ALLEN v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, ET AL.

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA IS GRANTED; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE THOMAS N. ONEILL, JR ON 3/9/16. 3/9/16 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE, E-MAILED.(jl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANK ALLEN

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vs.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
O’NEILL, J.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-5187

March 9, 2015
MEMORANDUM

I have before me defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s response in opposition and
defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s response.
In his amended complaint plaintiff, appearing pro se, asserts that he is the owner and
occupant of a multiunit three family building located at 778 N. 25th Street, Philadelphia, PA. He
asserts that the property in which he resides and owns is subject to an annual $300.00 trash fee
and that under the City’s ordinance this fee is not levied upon single family, condo and co-op
owners and additionally that the $300.00 fee is discounted by fifty percent for owner occupied
duplex owners. He asserts that this ordinance violates his rights to equal protection of the law
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and brings this action under 42
U.S.C. §1983.
However, it appears that plaintiff has previously litigated the constitutionality of the
ordinance in the State courts. In particular, before the City of Philadelphia’s Tax Review Board,
the Court of Common Pleas and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. See paragraphs 21
through 26 of the amended complaint. Plaintiff states in paragraph #27 of the amended
complaint that he “feels he did not get a fair and unbiased review from those courts because they

were obviously protecting the interests of the city while neglecting the petitioner’s rights which
are protected by the Constitution under the 14th amendment.”
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.1 “The doctrine
of res judicata is intended to insure the finality of judgments and prevent repetitive litigation.”
Tyler v. O’Neill, 52 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Claim preclusion acts to prevent a
party from litigating issues that could have been brought in the original suit regardless of
whether those claims were actually raised in the original suit. Id. at 475. Additionally, a
“federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given
that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).2
Any further amendment of the complaint would be futile and amendment will not be
allowed.
An appropriate Order follows.

1

Although defendant does not raise the argument in its motion to dismiss, I note
also that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies to bar “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Where a “federal
claim is inextricably intertwined with [a] state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only
be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong,” it is barred under RookerFeldman. In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009).
2
The subsequent amendment of the ordinance to add an additional partial
exemption from the municipal trash collection fee for owner occupied duplexes does not enable
plaintiff to re-litigate the constitutionality of the ordinance.
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