THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 39

ORDER THAT DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE C. DARNELL JONES, II ON 6/18/18. 6/18/18 ENTERED AND E-MAILED. (JL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TREZJUAN THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,

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v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION
NO.: 16-3287

ORDER-MEMORANDUM
AND NOW, this 18th day of June, 2018, upon consideration of the Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 32), Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33), Plaintiff’s Response in
Opposition thereto (ECF No. 34), and Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 37), it is hereby ORDERED
that Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
Defendant is directed to file an Answer to the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) within
fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Order.
Factual Background
The facts presently before the Court are largely the same as that which the Court
previously considered in its Memorandum dated July 12, 2017 (ECF No. 24). As such, and in the
interest of brevity, this Court refers the parties to the Court’s earlier Memorandum for a full
recitation of the facts.
In its previous Memorandum, this Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint as it related to Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”), and granted Defendant’s Motion as it related to Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress (“NIED”). (ECF No. 24, p. 9.) The Court found the pleadings insufficient
to state a claim for NIED because the record was bereft of facts that would demonstrate that
Plaintiff’s alleged emotional trauma manifested physically. (ECF No. 24, p. 5-6.) Plaintiff’s
ambiguous allegation of “extreme pain and discomfort” was insufficient to determine whether

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Plaintiff’s pain arose from his physical injury or from the emotional trauma. Id. at 5. This Court,
thus, dismissed Plaintiff’s NIED claim without prejudice and with leave to amend to correct the
pleading deficiency. Id.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiff alleges
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and Federal Detention Center’s (“FDC”) employees
owed Plaintiff a duty of care, breached said duty, and caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional
distress as a result. (ECF No. 32, ¶ 48.) The Amended Complaint further alleges that the resultant
emotional distress Plaintiff experienced manifested in physical symptoms including headaches,
difficulty sleeping, nightmares, anxiety, and sweating. (ECF No. 32, ¶ 48.) Defendant timely
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for NIED on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim upon which can be granted. (ECF No. 33, p. 4.)
Standard of Review
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts must “accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled
to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007), it was established that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). But rather, “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard, which applies
to all civil cases, “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. at 678; accord Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]ll civil

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complaints must contain more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Analysis
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for NIED on two grounds. First, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a special relationship through which
Defendant would owe Plaintiff a duty of care. (ECF No. 33, p. 10.) And second, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to distinguish Plaintiff’s claim for NIED from
Plaintiff’s existing claim for malpractice – a claim Defendant neither challenges here nor in its
first Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 33, p. 10.) The Court finds neither argument
persuasive. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint is denied.
I.

Special Relationship

In Pennsylvania, recovery for NIED is limited to four factual scenarios: “(1) where the
defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff; (2) where the plaintiff was
subjected to a physical impact; (3) where the plaintiff was in a zone of danger, thereby
reasonably experiencing fear of impending physical injury; or (4) [where] the plaintiff observed
a tortious injury to a close relative.” Classen v. Nutter, Civ. No. 15-4078, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
199269, *24 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2017)(citing Doe v. Philadelphia Comm. Health Alts. AIDS Task
Force, 745 A.2d 25, 26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). Though Pennsylvania courts recognize that a
doctor-patient relationship could serve as a basis for an NIED claim, Toney v. Chester County
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95 (Pa. 2011), Defendant argues that the facts of this case are insufficient for
a finding of one such special relationship here. (ECF No. 33, p. 10.) This Court emphatically
disagrees.
As a preliminary matter, this Court finds none of the cases to which Defendant cites,

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persuasive. Where said cases conclude that their respective facts are incongruent with any of the
delineated scenarios from which a NIED claim may arise under Pennsylvania law, there is
insufficient discussion from which this Court could reasonably determine that the courts’
holdings reflect a finding that no duty existed between the parties – as opposed to a finding that
no breach occurred. None of the cited cases assess – in any degree of detail – whether, or when, a
special relationship could exist between prison medical staff and an imprisoned patient. The
holdings of the referenced cases, thus, are not pertinent to the disposition of the inquiry at issue
here.
Instead, this Court follows the clear directive of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
assess the unique facts of this case. See, Toney, 36 A.3d at 95 (“Rather we find it prudent to
leave the legal question of whether a sufficient duty exists to our trial judges to decide on a case
by case basis, at some point prior to trial, be it preliminary objections, summary judgment, or the
like.”). In so assessing, the Court finds that the relationship between Plaintiff and the FDC and
BOP personnel charged with Plaintiff’s care is a NIED qualifying relationship from which arises
a duty to care for Plaintiff’s emotional well-being. As a detainee, Plaintiff was without the ability
to seek medical attention outside of the prison. And as evidenced by the facts alleged, even
Plaintiff’s communication with his surgeon was entirely at the whim of prison officials.
“Plaintiff’s detention rendered Plaintiff uniquely dependent on BOP and FDC personnel to act in
Plaintiff’s best interest,” (ECF No. 24, p. 8), and this Court will not hold that regard for
Plaintiff’s emotional well-being was somehow divorced from the prison’s other responsibilities
as Plaintiff’s custodian.
II.

Distinction Between Malpractice and NIED Claims

Defendant further challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings to adequately state an NIED

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cause of action distinct from Plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice. (ECF No. 33, p. 6.) In
Defendant’s assessment, Plaintiff’s NIED claim “arises out of [Plaintiff’s] alleged physical
injury and alleges harm fully encompassed in his medical malpractice claim.” (ECF No. 33, p.
8.) Defendant encourages the Court to find that, in light of Plaintiff’s existing claim for medical
malpractice, Plaintiff’s claim for NIED fails as duplicative and redundant. (ECF No. 33, p. 10.)
Upon review of the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds that
Plaintiff adequately alleges two distinct causes of action. Assuming the allegations true,
Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim seeks recovery for the persistent infection, and attendant
pain and suffering, that resulted from the BOP and FDC’s deficient care. (ECF No. 32, ¶ 44-47.)
In contrast, Plaintiff’s claim for NIED seeks recovery for the emotional distress experienced as a
result of the BOP and FDC personnel’s apparent apathy in the face of Plaintiff’s repeated
complaints of “substantial pain” and numerous requests for aid. (ECF No. 32, ¶ 48.) It is entirely
conceivable that being left in a soiled cast for weeks with a festering infection could result in
emotional trauma separate and apart from the resultant physical injury. Though the underlying
alleged tortious conduct is undoubtedly related, this Court finds sufficient facts in the Amended
Complaint to establish two discrete, actionable harms.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges a claim
against Defendant for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant’s Motion is therefore
DENIED.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ C. Darnell Jones, II
C. Darnell Jones, II

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J.