IN RE: THOMAS W. OLICK

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM. SIGNED BY HONORABLE WILLIAM H. YOHN, JR ON 10/8/2013. 10/8/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE'S AND E-MAILED.(amas)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re THOMAS OLICK,
Debtor.
THOMAS OLICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
City of Easton et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-3158

MEMORANDUM
YOHN, J.

October 8, 2013

This bankruptcy appeal arises from an adversary proceeding brought by Thomas Olick
against the City of Easton, Northampton County, Portnoff Law Associates Ltd., Sal Panto, Howard
White, and William Murphy.1 Olick appeals from the bankruptcy court’s March 8, 2013 order
making findings of fact detailing the provisions of the parties’ settlement reached on December 13,
2012 and articulated in open court on the record that date.2 Olick claims that the bankruptcy court

1

Olick is no stranger to the bankruptcy court or this court. According to the defendants’
brief he has filed seven bankruptcy cases in the bankruptcy court beginning in 1993 and no less
than fifty-eight adversary cases dating back to 1996. He has filed twenty-three appeals in this
court beginning in 1996.
2

Olick and all defendants in the underlying adversary proceedings, except for
Northampton County, were parties to the settlement conference held on December 13, 2012; and
thus Northampton County is the only defendant in those proceedings to which the March 8, 2013
order does not apply. (Appellant’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Appeal (“Appellant’s Br.”) Ex. 1, Tr.
of Dec. 13, 2012 Settlement Conference (“Dec. 13, 2012 Tr.”) at p. 7.) Accordingly, this
memorandum applies to all defendants except Northampton County, and when I refer to the
“defendants”, I am referring to all defendants listed in Olick’s underlying adversary proceedings
except for Northampton County.

erred because: (1) the December 13, 2012 settlement was only a tentative settlement and not final,
and (2) the March 8, 2013 order included a nonparty, the Olick Family Trust, that was not a party
to the agreement. For the reasons that follow, I will affirm the bankruptcy court’s March 8, 2013
order.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
The March 8, 2013 order sets forth the details of the December 13, 2012 settlement between

Olick and the defendants. As litigation between the parties is extensive, there are numerous
bankruptcy court and state court actions that are part of the March 8, 2013 settlement order that Olick
is appealing; accordingly, I have detailed them below.
Olick filed the underlying bankruptcy case under docket number 07-10880 on February 9,
2007. (Bankr. No. 07-10880, Doc. No. 1.) On June 8, 2012, Olick initiated an adversary proceeding
in the bankruptcy court against the City of Easton, docketed as Adv. No. 12-00444. On October 10,
2012, Olick initiated an additional adversary action against the defendants, including Northampton
County, docketed as Adv. No. 12-00628, by removing an action then pending in the Court of
Common Pleas of Northampton County, Pennsylvania. Olick initiated the underlying adversary
proceeding, docketed as Adv. No. 12-00631, on October 11, 2012. The December 13, 2012
settlement hearing was initiated to discuss these three adversary proceedings. (Appellant’s Br. Ex.
1, Dec. 13, 2012 Tr. at p. 6.)

3

Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed and are drawn largely
from the bankruptcy court’s March 8, 2013 order. While plaintiff appeals the order, he does not
contest any factual recitations from the numerous bankruptcy court proceedings. Olick only
argues that the March 8, 2013 order is invalid because the December 13, 2012 settlement was
tentative and that the Olick Family Trust was not a party to the settlement.
2

Before Olick filed the above adversary actions against the defendants, he had already filed
three adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court. The first proceeding–docked as Adv. No. 0800264–was filed by Olick on or about September 22, 2008, against the City of Easton, the
Northampton County Tax Claim Bureau, Easton Area School District, and Northampton County. On
July 27, 2009, Olick initiated an adversary proceeding against the City of Easton and Becky Bradley,
docketed as Adv. No. 09-00235. Olick initiated an adversary proceeding on October 7, 2009, against
the City of Easton, Northampton County, Palmer Township, and Easton Area School District, which
was docketed as Adv. No. 09-00312.
In addition to the bankruptcy court proceedings, before the December 13, 2012 settlement
conference, Olick, the defendants, and certain other parties including the Olick Family Trust and
David and Matthew Olick (“Olick’s sons”), were litigants in various actions pending in the Court
of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania (hereinafter jointly referred to as the “State Court Litigation”).
The above adversary actions in bankruptcy court and the State Court litigation all involve real
estate tax issues surrounding two properties located in Easton, Pennsylvania: 1209-15 Chidsey Street
(which Olick has described as the “Lot”), and 1220-22 Chidsey Street (which Olick has described
as the “Rental Property”). (Appellant’s Br. at 1.) While neither party details the facts surrounding
the litigation for the taxes on these two properties, it seems that the City of Easton brought actions
against Olick, the Olick Family Trust, and Matthew and David Olick, for delinquent real estate taxes
on the Lot and the Rental Property. (Id.) In his adversary proceedings, however, Olick claims that
the City of Easton “has been misapplying and/or failing to credit the real estate tax payments made
on the Plaintiff’s Properties.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Appeal (“Appellant’s Reply
3

Br.”) at. 1.) Olick states, without documentary proof, that he and the Olick Family Trust– for which
he is the Trustee and his children Matthew and David Olick are the beneficiaries– are the owners of
the Lot. (Id.) Olick claims that he and Matthew and David Olick are the owners of the Rental
Property.4 (Id.)
On December 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court held a settlement conference for the three recent
adversary proceedings: Adv. No. 12-00444, Adv. No. 12-00628, and Adv. No. 12-00631.
(Appellant’s Br. Ex. 1, Dec. 13, 2012 Tr. at p. 6.) Olick and two attorneys representing all
defendants, except for Northampton County, in the three recent adversary actions were present at the
settlement conference. (Id. at p. 6-7.) The bankruptcy judge specifically noted that Northampton
County was not a party to the settlement conference and thus, the settlement would not apply to
Northampton County. (Id. at p. 7.) The bankruptcy judge spoke with Olick and the parties off the
record for a significant amount of time to discuss settlement, which was eventually achieved. (Id.)
After the off-the-record discussion, the bankruptcy judge placed the agreement on the record
and stated that “the purpose of going on the record at this point is to put on the record that a
settlement has been achieved.” (Id.) He then detailed what was going to occur on the record by
stating, “What I will do is, I will put on the record what I understand the terms of the settlement, and
give the parties a chance to comment, correct, or hopefully affirm that I’ve accurately stated the
settlement.” (Id. at p. 8.) The bankruptcy judge then stated what the terms of the settlement were to
resolve Olick’s claims in the three recent adversary proceedings–Adv. No. 12-00444, Adv. No. 1200628, and Adv. No. 12-00631. Specifically, the bankruptcy judge explained that the terms included
4

In his reply brief, Olick alleges that his sons, David and Matthew, were minors when
they purchased the Rental Property, and accordingly Olick acted as their trustee until they
“became ‘adults.’” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at. 2.)
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the City of Easton writing a check to Olick for the amount that Easton had claimed Olick owed in
delinquent real estate taxes through 2011. Then Olick would return the check to the City of Easton.
(Id. at p. 8-9.) The City of Easton would also pay Olick one hundred dollars, and it would not be
allowed to collect the real estate taxes on the Lot and the Rental property through 2011 that were
subject to the settlement. (Id.)
The bankruptcy judge and the parties discussed how the settlement would effect the other
proceedings regarding the real estate taxes on the Lot and the Rental Property, including the State
Court Litigation. The colloquy is as follows:
Mr. Daday: I would have to actually check the dockets, Your Honor, because I know
he filed a couple of different actions.
The Court: All right. You would agree, Mr. Olick, just for the sake of the record, that
this is a settlement of all of the disputes relating to the taxes on this property?
Mr. Olick: My understanding is this is entered into as a general mutual release for
the parties of each other.
The Court: It isn’t really a generalized release.
Mr. Olick: Regarding the taxes.
The Court: [The settlement] is a release of specific related disputes; that is, the
disputes dealing with the claim of the City that you disputed that there were
delinquent taxes on the two Chidsey Street properties. That’s what’s being settled
here. And so the record’s clear, you are agreeing that based on the consideration you
were receiving, that I’ve been describing, not only will the Bankruptcy Court
Adversary proceedings be terminated as to the City and City-related Defendants, but
the Commonwealth Court of Appeal will be terminated in whatever manner it takes,
and if there are any State Court actions raising the same claims, that were not
removed to the Bankruptcy Court, that they, too will be withdrawn. Is that - - you’re
agreeable to that?
....

Mr. Olick: Yes, that’s my understanding. . . .
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Mr. Olick: I’m not aware of any other [cases].
The Court: All right. But if there are, you’re willing to cooperate in them being
withdrawn?
Mr. Olick: Anything involving taxes.
(Id. at p. 12-13.) The defendants noted that they needed to get the settlement approved by the City
Council for the City of Easton, which would have to take place at a future city council meeting. (Id.
at p. 13.) Subsequently, the bankruptcy judge stated that he would issue an order stating that the
adversary proceedings had been settled and requested that the City of Easton draft a document to
“memorialize” the settlement that had just occurred. (Id. at p. 14-15.)
On December 14, 2012, the bankruptcy court filed an order stating that the parties had
reached “a global settlement” . . . “the substance of which was put on the record in open court.”
In his March 8, 2013 order, the bankruptcy judge explained that the parties had been unable
to reduce to writing the terms of the settlement agreement reached on December 13, 2012. (Order,
Olick v. City of Easton, Case No. 12-00631-elf (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2013), ECF No. 37,
hereinafter referred to as “Mar. 8, 2013 Order”.) Accordingly, in his March 8, 2013 order, the
bankruptcy judge memorialized the December 13, 2012 settlement agreement in detail by making
findings of fact as to the settlement after reviewing the written submissions of the parties and the
transcript of the December 13, 2012 settlement conference. (Id.)
The order referred to the three adversary proceedings pending in the bankruptcy court, three
actions pending in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas and one action in the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court stated that the parties had been unable to reduce
to writing the terms of the settlement agreement that was placed on the record on December 13, 2012

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and it therefore made findings of fact that all of the above litigation has been settled on the terms set
forth therein, which basically incorporated the terms of the colloquy on December 13, 2012. After
payment of the various amounts previously agreed to, it ordered Olick and the Olick Family Trust,
as well as the defendants (other than Northampton County) to exchange releases and the state court
litigation to be discontinued.
Subsequently, Olick filed a motion to reconsider the March 8, 2013 order. Olick argued that
the bankruptcy judge abused his discretion when he included the Olick Family Trust (the “Trust”)
in the release section, which released all of the defendants from any claims the Trust currently had
or could have with regard to the allegations made in the adversary bankruptcy proceedings and the
State Court Litigation. (Motion for Recons. from Judgment Adv. No. 12-00631, ECF No. 41 (“Mot.
for Recons.”) at 1.) Olick claimed that the Olick Family Trust was not a party to the bankruptcy
adversary proceedings, and thus, the bankruptcy judge changed the terms of the December 13, 2012
settlement by including the trust in the March 8, 2013 order. (Id.)
The bankruptcy judge denied Olick’s motion for reconsideration in an order issued on March
20, 2013. Order, Olick v. City of Easton, Case No. 12-00631-elf (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2013),
ECF No. 44, hereinafter referred to as “Mar. 20, 2013 Order”.) The bankruptcy judge stated:
The primary ground for reconsideration asserted was that the settlement encompassed
the rights of a non-party, the Olick Family Trust. However, it was absolutely clear to
the court from the tenor and specific content of the discussions held with the parties
that the settlement was intended to be a global settlement, resolving all claims of all
parties relating to the taxes allegedly owed on the subject real property for the tax
years in question. The settlement was intended to end all litigation. The plaintiff’s
suggestion that the March 8, 2013 [order] misstated the settlement because the parties
intended to permit the Olick Family Trust (an entity controlled by the Plaintiff) to
retain claims against the Defendants is disingenuous.
(Id. at 1.) Olick subsequently appealed the March 8, 2013 order making findings concerning the
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settlement agreement to this court. Olick raises two main issues for appeal; he claims that the
bankruptcy court erred because: (1) the December 13, 2012 settlement was only a tentative
settlement, and (2) the March 8, 2013 order encompassed the rights of a non party, the Olick Family
Trust. (Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments and orders of the

bankruptcy courts. Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a district court, sitting as an
appellate tribunal, “may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment, order, or decree
or remand with instructions for further proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. In so doing, the district
court applies a clearly erroneous standard to review a bankruptcy court’s factual findings and a de
novo standard to review its conclusions of law. See In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).
III.

DISCUSSION
Olick first argues that the December 13, 2012 settlement was merely tentative. (Appellant’s

Br. at 5.) Olick claims that the settlement was tentative because it still had to be approved by the City
Council for the City of Easton. (Id.) Olick explains that the December 13, 2012 settlement was never
approved by the City Council, and instead defendants sent him a “counteroffer” that included
language that released the defendants from any of the Trust’s claims. (Id.) Olick refused to sign the
“counteroffer” because it released the defendants from any claims that the Trust may have had that
related to the taxes on the Lot and the Rental Property. (Id.)
Defendants argue that the December 13, 2012 settlement was not a tentative settlement and
was intended to bind the parties as long as the City Council subsequently agreed to the terms.
(Appellees’ Br. at 1-2.) Defendants explain that the City Council agreed to the settlement terms on
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March 13, 2013, and have attached the minutes from the City Council’s meeting on that date to their
brief. (Id.)
After reviewing the minutes it is clear that the settlement with Olick was unanimously
adopted by the City Council. (Appellees’ Br. at Ex. A, p. 8.) Additionally, it is clear that the
bankruptcy court judge found that the December 13, 2012 settlement was not “tentative.” In the
transcript from the December 13, 2012 hearing, the bankruptcy court explicitly stated that a
settlement had been reached. (Appellant’s Br. Ex. 1, Dec. 13, 2012 Tr. at p. 7.) On December 14,
2012, the bankruptcy court issued an order stating that, during the December 13, 2012 settlement
conference, plaintiff and the defendants “reached a global settlement encompassing a resolution of
the claims . . . .” (Order, Olick v. City of Easton, Case No. 12-00631-elf (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 14,
2012), ECF No. 13.) Finally, the March 8, 2013 order making findings as to the terms of the
settlement specifically states that Olick and the defendants reached a global settlement on December
13, 2012. (Mar. 8, 2013 Order, 2.)
The bankruptcy court’s finding that on December 13, 2012, the parties reached a global
settlement is a finding of fact, and, accordingly, I must apply a clearly erroneous standard to that
finding. Olick only baldly asserts that the settlement was tentative and puts forth no evidence to
prove his assertion other than his claim that City Council had to agree to the terms. It did. As in any
case involving a municipality, the governing body must approve or authorize the settlement of such
claims. Accordingly, I find that the bankruptcy court’s finding that a settlement had been reached
and confirmed by the parties was not clearly erroneous. Thus, I will affirm the bankruptcy court’s

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finding in its March 8, 2012 order that a settlement was reached on December 13, 2012.5
Olick’s final argument is that the March 8, 2013 order should not have released the
defendants from any litigation related to the tax issues on the Lot and Rental Property brought by the
Trust, because the Trust was not a party to the underlying adversary actions in the bankruptcy court.
To support his argument, Olick points to the testimony from the December 13, 2012 settlement
conference, and notes that the bankruptcy court did not refer to the Olick Family Trust but instead
stated, “The settlement will resolve all claims that Mr. Olick has against the City of Easton . . . .”6
Olick made this exact argument to the bankruptcy judge is his motion for reconsideration.
In his March 20, 2013 order, the bankruptcy judge rejected Olick’s argument that the Olick Family
Trust was not part of the settlement. The bankruptcy judge explained that “ it was absolutely clear
to the court from the tenor and specific content of the discussions held with the parties that the
settlement was intended to be a global settlement, resolving all claims of all parties relating to the
taxes allegedly owed on the subject real property. . . . The settlement was intended to end all
litigation.” (Mar. 20, 2013 Order, 1.) Additionally, he noted that the Olick Family Trust is controlled

5

Even if the bankruptcy judge’s conclusion that the parties reached a settlement on
December 13, 2012, was a conclusion of law, I would still affirm the March 8, 2013 order. As
stated in the fact section of this memorandum, both parties agreed to be bound by the settlement
on December 13, 2012, and defendants established that the City Council approved the settlement
on March 13, 2013.
6

Olick points out that he and his sons, David and Matthew, are the owners of the Rental
Property, not the Olick Family Trust. As the bankruptcy court did not include language explicitly
releasing the defendants from claims brought by David and Matthew Olick regarding the real
estate taxes on the Rental Property in its March 8, 2013 order, I cannot decide whether those
parties were subject to the December 13, 2012 settlement. The record and briefs do not contain
the ages of the sons on December 13, 2012. If they were minors at that time, the consent of
Olick to the settlement, as their parent and natural guardian, would bind them. However, if they
had reached the age of majority, neither party has submitted any evidence as to their position on
the settlement.
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by Olick, as he is the Trustee. (Id.) Accordingly, he found that Olick’s argument was disingenuous.
(Id.)
The bankruptcy judge’s finding that the December 13, 2012 settlement included a release of
the Olick Family Trust’s claims against defendants relating to the taxes owed on the Lot and the
Rental Property is a finding of fact, and accordingly I must apply a clearly erroneous standard to that
finding. While Olick is correct that the Olick Family Trust is not mentioned in the December 13,
2012 testimony that is on the record, the bankruptcy judge noted that he had discussed the settlement
with the parties, and in fact reached a settlement with the parties, before they went on the record.
Additionally, the testimony on the record stated that it was a global settlement that dismissed all
disputes dealing with all claims about the taxes on the Lot and the Rental Property. (Appellant’s Br.
Ex. 1, Dec. 13, 2012 Tr. at p. 12-13.) Olick confirms that he was the Trustee of the Trust and does
not deny that he has the authority to act on behalf of and bind the Trust for purposes of a settlement
agreement. As such, he had the authority to bind the Trust to the settlement. The settlement was
represented as a global settlement of all of the tax issues in all of this litigation, state and federal.
As the Trustee, he had the authority to consent to that settlement on behalf of the Trust and did so.
Olick correctly points out that he could not act as counsel for the Trust. But he did not act as counsel.
He acted as the Trustee, just as he acted for himself as an individual. A trustee can make an
agreement on behalf of the trust without having legal representation. Accordingly, I find that the
bankruptcy judge’s finding that the Olick Family Trust released its claims against the defendants
relating to the real estate taxes on the Lot and the Rental Property was not clearly erroneous.
Therefore, I will affirm that bankruptcy court’s March 8, 2013 order.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I will affirm the bankruptcy court’s March 8, 2013 order. An

appropriate order accompanies this memorandum.

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