TRAINER v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE KAREN S. MARSTON ON 6/3/2024. 6/4/2024 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(sg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION

JAMILLAH A. TRAINER,
Plaintiff,

NO. 23-1940-KSM

v.
COUNTY OF DELAWARE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
Marston, J.

June 3, 2024

Before the Court is Defendant County of Delaware’s (the “County”) motion for partial
summary judgment in this employment discrimination suit. (Doc. No. 17.) Plaintiff Jamillah A.
Trainer opposes the motion. (Doc. Nos. 24, 25.) For the reasons that follow, the Court grants
the County’s motion.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Trainer began working as a correctional officer at George W. Hill Correctional

Facility (“the Facility”) in March 2006. (Doc. No. 17-5 at 10:20–11:2.) From November 2020
to March 2022, Plaintiff took a leave of absence. (Id. at 41:21–25.) During this period from
2006 to 2022, the Facility was operated by the GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”). (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶
2.)
Plaintiff returned to work on March 16, 2022. (See Doc. No. 17-18 at 1.) At the time,
the County was preparing to take over operations of the Facility from GEO, and Laura Williams
had been named as Warden of the Facility. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 7.) The County informed the

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correctional officers employed by GEO that they would be permitted to apply for employment
with the County if they were currently full-duty, active employees, even if they became full-duty
after April 6, 2022, when the County officially took over operations. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11.)
Plaintiff subsequently applied for a position with the County and was initially
interviewed by a third party hired by the County to assist in the interview process. (Id. at ¶ 46.)
Then on March 17, 2022, Plaintiff was interviewed in person by George Rhoades, “a highly
qualified” retired captain who had extensive interview experience. 1 (Id. at ¶ 47; Doc. No. 17-18
at 1; Doc. No. 17-9 at 28:9–23.)
In conducting Plaintiff’s interview, Rhoades used standardized interview questions,
developed in advance by Warden Williams and recorded Plaintiff’s answers on the interview
form. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶¶ 17, 48; Doc. No. 26-2 at 17:13–21.) As with every other candidate,
after completing the interview, Rhoades used his professional judgment to provide a
recommendation as to whether Plaintiff should be offered a position of employment. (Doc. No.
26-2 at 20:16–21:8; see Doc. No. 17-9 at 31:23–32:1 (Warden Williams testifying “[the
interviewers] all knew at that time the direction, mission, values of the agency moving forward
and were told to evaluate each candidate independently and utilize their judgment”).) After
receiving each candidate’s completed interview form with Rhoades’s recommendation, Warden
Williams made the final determination as to whether an applicant would be offered continued
employment with the County. 2 (Doc. No. 17-9 at 18:23–19:14.)

Warden Williams selected Rhoades as an interviewer due, in part, to his experience conducting
numerous interviews throughout his professional career. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 13.)

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Warden Williams testified that her hiring decisions in theory were subject to approval of the County’s
Human Resources Manager, Budget Director and the Chair of the Jail Oversight Board. (Doc. No. 17-9
at 18:23–20:20.)

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During Plaintiff’s interview, Rhoades asked, among other things, about Plaintiff’s
employment history and why she applied for the correctional officer position. (Doc. No. 17-18
at 1.) The two also discussed Plaintiff’s recent leave of absence. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that she
explained to Rhoades that she had been on a leave of absence due to medical reasons (Doc. No.
17-5 at 57:24–58:4), but Rhoades maintains that Plaintiff stated only that she was on leave for
“personal reasons,” and that he did not probe for any further details (Doc. No. 26-2 at 33:18–
35:18). Rhoades’s interview notes state, “GWHCF 3/2006 to present. 11/2020 went out on leave
due to personal issues came back 3/16/22.” 3 (Doc. No. 17-18 at 1; see also Doc. No. 26-2 at
37:24–25 (Rhoades testifying, “Under oath, [Plaintiff] never mentioned medical leave – ever”).)
Although Plaintiff testified that Rhoades told her that he planned to recommend that she be
offered a position (Doc. No. 17-5 at 58:4–19), Rhoades testified to the contrary and his interview
notes record a recommendation that she not be hired, with the comment, “[c]ommitted years of
service, not meeting expectations for forward direction of institution.” (Doc. No. 26-2 at 38:5–
39:23; Doc. No. 17-18 at 3). Warden Williams ultimately agreed with Rhoades’s
recommendation not to hire Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 17-18 at 3 (Warden Williams’s annotation
below Rhoades’s recommendation to not hire, “Agree. Do not hire”); Doc. No. 17-9 at 59:3–7;
Doc. No. 17-14 at ¶ 21.)
On April 5, 2022, Plaintiff had an in-person meeting with Iris Wiley, then-Human
Resource Manager for the Facility; Dele Faly, Facility Deputy Warden; and Mario Colucci, thenGEO Deputy Warden. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 61.) Plaintiff was given a letter informing her that

Rhoades’s interview notes also state, “HR Approved. -*Sent HR email June of 2021 to return, no
response. * Sent another 3/4/22.” (Doc. No. 17-18 at 2.) Plaintiff testified during her deposition that the
Facility’s then-GEO Human Resource representatives were inappropriately “stopping” her from returning
to work. (Doc. No. 17-5 at 23:16–24:11; 45:4–19.)

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Warden Williams was not offering her a position for continued employment with the County. 4
(Id.) Warden Williams testified that it was their practice to have both a County and GEO
representative present on the final date of the GEO employment contract and that then-Deputy
Warden Colucci was present at the meeting as a witness. 5 (Id. at ¶ 62; Doc. No. 17-9 at 87:10–
25; Doc. No. 17-14 at ¶ 24.) Colucci otherwise did not participate in Plaintiff’s interview
process—he did not conduct any interviews, and Warden Williams testified that he had no input
in whether or not to extend an offer of employment to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 17-9 at 67:17–20;
Doc. No. 17-6 at 36:20–37:6 (Deputy Warden for Operations and Administration testifying that
“[t]o the best of my knowledge, Mario Colucci didn’t have any involvement in the interview
process”); Doc. No. 17-10 at 39:3–5 (Union Vice President testifying that he was not aware of
anyone who was interviewed by Colucci).) 6 No one at the County in human resources,
management, or administration told Plaintiff that Colucci was involved in the decision not to hire
her. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 59.) After Plaintiff read the letter informing her of the Warden’s

There is evidence in the record that the County had a limited review process for applicants who wished
to discuss why they were not selected for employment. (See Doc. No. 17-20 at 1 (Dele Faly email memo
stating that then-HR Manager Wiley explained to Plaintiff that if she has any questions regarding her
hiring disposition letter, she can “provide them in writing and someone will response (sic) back to her”);
Doc. No. 24-3 at 2 (handwritten note by Warden Williams on an applicant’s no-hire disposition letter
stating, “Afforded opportunity for discussion – she asked if the exact reason [for not hiring] was cited in
her letter. Informed she could follow up with HR and this request will be reviewed”).)

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Again, Plaintiff’s opposition to this undisputed fact merely states, “there was no legitimate reason for
Mr. Colucci to attend the April 5, 2022 meeting,” without pointing to any evidence in the record to
support this assertion. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 62.) Because the Court cannot discern any proper evidence to
the contrary, the Court accepts this justification for Colucci’s presence as undisputed fact.
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The president of the Delaware County Employees Independent Union (the “Union”) testified during his
deposition that he “believe[s] Colucci was an integral part” of the hiring decisions for the County. (Doc.
No. 17-11 at 66:1–4.) However, despite repeated prompts to provide evidence supporting this belief, the
Union president was unable to demonstrate any personal knowledge to substantiate his speculation aside
from Colucci’s attendance as a witness at the meetings where rejected applicants were given their hiring
disposition letters. (See, e.g., id. at 66:23–67:2 (“Q: . . . did anyone ever tell you from the County that
Mr. Colucci was the one making the decision? A: They won’t tell you that, but he was behind it.”).)
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decision, she turned to Colucci, accused him of being racist, and claimed that he was the reason
she was not retained by the County for employment. (See Doc. No. 17-20 at 1–4.)
During Plaintiff’s deposition, she alleged that Colucci was historically a racist individual,
and claimed that he inappropriately influenced Rhoades not to hire Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Doc. No.
17-5 at 27:2–7, 84:1–9; Doc. No. 25 at 8–9.) She alleged that “based on the extensive
interactions between Mr. Colucci and Mr. Rhoades, . . . Mr. Colucci influenced Mr. Rhoades to
reverse his stated intention to her to recommend that she be offered employment with defendant,
and instead recommend that she not be offered employment.” (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 58.)
However, Rhoades testified that he had no interaction with Colucci in connection with the
interviews he conducted for correctional officer candidates. (Doc. No. 26-2 at 42:19–22.)
Rhoades understood Colucci was present as a witness during the meetings where applicants were
informed of the Warden’s hiring decision, but explained that Colucci had no role in the decision
whether to hire an applicant. (Id. at 42:23–43:19.) There is no evidence in the record to suggest
that Colucci was involved in the decision not to offer Plaintiff employment and no evidence of
Colucci’s alleged “influencing” of Rhoades. 7 (See Doc. No. 17-9 at 68:19–20 (Warden Williams
testifying, “Mr. Colucci did not have any decision making in the hiring determination.”).)
After the County concluded its hiring, the County’s employees consisted of 84.49% black
correctional officers, and 80.87% black employees when considering the combined group of
Plaintiff also claims that Colucci possessed a “no-hire” list of employees who he planned to recommend
should not be hired. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 66.) Plaintiff does not offer any tangible evidence of this list
aside from a blurry photograph of Colucci holding a non-descript notebook. (Doc. No. 17-21.) Plaintiff
does not allege that she saw any of the names on the list, or that she saw her own name on the list. (Doc.
No. 17-5 at 28:9–29:5.) Other witnesses, including the Union president and vice president, testified that
they had seen Colucci in possession of a “no-hire” list, but stated their understanding that the list was
compiled based on allegations of bringing contraband into the Facility. (Doc. No. 17-10 at 40:3–19; Doc.
No. 17-11 at 46:17–47:3.) Neither witness testified that they had seen Plaintiff’s name on the list (see
Doc. No. 17-10 at 41:21–23), and neither testified that they had any personal knowledge that Warden
Williams considered such list in her final hiring determinations.
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correctional officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. (Doc. No. 17-23.) The County also hired three
white men who had been absent for an extended period of time: Robert Cullen as a correctional
officer, and John Omelchuk and Zach Serody as sergeants. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶¶ 34, 39; Doc.
No. 17-5 at 13:21–14:5; 46:9–12; Doc. No. 17-10 at 58:24–60:20.) Although these candidates
had been on extended leave, the length of their leaves of absence were not identified during their
interviews. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶¶ 35, 37, 38.) Warden Williams testified that she had never
learned the length of each individual’s leave. (Doc. No. 17-14 at ¶ 5; Doc. No. 17-9 at 73:17–22;
74:4–18; 76:4–9; 76:20–77:8.) The County did not have access to the personnel files previously
maintained by GEO’s human resources. 8 (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 5; Doc. No. 17-9 at 31:21–32:6
(Warden Williams testifying that the County did not have access to GEO records); Doc. No. 1714 at ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on May 5, 2023, alleging (1) a failure to make
reasonable accommodations under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951,
(2) disability discrimination under the ADA and the PHRA, (3) race discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000, and the PHRA, and
(4) unlawful retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA. (Doc. No. 1.) The County filed a motion
for partial summary judgment, seeking to dismiss all claims except Plaintiff’s disability
discrimination claims under the ADA and PHRA. (Doc. No. 17.)

Plaintiff does not admit or deny Defendant’s inclusion of this as an undisputed fact and instead states:
“After reasonable investigation, Ms. Trainer does not possess knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth” of this fact. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 5.) Because Plaintiff fails to counter this fact, the
Court accepts this as undisputed. See Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490,
493 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that “unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations or mere suspicions” are
insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment).

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Plaintiff agrees that she will not pursue her failure to accommodate claims under the
ADA and the PHRA or her retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA. 9 (Doc. No. 25 at
1.) The Court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on these claims.
Cf. McCarthy v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers, No. 21-1673, 2021 WL 5766569, at
*2 n.3 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2021) (“Plaintiffs abandoned their claims under the LMRA [. . .] by
omitting any reference to them in their opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.”); McCowan v. City of Philadelphia, 603 F. Supp. 3d 171, 193 (E.D. Pa. 2022)
(collecting cases supporting the proposition that a plaintiff’s failure to address the substance of
particular claims in opposition to a motion for summary judgment constitutes abandonment of
those causes of action); Laymon v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 645 F. Supp. 3d 443, 458 (W.D. Pa.
2022) (“Plaintiff’s failure to respond substantively to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on the hostile work environment claim amounts to an abandonment those claims, and
the entry of summary judgment as to those claims is appropriate.”). This leaves only Plaintiff’s
race discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA for the Court’s consideration.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

Plaintiff’s response states, “Ms. Trainer is not pursuing [. . . ] retaliation claims under Title VII and the
ADA.” (Doc. No. 25 at 1.) Plaintiff’s original complaint did not include a retaliation claim under the
ADA, but it did include a retaliation claim under the PHRA. (See Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 27–30, 35–38.)
Because Plaintiff does not raise any argument related to retaliation under the ADA in her opposition to
the motion for summary judgment (see generally Doc. No. 25), the Court infers that Plaintiff intended to
state that she does not intend to pursue retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA.

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requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the
judge’s function is not [herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. “While we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, we are not required to take into account evidence
that would not be admissible at trial.” Rosati v. Colello, 94 F. Supp. 3d 704, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(citing Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 296–97 (3d Cir. 2014)).
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 325 (“[T]he
burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the
district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”).
After the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required to “designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 323 (quotation marks omitted); see
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has carried
its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). “[U]nsupported assertions,
conclusory allegations or mere suspicions” are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment. Schaar, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 493. Summary judgment must be granted “if

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the evidence [. . . ] is too speculative to establish any material issue of fact.” Zimmer Paper
Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 94 (3d Cir. 1985).
III.

Analysis
The sole question before the Court is whether to grant the County’s motion for summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination under Title VII and the PHRA.
These claims are governed by the burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Analysis under this
framework proceeds in three steps. Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Co., 335 F. App’x 220, 222 (3d Cir.
2009). “First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Jones v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was
qualified for her position, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, (4) under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. Id. at 410–11; see
also Wallace v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 214 F. App’x 142, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (framing
the fourth element as requiring evidence that “either similarly-situated non-members of the
protected class were treated more favorably or the adverse job action occurred under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination”).
If the plaintiff carries her burden, “the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’” for the adverse employment action. Jones, 198 F.3d at
410–11 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). “Finally, should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248

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(1981)). To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must point “to some evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which a factfinder would reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. at 412–
13 (quoting Fuentes v. Perski, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Shaner v. Synthes
(USA), 204 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The plaintiff cannot simply show that the employee’s
decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory
animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or
competent.”).
Here, the County argues that Plaintiff does not have evidence to support her belief that
race was the reason behind the County’s decision not to hire her, asserting that her claim is
“unsubstantiated and speculative.” (Doc. No. 17 at 9.) The County argues that Plaintiff has not
set forth a prima facie case of race discrimination, but even if she had, the County has articulated
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff—that she had missed a significant
amount of time with GEO and the County was facing potential staffing concerns—and Plaintiff
fails to establish that this was merely pretext. (Id.) Plaintiff conversely argues that the County
fails to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not selecting Ms. Trainer, and that
there is “ample evidence” to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
circumstances surrounding her non-selection establish pretext. (Doc. No. 25 at 7.)
The Court need not address whether Plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case
of race discrimination 10, because even if she had, the County established a legitimate,
The Court notes that although the County agrees that Plaintiff satisfied the first three prongs of her
prima facie case, the County submits that Plaintiff failed to establish the fourth prong—that the
circumstances give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 11.) However,
the County’s brief on the motion for summary judgment does not elaborate on why they believe Plaintiff
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nondiscriminatory purpose for not hiring Plaintiff, and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the
County’s stated reason was pretextual.
A. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
The Court agrees that the County has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for not hiring Plaintiff. The County states that Plaintiff was not hired because she had missed a
significant amount of time with GEO and because the County faced potential staffing concerns
with correctional officers who were unavailable to work. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 11.) Plaintiff raises
three arguments to the contrary. First, Plaintiff argues that this is not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason because “significant amount of time” is a “nebulous, undefined term” and
is “entirely subjective.” (Doc. No. 25 at 7.) Second, Plaintiff argues that she was out on
protected leave during this period, and that Warden Williams “admitted that such a reason for an
extended period of time out from work cannot be relied upon as a reason not to hire an
applicant.” (Id. at 8.) Third, Plaintiff argues that the fact that she had been on leave for an
extended period with the previous employer does not mean that she will not be available to work
for a future employer. (Id.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
First, although it may be true that the phrase “significant amount of time” does not have a
specific definition, the Court finds that the County could consider a 15-month leave of absence—
over one full calendar year—to be a “significant amount of time.” See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763
(“The employer satisfies its burden of production [to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection] by introducing evidence which, taken as
true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable
employment decision.”); Terrell v. Main Line Health, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 644, 657 (E.D. Pa.
has failed to satisfy the fourth prong. (Id.) Thus, the Court focuses its analysis on the second and third
steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
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2018) (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763) (describing the employer’s burden at the second step of
the McDonnell Douglas framework to be a “relatively light” burden of production).
Second, for purposes of Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim, whether the County was on
notice of Plaintiff’s reason for her leave of absence is irrelevant. We are cabined here to
Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim, and while there appears to be a dispute as to whether
Plaintiff explained to Rhoades that she was on medical leave, this is material only to Plaintiff’s
disability discrimination claim, not her race discrimination claim. Cf. Lewis v. CNA Nat’l
Warranty Corp., 63 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (D. Minn. 2014) (“The conclusion that Lewis has
produced sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that she was discharged because of her sex and/or
age does not dictate that that evidence is susceptible to an inference that she was discharged
because of a disability. While the relevance of Lewis’ ADHD and anxiety to her sex and age
discrimination claims may yet be shown, she has not even attempted to identify evidence from
which it could be inferred that she was discharged because of a disability. Therefore, insofar as
CNAN seeks summary judgment on Lewis’ disability discrimination claim, the motion is
granted.”); White v. U.S. Cath. Conf., No. CIV.A.97-1253TAF/JMF, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11832, at *5 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998) (“[O]nly discrimination or retaliation of the same character
and type as that [which] is alleged is probative.”).
Last, while not a foregone conclusion that Plaintiff would be unavailable to work
consistently and full-time for the County as a correctional officer if she were retained, the
County’s consideration of Plaintiff’s past work history, which included over one year of leave, is
reasonable. The record indicates that the County had legitimate concerns regarding whether it
would have the staffing needed to maintain the safety of its personnel (see Doc. No. 17-9 at
51:18–52:5), and the County’s consideration of an applicant’s past work history with GEO is

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reasonable and relevant to that concern. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff hypothetically could have
been available if retained does not suggest that Defendant’s proffered reason is illegitimate. See
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (“The employer satisfies its burden of production by introducing
evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory
reason for the unfavorable employment decision.”); cf. id. (noting that the employer need not
“prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout this burdenshifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the
plaintiff”) (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court finds that the County has successfully
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not offering Plaintiff a position of
employment.
B. Pretext
Second, the Court agrees with the County that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any dispute
of fact suggesting that the County’s stated reason was a pretext for race discrimination. Plaintiff
argues that there are disputes of facts relating to the pretext prong of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, including (1) disputes concerning whether Mario Colucci was involved in the
decision to not offer Plaintiff employment; (2) disputes concerning whether the County’s
decision to offer employment to three white officers who had also been out on extended leave is
evidence of pretext; and (3) disputes regarding whether Warden Williams’s failure to take action
in response to Plaintiff’s complaint of race discrimination on April 5, 2022 is probative of
pretext. (Doc. No. 25 at 8–10.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
First, Plaintiff argues that Colucci, who she alleges is a racist individual, may have been
involved in the decision not to hire her as a correctional officer. (Id. at 8.) She argues that
although the County’s witnesses testified that Colucci had no official role in connection with

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Plaintiff’s employment application, “Mr. Rhoades testified that he had extensive interactions and
was very familiar with Mr. Colucci for many years before GEO hire[d] Mr. Rhoades in 2021.
Based on those interactions, Ms. Trainer contends that Mr. Colucci influenced Mr. Rhoades to
reverse his stated intention to her to recommend that she be offered employment, and instead
recommend that she not be offered employment.” (Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiff’s argument is belied by
the record and is flagrantly speculative. Contrary to Plaintiff’s unsupported claim, Rhoades
specifically testified that Colucci had no involvement in the hiring process and did not have any
impact on his decision to not recommend Plaintiff for employment. (Doc. No. 26-2 at 42:19–
19.) Other witnesses also confirmed that Colucci did not have any involvement in the hiring
decision for Plaintiff and did not conduct any interviews. (See Doc. No. 17-9 at 68:19–20
(Warden Williams testifying, “Mr. Colucci did not have any decision making in the hiring
determination”); id. at 67:17–20 (Warden Williams deposition, “Q: Now, did Mr. Colucci have
any input in whether or not you were going to hire Ms. Trainer – or extend an offer of
employment to her? A: No.”); Doc. No. 17-6 at 36:20–37:6 (Deputy Warden for Operations and
Administration testifying that “[t]o the best of my knowledge, Mario Colucci didn’t have any
involvement in the interview process”); Doc. No. 17-10 at 39:3–5 (Union Vice President
testifying that he was not aware of anyone who was interviewed by Colucci). 11 Plaintiff’s only
Although not discussed in Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment, the Union president’s
speculative testimony that Colucci played an “integral” role in the hiring determination is insufficient to
create a dispute of fact to defeat entry of judgment. The Union president was unable to provide even a
modicum of evidence based on personal knowledge and was merely speculating that Colucci was
involved because he was present at the letter disposition meetings. See supra n.6. See Robertson v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990) (“We note that an inference based upon a speculation
or conjecture does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment.”);
Huff v. Dresher Hill Health & Rehab. Ctr., No. 21-1773, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108264, at *22–23 (E.D.
Pa. June 22, 2023) (in disability association discrimination case, holding that a witness’s deposition
testimony was insufficient to avoid entry of summary judgment because “[n]othing in this testimony
allows any inference, or even suspicion, that among the reasons Plaintiff was fired, one of them was her
association with her son. . . . Plaintiff cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions that Defendant might have also terminated her because of her son’s disability”)
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proffered “evidence” that Colucci was involved in her hiring process is her speculation that
merely because Rhoades and Colucci were “friendly,” Colucci must have convinced Rhoades not
to hire her. (Doc. No. 25 at 8–9.) However, there is not a shred of evidence in the record to
support this assertion, and the Court concludes that there is no dispute of fact suggesting that the
County’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff was pretextual. 12 See Ma
v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC, F. App’x 165, 169–71 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff
failed to establish pretext in a gender/religious discrimination case because “the ‘evidence’ to
which [the plaintiff] points consists of her own conclusory statements and opinions, which are
legally insufficient to support an inference of pretext”); Fitzgerald v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
No. 23-2340, 2024 WL 771711, at *9 (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2024) (“To establish pretext under
the summary judgment standard, a plaintiff must either (1) offer evidence that casts sufficient
doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could
reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication, or (2) present evidence sufficient to
support an inference that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of the adverse employment action. Fitzgerald, however, relies on only his
own speculation and conjecture to demonstrate pretext, which is insufficient to defeat summary
judgment.”) (citation and quotation omitted); cf. Rosati, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 714–15 (holding that
the plaintiff failed to show a prima facie case of sex discrimination because “[a] plaintiff cannot

(cleaned up); Rosati, 94 F. Supp. at 715 (citing Blunt, 767 F.3d at 296–97) (“While we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, we are not required to take into account evidence that
would not be admissible at trial.”).
Plaintiff does not discuss this in her opposition brief to the County’s motion for summary judgment, but
to the extent Plaintiff argues that Colucci was involved in the determination not to hire her because he
was in a possession of a “no-hire” list of employees, Plaintiff fails to provide any admissible evidence
suggesting that Colucci had a created such a list that was based on racial animus, or otherwise that
Colucci was involved in Plaintiff’s hiring determination. See supra n.7.

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rely on unsupported assertions, speculation, or conclusory allegations to avoid the entry
of summary judgment. Rosati’s assertions that she alone received certain extra assignments from
Sgt. Colello, and that he specifically assigned them to her because of her sex, are unsupported
and conclusory. Beyond the pleadings, Rosati provides only her deposition testimony to support
this claim, and her deposition testimony relies on hearsay -- that is, what other police officers
told her their work assignments were”) (citations omitted).
Second, Plaintiff argues that that the legitimate reason for not hiring Plaintiff is pretext
for race discrimination because the County offered employment positions to three white
individuals—John Omelchuk, Zach Serody, and Robert Cullen—who, like Plaintiff, had recently
taken extended leaves of absence prior to receiving employment offers from the County. 13 (Doc.
No. 25 at 9.) But, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that although Warden Williams
knew that Plaintiff had been out on leave for approximately 15 months (see Doc. No. 17-18 at 1;
Doc. No. 17-5 at 41:21–25), she did not know the length of the leaves taken by Omelchuk,
Serody and Cullen. (Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶¶ 35, 37, 38; Doc. No. 17-14 at ¶ 5; Doc. No. 17-9 at
73:17–22; 74:4–18; 76:4–9; 76:20–77:8.) Instead, she testified that she did not have access to
GEO’s personnel records to determine the length of leave of absence for Omelchuk, Serody, and
Cullen, and that she did not learn the length of their leaves of absence during the interview
process. (Doc. No. 17-9 at 31:21–32:6; 73:17–22; 74:4–18; 76:4–9; 76:20–77:8.) Although
Plaintiff argues that Warden Williams testified that she knew at least two of them were on
extended leaves due to approved medical or workers compensation claims (Doc. No. 25 at 9), the
record indicates the contrary. Plaintiff’s only record citation for this assertion is to Warden
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he testimony of Mr. Rhoades and Ms. Williams that they allegedly did not
know the reason why Ms. Trainer was out from work merely establishes a dispute as to a genuine issue of
material fact.” (Id.) But as discussed above, whether Rhoades and Warden Williams actually knew of the
reason for Plaintiff’s leave is irrelevant to her race discrimination claim. See supra Part III.A.

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Williams’s deposition (see id.), 14 but in the cited record, Warden Williams specifically denied
knowledge of the length of each individual’s leave. (See Doc. No. 17-9 at 73:17–22 (“A: But
your original question was whether or not I was aware if [Robert Cullen] was out on any leave?
Q: Yes. Were you? A: I was not aware that he was out on any leave.”); id. at 74:4–76:16 (“Q:
you interviewed Mr. [Serody]. Correct? A: Yes. [. . .] Q: Did you know at the time that he had
been out for a year or so because of a hand injury. [Defendant’s counsel objects to form.] A:
Worker’s Compensation claim. I don’t know the length of time.”) (emphasis added); id. at
76:20–77:8 (“Q: do you recall whether [John Omelchuk] was out on leave for a period of time
while he worked for GEO? A: I believe he was as well. I don’t know the specifics. Q: You
don’t know how long he was out? A: No.”) (emphasis added).) Because Warden Williams was
unaware of the length of leave for the three white employees, and there is no proper evidence
indicating a genuine dispute of fact as to this issue, these three candidates are inapt comparisons
to Plaintiff. This cannot serve as a basis for establishing pretext.
Last, Plaintiff argues that Warden Williams’s failure to act after Plaintiff lodged
allegations of racial discrimination against Colucci during her April 5, 2022 rejection meeting
establishes pretext. (Doc. No. 25 at 9–10.) Plaintiff suggests that the County established a
mechanism for rejected applicants to seek review of the rejection decision, that Warden Williams
had “numerous documents” relating to Plaintiff’s complaint that race was a motivating factor in
her decision not to continue her employment with the County, and that Warden Williams’ failure
to investigate Plaintiff’s complaint in light of this “evidence” is “probative of whether race
discrimination in fact was a motivating factor in the decision to not offer her employment.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s brief cites to paragraphs 87 and 88 of Plaintiff’s Additional Statement of Undisputed Facts,
but based on the context of the argument, the Court understands that Plaintiff was likely referring to
paragraphs 86 and 87 of the Additional Statement of Undisputed Facts. (See Doc. No. 24-2.)

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Plaintiff’s confused argument misrepresents the evidence in the record and fails to provide a
coherent basis for suggesting that the County’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not
hiring Plaintiff was pretextual. Any failure of Warden Williams not to pursue Plaintiff’s
allegations of racism against Colucci raised during the April 5, 2022 meeting (see Doc. No. 24-3
at 6–9), is insufficient to establish that the County’s reason for not hiring Plaintiff was pretextual.
The evidence shows that Warden Williams had personal knowledge that Colucci was not
involved in Plaintiff’s hiring determination, which was made prior to any accusations of racism.
(See Doc. No. 17-9 at 68:15–22 (“Q: So once you received that information, did you do any kind
of investigation to determine whether or not there was any truth or validity to what Ms. Trainer
alleged? A: Well, Mr. Colucci did not have any decision making in the hiring determination.
And in terms of the allegations of Mr. Colucci being racist, I had no --- no other evidence to
substantiate that. [. . . .] Q: So would it be correct to say that if Mr. Colucci, in fact, was a racist,
that had no impact on your decision to either hire --- offer an employment to Ms. Trainer or to
change your recommendation not to offer employment? A: The decision to offer employment
had already been made or not to offer. His allegations of being racist was a separate issue.”).)
Plaintiff’s speculation that Colucci was racist and must have been involved in the decision of the
County not to hire her cannot manufacture a dispute of fact.
Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any dispute of fact that
would permit a reasonable jury to determine that the County’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for denying Plaintiff’s employment application was pretextual of race discrimination. 15

The overall employment statistics for employees hired at the Facility further bely Plaintiff’s argument
that the County’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not employing Plaintiff was pretextual.
Plaintiff admits that nearly 85% of correctional officers hired at the Facility self-identified as Black, and
over 80% of all correctional officers, lieutenants and sergeants who disclosed their race did the same.
(Doc. No. 17-23; Doc. No. 24-2 at ¶ 27.) The Court concludes that this additional evidence also refutes
Plaintiff’s suggestion of pretext.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the County’s partial motion for summary judgment is
granted. An appropriate Order follows.

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