SATELL v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARK A. KEARNEY ON 7/25/17. 7/25/17 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE AND E-MAILED.(ti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION

STEPHEN SATELL

N0.17-2774

v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

KEARNEY,J.

July 25, 2017
MEMORANDUM

A university reducing a grade for a doctoral student based on plagiarism moves to
dismiss the student's pro se complaint alleging breach of contract and possible due process
violations.

The student cannot cite a contract other than the student handbook which

Pennsylvania has not recognized as a contract.
claim.

The student also has not plead a due process

Liberally construing his claim as also raising race-based discrimination, we deny the

university's request to dismiss a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

I.

Alleged Facts
Student Stephen Satell pro se sues Temple University alleging it subjected him to

disparate treatment causing him to receive a reduced grade and harm his reputation as a doctoral
student in the University's Department of Afrocology and African American Studies. 1 Mr. Satell
alleges the University agreed to provide education services for $500 a credit. 2 Mr. Satell also
alleges the University promised to be "fair and accord [him] due process" for charges of
academic misconduct and to keep his grades and academic status confidential. 3
In May 2016, Professor Aaron Smith gave Mr. Satell an 'A' in his Independent Study
4

course. On May 16, 2016, Dr. Asante, Chair of the University's Department of Afrocology and
African American Studies emailed Mr. Satell informing him the University reduced his

Independent Study grade to a 'C' because Mr. Satell used other authors' words without proper
.
attn"bution. 5

The University never informed him of the plagiarism allegation, never showed him the
plagiarized documents and did not afford him an opportunity to respond to the plagiarism
allegations. 6 Mr. Satell alleges the University's conduct breached its contractual obligation to be
"fair and accord due process." 7 Mr. Satell also alleges the University breached the contract by
disclosing his grades to Larry Robin. 8

Mr. Satell never describes Mr. Robin's role or

dissemination of this information.
Mr. Satell alleges the University hindered his academic process, undermined his work,
and deliberately misrepresented his actions "due to [his] race (Caucasian) and all being disparate
treatment toward [him] - the only Caucasian student [in] the Department." 9
Mr. Satell alleges the lowered grade harmed his reputation and financially damaged him
due to lost tuition payments and the expense to correct his reputation. 10 He alleges he paid
"approximately $50,000 and expended a considerable amount over and above that for expenses"
to the University and "demands judgment against [the University] in an amount in excess of
$50,000. " 11
On June 1, 2017, Mr. Satell prose sued the University in the Court of Common Pleas for
Philadelphia County for breach of contract. 12 The University construed Mr. Satell's claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of due process and removed to this Court. 13

II.

Analysis
The University now moves to dismiss Mr. Satell's complaint for failing to state a claim.

We review Mr. Satell's prose complaint originally filed in state court. "[W]e tend to be flexible
when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially when interpreting their

2

pleadings .... [t]his means that we are willing to apply the relevant legal principle even when
the complaint has failed to name it." 14 We construe Mr. Satell's pro se complaint to be a suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving him of due process.

We also construe Mr. Satell's

assertions of discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While we hold pro

se pleadings "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," they still
must, however, "allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." 15 As presently
before us, Mr. Satell does not plead claims for breach of contract, deprivation of due process but,
with liberal deference, states a claim under Title VI.

A. Mr. Satell fails to state a claim for breach of contract.
Mr. Satell alleges he contracted with the University according to terms in the University's
Department of Psychology Graduate Handbook, and it breached those terms. 16 Mr. Satell also
alleges he "was not given any other document that was part of the Contract nor was any such
document made accessible to [him] in any form."

17

We construe Mr. Satell's allegations of

breach as referring to terms in the Handbook.
Mr. Satell fails to plead the University breached a contract because he does not allege
facts to support the existence of a contract. "To sustain a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff
must prove: 1) the existence of a contract and its terms; 2) a breach of the duty imposed by the
contract; and 3) damages that resulted." 18 In Johnson v. Temple U.--of Cmmw. System of Higher

Educ., the Honorable Richard B. Surrick held "the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has declined
to construe the student handbook of a public university as a contract between the public
university and the student," and held the University's student handbook is not a contract. 19
Mr. Satell alleges he contracted with the University under the terms of the Department of
Psychology Graduate Handbook, and the allegations of breach refer to terms in the Handbook.

3

Because Pennsylvania does not recognize the University's student handbook as a contract, Mr.
Satell does not allege the existence of a contract and we must dismiss this claim.

B. Mr. Satell fails to plead the University deprived him of due process.
Mr. Satell alleges the University deprived him of fairness and due process when it
reduced his 'A' grade to a 'C' without notice and a chance to respond to the allegations. "In
order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of
the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently
inadequate." 20 Our court of appeals instructs, "[a] state cannot be held to have violated due
process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has
simply refused to avail himself of them." 21 Mr. Satell fails to meet these initial requirements.
He does not allege using a procedure remedy or a procedure remedy is unavailable or inadequate.
Because he does not meet the initial procedural requirements, Mr. Satell fails to plead the
University deprived him of due process.

C. Even if Mr. Satell meets the procedural requirement, he does not plead the
University deprived him of due process.
"To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, [Mr.
Satell] must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures
available to him did not provide 'due process of law.'" 22 We construe Mr. Satell's complaint to
allege the University deprived him of a liberty interest in reputation based on harming his
reputation and depriving him of a property interest based on allegedly depriving him of paid
services.

4

1. Mr. Satell fails to plead the University violated his liberty interest in
reputation.
Mr. Satell does not state a due process claim for depravation of a liberty interest in his
reputation because he does not allege stigmatizing statements in public. Under the "stigma-plus"
test, "[i]n order to support a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation,
the plaintiff must show (1) a stigma to his or her reputation plus (2) a deprivation of an additional
right or interest." 23

To satisfy the 'stigma' prong of the test, ''it must be alleged that the

purportedly stigmatizing statement(s) (1) were made publicly, and (2) were false." 24 Mr. Satell
"must plead that the allegedly stigmatizing information was "published" or otherwise
disseminated by [Temple] to the public."25 A plaintiffs single factual allegation his co-worker
made an allegedly stigmatizing comment about the plaintiff is "not alleged to have been made
publically." 26
Mr. Satell alleges his profossor "deliberately misrepresented [his] actions to the
department chair" and the department chair disclosed Mr. Satell's grades, plagiarism charges,
and disciplinary actions to Larry Robin. 27 While Mr. Satell alleges his professor gave false
statements, he does not allege either his professor or the department chair made the statements
publicly. 28 Mr. Satell does not plead the identity of Larry Robin or his relationship to parties and
a single disclosure to another person, without additional facts, is not publishing or disseminating
the allegedly stigmatizing comment to the public. Because Mr. Satell does not provide facts to
show the University publicly made the allegedly false statements, he fails to state a claim for
stigma to his reputation violating his due process liberty interest.

2. Mr. Satell fails to plead the University violated his property interest.
Mr. Satell does not state a due process claim for deprivation of a property interest
because he does not allege the University removed him from the doctoral program.

5

"For

purposes of procedural due process, we look to state law to determine whether a property interest
exists," and "[u]nder Pennsylvania law, it has been held that a graduate student has a property
interest protected by procedural due process in the continuation of her course of study. " 29 Mr.
Satell does not allege the University removed him from the doctoral program. 30 Instead, he
alleges the University deprived him of a property interest in tuition payments to repair his
harmed reputation. 31 Mr. Satell fails to plead a denial of a due process property interest because
he does not allege the University stopped him from continuing his education. As he fails to
allege a property interest, we must dismiss his due process claim.

3.

Even if Mr. Satell successfully pleads a deprivation of a liberty or
property interest, he does not plead the University's process did not
provide "due process."

If Mr. Satell could show the University deprived him of a liberty or property interest, he

must then allege Temple's "procedures available to him did not provide 'due process of law. "'32
Courts note due process requires different standards for procedures whether an institution
dismisses a student for academic or disciplinary reasons. 33 Our court of appeals discussed the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding "the due process rights of students in state operated
universities," and explained, "[we] are generally ill-equipped to review subjective academic
appraisals of educational institutions, and [the Supreme Court] admonished [us] to permit
university faculties a wide range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic
performance of students."34 Our court of appeals held, in Hankins, "when a student is discharged
for academic reasons, an informal faculty evaluation is all that is required." 35
Mr. Satell does not allege the University dismissed him from his doctoral program or
failed to hold an informal faculty evaluation. Mr. Satell also fails to allege the University's
procedures were inadequate and, in fact, does not allege facts about the University's procedures

6

for resolving allegations of academic misconduct. Even if Mr. Satell discussed the availability or
adequacy of the University's procedures, Mr. Satell does not allege the University deprived him
of the "informal faculty evaluation" required to satisfy due process. Mr. Satell fails to plead the
University deprived him of due process.

D. Mr. Satell states a claim the University violated Title VI.
Mr. Satell alleges the University hindered his academic process, undermined his work,
and deliberately misrepresented his actions "due to [his] race (Caucasian) and all being disparate
treatment toward [him] - the only Caucasian student [in] the Department."36 "To make out a
prima facie case under Title VI," Mr. Satell must show (1) he is a member of a protected class;

(2) he was qualified to continue in pursuit of his education; (3) he suffered an adverse action; and
"(4) such action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." 37
"A determination whether a prima facie case has been made, however, is an evidentiary
inquiry-it defines the quantum of proof plaintiff must present to create a rebuttable presumption
of discrimination." 38 For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, our court of appeals explains,
"[e]ven post-Twombly, it has been noted that a plaintiff is not required to establish the elements
of a prima facie case but instead, need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[ s]. " 39
Based on Mr. Satell's allegations the University undermined his work, deliberately
misrepresented his actions, hindered his academic progress, and he is the only Caucasian in the
Department, taken as true, Mr. Satell raises "a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element[s]."40

7

III.

Conclusion

Mr. Satell states a claim the University violated Title VI. We deny the University's
motion to dismiss in part as to the Title VI claim but dismiss the due process and breach of
contract claims without prejudice should he adduce facts to be able to timely allege these claims
in good faith.
1

See Notice of Removal, ECF Doc. No. 1, Exhibit A.

2

Id. 114.

3

Id. 1113-14.

4

Id. 1119.

5

Id. 1118-19.

6

Id. 11 21-24.

7

Id. 11 21-24.

8

Id. 11 25.

9

Id. 1126.

10

Id. 1127.

11

Id. 11 28.

12

Notice of Removal, ECF Doc. No. 1.

13

Id.

14

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013).

15

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"Although the plausibility standard 'does not impose a probability requirement,' it does require a
pleading to show 'more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' A
complaint that pleads facts 'merely consistent with a defendant's liability ... stops short of the
8

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief."' Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp.,
809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
16

In his Complaint, Mr. Satell alleges he attached a copy of "the Contract" but he did not submit
the attachment when filing his complaint electronically. Mr. Satell later provided the attachment
to the University, and the University attached the Complaint to the motion to dismiss. See ECF
Doc. No. 3, Exhibit A; see also ECF Doc. No. 3, at n. 2. Mr. Satell alleges some term "implied
in fact." Pennsylvania courts have held students and private universities may contract terms, but
to the extent a contract exists "the contract between the university and its students is comprised
solely of the written materials provided to the students." Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 919
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
17

E cF Doc. No. 1, 11 7.

18

Furey v. Temple U., 730 F. Supp. 2d 380, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing CoreStates Bank v.
Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999)).
19

Johnson v. Temple U.--of Cmmw. System of Higher Educ., No. 12-515, 2013 WL 5298484 at
*13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2013).

20

Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).

21

"This requirement is to be distinguished from exhaustion requirements that exist in other
contexts .... exhaustion simpliciter is analytically distinct from the requirement that the harm
alleged has occurred." Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). "Temple's actions
have been held to constitute state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Moire v. Temple U.
Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
22

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006). "Temple's actions have
been held to constitute state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Moire v. Temple U. Sch.
of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
23

Paterno v. Pennsylvania State U., _Fed. App'x _ . 2017 WL 1906744 at *2 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing Hill, 455 F.3d at 236).

24

Hill, 455 F.3d at 236 (internal citations omitted).

25

Chahal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1223 (3d Cir. 1988).

26

Cortazzo v. City of Reading, No. 14-2513, 2015 WL 1380061 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2015)
("The single factual allegation as to negative comments made about plaintiff-a remark by
defendant Winchester (a co-worker) to another co-worker stating 'Plaintiff was going to get him
in trouble and that Plaintiff could be a detriment to his advancement at the police
department,' ... is not alleged to have been made publicly.").
27

ECF Doc. No. 11125.
9

28

Id. 1! 26.

29

Manning v. Temple U., 03-4012, 2004 WL 3019230, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2004), aff'd, 157
Fed. Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2005).

ECF Doc. No. 1 ~27. Mr. Satell's Response notes "[t]he Motion never points to a document
notifying Plaintiff of the charges and his right to respond and not even a document notifying
Plaintiff he has been dismissed from the program a fact that Plaintiff learned about only after
reading the Motion." ECF Doc. No. 4-1.
30

31
32

E cF Doc. No. 1, 1! 27.

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006).

33

See Borrell v. Bloomsburg U., 63 F. Supp. 3d 418, 447 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (relying on Hankins v.
Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 444 (3d Cir.1987)).

34

Hankins v. Temple U. (Health Scis. Ctr.), 829 F.2d 437, 444 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing Board
of Curators of the University of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) and Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
35

Id. at 445.

36

ECF Doc. No. 1, 1l 26.

37

Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2011), aff'd, 767 F.3d
247 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing, e.g., Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir.2003)).
"Private individuals who bring suits under Title VI may not recover compensatory relief unless
they show that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination," and to move forward with a
Title VI claim, Mr. Satell "must raise at least an inference of discrimination." Blunt v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 272 (3d Cir. 2014); Bridges ex rel. D.B. v. Scranton Sch. Dist.,
644 F. App'x. 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2016).
38

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Powell v. Ridge, 189
F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir.1999)).

39

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

40

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

10