NEWSON v. UPS CORPORATION

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE MIA ROBERTS PEREZ ON 3/5/25. 3/5/25 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE.(bw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YOLANDA E. NEWSON,
Plaintiff,

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v.
UPS CORPORATION,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-0534

MEMORANDUM
PEREZ, J.

MARCH 5th, 2025

Currently before the Court is a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Yolanda E. Newson 1 against
UPS Corporation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”). Newson seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court
will grant Newson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her Complaint.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2
Newson alleges that on January 25, 2025, she visited a UPS “Drop-Store” in

Philadelphia. (Compl. at 2, 4.) Newson, who alleges that she is “handicapped,” did not have a
place to sit while she was dropping off mail. (Id. at 4.) Rather, she had to “lean on the back
table” and “on the person helping [her]” because UPS did not have “chairs/stools for those with a
disability to sit while waiting for the cashiers to wait on the customers.” (Id. at 5.) As a result,
she experienced pain in her hip and knee, as well as “mental anguish.” (Id.) Newson claims that

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The Complaint refers to Plaintiff as Yolanda Newson and Yolanda Quewon. The Court will
refer to her as Newson, as used in the caption.
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The factual allegations are taken from the Complaint (ECF No. 2) and assumed to be true for
purposes of this Memorandum. The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the
CM/ECF docketing system.

her rights under the United States Constitution and the ADA were violated, and seeks damages.
(Id. at 3, 5.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Newson leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that she

does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). ‘“At this
early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as
true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]
complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d
768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v.
Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
As Newson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the
complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented

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litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other
litigants.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional Claims
Newson seeks damages for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. (Compl. at 3.)

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. §
1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Whether a defendant is acting under color of state law—i.e., whether the defendant is a state
actor—depends on whether there is “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged
action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko
v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “To answer that
question, [the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court
jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the
private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and alteration omitted).
Since UPS is a private company, and since nothing in the Complaint suggests any basis
for state action here, § 1983 is inapplicable. See, e.g., Overstreet v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., No.
2:24-CV-00478, 2025 WL 69189, at *11 (D. Utah Jan. 10, 2025) (concluding that UPS was not a

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state actor and citing cases holding same); Bey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 11-2993, 2012
WL 4328379, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2012) (“UPS is a private entity, not a state actor.”);
Menefee v. U.P.S., No. 05-74892, 2006 WL 373046, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2006) (“The
pending complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim, because UPS is not a state actor and the
alleged conduct is not fairly attributable to the State.” (quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the
Court will dismiss Newson’s constitutional claims.
B. ADA Claim
Newson also asserts damages claims under Title III of the ADA, which prohibits places
of public accommodation from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in connection
with goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a). To state a claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1)
she has a disability; (2) the defendant is a public accommodation within the meaning of the
statue; and (3) she was denied goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations due to discrimination based on her disability, which can include failure to
reasonably accommodate her disability. See Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 175 (3d
Cir. 2019); Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F. Supp. 2d 358, 368 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
A plaintiff is disabled for purposes of the ADA if she (1) has a “physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more” of her “major life activities”; (2) has “a record
of such an impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” Eshleman v. Patrick
Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). “[M]ajor life
activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

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Public accommodations include, for example, grocery stores, banks, shopping centers or other
service establishments that affect commerce. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E)-(F). Only injunctive
relief is available to a private plaintiff suing under Title III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a);
Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 433 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Title III defendants
cannot be liable for money damages.”); see also Abadi v. Target Corp., No. 23-1050, 2023 WL
4045373, at *2 (3d Cir. June 16, 2023) (“Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in public accommodations, only provides for injunctive relief.” (citation
omitted)).
Newson’s Complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA because she has not described
her disability with any specificity. In any event, even if she had, the relief she seeks (damages)
is unavailable to her under the relevant statutory framework. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss
Newson’s ADA claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Newson leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for failure to state a claim. Newson cannot cure the defects
in her Complaint, so she will not be given leave to amend. An Order follows, which shall be
docketed separately.
BY THE COURT:
________________________
HON. MIA R. PEREZ

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