v.
Med. Transp. Of Am., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding personal jurisdiction
where the “plaintiff was contacted in Pennsylvania at the behest of GTCR and MTA; he received
transmissions in Pennsylvania assuring him of GTCR’s involvement in the project; the offer
letter was faxed to him and signed by him in Pennsylvania”). Third, the Court’s determination
that minimum contacts exist comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317; see also Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149

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F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that if minimum contacts are present, then jurisdiction will
be unreasonable only in “rare cases”).
None of the “fairness factors”—“the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies and
the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies”—suggest that
exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable in this case. Pennzoil Products Co., 149 F.3d at
207–08. “This is not a case where a severe burden is placed on an alien defendant as in Asahi
[Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)]. Nor does this case involve
one isolated occurrence where the defendant had no connection with the forum state, as in
World-Wide Volkswagen [v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980)].” Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp.,
897 F.2d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1990). An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

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