TAYLOR v. BRENNAN et al

Filing 55

ORDER THAT TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ARE OVERRULED. THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IS APPROVED AND ADOPTED. THE UNION'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS GRANTED IN PART TO THE EXTENT THAT TAYLOR MUST PAY THE UNION $56.82 IN COSTS. SIGNED BY CHIEF JUDGE JUAN R. SANCHEZ ON 3/4/2020. 3/5/2020 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE AND E-MAILED.(amas)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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DAVID W. TAYLOR
v.
MEGAN J. BRENNAN
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
POSTMASTER GENERAL, et al.

CIVIL ACTION
No. 18-2118

ORDER
AND NOW, this 4th day of March, 2020, upon consideration of Defendant American
Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, Philadelphia, PA Area Local 89’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees,
and after careful and independent review of the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa, pro se Plaintiff David W. Taylor’s objections to the Report
and Recommendation, and the Union’s response to Taylor’s objections, it is ORDERED:
1. Taylor’s objections to the Report and Recommendation (Document 52) are
OVERRULED;1

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The Report and Recommendation grants the Union $56.82 in costs. Taylor objects because the
Union has already paid those costs. He also notes that, as a Union member, his dues contributed
to paying those costs. Taylor’s objections are meritless. Cost-shifting allows a prevailing party to
be reimbursed for costs it already paid. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (“[C]osts--other than attorney’s
fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party.”); see also Reger v. The Nemours Found., Inc.,
599 F.3d 285, 288 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (listing the kinds of costs that may be reimbursed and
explaining that “there is a strong presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party”
(internal citations omitted)). Because costs by definition have been paid by the prevailing party,
Taylor’s argument that already paid costs should not be awarded is illogical.
Taylor’s argument based on his payment of Union dues is also unavailing. His obligation
to pay Union dues is entirely distinct from his obligations relating to this litigation. As a member
of the Union, Taylor pays dues so the Union can work on his behalf. While a small percentage of
Taylor’s dues may have gone toward the costs of this case, the majority of his dues were likely
used for the Union’s many operating expenses. He was also not the only person whose dues
contributed to the costs. The Union likely paid the costs from funds it received from many Union
members. Therefore, the Court’s award of costs will not force Taylor to pay twice for the same
litigation.
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2. The Report and Recommendation (Document 51) is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
3. The Union’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Document 43) is GRANTED in part to the
extent that Taylor must pay the Union $56.82 in costs.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez
Juan R. Sánchez, C.J. 

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