TALBERT v. CARNEY et al
Filing
141
MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARK A. KEARNEY ON 08/13/2019. 08/13/2019 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PLAINTIFF AND E-MAILED.(nd, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES TALBERT
v.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 18-1620
BLANCHE CARNEY, et al.
MEMORANDUM
August 13, 2019
KEARNEY,J.
Inmate Charles Talbert pro se alleges the Commissioner and two wardens in the
Philadelphia Department of Prisons placed him in administrative segregation in retaliation for his
earlier lawsuits against them.
He alleges the prison officials placed him in administrative
segregation for an indefinite period without notice.
While there, he suffered a "lack of shower,
sleep, eating, and recreation time due to the plague of mice[;]" "damaged commissary from mice
chewing through its packages, costing hundreds of dollars in financial loss[;]" and "lack of out-ofcell[] and outdoor exercise[] that caused poor health conditions such as high cholesterol[] and
aggravation to his preexisting chronic lower back pain and spasms." 1 Mr. Talbert also claims the
Commissioner and two wardens "deprived equal access to Islamic literature[] and [I]mam[] that
Christians had to Chaplains and Bibles."2 After examination of the summary judgment record
which does not include sworn statements from the prison officials as to why they placed Mr.
Talbert in administrative segregation or address the allegedly indefinite duration of segregation
without notice, we find genuine issues of material fact require the jury's findings on his First
Amendment retaliation and procedural due process claims. We find no triable issues on his
substantive due process, access to religious services, or supervisory liability claims arising from a
2019 assault.
I.
Analysis
Mr. Talbert sues Blanche Carney, Commissioner of the Philadelphia Department of
Prisons; Gerald May, Warden of the Curran-Frornhold Correctional Facility; Terrance Clark,
Warden of the Detention Center; and Officer Shaniqua Ford, a Correctional Officer at CurranFromhold Correctional Facility "assigned to [Mr. Talbert's] housing unit" in February 2019. 3 Mr.
Talbert has yet to return the U.S. Marshal's address form necessary to serve Officer Ford and we
today sever her from trial next month.
We construe Mr. Talbert's operative complaint as alleging First Amendment retaliation
and procedural and substantive due process claims against Commissioner Carney, Warden May,
and Warden Clark.
A.
To proceed to trial on his First Amendment retaliation claim against
Commissioner Carney and Wardens May and Clark, Mr. Talbert must prove
protected conduct, an adverse action, and causation.
"A prisoner alleging retaliation must show ( 1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an
adverse action by prison officials 'sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his [constitutional] rights,' and (3) 'a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights
and the adverse action taken against him. "'4 At the summary judgment stage, we assess the
prisoner's retaliation claim under "a burden-shifting framework." 5 Under this framework, the
prisoner must first "prove that his protected conduct in exercising a constitutional right was a
substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision." The inmate can satisfy this burden by
"prov[ing] one of two things: (1) an unusually suggestive time proximity between the protected
activity and the allegedly retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to
establish a causal link. " 6 If the prisoner is unable to demonstrate "unusually suggestive time
2
proximity" or "a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing ... then the plaintiff must show that,
from the evidence in the record as a whole, the trier of fact should infer causation." 7
If the inmate makes this initial showing, "the burden then shifts to the prison official to
prove that the same decision would have been made absent the protected conduct for reasons
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." 8
1. Mr. Talbert's lawsuits against Commissioner Carney and Wardens May and
Clark constitute protected conduct.
Mr. Talbert claims his earlier lawsuits against Commissioner Carney and Wardens May
and Clark constitute protected conduct. 9 He is correct. Filing grievances within the prison system
and civil actions in court constitute constitutionally protected conduct under the First
Amendment. 10 Mr. Talbert filed various lawsuits against Commissioner Camey and Wardens May
and Clark before the placement decision challenged in this case.
In Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 16-5360, Mr. Talbert alleged Warden May "made
disrespectful comments" and "call[ed] [Mr. Talbert] a 'jailhouse snitch[,]' in regards to [him] filing
grievances and lawsuits." 11 In Talbert v. Mental Health Management, No. 17-4263, Mr. Talbert
alleged Warden Clark improperly allowed Mr. Talbert to be housed on a unit with "mentally ill
inmates," who would "flood their cells with water, feces, and urine on a constant basis to where
those toxins would flood Plaintiff's cell." 12
In Talbert v. Christmas, No. 17-4266, Mr. Talbert sued Commissioner Camey and Warden
Clark alleging Commissioner Camey ordered Mr. Talbert transferred from Curran-Fromhold to
the Detention Center, where "he was ... placed in the hole, despite not having any prison
misconduct report filed against him." 13 Mr. Talbert raised nearly identical claims in Talbert v.
Christmas, No. 17-4376, which we dismissed as duplicative of his claims in earlier-filed No. 17-
4266.14 And in Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-4262, Mr. Talbert sued Commissioner
3
Carney and Warden Clark alleging they "failed to install surveillance monitors, capable of
recording, on a closed-custody unit, like all other closed-custody prisons within their authority and
jurisdiction." 15 Mr. Talbert raised nearly identical claims in Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No.
17-4379, which we dismissed on October 5, 2017, as duplicative of his claims raised in No. 174262.16
2. A jury could find transfer of Mr. Talbert to administrative segregation
constituted an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness
from exercising his constitutional rights.
Mr. Talbert carries his burden at summary judgment of demonstrating "an adverse action
by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
constitutional rights." 17 The Commissioner and Wardens argue Mr. Talbert's claim fails because
he "has never been deterred from exercising his First Amendment right to sue prison officials," as
he threatened to file additional lawsuits during his time in administrative segregation. 18 The
Commissioner and Wardens cite a November 13, 2017 grievance Mr. Talbert addressed to Major
Christmas in which Mr. Talbert wrote he "did absolutely nothing" to warrant his placement in the
hole and cautioned Defendants' campaign of First Amendment retaliation against him would be
unsuccessful. "Anyway, I will just file suit again once I'm released," Mr. Talbert wrote. 19
It may be true Commissioner Carney's, Warden May's, or Warden Clark's alleged decision
did not deter Mr. Talbert from suing. But this fact alone does not compel summary judgment in
their favor. The test is objective, not subjective. In Banda v. Corniel, an individual subject to civil
commitment as a sexually violent predator sued various staff members of his treatment unit
"alleging that they retaliated against him for filing grievances by placing him in a Modified
Activities Program (MAP), which resulted in the loss of numerous privileges, including hisjob."20
The district court found the prisoner failed to state a claim for retaliation against the defendants
4
remaining in the case because his allegations admit his placement did not deter him from filing
grievances. 21 Our Court of Appeals, however, vacated the district court's dismissal, explaining
"whether [the plaintiff] was actually deterred is immaterial; the question is whether 'a person of
ordinary firmness' would have been deterred." 22
A jury could find Commissioner Carney and Warden May and Clark's (either individually
or jointly) placement of Mr. Talbert in administrative segregation under these circumstances could
have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights. Mr.
Talbert's claim of adverse action is similar to those alleged in Allah v. Seiverling, where an inmate
claimed his retaliatory placement in administrative segregation resulted in his "reduced access to
phone calls, reduced access to the commissary, reduced access to recreation, confinement in his
cell for all but five hours per week, denial of access to rehabilitative programs and, significantly,
inadequate access to legal research materials and assistance. ,m Our Court of Appeals found "[a]
fact finder could conclude from those facts that retaliatory continued placement in administrative
confinement would 'deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment
rights. "' 24
Mr. Talbert claims he experienced materially different conditions in administrative
segregation, including damaged commissary and reduced out-of-cell exercise time.
We are
mindful our Court of Appeals has acknowledged "several months in disciplinary confinement
would deter a reasonably firm prisoner from exercising his First Amendment rights." 25 A jury
could find Mr. Talbert's transfer to administrative segregation, subjecting him to differing
conditions of confinement, including the loss of certain liberties available to inmates in the general
prison population, constituted an adverse action.
5
3. Genuine issues of material fact surrounding causation preclude summary
judgment on the First Amendment claim.
Mr. Talbert must also demonstrate "his protected conduct in exercising a constitutional
right was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision," which he may do by
"prov[ing] one of two things: (1) an unusually suggestive time proximity between the protected
activity and the allegedly retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to
establish a causal link." 26 If the prisoner is unable to demonstrate "unusually suggestive time
proximity" or "a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing ... then the plaintiff must show that,
from the evidence in the record as a whole, the trier of fact should infer causation." 27 On this
limited summary judgment record, Mr. Talbert sufficiently demonstrates an unusually suggestive
time proximity between his protected activity in early and mid-October 2017 (filing lawsuits in
this court against Defendants) and the retaliatory action in early November 2017 (his placement in
administrative segregation).
The summary judgment record does not identify the definitive date of Mr. Talbert's
placement in administrative segregation.
For example, a November 27, 2017 form labeled
"Medical/Behavioral Health Review for Segregation Placement" lists Mr. Talbert's "[d]ate of
[s]egregation [p]lacement" as November 9, 2017. 28 But the officials' Special Management Status
Placement Order and subsequent weekly Special Management Status Review forms report officials
placed Mr. Talbert in restricted status on November 27, 2017. 29 Mr. Talbert's November 13, 2017
grievance addressed to Major Christmas suggests the adverse action occurred on November 9,
2017 as opposed to November 27, 2017. It is possible, of course, administrative segregation and
"Special Management Status" refer to different inmate housing or security designations, but
because Defendants' counsel elected to not produce affidavits or other evidence explaining
material differences in these statuses and we must draw inferences in favor of Mr. Talbert as the
6
non-moving party, we construe the various prison records as demonstrating the date of the alleged
adverse action as November 9, 2017.
At one end of the spectrum, a span of years or numerous months between protected conduct
and retaliatory action is too remote for an inmate to rely on timing alone. In Keeling v. Barrager,
for example, our Court of Appeals held a thirteen-month gap between the inmate's transfer to a
different cell block and the inmate's preceding lawsuit allegedly motivating the retaliatory transfer
"was too remote in time to infer an unlawful motive." 30 Similarly, in Watson v. Rozum, our Court
of Appeals held an inmate's lawsuit filed in 2009 was "just too remote to suggest a retaliatory
motive" for conduct occurring in 2011. 31 At the other end of the spectrum, an inmate suffering an
adverse action within hours or days of protected conduct may rely on timing alone to demonstrate
causation. 32 Mr. Talbert's claim falls between those two.
We find instructive Henry v. Lamoreaux, in which Judge Baxter found the span of just over
one month between the inmate's protected conduct and the adverse action "close enough to be
considered 'unusually suggestive' of retaliatory motive, so as to satisfy the third element of [the
inmate's] retaliation claim." 33 Judge Pratter's analysis in Walker v. Regan also counsels a span of
seventeen days between the protected conduct and the adverse action "alone may not be 'unduly
suggestive' of causation," but the timing combined with the defendant's "history of acrimony, is
sufficient to create an inference of causation. " 34
Mr. Talbert's claimed time between his protected activity and the adverse action is
significantly less than in Keeling and Watson. On October 5, 2017, just thirty-five days before his
transfer to administrative segregation, Mr. Talbert sued Commissioner Carney and Warden Clark
in Talbert v. Christmas, No. 17-4266, and Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-4379. And on
October 4, Mr. Talbert sued Warden Clark in Talbert v. Mental Health Management, No. 17-4263,
7
and Commissioner Carney and Warden Clark in Talbert v. City ofPhiladelphia, No. 17-4262. On
October 17, 2017, Mr. Talbert settled his claims in Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-4262,
and Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 16-5360, following a settlement conference with Judge
Heffley. 35
Absent contrary competent evidence adduced from the Commissioner or Wardens at this
stage, Mr. Talbert presents sufficient evidence of unduly suggestive timing. In addition to his early
October complaints, Mr. Talbert settled cases against all three Defendants within approximately
three weeks of his transfer to administrative segregation. The dispute apparently did not end on
the date of dismissal, as Mr. Talbert later sued the City of Philadelphia claiming a breach of the
settlement agreement. 36
Because Mr. Talbert has demonstrated timing unduly suggestive of causation, "the burden
then shifts to the prison official[s] to prove that the same decision would have been made absent
the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest."37
Commissioner Camey and Wardens May and Clark have not carried their burden at this stage.
Absent sworn testimony, we cannot discern from the Defendants' submitted record why prison
officials placed Mr. Talbert in administrative segregation. The Medical/Behavioral Health Review
for Segregation Placement form lists the "[r]eason for [s]egregation [p]lacement" as "Ad. Seg Close Custody," but the form does not provide any other details explaining why Mr. Talbert is
under close custody. 38 One might expect to find more clarity in the "Special Management Status
Placement Order," as the form requires the official select one of the following grounds:
[] The inmate is potentially dangerous to himself or herself or others or poses a serious
escape risk.
[] The [i]nmate requests protection or is deemed by a Supervisor to require protection,
such as a witness for whom restrictive status is necessary.
8
[ ] The inmate requires Immediate mental health evaluation and cannot be in contact with
general population inmates pending that evaluation. Inmates in this category will be
placed in administrative segregation only if medical housing is not available otherwise.
[ ] Medical isolation cases in which medical housing is not otherwise available.
[ ] The inmate is charged with a disciplinary infraction, awaiting a disciplinary hearing
and in the judgment of a supervisor may become disruptive or be dangerous if left in
the general population.
[] The inmate is in transfer status to a higher security facility.
[ ] The inmate, in the judgement of staff, may for any other reason pose a threat to himself,
herself, others or the security of the facility. 39
But the official who completed Mr. Talbert's Special Management Placement Order
selected the last reason, "[t]he inmate, in the judgement of staff, may for any other reason pose a
threat to himself, herself, others or the security of the facility. " 40 Below the checked box appears
the following additional explanation: "Reason: Close Custody."41 But Commissioner Carney and
Wardens May and Clark do not provide an affidavit or manual explaining when, how, or why an
inmate may be placed in close custody. They instead ask us to employ circular reasoning: Mr.
Talbert is in "Special Management Status" because he is in close custody.
And although Commissioner Carney and Wardens May and Clark argue the "Keep
Separate Summary" suggests they placed Mr. Talbert in administrative segregation because of his
various conflicts with the listed inmates, we cannot discern a nexus in the submitted record
between the Keep Separate Summary and Mr. Talbert's placement in administrative segregation.
The Keep Separate Summary, for example, does not list the date on which prison officials or
employees added an inmate's name to the Keep Separate Summary.
This information is
particularly important because Mr. Talbert claims inmate Knox assaulted him in 2019-over a
year after the alleged retaliation.
B.
Mr. Talbert's procedural due process claim may proceed to trial, but he has
failed to adduce evidence of prison conditions amounting to punishment.
1.
Mr. Talbert's procedural due process challenge to the indefinite
segregation may proceed.
9
As in our October 3, 2018 Memorandum, we construe Mr. Talbert's complaint as alleging
a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. 42 Mr. Talbert alleges he
"remained in administrative segregation[] indefinitely, with no explanation as to why he was there
under that status. " 43
Commissioner Carney and Wardens May and Clark do not advance a
summary judgment argument addressing Mr. Talbert's procedural due process claim.
In Stevenson v. Carroll, our Court of Appeals held "[a]lthough pretrial detainees do not
have a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population, they do have a liberty
interest in not being detained indefinitely in the S[ecurity Housing Unit] without explanation or
review of their confinement. " 44 But "the process required for administrative transfers of pretrial
detainees need not be extensive."45 Prison officials need only "provide detainees who are
transferred into more restrictive housing for administrative purposes ... an explanation of the
reason for their transfer as well as an opportunity to respond. " 46
Commissioner Carney's and Wardens May's and Clark's submitted record does not reveal
the lack of a dispute of material fact as to notice. They produce a printout listing Mr. Talbert's
history of administrative and disciplinary confinements. The entry corresponding to the detention
at issue in this case simply says "Hearing" under the heading "Status" and "12/26/2017" under the
heading "Review."47 It does not disclose whether Mr. Talbert received notice of the hearing or
attended it. While the record shows prison officials regularly reviewed Mr. Talbert's status after
his placement in administrative segregation, the records do not show whether Mr. Talbert received
notice of these reviews or attended them himself. A single affidavit could have provided much
clarity to these records and prison processes. We are instead asked to examine these spreadsheets
and then draw inferences in Commissioner Carney and Wardens May and Clark's favor. We
10
cannot do this. Mr. Talbert may proceed to trial on his procedural due process claim challenging
his detention.
2.
Mr. Talbert may not proceed on a substantive due process claim.
Mr. Talbert claims his transfer to administrative segregation and the materially different
conditions he endured there amounted to punishment violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Commissioner Camey and Wardens May and Clark move for summary
judgment arguing Mr. Talbert "has not produced any evidence to support his claim of unsanitary
conditions, beyond his mere statements that the prison was infested with mice and rodents," and
Mr. Talbert "acknowledges that he was given access to the administrative segregation law
library." 48
"While the Eighth Amendment bars cruel and unusual punishment-typically deprivations
of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities[]' -the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause protects pretrial detainees from being punished at all. " 49
To effectuate this
prohibition on pretrial punishment, "[a] court must decide whether the disability is imposed for
the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose." 50 The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish held "if a particular condition or restriction of
pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to 'punishment,"' but "if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a
legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose
of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees qua detainees." 51
Commissioner Carney and Wardens May and Clark adduced the October 13, 2017
Detention Center 2017 Inspection Report, in which an Inspection Team from the Department of
11
Corrections' Office of County Inspections and Services described procedures and conditions in
the Detention Center. 52 The Inspection Team inspected the Detention Center on September 26,
2017 and reported on the general prison conditions. The Inspection Team found the housing units
"clean, quiet, and orderly," and the "[s]howers and vents ... reasonably clean and maintained." 53
The Inspection Team reported "[p]illows, mattresses, sheets, and blankets were clean and in
satisfactory condition" and "[b]edding items are laundered weekly." 54 The Inspection Team
concluded "[d]uring the physical inspection of the facility, the Inspectors observed that the overall
conditions of confinement and quality of life were consistent with Title 37, Chapter 95
requirements" and "[t]he housing and support areas were clean and maintained in conditions that
appeared appropriate for the age of the facility." 55
Mr. Talbert has not adduced evidence relating to prison conditions opposing Commissioner
Camey and Wardens May and Clark's facts.
These facts are undisputed and warrant our
dismissing the substantive due process claim before trial.
3.
Mr. Talbert has not shown the Commissioner's or the Wardens'
personal involvement in alleged denial of equal access to religious
services or the 2019 alleged assault.
To the extent Mr. Talbert alleges a freestanding claim relating to his alleged denial of
"equal access to Islamic literature[] and [I]mam" to the same extent "Christians had [access] to
Chaplains and Bibles," Mr. Talbert has not produced evidence showing Defendants' personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. 56
"Individual liability can be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an
'affirmative part' in the alleged misconduct and 'cannot be predicated solely on the operation
ofrespondeat superior. "'57
A plaintiff must prove "each individual [defendant] . . .
had personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing." 58 Mr. Talbert swore he "asked the chaplain
12
multiple times for religious materials and the Imam." 59 He does not, however, produce evidence
showing how Commissioner Carney or Warden May or Warden Clark personally acted to deprive
him access to religious instruction or materials. Mr. Talbert did not sue the chaplain.
The
Commissioner and Wardens cannot be held liable solely because they are supervisors.
We similarly conclude Mr. Talbert cannot impose liability on Commissioner Carney and
Wardens May and Clark for the alleged 2019 assault by inmate Knox. Mr. Talbert alleges Officer
"Ford caused [Mr. Talbert] to be assaulted by Knox[] in retaliation [for Mr. Talbert] filing lawsuits
against [Commissioner] Carney and other PDP staff members." 60
But Mr. Talbert has not
produced evidence of Defendants' knowledge of or acquiescence in Officer Ford's alleged
conduct. Because Mr. Talbert has yet to serve Defendant Ford, we do not pass on the merit of the
allegations against her.
II.
Conclusion
Genuine issues of material fact preclude our summary dismissal of Mr. Talbert's First
Amendment retaliation and procedural due process claims.
The Commissioner and Wardens
elected not to adduce testimonial evidence for summary judgment. Our jury will evaluate the
competing evidence on the First Amendment retaliation and procedural due process claims.
We
find no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on Mr. Talbert's substantive
due process, access to religious materials, or supervisory claims.
We grant Commissioner
Carney's and Wardens May's and Clark's motion for summary judgment as to the substantive due
process, access to religious materials and supervisory claims, but deny summary judgment on Mr.
Talbert's First Amendment retaliation and procedural due process claims.
1
ECF Doc. No. 61 at ,r 14.
13
Id. at ,r,r 2-6, 21. Mr. Talbert also alleged claims against Lt. Muhollan, but on July 11, 2019, we
struck "paragraphs 5 and 16-30 of the second amended Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 61) to the extent
they refer to Lt. Muhollan" and "dismiss[ed] Lt. Muhollan." ECF Doc. No. 109 (emphasis
omitted).
On July 30, 2019, we denied Mr. Talbert's Rule 60(b) Motion seeking to vacate our
July 11, 2019 Order. ECF Doc. No. 129.
3
4
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Rauser v.
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).
5
DeFranco v. Wolfe, 387 F. App'x 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2010).
ECF Doc. No. 61 at ,r 9 (arguing Defendants placed him in administrative segregation "in
retaliation [for] my lawsuits").
9
10
See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530; Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000).
11
Complaint, Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 16-5360 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2016), ECF Doc.
No. 1-1.
12
Complaint, Talbert v. Mental Health Management, No. 17-4263 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2017), ECF
Doc. No. 3.
13
Complaint, Talbert v. Christmas, No. 17-4266 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 3.
14
Order, Talbert v. Christmas, No. 17-4376 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 2.
15
Complaint, Talbert v. City ofPhiladelphia, No. 17-4262 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2017), ECF Doc. No.
3.
16
Order, Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-4379 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 2.
17
DeFranco, 387 F. App'x at 154.
18
ECF Doc. No. 119 at 3.
19
ECF Doc. No. 121 at 23.
20
Banda v. Corniel, 682 F. App'x 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted).
14
21
Id. at 173.
22
Id. at 174 (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333).
23
229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).
24
Id. (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)).
25
Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530.
26
DeFranco, 387 F. App'x at 154.
21
Id.
28
ECF Doc. No. 121 at 10.
29
See id. at 12-17.
°Keeling v. Barrager, 666 F. App'x 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2016).
3
31
Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,423 (3d Cir. 2016).
32
See, e.g., Hill v. Barnacle, 655 F. App'x 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016).
33
Henryv. Lamoreaux, No. 16-250, 2018 WL 3037180, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 19, 2018). In Henry,
the inmate "filed the subject grievance against prison official Wells, among others, on March 5,
2016," received on March 16, 2016 "an extension notice indicating that Plaintiff's allegations of
excessive force were being investigated," and the "alleged retaliatory conduct occurred on April
7, 2016." Id.
34
Walker v. Regan, No. 13-7556, 2019 WL 1003155, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2019).
35
Order, Talbert v. Philadelphia, No. 17-4262 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 4; Order,
Talbert v. Philadelphia, No. 16-5360 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 23.
36
Complaint, Talbert v. City of Philadelphia, No. 18-1581 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2018), ECF Doc.
No.2.
37
DeFranco, 387 F. App'x at 154.
38
ECF Doc. No. 121 at 10.
39
Id. at 12.
40
Id. (emphasis added).
41
Id.
15
42
See ECF Doc. No. 29 at 7.
43
ECF Doc. No. 61 at ,r 13.
44
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2007).
45
Id at 70.
46
Id
47
ECF Doc. No. 121 at 21.
48
ECF Doc. No. 119 at 4-5.
49
Dewald v. Jenkins, No. 16-04597, 2017 WL 1364673, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2017) (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
50
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
51
Id at 539.
52
ECF Doc. No. 121 at 33-47.
53
Id at 39.
54
Id at 40.
55
Id at 37.
56
ECF Doc. No. 61 at ,r 14.
57
Shockley-Byrdv. Zambrana, No. 18-4845, 2019 WL 2226128, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2019)
(quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)).
58
Id.
59
ECF Doc. No. 121 at 25.
60
ECF Doc. No. 61 at ,r 28.
16
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