JOHNSON v. CREDENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE WENDY BEETLESTONE ON 1/31/17. 2/1/17 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE, EMAILED TO COUNSEL AND COPY TO LEGAL.(jaa, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SCOTTLAND JOHNSON ,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v.
CREDENCE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT,
Defendant.

NO. 16-3936

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Scottland Johnson brings this case against Defendant Credence Resource
Management, asserting claims for negligent and willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment1
and seeks statutory attorney’s fees. Plaintiff was granted several chances to respond to
Defendant’s motion, and was also afforded an opportunity to request discovery. To date, he has
not responded. The motion shall be granted as to liability and denied as to fees.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint pro se and in forma pauperis against Defendant, alleging that

Defendant obtained his consumer credit report without a permissible purpose, in violation of
FCRA. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has never had any business dealings or
accounts with Defendant and that Defendant obtained his consumer credit report without
1

“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and the moving party
is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence,
could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof.” Doe v. Abington Friends
Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-52 (1986)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he reviewing
court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
that party's favor.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). However, the party opposing
summary judgment must support each essential element of the opposition with concrete evidence in the record.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. “[T]he non-movant may not rest on speculation and conjecture.” Ramara, Inc. v.
Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F. 3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016). Unless otherwise specified by the Court, a party may file for
summary judgment “at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).

Plaintiff’s consent. In support of its summary judgment motion, Defendant submitted an
affidavit from its Manager of Compliance, Denise Lewis, in which she stated that it obtained
Plaintiff’s consumer credit report for the purpose of collecting a debt that was placed with
Defendant by T-Mobile. Defendant also submitted docket reports from four similar lawsuits
filed by Plaintiff in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against various debt collectors alleging
similar violations of FCRA in connection with the debt collectors’ procurement of Plaintiff’s
consumer credit report. Finally, Defendant submitted a screenshot of Plaintiff’s consumer credit
report.
II.

DISCUSSION
FCRA imposes civil liability for willfully or negligently obtaining a consumer credit

report for a purpose that is not authorized by the statute. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(f), 1681n(a), 1681o.
Among the permissible purposes enumerated by the statute is “to use the information in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer . . . and involving the extension of
credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)
(emphasis added). This provision allows debt collectors to access credit reports for the purpose
of collecting on debts placed with the debt collector by another entity. See Huertas v. Galaxy
Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 34 (3d Cir. 2011).
In her affidavit, Denise Lewis states that on October 20, 2015, T-Mobile placed with
Defendant a debt owed by Plaintiff for cellphone services. Lewis further attests that on October
21, 2015, Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s consumer credit report in an effort to collect the TMobile debt. This is confirmed by the screenshot of Plaintiff’s consumer credit report, which
also shows that Defendant requested Plaintiff’s consumer credit report on October 21, 2015.

2

Taken together, these undisputed facts are sufficient to establish that Defendant accessed
Plaintiff’s credit report pursuant to a permissible purpose under FCRA.
Plaintiff makes two allegations in his Complaint to support his theory that Defendant
unlawfully obtained his credit report, both of which are unavailing. First, he states that he has
“never had any business dealings or accounts with” Defendant. Second, he states that Defendant
obtained his credit report without his consent. However, neither of these conditions are required
for the disclosure of a consumer credit report to be permissible. See Huertas, 641 F.3d at 34
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)). Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in
its favor on the question of liability.
Defendant also requests that the Court award statutory attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. §
1681n(c). To prevail would “require[] a showing that [the Complaint] was filed in bad faith.”
Rogers v. Johnson-Norman, 514 F. Supp. 2d 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2007) (collecting cases). Here,
Defendant’s sole argument for attorney’s fees is that the instant action is one of five lawsuits
Plaintiff filed on the same day against debt collectors alleging similar violations of FCRA, and
that because the Defendants in four out of five of those cases have “filed dispositive motions,”
this suit constitutes “harassment.” On such a thin record, it is not possible to conclude that the
Complaint was filed in bad faith or for the purposes of harassment. Consequently, Defendant is
not entitled fees under Section 1681n(c), and so the motion for attorney’s fees will be denied.
Dated: January 31, 2017

BY THE COURT:

/S/WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.
_______________________________
WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.
3