LECOUNT v. KROPP et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE JOSHUA D. WOLSON ON 3/12/25. 3/12/25 ENTERED AND COPIES NOT MAILED TO PRO SE(rf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AHRMADE LECOUNT,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. EDWARD KROPP, JR., et al. ,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Case No. 2:25-cv-1161-JDW

MEMORANDUM
Ahrmade LeCount alleges that Sergeant Edward Kropp, Jr., Officer Craig Johnson,
and Officer Stoltzfus of the Pottstown Police Department violated his rights when they
detained him while he was in his car. Mr. LeCount seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. I
will permit Mr. LeCount to proceed without paying the required fees. I will dismiss his
Complaint but give him an opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the
deficiencies that I identify.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
On March 13, 2023, Sergeant Kropp and Officer Stoltzfus violated Mr. LeCount’s

rights when they “performed an unjustified investigative detention when they boxed [his]
legally parked car into its parking spot, approached from both sides, effectively restraining
my freedom and liberty of movement, resulting in an unlawful de facto arrest and false
imprisonment.” (ECF No. 2 at § IV.D.) According to Mr. LeCount, Sergeant Kropp and
Officer Stoltzfus lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do so. Mr. LeCount’s
mental health has suffered as a result. He seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis must establish that he cannot pay

the costs of his suit. See Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989).
Where, as here, a court grants a plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it must determine
whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). That inquiry applies the standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). I must determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotations omitted). That means I must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as
true, draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether there is a plausible claim.

See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se,, I construe his allegations liberally.
See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).

III.

DISCUSSION
A.

In Forma Pauperis

Mr. LeCount has completed the Court’s form to proceed in forma pauperis, which
demonstrates that he lacks the income or assets to pay the fees for this case. He has
also provided a prison trust fund account statement. I will therefore grant him leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. However, because he is a prisoner, he will nonetheless have
to pay the filing fee over time, even if I dismiss the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

2

B.

Plausibility Of Claims

Mr. LeCount presents claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). I construe the
Complaint to assert violations of Mr. LeCount’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unlawful search and seizure, as well as false arrest and false imprisonment. Even
under a liberal construction of the Complaint, however, Mr. LeCount has not alleged a
plausible basis for those claims.
1.

Individual capacity claims

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The elements of a § 1983 claim for unreasonable search and seizure
are: (a) the actions of the police officers constituted a search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment; and (b) the actions were unreasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances. See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1989).
Although searches generally require probable cause or, at least, reasonable suspicion,

3

there are exceptions, including one that permits an arresting officer to perform a search
incident to an arrest. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 455-61 (2016).
False arrest and false imprisonment are “nearly identical claims” that courts
analyze together. Brockington v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F. Supp.2d 563, 570 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
2005). To state a § 1983 claim for false arrest or false imprisonment, the plaintiff must
allege: “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable
cause.” James v. City of Wilkes Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Therefore, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
the defendants acted without probable cause. “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the
facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “[P]robable cause exists when the totality of the
circumstances within an officer’s knowledge is sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution to conclude that the person being arrested has committed or is committing an
offense.” U.S. v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). The standard is “not whether the
person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had
probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.” Dowling v.

City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). “False arrest and false imprisonment claims
will ‘necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of the crimes charged against

4

the arrestee.’” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quote omitted). In
other words, for false arrest claims involving multiple charges, establishing probable cause
on one charge insulates the defendant from liability. See Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of

Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2024).
Mr. LeCount’s unreasonable search, seizure, and false arrest claims lack enough
detail for me to evaluate them. He says that the officers boxed in his car and approached
from both sides. But he provides no information about why those actions were
unreasonable. To make out a claim, there has to be some detail about the circumstances
under which the seizure occurred. See, e.g., Medina v. Aprile, No. 23-1057, 2023 WL
3440236, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Medina v. Allentown Police Dep’t,
No. 23-2055, 2023 WL 7381461 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2023). In particular, while Mr. LeCount lists
Officer Johnson in the caption of the Complaint and in the list of Defendants, Mr. LeCount
makes no factual allegations about him. To establish individual liability in a § 1983 action,
the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a
required element, meaning a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in
the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims brought against that defendant. See

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). Given the lack of detail, I will
dismiss all of the Fourth Amendment claims based on an alleged unreasonable search,
seizure, or false arrest. I will give Mr. LeCount a chance to include more detail in an
amended complaint.

5

2.

Official capacity claims

Mr. LeCount checked the box on the form Complaint to indicate that he intends to
present claims against Defendants their official capacities as well as their individual
capacities. An official capacity claim is indistinguishable from a claim against the entity
that employs the official. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). This means
official capacity claims are “treated as a suit against the entity” and must meet the
pleading standards for claims against an entity to be plausible. Id. The relevant entity here
is the Borough of Pottstown.
To state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality’s
policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
694; Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). The plaintiff
“must identify [the] custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was”
to satisfy the pleading standard. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009).
It is not enough, however, to allege the existence of a policy or custom. “A plaintiff must
also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Estate of

Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). This can be
done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the
particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id. Further, “[i]t is well-settled that, if there is
no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.” See Mulholland

v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013).

6

Mr. LeCount has not alleged facts to establish that anyone violated his rights. In
addition, he does not allege any facts to suggest that the Borough is responsible as a
result of a policy or custom. I will therefore dismiss the official capacity claims. Again, if
Mr. LeCount has more details that he can plead, I will give him the chance to include them
in an amended complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION
I will grant Mr. LeCount’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. I will dismiss his

Complaint because it lacks detail. I’ll give him a chance to file an amended complaint that
has additional information. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
March 12, 2025

7