KATZ HARGREAVES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT JUDGEMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF IS DENIED. THE CLERK OF COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO MARK THIS CASE CLOSED; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE J. WILLIAM DITTER, JR ON 5/16/11. 5/17/11 ENTERED AND E-MAILED.(jl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JESSICA KATZ HARGREAVES
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security
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:
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 10-2037
MEMORANDUM
J. WILLIAM DITTER, JR., Sr. J
MAY 16, 2011
Upon consideration of the brief in support of request for review filed by plaintiff
as part of her motion not to have her case dismissed (Doc. No. 12) and defendant’s response
thereto (Doc. No. 14) , the court makes the following findings and conclusions:
1.
On April 4, 2007, Jessica Katz Hargreaves, (“Hargreaves”) filed an
application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f, for a period of benefits between July 2006 and July 2009. (Tr. 2; 80; 12834). Throughout the administrative process, including an administrative hearing held on
December 10, 2008 before an ALJ, Hargreaves’ claims were denied. (Tr. 11-19; 20-55; 94-98).
After the Appeals Council denied review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Hargreaves filed her
complaint in this court on May 10, 2010. (Tr. 1-6; Doc. No. 4).
2.
In his February 12, 2009 decision, the ALJ concluded, inter alia, that: (1)
Hargreaves had a severe mood disorder; (2) her impairments did not meet or equal a listing; (3)
she had the RFC to perform work at all exertional levels with no detailed instructions; (4) she
could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy; and (5) she was not
disabled. (Tr. 11 ¶ 5; 13 Findings 2 & 3; 13 ¶ 5 - 15 ¶ 1; 15 Finding 4; 18 Finding 9; 19 Finding
10; 19 ¶¶ 2 -3).1
3.
This Court has plenary review of legal issues, but it reviews the ALJ’s
factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Schaudeck v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.
1979). It is more than a mere scintilla but may be less than a preponderance. See Brown v.
Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). If the conclusion of the ALJ is supported by
1
All numbered paragraph references to the ALJ’s decision begin with the first full paragraph on each page.
substantial evidence, this court may not set aside the Commissioner’s decision even if it would
have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
4.
Hargreaves raises three arguments in which she alleges that the
determinations by the ALJ were legally insufficient or not supported by substantial evidence.
These arguments are addressed below. However, upon independent consideration of all of the
arguments and evidence, I find that the ALJ’s decision is legally sufficient and supported by
substantial evidence.
A.
Hargreaves’ first contention is that, before concluding that she did
not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ failed to identify any particular listings that he considered
and failed to provide any discussion of why he concluded Hargreaves did not meet or equal a
listed impairment. This argument is perplexing in that it is facially meritless. The ALJ
specifically stated in his decision that, while he considered all of the listings, he gave particular
consideration to the listings in section 12.00 (mental disorders). (Tr. 13 ¶ 5). The ALJ then
continued by analyzing for over a page, why he concluded that Hargreaves did not meet or equal
the various criteria in listing 12.04 (Affective Disorders). (Tr. 13 ¶ 6 - 15 ¶ 1). As a result,
Hargreaves’ contention must fail.
B.
Hargreaves next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to elicit
testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”) regarding what jobs she could perform. Typically,
when the ALJ finds that a claimant has non-exertional limitations, as in this case, and those nonexertional limitations erode the claimant’s occupational base, the ALJ will use the Medical
Vocational Guidelines (“the Grids”) as a starting point for evaluating whether the claimant can
perform work. S.S.R. 85-15. Then, the ALJ will often consult a VE regarding how much of the
claimant’s occupational base has been eroded by the non-exertional limitations. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §
416.966(d)-(e).
While the ALJ did find a non-exertional limitation and did not
consult a VE, the ALJ explained that the non-exertional limitation of requiring work without
detailed instructions did not appreciably erode the occupational base of unskilled work. (Tr. 18 ¶
4 - 19 ¶ 2). Because there was little to no erosion of the occupational base, there was no need to
consult a VE. S.S.R. 85-15. Therefore, Hargreaves assertion to the contrary is incorrect.
C.
Third, Hargreaves alleges that the ALJ failed to adequately
explain why he did not give great weight to: (1) the October 8, 2008 report of her treating
psychiatrist, John F. Campion, M.D., that she could not work2; and (2) the testimony of her
parents. See (Tr. 33-51; 365-68). I disagree. In his decision, the ALJ detailed both parents’
testimony and opined that the testimony was not fully credible in light of the unimpressive
medical record, lack of significant treatment, the findings in a June 21, 2007 consultative report
2
I note that the issue of whether a claimant can work is reserved for the Commissioner and a physician’s
opinion thereon is not entitled to any special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e); S.S.R. 96-5p .
2
and a state agency evaluation, her activities of daily living, and her demeanor at the hearing. (Tr.
15 ¶ 5 - 18 ¶ 2); See (Tr. 270-76; 277-90). In addition to the factors listed above, the ALJ also
specifically limited the weight of Dr. Campion’s opinion because it was not substantiated by any
treatment notes or the moderate GAF scores found in the record. (Tr. 16 ¶ 4; 18 ¶ 1). I find that
the ALJ adequately discharged his duty to examine and discuss the contradictory medical
evidence and the testimony of the witnesses. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that the ALJ “must give some indication of the evidence that he rejects and his
reason(s) for discounting that evidence”); Burnett v. Comm. Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112,
122 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the ALJ must also “consider and weigh all of the non-medical
evidence before him”). As a result, Hargreaves’ argument must fail.
5.
After carefully reviewing all of the arguments and evidence, I find that the ALJ’s
conclusion that Hargreaves was not disabled was legally sufficient and supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, Hargreaves’ request for relief must be denied and the decision must be
affirmed.
An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JESSICA KATZ HARGREAVES
:
:
:
:
:
:
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 10-2037
ORDER
AND NOW, this
16th
day of May, 2011, upon consideration of the brief in
support of request for review filed by plaintiff as part of her motion not to have her case
dismissed (Doc. No. 12) and defendant’s response thereto (Doc. No. 14) and having found after
careful and independent consideration that the record reveals that the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards and that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, for the reasons set forth in the memorandum
above, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT,
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY and the relief sought by plaintiff is DENIED; and
2.
The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to mark this case closed.
/s/ J. William Ditter, Jr
J. WILLIAM DITTER, JR., Sr. J
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