TRIEU v. SPOTTS

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE JUAN R. SANCHEZ ON 3/5/25. 3/5/25 ENTERED AND COPIES NOT MAILED TO PRO SE.(mbh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TUAN ANH TRIEU,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAUREN SPOTTS,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-4876

MEMORANDUM
SÁNCHEZ, J.

MARCH 5, 2025

Pro se Plaintiff Tuan Anh Trieu, an incarcerated individual at SCI Phoenix, asserts
constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after he was denied reenrollment in the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ Sex Offender Program, a requirement for his parole.
Trieu was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Trieu’s initial Complaint was dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) upon screening as it failed to state a claim. See Trieu
v. Spotts, No. 24-4876, 2024 WL 5188043, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2024). Trieu returned with
this Amended Complaint. 1 The Court will dismiss Trieu’s Amended Complaint for the reasons
stated.

1

Trieu again used the form complaint available to unrepresented litigants to file his
claims and added typed pages and exhibits. (ECF No. 10.) Trieu also attached to his Complaint
grievance and other prison documents. (Id. at 21-71.) The Court considers the entire submission
as the Amended Complaint, and adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF
docketing system. Trieu subsequently filed a copy of his Amended Complaint but did not attach
any of the exhibits or extra typewritten pages to that filing. (See ECF No. 12.) Thus, the Court
will consider ECF No. 10 as the operative Amended Complaint. The Court will correct
punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors when quoting from the Amended Complaint.

I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2
In his initial Complaint, Trieu alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights by

sole Defendant Dr. Lauren Spotts, a psychologist at SCI Phoenix who runs the prison’s Sex
Offender Program. (Compl. (ECF No. 2) at 4.) Trieu alleged that Spotts deprived him of his
liberty interest in parole eligibility by preventing him from participating in the Sex Offender
Program, a requirement before an inmate can meet with the parole board. (Id. at 3, 13.) Trieu
was originally enrolled in the program in March of 2024 but was then removed in June of 2024.
(Id. at 13, 28, 31, 43-44.) Trieu alleged that Spotts treated him unfairly, is a “racist” who harbors
“Asian hate,” and is an “evil doctor.” (Id. at 5, 12.) He further stated that Spotts wrote him up
for a “misconduct” in April of 2024 in order to have him removed from the program and have his
eligibility for parole “prolonged.” (Id. at 13.) For relief, Trieu requested that the Court help him
get “back to the parole board” so that he can be united with his family. (Id. at 5.)
In its December 20 Memorandum, the Court granted Trieu leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and construed the Complaint as asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims for due
process and equal protection. See Trieu, 2024 WL 5188043, at *3. The Court concluded that the
due process claims must be dismissed with prejudice because “Trieu has no constitutionally
protected interest in parole or any parole procedures, including being provided an interview with
the parole board.” Id. at *2 (citing cases). The Court also concluded that Trieu failed to state a
plausible equal protection claim because he merely asserted “in conclusory fashion that Spotts
treated him unfairly and is ‘racist’” but failed to “allege any facts that raise a plausible inference
that Spotts discriminated against him on the basis of his race.” Id. at *3. The Court advised

2

The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Trieu’s Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Where the Court quotes from the Amended Complaint, punctuation,
spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up.
2

Trieu that he could amend his equal protection claim if he could allege facts to cure the defects
as to that claim. Id. Trieu returned with this Amended Complaint, which again names Dr. Spotts
only.
Trieu asserts nearly identical allegations in his Amended Complaint. He states that in
July 2022, Spotts invited him to participate SCI Phoenix’s Sex Offender Program. (Am. Compl.
at 40.) However, Trieu did not enroll in the program until March 2024 because Spotts allegedly
failed to complete Trieu’s paperwork. (Id. at 21-24, 40, 46.) For reasons that are not clear, Trieu
was removed from the program a few months later. (Id. at 46.) 3 Trieu alleges that Spotts treated
him unfairly by causing parole board meetings to be “postponed and delayed” in February and
May of 2024. (Id. at 7, 40.) He further alleges that when he complained about Spotts, she
“punished” him “with two misconducts.” (Id. at 7.) Trieu states that Spotts has “Asian hate” and
is a “racist.” (Id. at 5, 40.) He avers that Spotts refused to translate all of the program
documents to Vietnamese and never called Trieu by his name but instead only waved one finger
at him. (Id. at 40.) Trieu again asserts in his Amended Complaint that he was deprived of his
“liberty interest in parole eligibility” by not being permitted to participate in the Sex Offender
Program. (Id. at 3.) For relief, Trieu again requests that the Court help him get “back to the
parole board” so that he can be united with his family. (Id. at 5.)

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A grievance document attached as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint reveals that
“[o]n 6/18/24, the Sex Offender Treatment Team met with [Trieu] to discuss concerns about
[his] participating in the program” and “[t]he final decision of the treatment team was to remove
[him] from [his] treatment group due to violations of the terms and conditions of SOP group
programing.” (Am. Compl. at 46.) Trieu was allegedly placed on a waiting list to be invited to
rejoin the program at a later date. (Id.)
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Trieu is proceeding pro se, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies and requires the

Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this early stage of the
litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.
2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d
Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Trieu is
proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185
(3d Cir. 2021).
III.

DISCUSSION
Trieu again brings Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by

which federal constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Court previously dismissed Trieu’s due process claim with prejudice. See Trieu, 2024 WL
5188043, at *2 (“Since Trieu has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole or any

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parole procedures, including being provided an interview with the parole board, his claim for a
due process violation based on Defendant Spotts’s actions in allegedly preventing his completion
of the Sex Offender Program necessarily fails.” (citing cases)). Accordingly, to the extent that
Trieu attempts to reassert a due process claim in his Amended Complaint, the claim is also
dismissed with prejudice.
Trieu’s equal protection claim remains. As the Court explained in its December 20
Memorandum, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982)). To establish an equal protection violation, a prisoner must allege “that he was
treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the
result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class.” Mack v.
Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d
277, 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2015)). “Persons are ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of an equal
protection claim when ‘they are alike in all relevant aspects.’” Startzell v. City of Philadelphia,
533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted). A plaintiff claiming race-based
discrimination must prove defendants acted with racial bias. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 503
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807
F.2d 355, 357 (3d Cir. 1986)).
In support of an equal protection claim, Trieu again alleges that Spotts harbors “Asian
hate” and is a “racist.” (Am. Compl. at 5, 40.) He also alleges that she treated him unfairly by
interfering with his parole board meetings, issuing him misconducts, refusing to translate

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documents to Vietnamese, and using hand gestures to get his attention. Although these
allegations may raise a plausible inference that Trieu was treated unfairly, this is not enough to
state a plausible claim. Notably, Trieu has again failed to allege how Spotts treated him
differently than other similarly situated inmates who were not in a race-based protected class.
See Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (“At the motion to dismiss
stage, Perano must allege facts sufficient to make plausible the existence of such similarly
situated parties.”); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting equal
protection claim when inmate did “not allege facts showing that he was similarly situated to the
inmates” who received accommodations “or that there was no rational basis for his different
treatment”). Accordingly, Trieu failed to raise a plausible inference that Spotts discriminated
against him based on his race. 4
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Trieu’s Amended Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. As Trieu has already been given an
opportunity to cure the defects in his claims and has been unable to do so, the Court concludes
that further amendment would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp.
Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se litigant would be futile when

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To the extent Trieu alleges any claims based on the allegation that he was forced to
admit guilt to participate in the Sex Offender Program, the claim similarly lacks merit. See
Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of First Amendment
claim because “the prison may structure its treatment programs and pursue legitimate
penological objectives,” including conditioning parole for sex offenders on their admission of
guilt); Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Roman’s Fifth Amendment
claim fails because the consequence he faces—the repeat denial of parole for refusing to
participate in the sex offender rehabilitation program—does not rise to the level of compulsion
necessary to violate the Fifth Amendment.”).
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litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”). Accordingly, Trieu’s Amended Complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Juan R. Sánchez
JUAN R. SÁNCHEZ, J.

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