SCULL v. COLVIN

Filing 14

ORDER THAT PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS ARE OVERRULED. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IS APPROVED AND ADOPTED. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR REVIEW IS DENIED. THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER IS AFFIRMED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOHN R. PADOVA ON 9/21/16. 9/21/16 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERRANCE A. SCULL
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 15-1511

ORDER
AND NOW, this

day of September, 2016, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Brief

and Statement of Issues in Support of Request for Review (Docket No. 7), Defendant’s Response
thereto (Docket No. 8), the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge
Carol Sandra Moore Wells (Docket No. 10), Plaintiff’s Objections thereto (Docket No. 11), and
Defendant’s Response (Docket No. 13), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s Objections are OVERRULED.

2.

The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED. 1

1

Plaintiff Scull argued in his Brief that the ALJ failed to give controlling weight to the
opinion of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Putnam, and afforded limited weight to the findings of
the consultive examiner, Dr. Schwartz, by referencing only the “normal” findings in the record
and ignoring other evidence consistent with the treating source opinion. The Magistrate Judge
recommends that the ALJ’s decision to not give controlling weight to the treating source
opinions was supported by substantial evidence since the opinions were contradicted by Scull’s
infrequency of treatment, his reported activities of daily living (“ADL”), and Dr. Putman’s own
treatment notes. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed and discussed
Dr. Putnam’s findings — a point that Scull did not challenge in his Brief — before concluding
that his opinion, that Scull was markedly limited in several areas of mental function and
recommending “no work,” were unsupported.
Scull objects that the Magistrate Judge relied upon two inapposite decisions to support
her recommendation that the ALJ’s failure to discuss other evidence that supported Dr. Putnam
was not error. We overrule the objection. The Magistrate Judge correctly cited Johnson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating there is “no authority for the
proposition that an ALJ must cite all evidence a claimant presents”), and Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating “we do not expect the ALJ to make reference to every
relevant treatment note. . . .”) to support her recommendation that an ALJ is not required to cite
every piece of evidence in the record. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge correctly recommends
that the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence when he rejected the treating source opinions
as unsupported since Dr. Putman’s notes, up to that time, had described Scull as alert,
cooperative, having normal concentration, speech and movement, logical thought processes and

3.

Plaintiff’s Request for Review is DENIED.

4.

The Decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova
John R. Padova, J.

unimpaired thought content. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the ALJ
was supported by substantial evidence in partially rejecting Dr. Putnam’s opinions is approved
and adopted.
Scull next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the ALJ’s failure to
consider Scull’s work history in assessing his credibility was harmless error in light of the other
substantial evidence supporting the partial negative credibility determination. The ALJ found
that the evidence of Scull’s ADL was inconsistent with his claim of a disabling level of
depression. After reviewing this and other evidence, including the treating source progress
notes, the ALJ also observed as part of his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination
that Scull’s “alleged onset date appears to be relative to the date he was terminated from
employment, which suggests reasons other than disability for filing his application for benefits.”
(R. 30.) Scull argued in his Brief that this reasoning ignored his consistent work history prior to
his onset date, and evidence that he had searched for work after he was terminated from his last
employment. The Magistrate Judge acknowledges that the ALJ did not discuss the impact of
Scull’s work history in his credibility determination, and did not expressly acknowledge Scull’s
efforts to find work after his termination, but recommends that these failures were harmless since
other substantial evidence in the medical record supported the RFC determination. Scull objects
that it is error to conclude that the ability to perform ADL is conclusive evidence a claimant is
not credible. This assertion misstates the record and the objection is overruled. The Magistrate
Judge recommends that the ALJ’s finding — that Scull was only partially credible in describing
his symptoms — was based on the record as a whole including the ADL evidence, and that
because the ALJ articulated valid reasons other than the coincidence of the onset date with the
date of termination for discounting Scull’s credibility, that finding should not be disturbed. This
recommendation is approved and adopted.
Finally, Scull objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that there was no error
in the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert. The Magistrate Judge recommends
that since the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence in discounting Dr. Putnam’s opinions
on the severity of Scull’s limitations, there was no error in relying upon answers to hypothetical
questions that incorporated only the discounted limitations. We overrule the objection and
approve and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the ALJ properly incorporated
Scull’s limitations into the hypotheticals.