MACDOUGALL v. RHULING et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE KAREN S. MARSTON ON 8/28/2024. 8/29/2024 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(sg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HEATHER A. MACDOUGALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN RHULING, SR., et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-0989

MEMORANDUM
MARSTON, J.

August 28, 2024

In this civil action, Plaintiff Heather A. MacDougall raises claims stemming from her
prior employment with The Buck Hotel in Feasterville, Pennsylvania. The Court previously
dismissed MacDougall’s claims due to her failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 but permitted her leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. Nos. 9, 10), which she
has done (Doc. No. 11). For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss MacDougall’s
Amended Complaint and give her one more opportunity to amend.
I.

BACKGROUND 1
On March 6, 2024, MacDougall initiated this lawsuit by filing 192 pages of

miscellaneous and duplicative exhibits, several of which contain her handwritten notes. (Doc.
No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, through two separate filings, MacDougall submitted four separate
form complaints. (Doc. Nos. 3, 4.) While it was apparent that MacDougall intended to bring
forth employment discrimination claims against The Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling, Sr. and Brian
Ruling, Jr., her voluminous filings failed to provide “a clear narrative of the events at issue” and
“the specific contours of [her] claims, who she [brought] each claim against, and what each

The following allegations are taken from MacDougall’s filings. The Court adopts the pagination
supplied to those filings by the CM/ECF docketing system.

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defendant [was] alleged to have done with regard to each claim [was] unclear, even under a
liberal construction of [her] submissions.” (Doc. No. 9 at 1, 7.) The Court thus dismissed
MacDougall’s Complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. (Id.) The Court permitted MacDougall to file an Amended Complaint, instructing
her to clearly articulate the basis for her claims against each Defendant without relying
exclusively on exhibits. (Id. at 7 (“If MacDougall wishes to proceed with her case against The
Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling Sr., and Brian Rhuling Jr., she must file one comprehensive
complaint containing a coherent articulation of facts set forth in numbered paragraphs explaining
what each Defendant did or did not do that allegedly caused her injury, and an organized list of
claims she intends to bring based on those events.”).)
On June 14, 2024, MacDougall’s timely filed her Amended Complaint, which is
comprised of several documents and exhibits submitted together in one filing, in no particular
order. (Doc. No. 11.) It appears from these filings that MacDougall intends to bring forward
gender, disability, and familial status discrimination claims as well as a variety of state law tort
claims against The Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling Sr., and Brian Rhuling Jr. (Id.) However, given
the scattered and confused nature of her filing, the Court cannot discern a clear narrative of the
facts and finds it most fruitful to provide an overview of each document contained in
MacDougall’s Amended Complaint.
The first page of MacDougall’s filing is a one-page “civil complaint” form for use in
state courts, which reflects her intent to sue The Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling Sr., and Brian
Rhuling Jr. for $400,000 in damages. (Id.) MacDougall did not include any factual allegations
or claims in this form complaint. (Id.)

2

The second document provided by MacDougall purports to be an accounting of the
$400,000 in damages allegedly owed to MacDougall by Defendants and several other individuals
who are not named as defendants for matters including discrimination based on MacDougall’s
gender and status as a single mother, wrongful termination, Defendants disqualifying her from
unemployment, issues with her landlord, “car vandalism,” “car injury connected to auto
insurance policy fraud,” and “lost income from stalker.” (Doc. No. 11-1 (capitalization
omitted)).) The document attributes some of MacDougall’s harm to her prior landlord and his
stepson, an insurance agent who was allegedly friends with Brian Rhuling Jr., and MacDougall’s
“Ex’s Attorney.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 2, 4.)
The third document filed as a part of the Amended Complaint reflects MacDougall’s
intention to sue The Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling Sr. (identified as the Owner), and Brian Rhuling
Jr. (identified as the Manager) for discrimination based on her gender, disability, and family
status (“Single Mother – Head of Household – Two Dependents”). (Doc. No. 11-2 at 1.)
MacDougall’s allegations on this front are far reaching and disconnected. In particular, it
appears that MacDougall raises the following nine claims against Defendants:
•

First, MacDougall alleges that Brian Rhuling, Sr. terminated her “for absolutely
no good reason,” apparently based on a false accusation that she was “giving
away free beers” to a table that was not hers. (Id.)

•

Second, MacDougall alleges that she had a different computer system from the
“males” she worked with, that someone else was cashing out sodas on her
computer, and that once in a while she was “forced to multi-task to give
exceptional customer service,” causing delays in ringing items into the system.
(Id. at 2.)

•

Third, MacDougall alleges that she was discriminated against when Brian
Rhuling, Jr. refused to check the camera system to help her determine who
vandalized her car that was parked in The Buck Hotel parking lot. (Id.) When
MacDougall asked for the cameras to be checked, Rhuling, Jr. replied that there
were “[n]o cameras back there,” even though MacDougall alleges that there are in
fact cameras in the area and that she is “positive if one of the guys were to ask
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him to check the camera footage he would have been more likely to help them!”
(Id.)
•

Fourth, MacDougall claims she endured a “stalker intruder.” (Id. at 3.) Her
allegations regarding the stalker are opaque but suggest that she or others have or
had a restraining order against this individual, that he apparently visited The Buck
Hotel, and that Brian Rhuling Jr. refused to remove him when she asked. (Id.)
MacDougall alleges that she is “[i]nterested in following through with Restraining
Order again to guarantee he leaves [her] relationship and work endeavors alone!”
(Id.)

•

Fifth, MacDougall alleges that Defendants “unethically disqualified [her from]
unemployment multiple times,” although she provides no allegations explaining
what Defendants did. (Id.)

•

Sixth, MacDougall contends that The Buck Hotel has engaged in what she refers
to as “churning (bullying)”—apparently a term for speaking about her to clients in
what she believes is an untruthful or unfavorable manner. (Id. at 3–4.) She
claims these statements have damaged her reputation and prevented her from
finding an attorney to represent her. (Id. at 3–4.)

•

Seventh, she claims Defendants would not provide her with her “financial
history” when requested, apparently in reference to their refusal to provide her
copies of her paystubs. (Id. at 4.)

•

Eighth, she claims that The Buck Hotel permitted a false rumor to circulate that
she was dating an older man who she was in fact helping because he was “dying
from emphysema and sleep apnea.” (Id. at 4.)

•

Ninth, she alleges that Brian Rhuling Sr. called her “lazy” when she looked at the
television briefly while working a shift after undergoing a surgery that required
her to be careful and not lift anything heavy. (Id. at 5.)

In this document, MacDougall also lists “Additional Discriminating Partie(s),” where she
identifies other issues she has had with individuals who the owners of The Buck Hotel are
friendly with. (Id.) This includes a landlord/tenant dispute with “Joe Kelly and Daniel Kelly” of
“JMJM Inc.,” a car insurance dispute with “Mike Tienary” of SafeCo Auto Insurance, and a
dispute with “Eric McGee” who she describes as a “Custodial Party” that was involved with her
family hardships. (Id.) MacDougall contends she experienced “additional injury” due to

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defamation, slander, libel, discrimination, “ethnic intimidation,” and “Hate/Envy/Parental
Alienation.” (Id.)
The fourth document MacDougall submitted purports to be an explanation of her
discrimination claims in which reiterates the issues discussed in her third document.
Specifically, she writes:
Wrongful Termination (false accusation) – Pain & Suffering (stalker, landlord
problems, car, defamation), Financial & Family Hardships (custody issues),
Refused to remove Stalker (intruder with Restraining Orders), refused to send
over Pay Stubs (Asked kindly by email), refused to check camera footage after
endangering car vandalism (Paid Out-Of-Pocket – Someone slashed tires with
blades & vindictively shoved windshield wiper blades into hood during storm in
The Buck Hotel Parking Lot), POS Gender Discrimination (computer system
differed from guys I worked with), Referred to as “Dumb Blonde” in front of
customers, Demotion, Treated differently than the 4 guys I worked with for years!
(Doc. No. 11-3 at 1.)
The fifth document submitted as a part of the Amended Complaint is a completed form
complaint for a plaintiff raising employment discrimination claims. (Doc. No. 11-4.) In this
document, MacDougall confirms her desire to sue The Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling Sr., and Brian
Rhuling Jr. for discrimination related to her former employment as a server. 2 (Doc. No. 11-4 at
5, 8-11.) By checking the appropriate locations on the form complaint, and consistent with her
other documents, MacDougall indicates that she brings claims for gender discrimination pursuant
to Title VII, disability discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
and discrimination based on family status and disability pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (“PHRA”). (Id. at 5.) She contends that the Defendants unlawfully terminated
her, failed to promote her, failed to accommodate her ADHD, failed to stop harassment,
subjected her to unequal terms and conditions of employment, retaliated against her, and caused
MacDougall also included a copy of the Court’s prior order as part of her submission, which was not
necessary. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 2–4.)
2

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her other harm in the form of an “unwillingness to remove stalker intruder, provide pay stubs or
financial records, or check camera footage to verify car vandalism.” (Id. at 8–9.) She requests
monetary relief and for Defendants to refrain from “causing additional hardships” with her
family and finances. (Id. at 11.)
Finally, MacDougall submitted a variety of exhibits that appear unrelated to her claims
discussed above. In particular, she attaches documents pertaining to her car insurance dispute in
which she claims an additional unauthorized driver was added to her policy (Doc. No. 11-5 at 1–
6, 11–13), pertaining to a domestic relations case and landlord/tenant case in Bucks County, (id.
at 7, 14, 17; Doc. No. 11-6), and illustrating allegedly fraudulent activity pertaining to her credit
cards, her credit report, and matters with her landlord (Doc. No. 11-5 at 8–10, 15–16, 18–20). 3
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since MacDougall is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

requires the Court to dismiss her Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. This analysis is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 F. App’x 794, 797 (3d Cir. 2015). Thus,
the Court must determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he plausibility paradigm . . . applies with equal force to
analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.” Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). This means a plaintiff in an
employment discrimination case must put forth allegations that “raise a reasonable expectation
On August 19, 2024, two months after filing her Amended Complaint, MacDougall submitted a litany of
additional exhibits to the docket. (Doc. No. 12.) As discussed later in this memorandum, these exhibits
are largely duplicative of other exhibits MacDougall already filed in this matter and do not add any
substance to her claims. See infra at p. 20 n.10.
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that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Id. at 213 (quotation marks
omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As MacDougall is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally, and
will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)). Thus, “[a]t this early stage of the litigation, [the Court will] accept the
facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s]
favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a
plausible [] claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (alterations
accepted and internal quotation marks omitted). However, ‘pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185 (quoting Mala, 704
F. 3d at 245). And an unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by
the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id.
In that regard, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). Rule 8 requires a
pleading to include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” as well as a statement of the court’s jurisdiction and a demand for the relief sought.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In determining whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s “short and plain”
statement requirement, the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies
discrete defendants and the actions taken by [the named] defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s
claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). A pleading may still satisfy the “plain”
statement requirement “even if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information” and
“even if it does not include every name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. at 93–

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94. The important consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint’s language . . .
presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.” Id. at 94.
III.

DISCUSSION
Although MacDougall’s Amended Complaint is an improvement over her initial

Complaint (or series of complaints), it is still fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. The Amended Complaint is comprised of a group of exhibits and forms (or
portions of forms) that are put together in a disorganized manner, making it difficult for the
Court or Defendants to understand what she is alleging and what her claims are based upon.
(Doc. No. 11.) In particular, most of the exhibits and documents contained in the Amended
Complaint pertain to acts taken by third parties or involve matters that appear wholly unrelated
to the named Defendants, such as MacDougall’s car insurance dispute, domestic relations case,
and alleged financial or credit card fraud. (Id.) And although it is again apparent that
MacDougall seeks to raise claims against The Buck Hotel, Brian Rhuling Sr., and Brian Rhuling
Jr. based on her termination and other matters that occurred in connection with her employment
at The Buck Hotel, the Amended Complaint does not provide a clear narrative of events that
identifies what each defendant is alleged to have done and when. While MacDougall’s
continued failure to comply with Rule 8 is an independent basis to dismiss her complaint,
because the Court is able gather from this confused filing that MacDougall intends to bring forth
claims for gender discrimination under Title VII, disability discrimination under the ADA,
familial status and disability discrimination under the PHRA, and a variety of claims under
Pennsylvania tort law, out of an abundance of caution, we will address the merits of those claims

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below. See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the
applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”).
A. Federal Claims Under the ADA and Title VII
It appears that MacDougall intends to bring claims under Title VII for discrimination
based on her sex and under the ADA for discrimination based on her purported disability of
ADHD. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 8–9); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on gender); id. § 12112 (prohibiting employment discrimination based on
disability). As an initial matter, Title VII and the ADA do not provide a cause of action against
individual employees, as opposed to the employer (here, The Buck Hotel), so MacDougall
cannot sue Brian Rhuling, Sr. and Brian Rhuling, Jr. under these statutes. See Williams v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Title VII and the
ADA impose liability only on employers . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Koslow v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]here appears to be no
individual liability for damages under Title I of the ADA.”); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co.,100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e are persuaded that Congress did not
intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII.”). The Court will therefore construe
her ADA and Title VII claims as having been raised against The Buck Hotel only and discuss
each in turn below. 4
1. ADA
The Court turns first to MacDougall’s claims for discrimination under the ADA. The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits covered entities from discriminating against
Although MacDougall checked box on the Court’s form complaint suggesting she intends to raise
retaliation claims under Title VII or the ADA, (Doc. No. 11-4 at 9), even a liberal construction of her
pleading does not support any such claims. To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must plead
“sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the

4

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qualified employees based on their disabilities. Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242,
245 (3d Cir. 2020). To state a plausible discrimination claim under the ADA a plaintiff must
allege sufficient factual matter to support a reasonable inference that: (1) she is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job, with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment
decision as a result of discrimination based upon her disability. Id. (citation omitted). “[A]n
adverse employment action means simply that the employee suffered ‘some harm’ to a term or
condition of employment—in other words, that the employer treated the employee ‘worse’
because of a protected characteristic.” Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 277 (3d
Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). 5 An employer’s refusal to make reasonable accommodations for a

following elements: (1) she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII [or the ADA]; (2) the employer
took adverse action against her; and (3) a causal link exists between her protected conduct and the
employer’s adverse action.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016); see also
Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e analyze ADA retaliation claims
under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.”). Here,
MacDougall’s claim fails at the first step: she does not allege that she engaged in a protected activity
under either of these statutes. Accordingly, any retaliation claims are not plausible. The Court will
therefore focus its analysis on MacDougall’s employment discrimination claims, as this is the crux of her
allegations against The Buck Hotel.
While the Third Circuit previously held that an adverse employment action is “an action by an employer
that is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment,” Komis v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Lab., 918 F.3d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 2019), the
Supreme Court recently clarified in the context of a Title VII claim that an employee need not
demonstrate that an employment-related harm was significant, serious, substantial, “or any similar
adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.” Muldrow v.
City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024). Instead, as noted above, a plaintiff must show only that they
suffered “‘some harm’ to a term or condition of employment.” Peifer, 106 F.4th at 277 (quoting
Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355). Other Courts have applied this same standard to ADA claims like those
raised by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Leon v. Bensalem Twp. Sch. Dist., No. CV 23-01374, 2024 WL 3744352, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2024) (“Though Courts in this Circuit have not yet had the chance to weigh in,
several other Circuit Courts have since applied [the Muldrow] standard to adverse employment actions in
ADA cases.”).
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plaintiff’s disabilities can qualify as an adverse employment action. See Colwell v. Rite Aid
Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010).
A separate cause of action exists under the ADA where an employer fails “to make
reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184
F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999). To state a claim for a failure to accommodate under the ADA, a
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that: “(1) [s]he was
disabled and [her] employer knew it; (2) [s]he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3)
[her] employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) [s]he could have been
reasonably accommodated.” Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017).
As noted above, a necessary element of each claim is that the plaintiff be disabled. A
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA if she (1) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities; (2) has “a record of
such an impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” Eshleman, 961 F.3d at
245 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
Here, liberally construing the amended complaint, MacDougall appears to bring forth
claims under the ADA premised on her alleged diagnosis of ADHD (Doc. No. 11-4 at 9), and an
incident in which she was called lazy after returning from surgery when she briefly watched the
television while at work (Doc. No. 11-2 at 5). Neither claim is plausible as currently pled.
First, with regard to her claims arising from her ADHD diagnosis, MacDougall has not
stated a plausible claim for discrimination or failure to accommodate because she has not

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adequately alleged that this diagnosis qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Indeed, while the Amended Complaint suggests that MacDougall has been diagnosed with
ADHD (Doc. No. 11-4 at 9 (MacDougall describing her disability as “ADHD”)), it is completely
devoid of allegations suggesting that this diagnosis “substantially limits one or more [of her]
major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Although a plaintiff need not “go into particulars
about the life activity affected by her alleged disability or detail the nature of her substantial
limitations” at the pleading stage, she still must allege some facts to support an inference that she
suffered from a disability within the meaning of the statute. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213; see also
Collins v. Prudential Inv. & Ret. Servs., 119 F. App’x 371, 377 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Merely
having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. Whether a person
has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. An ADA plaintiff needs to
demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity.” (internal quotation marks, citations,
and alterations omitted)); Onely v. Redner’s Mkts., Inc., Civil Action No. 21-4785, 2022 WL
1773606, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2022) (“A complaint based on actual disability . . . need not
provide detail about the life activities affected by the alleged disability or about the nature of the
plaintiff’s substantial limitations. However, it must plausibly suggest that that the plaintiff has
substantial limitations due to a disability . . . Plaintiff has not alleged that her conditions restrict
her activity at all.”); Karipidis v. ACE Gaming LLC, No. 09-3321, 2010 WL 2521209, at *8
(D.N.J. June 9, 2010) (“By simply stating that the plaintiff lives with an injury, illness or
impairment without alleging that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity creates
a defect in the Complaint.”). MacDougall has not done so here.
Moreover, even assuming ADHD qualifies as a disability under the ADA, MacDougall’s
claim for disability discrimination fails because she has not alleged that she endured an adverse

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employment action as a result of her ADHD diagnosis. As noted above, to state a claim for
discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that she suffered an adverse employment
action “because of’ her disability.” Cambria v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, No.
CIV.A.03-CV-5605, 2005 WL 1563343, at *11 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2005). In other words, a
plaintiff must prove a causal relationship between her disability and the alleged adverse
employment action. Id. Here, while MacDougall was eventually terminated from The Buck
Hotel, she has not alleged any facts suggesting this termination was at all related to her ADHD
diagnosis. And while a failure to accommodate can be considered an adverse employment
action, Colwell, 602 F.3d at 504, MacDougall has not alleged any facts suggesting that The Buck
Hotel was aware of and failed to accommodate her ADHD diagnosis. She has therefore failed to
state a claim for disability discrimination in connection with her ADHD diagnosis.
And to the extent MacDougall intends to bring forward a claim for failure to
accommodate premised on her ADHD diagnosis, she has failed to state a claim for much of the
same reason discussed above: she has not alleged facts suggesting that The Buck Hotel was
aware of her ADHD diagnosis, that she requested a reasonable accommodation for this
disability, or that The Buck Hotel, to the extent it was aware, failed to provide reasonable
accommodations. See, e.g., Alvarez v. City of Philadelphia, No. 23-CV-3570, 2023 WL
6520507, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2023) (dismissing ADA claim for failure to accommodate where
plaintiff alleged only in conclusory fashion that her employer failed to provide reasonable
accommodations for her disability).
Second, MacDougall has also failed to state a claim for discrimination under the ADA
related to the incident in which she was called “lazy” by Brian Rhuling Sr. after returning to

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work following an unspecified surgery. 6 (Doc. No. 11-2 at 5 (describing this incident as
“discriminatory”).) Even assuming that MacDougall was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA following this surgery, she again has not alleged facts suggesting that she endured an
adverse employment action because of this disability. While Brian Rhuling Sr.’s comment was
unprofessional and crass, MacDougall has not pled any facts suggesting that it caused “some
harm to a term or condition of [her] employment.” Peifer, 106 F.4th at 277. Nor has
MacDougall alleged facts suggesting that she requested, or The Buck Hotel failed to provide,
reasonable accommodations following her surgery. Thus, MacDougall has failed to state a claim
for discrimination under the ADA in connection with Brian Rhuling Sr.’s comment.
In sum, MacDougall has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for
disability discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA regarding either her ADHD
diagnosis or the incident in which she was called “lazy” by Brian Rhuling Sr. Her claims under
the ADA are therefore dismissed. See White v. SP Plus Corp., 858 F. App’x 488, 490 & n.1 (3d
Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (concluding that plaintiff’s amended complaint, which “[made] general,
conclusory allegations and require[d] the reader to cobble together the relevant facts from
attached documents” and which reflected that plaintiff “took a leave of absence from work due to
a hand injury,” failed to state an ADA claim).
2. Title VII
The Court next addresses MacDougall’s claims for gender discrimination under Title VII.
Liberally construing the Amended Complaint, the Court understands MacDougall to be raising

The Court does not understand MacDougall to be bringing a separate failure to accommodate claim
under the ADA in relation to this incident. However, even if she had, it would fail because, as set forth
above, the Amended Complaint does not contain facts suggesting that MacDougall requested or that The
Buck Hotel failed to provide her reasonable accommodations after her surgery.
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claims for disparate treatment and hostile work environment. The Court addresses each below
and finds that none of these claims are plausible as pled.
a. Disparate Treatment
The Court turns first to MacDougall’s disparate treatment discrimination claims. To state
a claim for employment discrimination under this theory, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she was
a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for her position; (3) that she suffered an
adverse employment action; and, (4) that adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. See Sarullo v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Hamilton v. Norristown State Hosp., No.
CV 23-4068, 2024 WL 3623521, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2024). As to prong three, an adverse
employment action must result in “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of
employment.” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354–55. And as to the fourth prong, “[a]t the motion to
dismiss stage . . . a plaintiff can plead this element by presenting sufficient facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof that her gender was either a
‘motivating’ or ‘determinative’ factor in the employer’s adverse employment actions.” Leon,
2024 WL 3744352, at *4 (quoting Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789).
Liberally construing the Amended Complaint, the only factual allegations that could
potentially support a gender discrimination claim are MacDougall’s termination, that she had a
different computer system from the men she worked with, and that she was called a “dumb

15

blonde” in front of customers. 7 (Doc. No. 11-2 at 4; Doc. No. 11-3.) However, upon further
review, none of these allegations are sufficient to state a claim.
First, MacDougall has alleged no facts suggesting that she was terminated on the basis of
her gender. See Favors v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 695 F. App’x 42, 44 (3d Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (affirming dismissal of Title VII race discrimination claim where plaintiff “included
no allegations whatsoever linking his termination to his [membership in a protected class]”);
Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiff’s general assertions
of discrimination and retaliation, without any details whatsoever of events leading up to her
termination, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”). Second, as to her allegation that
she was called a “dumb blonde” in front of customers, this comment does not constitute an
adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim for disparate treatment. While this
comment was, again, highly unprofessional, MacDougall has not alleged any facts suggesting
that it caused harm to “an identifiable term or condition of [her] employment.” Muldrow, 601
U.S. at 354–55. Finally, as to her allegation that the computer system she used was different
than the “males” she works with, MacDougall has not provided sufficient context as to how her
system was different. And without more information as to how she was treated differently, the

In the portion of her Amended Complaint consisting of a form complaint, MacDougall also alleges
discrimination in the form of The Buck Hotel’s refusal to remove a stalker, to provide her pay stubs or
financial records, and to check the camera footage to verify car vandalism. (Doc. No. 11 at 9.) But
MacDougall fails to allege any facts suggesting that Defendant’s actions or inactions were based on her
gender. Thus, these allegations cannot support a claim for gender discrimination.

7

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Court cannot determine whether any differences in her computer system constituted an adverse
employment action or whether it was based on her gender.
In sum, as currently pled, MacDougall has not stated a claim for disparate treatment.
b. Hostile Work Environment
The Court turns next to MacDougall’s claim for hostile work environment. To state a
hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she suffered
intentional discrimination because of membership in a protected class; (2) the discrimination was
severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) it would have
detrimentally affected a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) a basis for employer
liability is present. Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d 416,
428 (3d Cir. 2020) (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). As to the
second prong, conduct is “severe or pervasive” when it is sufficient “to alter the conditions of
[the employee’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Moody v. Atlantic
City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). Because Title VII is not a “general civility code,” this standard is
“demanding” and will not prohibit “‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents
(unless extremely serious).” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998); see
also id. (“Properly applied, [this standard for hostility] will filter out complaints attacking ‘the
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, genderrelated jokes, and occasional teasing.’” (quoting B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment
in Employment Law 175 (1992)).
Here, MacDougall’s allegations that she was called a dumb blonde in front of customers
and that her computer system is different than her male counterparts do not support a hostile

17

work environment claim. 8 As an initial matter it is unclear, as discussed above, whether these
incidents constituted intentional sex discrimination. But regardless, these two limited incidents,
for which MacDougall does not provide much detail or when they occurred, are not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to meet the second prong of a prima facie case of hostile work environment.
See, e.g., Wiggins v. Universal Prot. Servs. LLC, No. 22-1491, 2022 WL 4116912, at *3 (3d Cir.
Sept. 9, 2022) (per curiam) (“Wiggins did not state a prima facie case for a hostile work
environment claim, as he did not make factual allegations that could suggest that his workplace
was ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’” (emphasis and alterations in original)); Culler v. Sec’y of U.S. Veterans Affs., 507
F. App’x 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of hostile work environment claim where
plaintiff’s allegations described workplace conflict, were insufficiently severe or pervasive, and
were insufficiently linked to his membership in a protected class). Thus, any hostile work
environment claim fails.
***
In sum, MacDougall has failed to state a claim for gender discrimination, whether viewed
as disparate treatment or hostile work environment. Thus, the Court dismisses MacDougall’s
claims under Title VII.
B. State Claims
MacDougall’s remaining claims, to the extent discernable, all arise under state law,
specifically the PHRA and Pennsylvania tort law. The Court will dismiss these claims for lack

Here too, the Court focuses on MacDougall’s allegations that she has plausibly connected to her gender
or sex. See supra at 16 n.7.

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of jurisdiction. The only independent basis for jurisdiction would be 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), 9
which permits district courts to exercise jurisdiction over cases raising claims exclusively under
state law if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Section 1332(a)
requires “complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,” which “means that, unless
there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,
592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010)). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the state
where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain.
See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 343 (3d Cir. 2011). A corporation is a citizen of
the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). In contrast, “the citizenship of an LLC [or other unincorporated entity]
is determined by the citizenship of its members.” Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420.
The Amended Complaint does not allege the parties’ citizenship. However, MacDougall
uses Pennsylvania addresses for herself and the Defendants, (Doc. No. 11-4 at 8). Accordingly,
MacDougall has not met her burden of establishing a basis for diversity jurisdiction and the
Court will dismiss her state law claims for lack of jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800

If MacDougall had stated a viable claim under federal law, the Court may have had supplemental
jurisdiction over these state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (providing that “in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”). But with
all federal claims dismissed at this early stage and given the sporadic nature of MacDougall’s Amended
Complaint, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. See
Chapman v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 3d 601, 613–14 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (“When a district court has
dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.”).
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F.3d at 105 (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its
existence.”)
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss MacDougall’s Amended Complaint for

failure to comply with Rule 8, for failure to state a plausible claim, and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 10 The dismissal will be without prejudice to MacDougall filing a second amended
complaint, which will be her final opportunity to present an organized narrative that clearly sets
forth what happened and when it happened in a manner that would support the employment
discrimination claims she seeks to bring in this Court. An appropriate Order follows, which
provides further instruction about amendment.

As noted earlier, on August 19, 2024, two months after filing her Amended Complaint, MacDougall
submitted a litany of exhibits to the docket. (Doc. No. 12.) Many of these exhibits are duplicative of
documents contained in her Amended Complaint, including documents related to her allegations of
identity theft and car insurance fraud. As for new material, MacDougall includes (1) documents related to
a car accident she endured (Doc. No. 12 at 12–15; Doc. No. 12-1), (2) a form complaint asserting the
same employment discrimination claims addressed above (Doc. No. 12-5 at 4–8), (3) a completed form
seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, even though the Court already granted MacDougall in forma
pauperis status (Doc. No. 10; Doc. No. 12-5 at 9–14), (4) another accounting of the damages that
MacDougall is seeking, which now alleges that The Buck Hotel paid her below minimum wage (Doc. No.
12-2); and (5) a form requesting the appointment of counsel (Doc. No. 12-5 at 15–18). Even if the Court
were to consider these belatedly filed exhibits, they are difficult to follow and do not add the factual
support necessary to support Plaintiff’s claims and thus would not alter the analysis set forth above in
which the Court found that MacDougall’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed.
10

Additionally, the Court will deny MacDougall’s request for the Court to appoint her counsel that was
embedded in these exhibits. Before counsel can be appointed, the Court must be satisfied that
MacDougall’s claims have merit. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (before exercising
discretion to appoint counsel “the district court must consider as a threshold matter the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim”); see also See Mentor v. Hillside Bd. of Educ., 428 F. App’x 221, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Regardless of whether we review the District Court’s order under Tabron or § 2000e–5(f)(1), Mentor
must show as a threshold matter that her claim had merit.”). And as set forth above, the Court finds that
MacDougall’s Amended Complaint lacks merit and is dismissed it in its entirety. Thus, she is not entitled
to have counsel appointed. MacDougall can renew her request for counsel after her Second Amended
Complaint is filed and screened for merit.

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