MUHAMMAD v. FIGUREROA et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM SIGNED BY HONORABLE CHAD F. KENNEY ON 1/7/22. 1/7/22 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED. (va)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREEM MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,

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v.
CYNTHIA FIGUREROA, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-CV-3372

MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J.

JANUARY 7, 2022

Plaintiff Kareem Muhammad brings this pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, together with several related state law claims. (ECF No. 1.) Muhammad has
previously been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF No. 5.) For the following
reasons, the Court will dismiss his federal claim with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B)(ii) and will dismiss his state law claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 1
Muhammad names the following individuals in the caption of his Complaint: (1) Cynthia

Figureroa, (2) Latoya Carr-Hermitt, (3) Charlene Samuels, (4) Chun Hon Lau, (5) Katherine
Pachulski, (6) Beth Whitehead, (7) Carla Gardner, (8) Viktoria Kristiansson, (9) J. Michele
Fanning, (10) Diane Thompson, (11) Mia B. Hyman, (12) Kathleen Grum, (13) Beth Oswald,
(14) Margaret Theresa Murphy, (15) Michele Jackson, (16) Nasriyn Muhammad, (17) Kara
Templeton. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) He alleges that they are “public officials” and brings claims

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The allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Muhammad’s Complaint. The
Court adopts the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system.
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against them in their individual capacities, but does not specifically identify what role most of
them played in the events he describes as causing him injury. (Id. at 2, ¶ 1.) Muhammad alleges
the following:
7. The Defendants named in the instant matter are responsible for various
misrepresentations of material fact relating to a domestic matter which had a
critical impact on family court and custody proceedings that took place shortly
afterwards. The misrepresentations complained of consist of a report of “no
finding of abuse” pertaining to a minor child belonging to the Plaintiff in 2019
despite clear tell signs of abuse, thereby giving rise to the misrepresentations
complained of in the instant complaint.
8. It was known or should have been known by the parties, depending on their
role in the matter, that the representation was false and it is on the basis of this
gross negligence in the representation of the matter that the Plaintiff brings suit
against each of the individual entities named in the instant matter in their
individual capacity.
(Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 7, 8.) Muhammad further alleges that the “knowledge and reckless disregard for
the truth . . . engaged in jointly by each of the individuals in the instant matter constitutes the
underlying causes of action in the instant matter.” (Id. at 3, ¶ 10.) He reiterates that “[t]he
negligent/false representation complained of” give rise to his claims. (Id. at 3, ¶ 11.)
Attached to the Complaint are several Exhibits including a letter dated October 16, 2019
addressed to Muhammad from Defendants Chun Hon Lau, identified as a “DHS Worker,” and
Latoya Carr-Hermitt, identified as a “DHS Supervisor,” stating:
As you know, I have been conducting an assessment regarding whether your
family is in need of general protective services pursuant to a report we received at
the Philadelphia Department of Human Services. This letter to [sic] advise you
that my assessment has not found substantial evidence that your family is in need
of general protective services as defined by the Child Protective Service Law and
Regulation in need [sic] of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. We are therefore
closing the case on your family.
(Id. at 9.) The letterhead also identifies Cynthia Figueroa as the Commissioner of the
Department of Human Services. (Id.)

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Also identified as Exhibit A is what appears to be a copy of an email from Muhammad to
Defendant Chun Hun Lau dated April 3, 2019 with a subject line “Video Sulaiman talks about
dinosaur more.” (Id. at 10.) The email appears intended to forward 3 attachments. (Id.) Exhibit
B appears to be a screenshot of a text message transmitting a video and a portion of what appears
to be a transcript of custody proceedings. (Id. at 11.)
Exhibit C includes what appears to be a completed Philadelphia Police Department
Domestic Violence Report dated January 7, 2020. Muhammad appears to be identified as the
offender. (Id. at 13-14.) The identity of the complainant is redacted. (Id.) The description of
the incident is as follows: “Police resp to abv loc. Upon arrival, abv compl stated she’s been
having an ongoing dispute with the abv offender over custody of their children. Offender not on
location. PFA advised.” (Id. at 14.) Exhibit C also includes what appears to be a completed
Philadelphia Police Department Complaint or Incident Report dated February 23, 2020.
Defendant Nasriyn Muhammad is identified as the offender; Muhammad is identified as the
complainant. (Id. at 15.) The description of the incident is as follows: “Meet Complainant. Abu
compl came into the 39th Dist. HQ + showed Police PFA Order # 2002V7114 that the below B/F
[Nasriyn Muhammad] petitioned + rec’d from the court based on Domestic DC 2020-39-9585.
Police checked original report + the information conflicts between the domestic report + the
sworn PFA Statement.” (Id.)
Exhibit D appears to be a screenshot of an unidentified male. (Id. at 16.) Exhibit E
includes what appears to be a legal text with the following language circled: “Courts must not
use arrest warrants or license suspensions as a means of coercing the payment of court debt when
individuals have not been afforded constitutionally adequate procedural protection.” (Id. at 17.)
Exhibit E also includes a page from a letter dated May 4, 2021 addressed to Muhammad from the

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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation advising that his driver’s license
has been suspended pending fulfillment of his Domestic Relations obligations. (Id.)
Based on the foregoing, Muhammad asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
and state law claims for negligent misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation, and fraudulent
misrepresentation. He seeks recovery of compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive
relief consisting of “Ordering the Defendants to correct the misrepresentations complained of.”
(Id. at 8.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Muhammad has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF No. 5.)

Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the
Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “‘At this early stage of the litigation,’
‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable
inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, .
. . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366,
374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Muhammad is proceeding pro
se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

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When allowing a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must review the
pleadings and dismiss the matter if it determines, inter alia, that the action fails to set forth a
proper basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”); Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d
116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff
commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See
Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.” (citing
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006))).
III.

DISCUSSION
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, which provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). For the following reasons, Muhammad’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed.
A.

Section 1983 Claim Based on Negligence

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Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that at some time in 2019, the named
Defendants negligently misrepresented that Muhammad’s minor child was not being subjected to
abuse. (See ECF No. 1 at 2-3, 7, 8 and Exhibit A, Id. at 9.) The misrepresentations are alleged
to have impacted subsequent family court and custody proceedings. These proceedings are not
described, and the Complaint does not describe the outcome. Moreover, the Complaint does not
allege which Defendants 2 made misrepresentations, when they were made, to whom the
misrepresentations were made, or in what context. However, Muhammad contends that the
impact on the proceedings resulting from the negligent misrepresentations of the named
Defendants amounted to a deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Even
assuming that the conduct described was undertaken by an individual acting under color of state
law, Muhammad has not stated a plausible § 1983 claim. The United States Supreme Court has
held that § 1983 claims may not be predicated on a state actor’s mere negligence. See Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) (holding that mere negligence in training cannot form basis
of § 1983 liability); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that official’s mere
negligence is not actionable under § 1983 because “the Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
2

Muhammad does not allege the job titles of these Defendants or the role they played in the
alleged transmission of misrepresentations. However, the Court notes that child welfare workers
and attorneys who prosecute dependency proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity from §
1983 claims. See B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 262-65 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that
“in Ernst v. Child & Youth Services of Chester County, . . . we joined several of our sister circuits
in deeming ‘child welfare workers and attorneys who prosecute dependency proceedings on
behalf of the state ... absolute[ly] immun[e] from suit for all of their actions in preparing for and
prosecuting such dependency proceedings”) (citing Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester
Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 488-89 (3d Cir. 1997)). To the extent any of these Defendants holds such a
position, they are immune. Additionally, it appears based on the Exhibits to the Complaint that
Defendant Nasriyn Muhammad is Muhammad’s co-parent. It does not appear that she is a state
actor and therefore is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. See Simonton v. Tennis, 437 F.
App’x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011).
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property”). Because Muhammad bases his claim upon the alleged negligence of the named
Defendants, his § 1983 claim is not plausible and will be dismissed with prejudice.
B.

Section 1983 Claim Barred by Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Court understands Muhammad to be raising claims based on the underlying state
family court proceedings. However, to the extent that he is, the claim is not reviewable by this
Court under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district courts from reviewing final
decisions of a state court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction over
suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). Based on that principle, the RookerFeldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction over “cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Id. at 166 (quotations omitted). See also Malhan v.Sec. v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, 938
F.3d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined “to cases of the kind from
which it acquired its name: [1] cases brought by state-court losers [2] complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district court proceedings commence and
[4] inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”)) In the context of final
judgments made by state courts regarding child custody and termination of parental rights, the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars claims for relief that ask the court to “vacat[e] the decisions of
the Pennsylvania Superior Court regarding [plaintiff’s] parental rights [because] it would require

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the Court to reverse the state court judgment[.]” See Muhammad v. Cappellini, Civ. A. No. 10CV-2374, 2011 WL 3034393, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2011). This is an additional reason
Muhammad’s §1983 claim must be dismissed.
C.

Muhammad’s State Law Claims

Because the Court has dismissed his federal claim, the Court will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any of Muhammad’s state law claims.
Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens
of different States.”
Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’
even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is
some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,
592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the
state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to
remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). It is the
plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of citizenship, see Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72
(1939); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140,
1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete
diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been
met); Jackson v. Rosen, C.A. No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).

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Muhammad does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides only a
Pennsylvania address for himself and no addresses for any of the named Defendants.
Accordingly, Muhammad has not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for
purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue.
Therefore, they will be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Muhammad’s § 1983 claim with

prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and will dismiss
his state law claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Muhammad will
not be granted leave to file an amended complaint because to do so would be futile. Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-113 (3d Cir. 2002). An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Chad F. Kenney
_________________________________________
CHAD F. KENNEY, J.

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