I-LEAD CHARTER SCHOOL-READING et al v. READING SCHOOL DISTRICT et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM/OPINION THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED AND THIS CASE SHALL BE DISMISSED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL ON 6/20/17. 6/20/17 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED. (ky, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
I-LEAD CHARTER SCHOOL-READING, et al,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 16-2844

v.
READING SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Schmehl, J. /s/ JLS
I.

June 20, 2017

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the motion to dismiss of Defendants, Reading School District,

Board of School Directors of Reading School District, Robin Costenbader-Jacobson,
Abraham Cepeda, Esq., Bernardo Carbajal, and Rebecca Acosta (hereinafter
“Defendants”) (Docket No. 14). Plaintiffs, I-Lead Charter School, nine parents suing on
their own behalf and on behalf of their children who attend I-Lead, and Will Cinfici and
Karen McCree, former members of the Reading School Board (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”)
have filed an opposition to the motion, and Defendants have filed a reply.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts First Amendment claims, due process
claims and Sunshine Act claims all arising out of the School Board’s vote to revoke ILead’s charter under the Pennsylvania Charter School Law. Having read the parties’
briefing, and after oral argument, for the reasons that follow, I find that Plaintiffs cannot
be successful on their claims against Defendants. Therefore, I will grant the motion to
dismiss.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I-Lead Charter School (hereinafter “I-Lead”) is located in Reading,

Pennsylvania, and was granted a charter by the Reading School District in 2011. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5.) The charter was renewed in 2013, and in 2015, the school board began
the process to revoke I-Lead’s charter. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 72.)
In addition to I-Lead, Plaintiffs include nine parents who are suing on their own
behalf and on behalf of their children. Their children are enrolled in I-Lead and these
parents want their children to continue to be educated at the school. (Id., ¶¶ 6-14.)
Plaintiffs also include two Reading residents who are former Directors on the Reading
School District School Board. (Id., ¶ 15.)
Defendants are the Reading School District, the Reading School District School
Board, and current School Board Directors Robin Costenbader-Jacobson, Abraham
Cepeda and Bernardo Carabajal, who are sued both individually and in their official
capacities. (Id., ¶¶ 16-18.) Rebecca Acosta, the final defendant, is sued individually “and
in her capacity as a former Director on the Board.” (Id., ¶ 19.)
A reading of the Amended Complaint shows that I-Lead’s problems seemed to
begin in March of 2014, when the School Board reviewed a letter from I-Lead’s landlord
that was derogatory towards I-Lead (Id., ¶¶ 29-30, 32.) Plaintiffs allege that a minority of
Board members “seized on [the] allegations [in this letter] as a possible ground to sway
public opinion against I-Lead and seek its closure…” (Id., ¶ 40.) The Board held a secret
meeting “between March 7, 2014 and June 1, 2014” where they retained the services of
counsel to investigate the allegations contained in the letter. (Id., ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs allege

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that other meetings were held in secret and with counsel to make decisions regarding
strategies to close I-Lead. (Id., ¶ 43.)
Plaintiffs allege that the Board was counseled to challenge the zoning
administrator’s approval of the use of the building that the school was housed in to “gain
a tactical advantage against” I-Lead, which the Board did and said challenge was
eventually rejected. (Id., ¶¶ 47, 48.) In 2015, then Board Director Rebecca Acosta told
Angel Figueroa, an executive at I-Lead, that she would oppose contesting the tax
exemption for the building that I-Lead was located in if he publically supported her
candidacy for magisterial district judge in the May 2015 primary election, and that she
“spurred the Board’s attack” when he refused. (Id., ¶¶ 51, 53.)
On June 5, 2015, I-Lead received a letter from counsel for the School Board that
threatened revocation proceedings against I-Lead and demanded that the school agreed to
several charter terms, which were allegedly “designed to be implemented for the sole
purpose of ensuring the termination of I-Lead’s charter.” (Id., ¶ 59.) I-Lead eventually
told the Board that it was “prepared, albeit under duress, to sign the charter agreement as
proposed,” and the School District, after meeting in secret in violation of the Sunshine
Law, withdrew its offer of charter amendment and instead instituted revocation
proceedings against I-Lead. (Id., ¶¶ 59-62.)
On September 21, 2015, in order to “resolve the conflicts” that it had with the
School District, I-Lead filed a Request for Amendment to Charter with the District. (Id., ¶
67.) The Board then met in secret in violation of the Sunshine Act, deliberated and
decided to ignore the request for charter amendment. (Id., ¶ 68.) Thereafter, on
September 23, 2015, at a public meeting, the Board approved a resolution that initiated

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revocation proceedings against I-Lead, and appointed Jeffrey D. Litts, Esquire, to serve
as a hearing officer for the revocation proceedings. (Id., ¶¶ 72, 76.) Mr. Litts presided
over public hearings on the revocation and received evidence to prepare findings of fact
and conclusions of law. (Id., ¶ 80.) Mr. Litts and the Board then conducted secret
meetings in violation of the Sunshine Act to shape Litts’ findings and conclusions so as
to effect a revocation of I-Lead’s charter. (Id.) In October of 2015, the school district
rejected I-Lead’s offer to mediate their dispute. (Id., ¶¶ 83, 85.)
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim satisfies the plausibility standard when the facts alleged “allow[]
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The Court of Appeals requires us to apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6)
motion: (1) “it must ‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a
claim;’” (2) “it should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;’” and, (3) “[w]hen there are wellpleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Connelly v. Lane
Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675,

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679); see also Burtch, 662 F.3d at 221; Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d. Cir.
2011); Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d. Cir. 2010).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. For the

reasons that follow, I will grant Defendants’ motion in its entirety and dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint. 1
A. The Individual Plaintiffs Will be Dismissed Due to Lack of Standing
It is undisputed that federal courts can only resolve matters that involve “cases
and controversies.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 254 (3d
Cir. 2005). As part of the case-or-controversy requirement, “plaintiffs must establish that
they have standing to sue.” Id. The Supreme Court has held that in order to establish
standing a plaintiff must establish three elements: an injury in fact; a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and substantial likelihood of remedy,
not mere speculation that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). An injury-in-fact “is an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. . .” Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432
F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005).
The individual parent Plaintiffs and their children clearly have no standing to sue
in this matter because they do not allege that they suffer from any cognizable injury.
Plaintiffs allege that they have a “right to continue the children’s educations at [I-Lead].”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 138.) However, I-Lead is continuing to operate as of the date of this
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At oral argument and in their opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss: 1) claims
against the school board in its own name; 2) punitive damages claim against the school district; and 3)
monetary official capacity claims against all of the individual defendants.

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opinion, and was recently successful in its de novo appeal of the charter revocation to the
CAB. I-Lead will continue to operate during any further appeal. Therefore, Plaintiff
parents and their children cannot allege that they were injured by any actions of
Defendants, as they continue to be educated at I-Lead.
Plaintiffs argue that they have standing based upon the Board’s conduct on
September 23, 2015, which they allege caused them harm. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim
that “[d]ue to the September 23rd revocation resolution, the students risk losing the
educational benefit received attending [I-Lead], and the taxpayers risk adverse financial
impact by the loss of an efficient system of public schools established through utilization
of the charter school system enabled by the [Charter School Law].” (Docket No. 16, p. 6.)
First, the allegation that the Board’s actions on September 23, 2015 caused harm
to Plaintiffs is insufficient to give Plaintiffs standing. No Plaintiff was prevented from
speaking at the September 23, 2015 meeting, members of the public were given time to
submit statements to the Board regarding the revocation, and there was a public hearing
on the revocation. Plaintiffs had many opportunities to speak before the Board made its
decision. Accordingly, Plaintiff parents and their children are dismissed from this matter
due to lack of standing.
Plaintiffs, Will Cinfici and Karen McCree, former members of the Reading
School Board, will also be dismissed from this matter due to lack of standing. A review
of the Amended Complaint shows that Cinfici and McCree have not made a single
allegation of any injury resulting from Defendants’ actions or inactions.
To the extent Plaintiffs are arguing that the Plaintiff parents or Cinfici and
McCree have standing as “municipal taxpayers,” this argument also must fail. Courts

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have sometimes recognized municipal taxpayer standing in certain circumstances,
although state and federal taxpayer standing is not recognized. See Doremus v. Bd. of Ed.
of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952). However, it is state spending, not municipal
spending that we are addressing here regarding the funding of a charter school, and the
law is clear that “state taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax
or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.” Daimler Chrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). Therefore, this argument also fails to provide
standing to the individual plaintiffs in this matter. Accordingly, all individual plaintiffs
are dismissed from this matter due to their lack of standing.
B. Constitutional Claims Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
As the individual plaintiffs must be dismissed from this matter due to lack of
standing to sue, the only remaining plaintiff is I-Lead itself. All constitutional claims
brought by I-Lead against the School District under section 1983 must be dismissed, as a
charter school cannot sue its creator school district under that section.
The political subdivision standing doctrine holds that a municipality, “created by
a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the
Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its
creator.” Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 1015
(1933). This rule has been applied “equally to all political subdivisions of a state ... and
bars any alleged federal claim” against the state by any of its subdivisions. See Cnty. of
Lancaster v. Phila. Elec. Co., 386 F.Supp. 934, 940 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 3, 1975); Nw. Sch. Dist.
v. Pittenger, 397 F.Supp. 975, 979–80 (W.D.Pa.975). Defendants in this matter argue that
a charter school operates pursuant to a written charter signed by the local school board

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and is therefore analogous to a municipality where the powers granted to it are defined by
its creator.
I find that Defendants are correct in this argument, and a charter school operates
with the authorization of a local school district for the limited purpose of providing an
alternate education option for students of the district. “This relationship is analogous to
that of a municipal corporation-creator where the powers granted to the municipal
corporation are defined and limited by the creator.” Pocono Mountain Charter School v.
Pocono Mountain School District, et al, 908 F.Supp.2d 597, 612 (M.D. 2012). Therefore,
a charter school, like a municipality, may not bring a constitutional challenge against its
creator. Id.; see also Reach Academy for Boys and Girls, Inc. v. Delaware Dept. of
Education, 8 F.Supp.3d 574, 578 (D. Del. 2014). Accordingly, I-Lead is sufficiently
analogous to a municipal corporation in this matter that it is precluded from asserting any
constitutional claims against the school district. Therefore, all of I-Lead’s section 1983
claims are dismissed from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with prejudice.
C.

First Amendment Claims

Even if I-Lead could bring constitutional claims against the school district, its
First Amendment claims would still fail. Plaintiffs state that their “claim of 1st
Amendment restriction deals specifically with the September 23 [2015] Board meeting
where the resolution authorizing charter termination was discussed and voted upon.”
(Docket No. 16, p. 13.) It appears Plaintiffs are arguing that their speech was restricted
because they were not given sufficient notice that the subject of I-Lead’s charter
revocation would be discussed at this meeting. However, Plaintiffs cite no authority to
support the proposition that they were entitled to specific notice of board agenda items in

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advance of the meeting. Further, Plaintiffs were not denied the right to speak at the
September 23, 2015 Board meeting. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims are
dismissed.
D. Due Process Claims
Both Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process claims also must fail. To
prevail on a substantive due process claim, ‘a plaintiff must establish as a threshold
matter that he has a protected property interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process protection applies.’ Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139–140
(3d Cir.2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For a property interest to be
protected for purposes of substantive due process, it must be ‘fundamental’ under the
United States Constitution. Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 140. Any substantive due process claim
by either the individual plaintiffs or I-Lead must fail, because they have failed to allege a
“fundamental” property interest that has been taken away from them. Continued
education at I-Lead is clearly not a fundamental right under the United States
Constitution. Therefore, any and all substantive due process claims are dismissed.
In order to establish a violation of an individual's right to procedural due process,
a plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of a protected interest in life, liberty or
property that has been interfered with by the state; and then second, establish that the
procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally insufficient. Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548
(1972); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The
individual plaintiffs in this matter do not allege the deprivation of a protected interest.
Plaintiffs do not have a protected liberty or property interest in attending a school of their

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choice. See Pocono Mountain Charter School v. Pocono Mountain School District, 442
Fed. Appx. 681, 685 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs claim that they are “not claiming a
property interest in attending the school of their choice, but instead they are claiming a
property interest in remaining in the charter school they are enrolled in . . .” (Docket No.
16, p. 15.) I find this argument to be a distinction without a legal difference. Plaintiffs are
arguing that they have a property interest in continuing to attend I-Lead, which is clearly
not a protected interest under the Constitution. Therefore, the individual plaintiffs’
procedural due process claims must fail.
I-Lead’s procedural due process claim also fails, because it had a remedy from
any revocation of its charter. Pennsylvania law provides that the Charter School Appeal
Board “shall have the exclusive review of a decision not to renew or revoke a charter.” 24
P.S. § 17-1729-A(d). All decisions of the Charter Appeal Board are then subject to
appellate review by the Commonwealth Court. 24 P.S. § 17-1729-A(h). As the Charter
School Law provides an exclusive remedy of the decision to revoke a charter in the form
of an appeal to CAB, a remedy which I-Lead did indeed choose to utilize, I-Lead has
clearly not been deprived of any protected interest, as the CAB found in I-Lead’s favor.
Further, Plaintiffs make no allegations that the procedures set forth in the Charter School
Law to appeal a revocation of a charter are constitutionally insufficient. Accordingly, ILead’s procedural due process claim must fail.
E. Claims Under the Pennsylvania Constitution
Plaintiffs have also brought claims under Article I, Section 7 and 20 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. However, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Pennsylvania
Constitution must also fail, as “[t]o date, neither Pennsylvania statutory authority, nor

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appellate case law has authorized the award of monetary damages for a violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.” Baletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)
(citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ response fails to set forth any authority to support the
proposition that they are entitled to recover monetary damages under the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ due process and First Amendment claims under the
Pennsylvania Constitution must be dismissed with prejudice.
F. Claims for Sunshine Act Violations
Lastly, Plaintiffs set forth claims for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania
Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. C.S. § 701-716. These claims must also fail. Legal challenges
alleging violations of the Sunshine Act must be brought within 30 days of the date of an
open meeting, or 30 days from the date of discovery of an alleged closed meeting, but no
more than one (1) year after the date of the meeting in question. Plaintiffs allege in their
Amended Complaint that they discovered the Sunshine Act issues within thirty days of
the commencement of this case, but provide no allegations or evidence to support that
claim. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not include the dates of the occurrence of
closed meetings alleged, and if dates of alleged closed meetings are provided in the
Amended Complaint, they are more than one year before the complaint in this case was
filed. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the closed meetings that they claim violate
the Sunshine Act occurred less than one year before the original complaint was filed in
this matter. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Sunshine Act claims are dismissed as untimely.
Further, I-Lead, the only proper plaintiff in this action, is not a “person” permitted
to bring a legal challenge under the Sunshine Act. An action to challenge actions of an
agency under the Sunshine Act may be brought by “any person where the agency whose

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act is complained of is located or where the act complained of occurred.” 65 Pa.C.S.A.
§715. Courts consider the definition of the term “person” as used in that statute under
Pennsylvania law. Press-Enter., Inc. v. Benton Area Sch. Dist., 604 A.2d 1221, 1223
(Pa.Cmwlth 1992). Under 1 Pa.C.S.A. §1991 , a “person” includes a corporation,
partnership, limited liability company, business trust, other association, government
entity (other than the Commonwealth), estate, trust, foundation or natural person.” As this
definition of person clearly does not include the type of entity we have here, a charter
school, I-Lead is not entitled to bring a legal challenge under the Sunshine Act, and these
claims are also dismissed with prejudice.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and this case

shall be dismissed.

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