BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT v. ZHOU

Filing 258

ORDER THAT THE BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND ADJUST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL LODESTAR VALUE AND ATTORNEYS' FEES CALCULATION IS DENIED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE J. WILLIAM DITTER, JR ON 7/1/2014. 7/2/2014 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(kp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
v.
DIANA ZHOU

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 09-CV-03493

MEMORANDUM ORDER
AND NOW, this

1st

day of July, 2014, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

Bethlehem Area School District’s motion to “amend and adjust Plaintiff’s counsel
lodestar value and attorneys’ fees calculation” (Dkt. # 239) is DENIED.
In support of this order I make the following findings.
1. The District seeks to increase its rates from the amount it agreed to charge the
District, $145 - $165 per hour, to an amount it now claims is the appropriate prevailing
rate, $355 - $450 per hour. The District’s motion to amend also seeks fees for over 500
hours not included in its original fee petition, but fails to explain the disparity in hours.
The new lodestar would total $847,017.50. This not a simple amendment or adjustment
to correct a clerical error or minor omission.1

1

This essentially new fee petition is also untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(D)(2)(b)(i) and (iii) (a motion for
attorneys’ fees shall be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment unless the court orders otherwise and
the motion must “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it.”). The District’s explanation for seeking
this amendment is “to establish a level playing field in comparing the fee petitions expected to be submitted and
considered, and to reflect the disparity in obligations to pay, difference in experience, uniqueness of the actions
pursued and similarity in conditions and circumstances of the trial itself.” See Mot. to Amend, at 5, ¶ 21. The District
has made no effort to explain why it did not seek these rates and the additional hours in its original timely fee
petition and it provides no legal authority for allowing such an amendment.

2. The District had already filed a fee petition seeking in excess of $300,000 in
attorneys’ fees and costs that reflected the actual hourly rate paid by the District to its
counsel. The billing rate was set by a contract that was entered into by the District and
the King Spry law firm after a competitive bidding process.
3. The determination of reasonable attorneys’ fee is a matter within my discretion,
but I must provide an explanation for the fee, including any enhancement. Perdue v.
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010). The lodestar method is designed to produce
“an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have
received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a
comparable case.” Id. at 551. Enhancement of the lodestar is reserved to the “rare” and
“exceptional” circumstance. Id. at 552. Here we know the actual fee counsel for the
District was willing to be paid for their representation of the District in this case.
4. In consideration of the nature of this case, the performance of counsel, and the
results achieved, I find the rates actually charged are reasonable. Contrary to the
District’s counsel’s assertions otherwise, there are no rare or exceptional circumstances in
this case that justify the requested enhancement. To the extent this case was novel or
complex, these factors are reflected in the number of hours billed by counsel. Id. at 552553.
5. “A reasonable attorney’s fee is one that is adequate to attract competent
counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.

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886, 897 (1984). In this case, there is no reason to reimburse attorneys’ fees in excess of
the amount actually charged.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ J. William Ditter, Jr.
J. WILLIAM DITTER, JR., J.

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