SCHRAD et al v. RADNOR TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION SIGNED BY HONORABLE MITCHELL S. GOLDBERG ON 9/28/17. 9/28/17 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(ti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK AND JENNIFER SCHRAD,
on behalf of their daughter, S.S.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RADNOR TOWNSHIP SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO.

16-6354

Goldberg, J.

September 28, 2017
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Mark and Jennifer Schrad, on behalf of their daughter S.S., bring the present
action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1411, et seq. (“IDEA”),
challenging the findings from a due process hearing between themselves and Defendant Radnor
Township School District (the “District”). Plaintiffs also seek an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs because they were the prevailing parties in the due process hearing. Currently pending
before me is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss three of Defendant’s Counterclaims.

For the

following reasons, I will grant the Motion and dismiss Counterclaim Counts I.A, I.B, and I.C.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 10, 2015, when S.S. was in third grade, Plaintiffs challenged an

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) offered by the District. (Compl. ¶ 1.) On November
7, 2016, following a due process hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that both the proposed
IEP and previous IEPs offered by the District failed to offer S.S. a free, appropriate public

education (“FAPE”) in reading, language arts, and literacy. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 13.) The Hearing Officer
awarded compensatory education for the District’s failures in both second and third grade, and
directed the District to develop a new IEP for S.S. containing appropriate goals in literacy,
writing, and mathematics. (Id. ¶ 3.) The Hearing Officer further ordered that, in the event the
District and Plaintiffs disagreed on the appropriate goals and objectives in academic subjects in
the new IEP, Plaintiffs’ literacy expert should serve as the “tie-breaker” to resolve such
disagreements at the District’s expense. (Id.)
According to Plaintiffs, the Hearing Officer failed to address and decide one of the
fundamental issues they had raised regarding whether the District’s proposed program for S.S.
enabled her to be educated with children who do not have disabilities to the maximum extent
appropriate, as required by 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). (Id. ¶ 4.) In other words, Plaintiffs allege
that while the Hearing Officer ruled on the FAPE requirement of IDEA, he did not address the
Least Restrictive Environment (“LRE”) requirement of IDEA. See T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd.
of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that IDEA requires States to provide a free,
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment).
On December 8, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this civil action, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2),
to contest portions of the Hearing Officer’s decision.1 In addition, Plaintiffs raised claims under

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This section provides that:
[A]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under
subsection (f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under
subsection (g), and any party aggrieved by the findings and
decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a
civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this
section, which action may be brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States,
without regard to the amount in controversy.
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.4, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. As part of
their request for relief, Plaintiffs sought an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), for both the due process proceeding and the time to
litigate the federal case.
On January 30, 2017, Defendant filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses. In addition,
Defendant filed six counterclaims that: (1) Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties under IDEA and,
therefore, are not entitled to reimbursement of attorneys’ fees or costs; (2) even if Plaintiffs
prevailed on some of their claims, Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee demand is excessive; (3) Plaintiffs’
demand for reimbursement of costs paid to experts is expressly denied under IDEA; (4) the
Hearing Officer erred in directing Plaintiffs’ literary expert to “break the tie” regarding areas of
instruction for which she has no expertise; (5) the Hearing Officer erred in finding that the
District failed to provide a FAPE for S.S. in reading and writing; and (6) arguments raised in the
federal court proceeding were not raised in the due process proceeding and, therefore, are barred.
On February 20, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s first three
Counterclaims. Defendant responded on March 6, 2017.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of

demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations omitted). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” and “only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. A complaint does not show an entitlement to relief when the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. Allegations in
counterclaims are held to the same pleading standards as allegations in complaints. RAH Color
Techs. LLC v. Ricoh USA Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d 346, 348 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has detailed a three-step process
to determine whether a complaint meets the pleadings standard. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352
(3d Cir. 2014). First, the court outlines the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for
relief. Id. at 365. Next, the court must “peel away those allegations that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Finally, the court “look[s] for
well-pled factual allegations, assume[s] their veracity, and then ‘determine[s] whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The last
step is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek dismissal of Defendant’s first three Counterclaims, which allege that: (1)

Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties under IDEA and, therefore, are not entitled to reimbursement
of attorneys’ fees or costs; (2) even if Plaintiffs prevailed on some of their claims, Plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fee demand is excessive; and (3) Plaintiffs’ demand for reimbursement of costs paid to

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experts is expressly denied under IDEA. Plaintiffs argue that the Counterclaims are neither
independent claims against Plaintiffs nor affirmative defenses, but rather mere denials of the
claims asserted by Plaintiffs. I agree and will dismiss these Counterclaims.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, counterclaims seek affirmative relief, meaning
the party asserting them bears the burden of properly pleading them. 6 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1407 (3d ed.). A Rule 13 claim must be presented in
a simple, concise, and direct manner, as required by Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(e). Id. “As with all
claims for relief, an attempt to invoke Rule 13 must state a claim upon which relief can be
granted or it will be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.
Notably, “[t]he label ‘counterclaim’ has no magic. What is really an answer or defense to
a suit does not become an independent piece of litigation because of its label.” Tenneco Inc. v.
Saxony Bar & Tube, Inc., 776 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1985). Rather,
[T]he question whether a set of facts is properly a counterclaim or
merely a defense is not always an easy one to answer. When the
defendant is asking for an affirmative award of money damages
rather than simply a reduction of plaintiff’s claim, defendant’s
pleading should be regarded as a counterclaim. But many kinds of
relief, though affirmative in form, are in result nothing more than
defenses to plaintiff’s claim.
Fleming James, Jr. & Geoffrey Hazard, Civil Procedure 252, 255 (5th ed. 2001) (footnote
omitted). As a general rule, counterclaims must seek relief independent of that sought in the
complaint. Id.
Here, Defendant’s first three Counterclaims are not independent pieces of litigation
seeking an affirmative award against Plaintiffs. Rather, they are merely a response and defense
to Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs in the Complaint. Absent Plaintiffs’ claim,
Defendant’s first three Counterclaims would have no basis and could not be separately asserted

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against Plaintiffs in a freestanding litigation. As these Counterclaims do not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, they are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).2
The discussion, however, does not end there. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)
provides that “[i]f a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim
as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly
designated, and may impose terms for doing so.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(2). Under this Rule, the
question then becomes whether Defendant’s first three Counterclaims must be resdesignated as
affirmative defenses. I find that they should not be.
“An affirmative defense is an assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if proven,
defeat the plaintiff’s claim even if the allegations in her complaint are true.” Sterten v. Option
One Mtg. Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 479, 482–83 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing 2 James Wm. Moore et al.,
Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 8.07[1] (3d ed. 2006)). In other words, an affirmative defense
excuses the defendant’s conduct even if the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, while
a general defense negates an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case. Donohoe v. Am. Isuzu
Motors, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 515, 518 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
In this case, Defendant’s first three Counterclaims are nothing more than general
defenses. IDEA provides that,
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in
its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs . . . (I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a
disability. . . .

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Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion neither establishes that Defendant failed to plead the
requisite elements of their claims nor presents any argument that relief cannot be granted on the
facts as plead by the District. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Opp’n Mot. to Dismiss 3.) Defendant’s
Counterclaims, however, are not actually “claims” that have any elements, meaning that
Plaintiffs could not feasibly make such an argument.
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20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); see also J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d
267, 271 (3d Cir. 2002). Under this formulation, the party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the
burden on several elements. First, he must establish that he is a “prevailing party” as defined in
the case law. See Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792
(1989) (holding that to succeed on a request for attorneys’ fees under IDEA, “at a minimum, . . .
the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal
relationship between itself and the defendant.”); see also P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442
F.3d 848, 855 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff must establish that he/she is a “prevailing
party.”). Moreover, “[t]he party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden to prove that [his] request
for attorney’s fees is reasonable.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990);
see also Neena S. ex rel. Robert S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 05-5404, 2009 WL 2245066, at *2
(E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009) (“The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of establishing the
reasonableness of each factor in the lodestar equation with satisfactory evidence in addition to
submitting the attorneys’ own affidavits.”). Finally, the moving party has the burden of proving
that the costs which he seeks fall within the range of costs authorized by the statute. Neena,
2009 WL 2245066, at *10.
Defendant’s first three Counterclaims correspond precisely with these elements. To that
end, they are not affirmative defenses alleged in the event Plaintiffs can establish a prima facie
entitlement to all requested attorneys’ fees and costs. Rather, they are denials that Plaintiffs have
actually proven the elements of their prima facie case.3 As these titular “Counterclaims” actually

3

In its Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion fails to
take into account the procedural posture of this case and the fact that it is an appeal from a
Special Education Hearing Officer’s decision following a due process hearing. It goes on to
contend that “[t]he parties” are appealing that decision, and that Defendant’s Counterclaims
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constitute general defenses, I need not redesignate them as affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c).
I will therefore dismiss Counts I.A, I.B, and I.C of Defendant’s Counterclaim Complaint for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
An appropriate Order follows.

“seek a ruling that the District does not have to pay any fees because the Plaintiffs are not
entitled under the IDEA to attorneys’ fees.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Opp’n Mot. to Dismiss 4.)
This argument is misplaced on multiple grounds. First, contrary to Defendant’s
statement, it is well established that “an IDEA action filed in federal district court is properly
characterized as an original ‘civil action,’ not an ‘appeal.’” Jonathan H. v. The Souderton Area
Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)). Second,
Defendant’s first three Counterclaims do not represent any type of challenge or appeal of the
Hearing Officer’s decision because the Hearing Officer did not award attorneys’ fees, meaning
there is no award to be challenged. Finally, although Defendant’s responsive brief attempts to
recharacterize its first three Counterclaims as requests for declaratory judgment, the
Counterclaim Complaint is not styled as such.
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