ROBINSON v. HENDERSON et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE CHAD F. KENNEY ON 8/29/2024. 8/29/2024 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED.(sg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRAY ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,

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v.
HENDERSON, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVL ACTION NO. 24-CV-2599

MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J.

AUGUST 29, 2024

Plaintiff Tray Robinson, a convicted and sentenced prisoner who is currently incarcerated
at SCI Phoenix, filed this civil rights action against prison officials and medical staff based on
the conditions of his confinement. Robinson primarily alleges that the Defendants subjected him
to excessive force, falsely charged him with a disciplinary sanction, failed to provide him with
medical care for his injuries, and starved him. He seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For
the following reasons, the Court will grant Robinson leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss
certain claims, and permit the claims that pass statutory screening to proceed at this time.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
The SAC names as Defendants: (1) four correctional officers at SCI Phoenix, sued in

their individual and official capacities—Sergeant Henderson; Correctional Officer Love;

The following factual allegations are taken from the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”),
(ECF No. 13), which is the governing pleading in this case. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d
69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). Although the SAC is the third pleading that Robinson has submitted in
this case, the Court will refer to it as the SAC because it is captioned and docketed that way.
Since “the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading,” id., the
Court does not consider the initial Complaint, any Amended Complaints, or any other documents
in determining whether Robinson has stated a plausible claim. Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F.
App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[L]iberal construction of a pro se amended
complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.”). The Court
adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
1

Correctional Officer Koshy; and Correctional Officer Jordan; (2) two Superintendents at SCIPhoenix—Sipple and Terra (together with the Correctional Officers, the “DOC Defendants”);
and (3) five medical professionals employed at SCI Phoenix, sued in their individual capacity—
Senkowski, Bora, Annino, Ashley, and Ruiz (“Medical Defendants”). (SAC at 1-2.)
The specific events underlying Robinson’s claims began on June 14, 2023, when Officer
Love engaged Robinson in a conversation about her age that ended with Love “pok[ing] her
finger” in Robinson’s face, cursing at Robinson, threatening to have Robinson beaten up,
screaming, and becoming “volatile.” (Id. at 2.) Officer Henderson entered the unit to address
the confrontation, removed Officer Love from the area, and told Robinson he wanted to talk to
him while walking back to his cell. (Id.) Henderson then grabbed Robinson’s hand, but when
Robinson escaped his grasp, Henderson twisted Robinson’s arm behind his back and yelled “you
fucked up now!” (Id.) When Robinson tried to break free, Henderson flipped him to the ground,
twisting his back, and then placed him in a headlock, cutting off his oxygen, when he tried to
stand up. (Id.) Additionally, Officer Koshy jumped on Robinson’s back “several” times during
this interaction. (Id.)
Robinson broke free and returned to his cell, “where he was eventually apprehended and
escorted to medical for assessment of injuries.” (Id.) Robinson contends that he sustained
injuries to his back, arm, neck and leg, but that Defendant Ashley “only pressed a finger into his
back and stated (he’s ok) without any care.” (Id. at 3, 4.) Robinson was then taken to the
restricted housing unit (“RHU”) where he was “falsely charged with assault on an officer.” (Id.
at 3.)
On June 17, 2023, after a misconduct hearing, a hearing examiner dismissed the charges
against Robinson in part due to evidence from video surveillance. (Id.) As a result of the

2

incident, Robinson was housed in the RHU for a total of eight days. (Id.) He alleges that Officer
Jordan, against whom he previously made a complaint for a “sexually comment,” did not feed
him any dinner until he filed a grievance on the issue. (Id. at 3.) Elsewhere in the Complaint,
Robinson alleges that Jordan did not feed him at all for the eight-day period he was housed in the
RHU. (Id. at 5-6.)
Robinson alleges that the “facility manager” at SCI Phoenix “issues a carte blanch policy
authorizing employees to operate at will at this institution causing violations of constitutional
and state tort law.” (Id. at 3.) He further alleges that, since filing the instant lawsuit, he has been
“targeted” by Love, Henderson, and “co worker’s.” (Id.) Specifically, Robinson alleges that
Henderson has come onto the block where he is housed “telling other officer’s and inmate’s alike
that plaintiff Robinson is a (rat) snitch” and that Robinson “file’s paperwork and is snitching on
him and everybody else,” which caused Robinson to feel unsafe and has caused him to be
“attacked” by other officers.2 (Id.) Love and Jordan have also allegedly told other officers and
inmates that Robinson is a “snitch.” (Id. at 5.) Further, Robinson contends that Henderson and
Love have coworkers who have targeted him and “caused him to be placed in the rhu for a total
of (33) time’s.” (Id. at 3.)
Robinson asserts assorted constitutional and state law claims based on the above
allegations. (Id. at 4-8.) He seeks damages, unspecified “medical treatment for long term injury
mental [and] physical,” and an “order against retaliation.” (Id. at 7-8.)

Robinson does not describe this attack. He refers to “attached exhibit’s,” (SAC at 3), but he did
not include any attachments with his SAC.
2

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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Robinson leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the SAC if it fails to state a claim. Whether a
complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.
Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021).
“At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro
se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only
whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible []
claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v.
Hollingsworth, --- F.4th ---, 2024 WL 3820969 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2024). Conclusory and
unsupported allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Robinson is proceeding pro
se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court is also
obligated to dismiss any claims that seek monetary relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

3

Because Robinson is a prisoner, he must still pay the $350 filing fee in installments as
mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

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III.

DISCUSSION
Robinson asserts his constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which

federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In a § 1983 action, the personal
involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element, and,
therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences
giving rise to the claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). In
other words, “‘[e]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his
or her own misconduct.’”4 Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original).
A.

Excessive Force

Robinson brings excessive force claims against Love, Henderson, and Koshy based on
the force they used to subdue him on June 14, 2023 before bringing him to the RHU. (SAC at
4.) The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting
pain in a manner that offends contemporary standards of decency. See Hudson v. McMillian,

4

To the extent Robinson brings claims for money damages against the DOC Defendants, those
official capacity claims must be dismissed because they are essentially improper claims for
damages against those Defendants’ employer, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)); Lavia
v. Pa., Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that, “[b]ecause the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections is a part of the executive
department of the Commonwealth, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity” and is also not considered a person for purposes of § 1983 (internal citation omitted)).
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503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). “Force that is used ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm’ violates the Eighth Amendment.” Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). The factors used to determine
whether the force applied was excessive include: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force’; (2)
‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used’; (3) ‘’the extent of
injury inflicted’; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably
perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them’; and (5) ‘any efforts
made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). The inquiry is driven “by the extent of the force and
the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2002).
Robinson alleges that on his way back to his cell following his confrontation with Love
on June 14, 2023, Henderson twisted his arm, flipped him to the ground, twisted his back, and
placed him in a headlock, cutting off his oxygen. (SAC at 2.) Koshy, who joined in at some
point, allegedly jumped on Robinson’s back “several” times while he was being subdued. (Id.)
As a result of Henderson and Koshy’s use of force, Robinson sustained injuries to his back, arm,
neck and leg. (Id. at 3.) These allegations are sufficient to state excessive force claims against
Henderson and Koshy based on their use of force during this incident.
To the contrary, Robinson has not stated an excessive force claim against Love based on
the events of June 14, 2023. Love’s conduct on this day, according to Robinson, amounted to
use of profanity, threats, and pointing her finger in Robinson’s face. (SAC at 2.) However,
verbal harassment of a prisoner, even if offensive, does not give rise to an independent
constitutional violation. See Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 723 (3d Cir. 2012) (per

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curiam) (holding that threats that inmate was a “marked man and that his days were numbered”
did not state Eighth Amendment claim); Ayala v. Terhune, 195 F. App’x 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (“[A]llegations of verbal abuse, no matter how deplorable, do not present
actionable claims under § 1983.”); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Standing alone, simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the
laws.”), abrogated on other grounds, Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020). The same
is true of offensive gestures. See McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that threats and gestures do not amount to constitutional violations); Wright v.
O’Hara, No. 00-1557, 2004 WL 1793018, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004) (“Where plaintiff has
not been physically assaulted, defendant’s words and gestures alone are not of constitutional
merit.” (internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the excessive force
claim against Love. See Green v. White, No. 20-4211, 2021 WL 1979434, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May
18, 2021) (excessive force claim based on defendant “poking [plaintiff] in the face with pointed
fingernails and spitting at him” did not state an excessive force claim); Billman v. Corbett, No.
10-2996, 2011 WL 605814, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2011) (allegations that defendant “shook his
finger angrily in [plaintiff’s] face” did not state an excessive force claim). Furthermore, to the
extent Robinson sought to bring claims against any other Defendants for failing to intervene to
prevent the use of excessive force against him on June 14, 2023, he has not alleged that any other
individuals were present or had an opportunity to intervene, so he has not stated a factual basis
for any such claim. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 651 (“[A]n officer is only liable if there is a realistic
and reasonable opportunity to intervene.”).

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B.

Deliberate Indifference to Safety and Retaliation

Robinson brings Eighth Amendment claims against Love, Henderson, and Jordan for
deliberate indifference to his safety based on their behavior after the June 14, 2023 incident.5
(SAC at 4-5.) Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). In that regard, prison officials have a duty “‘to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners.’” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of
another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s
safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
To state a plausible failure to protect claim, Robinson must allege that: (1) the conditions
in which he was incarcerated posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference to that substantial risk of serious harm; and (3) the officials’
deliberate indifference caused harm. See id.; Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 746. Deliberate indifference
is a subjective standard. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). Robinson
must allege that the prison officials “knew or were aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to
[his] health or safety.” Id. at 135. “[I]t is not sufficient that the official should have been aware”
of the excessive risk. Id. at 125. Moreover, “an inmate need not wait until an actual attack
occurs to obtain relief.” Moore v. Mann, 823 F. App’x 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing
cases).

To the extent Robinson brings “deliberate indifference” claims against Love, Henderson, and
Koshy based on the use of force against him, (see SAC at 4-5), those claims are essentially
excessive force claims that the Court analyzed above.
5

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Liberally construing Robinson’s allegations, he contends that since he filed the instant
lawsuit, Defendants Henderson, Love, and Jordan have visited the unit where he is housed,
called him a “snitch” and a “rat,” told others that he filed “paperwork,” caused him to be
“attacked” by another officer, and indirectly caused him to be housed in the RHU thirty-three
times. (SAC at 3.) At this early stage of the litigation, Robinson may proceed on his deliberate
indifference claims against Henderson, Love, and Jordan based on these allegations. See Moore,
823 F. App’x at 94 (vacating grant of summary judgment on claims that “corrections defendants
allegedly began making inflammatory statements about Moore, calling him a pedophile, gay, and
a snitch” creating a risk that Moore would be assaulted and causing Moore to be assaulted)
Jackson v. O’Brien, No. 18-32, 2021 WL 3174687, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2021) (“Being
labeled a ‘snitch’ or a ‘rat’ can be a dangerous designation in prison.”).
These allegations could also be construed to raise a retaliation claim. See Holley v. Dep’t
of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable law, irrespective
of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”). To state a plausible First Amendment
retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct was “a
substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333
(3d Cir. 2001). A prisoner’s filing of a lawsuit or grievance constitutes constitutionally protected
conduct. See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d
523, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2003). “An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be
actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting
McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in

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lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more
than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68, 70 (3d Cir.
2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at 170). The timing of the allegedly retaliatory
behavior relative to the constitutionally protected conduct may establish a causal link between
the two for purposes of establishing motivation. See Watson, 834 F.3d at 422. Since Robinson
is proceeding on his deliberate indifference claims against Henderson, Love, and Jordan based
on their conduct after he filed the instant lawsuit, he may also proceed on a theory that they
engaged in this conduct to retaliate against him for filing a lawsuit.
C.

“Respondeat Superior”

Robinson’s constitutional claims against Defendants Sipple and Terra are based on
allegations that they violated his rights by “knowingly and intentionally, failing in remedy[ing]
the wrong” and/or failing to properly screen or train their officers, which Robinson characterizes
as “respondeat superior.” (SAC at 6.) Supervisors are not liable for alleged constitutional
violations committed by their subordinates simply because they employ them, so there is no
basis for respondeat superior liability here. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that
“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior”); Zigler v. Warren, No. 21-19474, 2022 WL
903383, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022) (“In simpler terms, a supervisor is not liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of his employees solely because he is a supervisor.”). Rather, “[s]uits
against high-level government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory
liability.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017).
There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d

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307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional
harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586
(3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)). This type of liability includes a failure to supervise,
however, a plaintiff asserting such a claim must “identify a supervisory policy or practice that the
supervisor failed to employ, and then prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the time
of the alleged injury created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendantofficial was aware that the policy created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent
to that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement the
supervisory practice or procedure.” Id. at 317; see also Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806
F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015). A supervisor may also “be personally liable under § 1983 if he or
she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the
person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional
conduct.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316. “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Robinson’s allegations against Defendants Sipple and Terra are far too conclusory to
state a claim. Robinson does not allege any facts explaining how these Defendants were
personally involved in any of the events at issue in his SAC, and their alleged awareness or
knowledge of events that occurred is insufficient on its own to state a plausible claim against
them. See Murray v. McCoy, No. 23-2582, 2024 WL 1328231, at *3 (3d Cir. Mar. 28, 2024)
(“Superintendent Ransom’s awareness of Murray’s allegations concerning C.O. McCoy, without
more, is insufficient to establish personal involvement” (citing cases)); see also Dooley v. Wetzel,

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957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (evidence that high level official was sent a copy of documents
related to prisoner’s claim and official’s lack of response did not establish personal involvement,
nor did involvement of officials who only reviewed and denied prisoner’s grievances). Nor has
Robinson identified any specific defects in supervision or training that would amount to
deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Mark v. Patton, 696 F. App’x 579, 582 (3d Cir. 2017) (plaintiff
failed to state a claim for supervisory liability where she “did not allege that any policy created
an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation or that either Patton or Dalmasi was aware of
such a risk”); see also Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (noting
that generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an
office or agency are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional
violation). In sum, the Court will dismiss Robinson’s constitutional claims against Sipple and
Terra because Robinson has not pled a plausible, non-conclusory basis for a § 1983 claim against
them.
D.

False Misconduct and Placement in the RHU

Robinson brings claims against Henderson and Love for falsely charging him with
disciplinary infractions that resulted in his eight-day confinement in the RHU, which he
describes as “false imprisonment.” (SAC at 5.) His allegations on this point are best construed
as due process claims.6 It is well-settled that prisoners have no inherent constitutional right to
any particular security classification or to any particular housing assignment. See Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (“We have held that the Constitution itself does not give

6

To the extent Robinson alludes to the Eighth Amendment, he has not alleged a plausible basis
for a claim under that provision with respect to his placement in the RHU. See, e.g., Riley v.
Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (“To violate the Eighth Amendment, conditions of
confinement must be dangerous, intolerable or shockingly substandard.”).
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rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.”).
Rather, in the prison context, “[d]ue process protection for a state created liberty interest is . . .
limited to those situations where deprivation of that interest ‘imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Griffin v. Vaughn,
112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
“[C]onfinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without more,
to establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty
interest.” Smith, 293 F.3d at 653 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486).
In deciding whether conditions are atypical and significant for purposes of establishing a
liberty interest, a court must consider “(1) the duration of the challenged conditions; and (2)
whether the conditions overall imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 560 (3d Cir. 2017).
In determining whether a hardship is atypical or significant, the relevant comparator is the
general population. Id. at 564. Further, “the filing of a fraudulent misconduct report and related
disciplinary sanctions do not without more violate due process,” Seville v. Martinez, 130 F.
App’x 549, 551 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), as “[d]ue process is satisfied where an inmate is
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly false misconduct
reports,” Thomas v. McCoy, 467 F. App’x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also Smith,
293 F.3d at 654 (“[S]o long as certain procedural requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of
falsified evidence or misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due process
claim.”).
Robinson cannot state a claim based on the filing of false disciplinary charges against
him because it is apparent that he received a hearing where he could rebut the charges, which he

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did successfully. See, e.g., Talley v. Griesmer, No. 19-3796, 2023 WL 3002742, at *2 (3d Cir.
Apr. 19, 2023) (per curiam) (“The filing of false disciplinary charges does not violate the
Constitution as long as the inmate was granted a hearing and an opportunity to rebut the
charges.”). Nor has Robinson stated a claim based on his confinement in the RHU for eight days
because he has not described punitive confinement that is atypical in either duration or condition.
Indeed, much more serious deprivations have been held not to implicate a liberty interest in this
context. See Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 855 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he duration in
segregated confinement that courts have found does not give rise to a liberty interest ranges up to
two and one-half years.”); Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522-23 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although
inmates who are transferred to the STGMU [Security Threat Group Management Unit] face
additional restrictions, we hold that the transfer to the STGMU does not impose an atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”); Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708
(holding that “exposure to the conditions of administrative custody for periods as long as 15
months falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed [. . .] by a court of law” and
does not constitute a due process violation (quotation omitted)). For these reasons, the Court
will dismiss Robinson’s claims based on the false misconduct and his confinement in the RHU.
E.

Deprivation of Food

Robinson brings an Eighth Amendment claim against Jordan for depriving him of food
for eight days while he was confined in the RHU until he filed a grievance. (SAC at 3, 5-6.)
“Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners are entitled to a nutritionally adequate diet.” Tapp v.
Proto, 718 F. Supp. 2d 598, 621 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 404 F. App’x 563 (3d Cir. 2010); see
also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (the Eighth Amendment requires provision of “adequate food” to
inmates). To allege an unconstitutional deprivation of food, the prisoner must allege “both an

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objective component (that the deprivation was sufficiently serious) and a subjective component
(that the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind).” Duran v. Merline, 923 F.
Supp. 2d 702, 720 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Whether the deprivation of food is objectively serious for purposes of establishing a
constitutional violation “depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation.” Id. at 720
(internal quotations omitted). Compare Lindsey v. O’Connor, 327 F. App’x 319, 321 (3d Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (“The purported deprivation of a single meal is not of such magnitude as to
rise to the level of a constitutional violation”) with Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 929
F.2d 1078, 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that failure to feed a prisoner for twelve
consecutive days violated the Eighth Amendment). “[O]nly a substantial deprivation of food to a
prisoner” states a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Rieco v. Moran, 633 F. App’x 76, 78 (3d
Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Lindsey, 327 F. App’x at 321).
Robinson alleges that Defendant Jordan did not feed for eight days while he was housed
in the RHU, and that this “greatly affected his mental health.” (SAC at 7.) It is not entirely clear
whether he is alleging that Jordan deprived him of dinner for these eight days, (id. at 3), or
whether Jordan deprived him of food entirely during this time, (id. at 5, 6). Liberally construing
the Complaint, however, Robinson has adequately alleged a basis for an Eighth Amendment
claim based on his allegations that Jordan refused to feed him for eight days. See Williams v.
Schueler, 436 F. App’x 687, 688-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing dismissal of Eighth Amendment
claim on screening where plaintiff who was unwell was deprived of food for forty-eight hours);
Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that “withholding food from
[plaintiff] on many occasions for three to five days at a time” was objectively serious for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment); Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1998)

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(concluding that prisoners established a basis for an Eight Amendment violation where “in the
entire thirty-two hour confinement in the maximum security cells, [they] missed four consecutive
meals”). But see Adderly v. Ferrier, No. 07-507, 2010 WL 2636109, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 29,
2010) (no Eighth Amendment violation where prisoner was denied breakfast and lunch trays for
seven days but received dinner trays during that time and there was no evidence that food
provided was nutritionally inadequate).
F.

State Law Claims Against DOC Employees

Robinson brings assorted tort claims pursuant to Pennsylvania law against the DOC
Defendants. (SAC at 6-7.) Pennsylvania law provides agencies, officials and employees of the
Commonwealth acting within the scope of their duties with sovereign immunity from damages
claims subject to exceptions not applicable here. See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310 (establishing
immunity for Commonwealth officials and employees); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521 (limiting
waiver of immunity to specific exceptions); id. § 8522 (setting forth limited exceptions);
Stackhouse v. Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 58 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (“Generally, the
Commonwealth and its agencies, officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties
are immune from suits for damages.”); see also Pew v. Sherman, No. 21-949, 2023 WL
8113270, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2023) (concluding that defendants were entitled to immunity
from claims that they failed to protect plaintiff from assault). Further, “a state officer is shielded
from liability for intentional torts committed while acting within the scope of his duties.” Bracey
v. Betancourt, No. 20-6205, 2021 WL 5112246, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2021); see also Poteat v.
Lydon, No. 22-2114, 2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2023) (per curiam) (“State
sovereign immunity bars these suits against the Commonwealth and its employees acting within
the scope of their duties, as the PSP employees were, and the limited negligence exceptions to

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sovereign immunity do not apply as Poteat alleged only intentional torts.”); Kidd v.
Pennsylvania, 37 F. App’x 588, 592 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (summarily dismissing intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim because “[t]he Commonwealth, it subdivisions, and its
employees acting within the scope of employment enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in
federal court. The Pennsylvania legislature has not chosen to waive this immunity for intentional
torts.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Robinson’s claims against the
DOC Defendants because they are barred by sovereign immunity. See Horseman v. Walton, No.
22-336, 2023 WL 1864882, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2023) (“Horseman’s state law claims for
assault, battery, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of DOC
policies are accordingly barred by sovereign immunity”).
G.

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Robinson brings deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against the Medical
Defendants. (SAC at 4.) To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical
treatment, a prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “A medical need is
serious, . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that
is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)
(internal quotations omitted). As noted above, a prison official is not deliberately indifferent
“unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

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Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a
prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary
medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving
needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). Allegations of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding proper medical
treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Further, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and
the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, ‘federal courts are generally reluctant to second
guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’” Davis
v. Superintendent Somerset SCI, 597 F. App’x 42, 45 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting
United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)).
Robinson contends that he sustained injuries to his back, arm, neck and leg, but that
Defendant Ashley “only pressed a finger into his back and stated (he’s ok) without any care.”
(SAC at 3, 4.) He further claims that the remaining Medical Defendants “fail[ed] to administer
health care . . . in a reasonable time frame.” (Id. at 4.) As alleged, it is not clear that Robinson’s
medical needs amounted to “serious” so as to fall within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.
See Stankowski v. Farley, 251 F. App’x 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[C]uts requiring
no more than small bandages do not constitute ‘serious medical needs’ covered by the Eighth
Amendment.”); Paulson v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 19-6013, 2020 WL 703656, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
11, 2020) (“[S]ymptoms such as bruising, without anything more, are not generally recognized
as presenting a serious medical need.” (citing cases)); Stroud v. Boorstein, 10-3355, 2014 WL
2115499, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (“Plaintiff may have experienced mild discomfort as a
result of the bruising, bleeding, and head pain, but these symptoms, without others, are not

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generally recognized as serious medical needs under the Estelle framework.”). Robinson has
also failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on behalf of the Medical Defendants. For
most of them, he does not describe the nature of his interactions with them, so the Court cannot
infer what they knew or did not know in a manner that would suggest whether they acted with
deliberate indifference. The only exception is Defendant Ashley, whom Robinson alleges
pushed a finger into his back when he went to the medical department and determined that he
was “ok.” (SAC at 4.) This allegation, however, is consistent with Ashley examining Robinson
and concluding that he did not require additional medical treatment at that time despite his
injuries. To the extent Robinson believes more treatment was required under the circumstances,
he has not provided any additional allegations to support a plausible inference that Ashley acted
with deliberate indifference. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (internal quotations omitted)); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Robinson leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his SAC except for: (1) Robinson’s excessive force claims against
Defendants Henderson and Koshy based on the June 14, 2023 incident; (2) Robinson’s deliberate
indifference to safety and retaliation claims against Defendants Henderson, Love, and Jordan as
described above; and (3) Robinson’s deliberate indifference claim against Jordan for depriving
him of food for eight days. Since Robinson has already amended his pleading multiple times, the

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Court will direct service of his remaining claims at this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ Chad F. Kenney
_____________________________
CHAD F. KENNEY, J.

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