ROLISON v. THE EDGEWOOD COMPANY, INC.

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE WENDY BEETLESTONE ON 6/4/2024. 6/5/2024 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(sg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NICK ROLISON,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

v.
THE EDGEWOOD COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.

NO. 23-3909

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Nick Rolison is suing his former employer, The Edgewood Company, Inc.
(“Edgewood”), stemming from the company’s actions after Rolison suffered a work-related
injury. He specifically brings an interference and retaliation claim under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, as well as claim that “Defendant unlawfully violated
the public policy exception to Pennsylvania’s common law tradition of at-will employment by
unlawfully terminating Plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for Plaintiff’s decision to avail
himself of the benefits of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation [Act].” (“WCA”)
Before the Court is Edgewood’s Motion, brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Edgewood’s
Motion shall be denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rolison was working as a Laborer/Equipment Operator when, in lifting a retaining wall,
he heard a pop in his back and then felt a sharp pain. He reported this work injury to Edgewood
immediately and, given that he had difficulty lifting and reaching overhead, immediately went
out on a leave of absence. A few days later, he was treated at a hospital and advised to be on
light duty for the foreseeable future.
1

From the day he went out on leave of absence he “remained in constant contact” with his
foreman about an anticipated return to work. Within a couple of weeks, he spoke with John Fry,
Edgewood’s co-owner, and requested that Edgewood open a workers’ compensation claim. Fry
responded: “okay, we’ll get started.”
A little more than a month later, Rolison received a Notice of Workers’ Compensation
Denial informing him that his claim was denied because he was no longer employed by
Edgewood. This is how Rolison learned of his work termination. Although he still does not
know the exact date on which he was terminated, Rolison understands that he was terminated for
a “no call, no show.”
LEGAL STANDARDS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. When analyzing a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed “in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff,” with the question being “whether, under any reasonable reading
of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Legal conclusions are disregarded, well-pleaded facts
are taken as true, and a determination is made as to whether those facts state a “plausible claim
for relief.” Id. at 210-11. Here, as set forth below, the Amended Complaint contains sufficient
factual matter to plausibly support Plaintiff’s claims.

2

DISCUSSION
A. FMLA Interference and Retaliation Claim
An FMLA interference claim requires that the plaintiff establish that: (1) he or she was an
eligible employee; (2) the employer was subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff
was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) the plaintiff notified the defendant of his or her intent
to take FMLA leave; and, (5) the employer denied FMLA benefits to which he or she was
entitled. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014). “Where, as here, the employee
claims that FMLA interference occurred based upon the employer’s failure to inform him of his
ability to take FMLA leave, the employee must show resulting prejudice.” Burbach v. Arconic
Corp., 561 F. Supp.3d 508, 517 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas.
Co., 364 F.3d 135, 143 (3d Cir. 2004)). “Prejudice occurs when the employer’s failure to advise
the plaintiff of her FMLA rights ‘rendered h[er] unable to exercise [the right to leave] in a
meaningful way, thereby causing injury.” Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 31819 (3d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 143). If the plaintiff
would have structured her leave in a different manner had she known of her ability to take
FMLA leave, she has shown prejudice. Burbach, 561 F. Supp.3d at 517 (citing Conoshenti, 364
F.3d at 142-43).
To invoke rights under the FMLA an employee must provide adequate notice to the
employer of the need to take leave. Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294,
303 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)). “When the leave is unforeseeable, the
employee’s obligation is to ‘provide sufficient information for an employer to reasonably
determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave request.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
825.303(b)). “[T]his is not a formalistic or stringent standard.” Id.

3

Edgewood first argues that Rolison’s Amended Complaint does not satisfy the fourth
prong in that Rolison did not notify Edgewood of his intent to take FMLA leave because he did
not make his employer aware of a serious health condition. However, the allegations of the
Amended Complaint plausibly state otherwise: Rolison avers that he suffered an injury while at
work that resulted in sharp pain and that he then immediately reported this injury to Edgewood.
He then remained in constant contact with his foreman about an anticipated return date. Not
only that, he also requested that Edgewood open a workers’ compensation claim when he spoke
with Edgewood’s co-owner.
Edgewood next argues that Rolison does not meet the fifth prong for an FMLA
interference claim because he does not sufficiently plead a causal and/or temporal link between
his work injury and his termination. This argument, however, is inapposite because the fifth
prong of an FMLA interference claim focuses on the plaintiff “show[ing] that FMLA benefits
were actually withheld,” not on a temporal link. See Ross, 755 F.3d at 192 (citing Callison v.
City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 117 (3d Cir. 2005)). As for causation, Rolison has pled that
he was qualified for leave under the FMLA, that Edgewood knew of his injury, and that
Edgewood did not provide him such leave. Further, his allegations plausibly suggest prejudice in
that he was terminated without being informed of his FMLA rights. Thus, his FMLA
interference claim proceeds. 1

To the extent that Edgewood’s argument pertains to Rolison’s FMLA retaliation claim, it also fails. Rolison avers
that he suffered his work injury on April 20, 2023; that he spoke again about the injury on May 2, 2023; and that he
discovered his employment termination on June 7, 2023. Given these facts, Edgewood would have been aware of
Rolison’s serious health issue and thus known to alert him of his ability to take FMLA leave on May 2, 2023 when
he requested that Edgewood file a workers’ compensation claim. This occurred approximately one month before
Rolison’s employment termination, a short enough time to demonstrate linkage between Edgewood’s knowledge of
Rolison’s need for FMLA leave and his termination. Rolison’s termination was likely even earlier than June 7,
2023, because that is the date where he learned of his termination, not when his employment actually was
terminated. At bottom, Rolison sufficiently pleads a causal link between his entitlement to FMLA benefits and his
termination.
1

4

An FMLA retaliation claim requires that the plaintiff show: (1) he or she invoked the
right to FMLA-qualifying leave; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment decision; and, (3)
the adverse decision was causally connected to his or her invocation of rights. Laguna v. Chester
Hous. Auth., 616 F. Supp.3d 462, 471 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 30102). Edgewood argues that Rolison does not satisfy the first prong because he did not engage in
any protected activity. As demonstrated above, however, Rolison engaged in a protected activity
when he allegedly suffered an injury at work and then immediately notified Edgewood of the
injury, remained in constant contact with his foreman, and requested Fry that the company make
a workers’ compensation claim. Thus, the FMLA retaliation claim also proceeds.
B. Wrongful Termination Claim Under Pennsylvania Common Law
Under Pennsylvania law, an employer may generally dismiss an employee for any reason
unless restrained by contract. Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Henry v.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 21 A. 157, 157 (1891)). Such power is not absolute and “may
be qualified by the dictates of public policy.” Id. Relevant here, “a cause of action exists under
Pennsylvania law for wrongful discharge of an employee who files a claim for workers’
compensation benefits.” Id. at 1238.
Here, Edgewood argues that the Amended Complaint “is devoid of any factual
allegations that Edgewood terminated Rolison in direct retaliation for availing himself of any of
the benefits provide[d] to him under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.” Id.at 1213. But that is not so. Although Rolison does not know the specific date of his employment
termination because he did not find out that he had been fired until he received a “Notice of
Workers’ Compensation Denial” on June 7, 2023, it is plausible that Edgewood terminated his
employment for seeking workers’ compensation given the allegations that: (1) Edgewood was

5

alerted to Rolison’s injury in late April; (2) Rolison asked Fry to open a workers’ compensation
claim; (3) Fry told Rolison that the company would “get started” on a workers’ compensation
claim in May; and, (4) the company must have terminated his employment within approximately
one month of that statement when Rolison learned of his termination on June 7.
“[A] cause of action exists under Pennsylvania law for wrongful discharge of an
employee who files a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with an employer but has not
filed a claim petition with the [Workers’ Compensation] Bureau.” Owens v. Lehigh Valley
Hosp., 103 A.3d 859, 869 (Pa. Commw. 2014) (emphasis added). Rolison was not merely
contemplating whether to file a workers’ compensation claim or casually discussing it. Rather,
he specifically told his employer’s co-owner that he wanted Edgewood to file a workers’
compensation claim on his behalf to which the co-owner said “okay, we’ll get started.”
The court’s analysis in Smith v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 2011 WL 4346340, (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 16, 2011), is instructive. In Smith, the court analyzed state and federal cases to determine
whether the plaintiff in that case had engaged in protected activity under the WCA. Id. at *3-*5.
The court concluded that “federal courts in Pennsylvania have oft predicted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in furthering the public policy underlying the WCA, would extend
the protection of the Act to injured employees who have expressed their intent to pursue workers
compensation claims.” Id. at *6. It went on to state:
it is the reporting of the work-related injury in conjunction with the employee’s
expression of intent to file a workers[’] compensation claim that is enough to trigger
the protection afforded by the [WCA]. This stands to reason because, without
question, the internal reporting of a workplace injury to the employer is the first
step in pursuing a workers’ compensation remedy.
Id. To find otherwise would lead to an employer having “a window to escape liability by beating
an injured employee to the punch” where the employer “who had been notified that an employee

6

has been injured on the job and knows of the injured employee’s intent to file a workers[’]
compensation claim . . . may terminate the injured employee before that employee reasonably
has the opportunity” to actually file a claim. Id.
The same reasoning applies here. Although Rolison did not learn of his employment
being terminated until June 7, 2023, and did not file a claim with the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation until June 1, 2023, he specifically asked his employer to file a workers’
compensation claim on May 2, 2023. It is plausible that Edgewood then terminated Rolison’s
employment for making that request. Dismissing Rolison’s claim here could encourage
Edgewood, or any company, to terminate an employee any time he or she notified the company
of an intent to file a workers’ compensation claim and thus avoid liability. Such an outcome
would frustrate the very purpose of Pennsylvania’s public policy to prevent the “wrongful
discharge of an employee who files a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.” See Shick, 716
A.2d at 1238. Thus, Count II of the Amended Complaint also proceeds to discovery.
An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:
/s/Wendy Beetlestone, J.
___________________________
WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.

7