PARKS, LLC v. TYSON FOODS, INC. et al

Filing 60

ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION IS GRANTED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR ON 8/25/2015. 8/26/2015 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(lbs, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
__________________________________________
PARKS, LLC,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
:
TYSON FOODS, INC.; HILLSHIRE
:
BRANDS COMPANY,
:
:
Defendants.
:
__________________________________________

No. 5:15-cv-00946

ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2015, upon consideration of Defendants’ Motion for
Protective Order, ECF No. 52, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. 1

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.___________
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge

1

Plaintiff objected to Defendants’ Motion on the basis that certain documentary and testimonial evidence
presented to the Court during the Court’s hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief may fall
within the scope of the umbrella protective order Defendants have proposed. Plaintiff acknowledges that the
proposed protective order provides that “[n]o information that is in the public domain shall be deemed or considered
to be Protected Information,” but nonetheless requests that the proposed protective order contain a specific
exception for information “presented by Defendants in the June 15, 2015 preliminary injunction hearing.” The Court
concludes that this exception is unnecessary. Pursuant to the terms of the protective order, if Plaintiff believes that
Defendants have improperly designated any information as protected that is in the public domain, Plaintiff may
challenge that designation by serving notice on Defendants, at which time Defendants would be required to justify
the designation.
The Court takes this opportunity to remind each of the parties that material should not be designated as
protected under an umbrella protective order unless such material is “at least arguably subject to protection,” and
that the act of designating a document as protected “may be viewed as equivalent to a motion for protective order
and subject to the sanctions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g).” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.17
(3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation (Second) § 21.431 (1985)).