SHELTON v. COUNTY OF CHESTER et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE GERALD A. MCHUGH ON 9/30/15. 9/30/15 ENTERED AND E-MAILED.(jl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LISA MARIE SHELTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF CHESTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION
No. 13-4667

MEMORANDUM ORDER
On this 30th day of September, 2015, upon review of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 48), 1 I DENY the Motion for the reasons that follow.

Standard of Review
The Third Circuit has held that “[t]he scope of a motion for reconsideration…is
extremely limited.” Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Howard Hess
Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010)). Such a motion
should only be granted if the moving party shows “(1) an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence…; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff appears to argue that
the court erred in finding that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
PrimeCare “knew of and allowed” reckless conduct by its employees. Pl.’s Mot.
Reconsideration at 2. Upon reconsideration, I am not persuaded that my analysis was in error.

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I issued an Order on September 16, 2015 granting Defendant’s Motion and striking Plaintiff’s Punitive Damages
Interrogatories and Notice of Videotape Deposition (Doc. 36). Plaintiff also sent a Sur-Reply on September 16th
(Doc. 48), but this document was received after my Order was issued. Plaintiff has requested that I treat the SurReply as a Motion for Reconsideration of my September 16th Order, and I consider it as such in the analysis that
follows.

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Review of the Court’s Previous Order
As stated in my September 16th Order, discovery of Plaintiff’s financial records is
warranted only if there is a real possibility Plaintiff will recover punitive damages from
PrimeCare. Plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence demonstrating that PrimeCare may
be vicariously liable for punitive damages under Section 505(c) of the MCARE Act because
PrimeCare “knew or should have known about the reckless conduct of its agents/employees.”
Pl.’s Mot. Reconsideration at 2.
Plaintiff incorrectly states the burden of proof for punitive vicarious liability under the
MCARE Act. Section 505(c) of the MCARE Act provides punitive damages for vicarious
liability only if the “party knew of and allowed the conduct by its agent that resulted in the award
of punitive damages.” 40 P.S. § 1303.505(c). Although the Pennsylvania appellate courts have
not addressed this provision, I am persuaded by the always insightful analysis of Judge Terrence
Nealon that the section adds “a scienter element into the respondeat superior equation,” making
a health care provider vicariously liable for punitive damages only if “it had actual knowledge of
the wrongful conduct of its agent and nevertheless allowed it to occur.” Wagner v. Onofrey, No.
3-403, 2006 WL 3704801, at *4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Nov. 30, 2006); see also Stroud v. Abington
Mem'l Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 238, 257 (E.D. Pa. 2008). Thus, proof that PrimeCare “should
have known” about the conduct of its employees is insufficient to state a claim for punitive
damages against PrimeCare itself. Plaintiff must prove both that PrimeCare’s employees
engaged in culpable conduct, and further prove that PrimeCare had actual knowledge of culpable
conduct and allowed it to continue.
Looking at Plaintiff’s Motion in light of this burden, I remain convinced that Plaintiff
cannot meet this burden. Plaintiff argues that PrimeCare acquired actual knowledge of the

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actions of its employees when Karen Murphy, a PrimeCare Administrator, was “consulted by the
nursing staff with respect to [the decedent] Mr. Carter’s condition and care.” Murphy Dep. at
22:10–2. While at first blush this might suggest that a PrimeCare administrator knew of and
condoned or ignored the conduct Plaintiff contends was outrageous, this is sleight of hand.
Plaintiff cites only the part of Nurse Murphy’s deposition in which she concedes she was
notified; as the deposition continues, however, Nurse Murphy offered further testimony
describing how, upon being consulted, she assessed Mr. Carter and then intervened to “get him
to a hospital as soon as possible.” Murphy Dep. at 28:1–2. Rather than showing that PrimeCare
allowed culpable conduct by its employees to continue, it shows the exact opposite.
My order preventing discovery of PrimeCare’s financial records stands.

/s/ Gerald Austin McHugh
United States District Court Judge

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