MEDINA v. KUYKENDALL et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM. AN APPROPRIATE ORDER FOLLOWS.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARK A. KEARNEY ON 6/27/17. 6/27/17 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PLFF., E-MAILED TO COUNSEL.(pr, )

IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM OMAR MEDINA

CIVIL ACTION

N0.16-6404

v.
LAURA KUYKENDALL,
et al.

June 27, 2017

KEARNEY,J.
MEMORANDUM

A prisoner suing wardens for alleged harm caused during a transfer between their two
facilities under the First and Eighth Amendments must specify each warden's conduct causing
him specific harm and plead the elements of each claim involving the warden. Otherwise, we
enter the accompanying Order granting the wardens' motion to dismiss. As the prisoner is
proceeding pro se and the wardens could possibly have personal involvement with the required
elements of a civil rights claim under the First or Eighth Amendments, we grant him leave to file
an amended complaint consistent with this Memorandum within sixty (60) days.
I.

Alleged facts.

Inmate William Omar Medina pro se sues Laura Kuykendall as Warden of Lehigh
County Community Corrections Center, and Janine Donate as Warden of Lehigh County Prison,
in forma pauperis for alleged conduct leading to injuries suffered during a transfer from the

Corrections Center to the County Prison. 1 Mr. Medina claims he is a "mental health inmate."2
Mr. Medina alleges Ms. Kuykendall, on September 30, 2016, placed him "in a cell with
personal clothing[,] sneakers, shoelaces and work belt" awaiting transfer from the Corrections
Center, which houses inmates "granted the privilege of work release" back to County Prison. 3

Ms. Kuykendall kept him in the cell for "several hours" without a "bathroom, water or
[surveillance] camera," and he alleges attempting suicide. 4 He generally alleges he did not
receive "meds at facility."

5

Ms. Kuykendall also kept his family from giving him rash

medication. 6
Mr. Medina alleges Ms. Donate at the County Prison denied him "religious material" and
the "right to take on kosher or halal meals." 7 Mr. Medina also alleges he used the County
Prison's grievance procedures and then the Prison issued him an infraction in retaliation for these
grievances. 8 Alleging he quit his job due to the prospect of an ongoing need to pray during the
early part of the work day, Mr. Medina seemingly concedes, however, the County Prison issued
the infraction for quitting his job. 9

II.

Analysis
Ms. Kuykendall and Ms. Donate move to dismiss Mr. Medina's complaint. 10 While pro

se pleadings, "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,"
they must "still allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." 11 To successfully
plead a "basic cause of action" in a § 1983 claim, Mr. Medina must allege facts showing "(1) .. .
the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) .. .
the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States." 12
Mr. Medina does not cite a constitutional provision or statute.

13

Alleging Ms.

Kuykendall placed him in a cell without a bathroom, water, or a surveillance camera and denied
him medication, we liberally construe Mr. Medina's complaint to claim unconstitutional
confinement and deprivation of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Alleging the
County Prison denied him religious materials and kosher and halal meals, we liberally construe

2

Mr. Medina to be claiming Ms. Donate violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). 14

A. Mr. Medina fails to plead Ms. Kuykendall violated the Eighth Amendment by
unconstitutionally confining him and depriving him of medical care.
To sufficiently plead Ms. Kuykendall violated his Eighth Amendment right to medical
care, Mr. Medina "must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs." 15 To sufficiently plead unconstitutional confinement, Mr.
Medina must also allege being "denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities
through prison officials' deliberate indifference to a condition posing a substantial risk of serious
harm." 16
While Mr. Medina alleges Ms. Kuykendall placed him in a cell for several hours and
alleges attempting suicide as a "mental health inmate" who did not receive medication, Mr.
Medina does not allege Ms. Kuykendall acted with awareness of a "substantial risk of serious
harm," nor does he allege Ms. Kuykendall acted with deliberate indifference to such a risk or
some serious medical need. 17 In McCargo v. Camden County Jail, our court of appeals affirmed
dismissal of a pro se complaint failing to "allege that anyone involved in the facts of [the]
complaint was aware of any 'substantial risk of serious harm' that he experienced during his
confinement, let alone acted with 'deliberate indifference' to such conditions." 18 Because Mr.
Medina does not allege awareness or deliberate indifference by Ms. Kuykendall, his complaint
lacks facial plausibility to support his claim against Ms. Kuykendall of unconstitutional
confinement or deprivation of medical care violating the Eighth Amendment.

3

B.

Mr. Medina fails to plead Ms. Donate deprived him of his First Amendment
right to practice his religion.

"Liability under § 1983 may not be based solely on the doctrine of respondeat
superior .... [m]ore particularly, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally
involved in the deprivation." 19 Mr. Medina does not list the County Prison as a defendant, and
while Mr. Medina sues Ms. Donate, he does not allege facts involving her conduct. 20
In Sutton v. Rasheed, our court of appeals held a pro se § 1983 complaint claiming
violations of the First Amendment's free exercise clause failed to allege the defendant's personal
involvement and affirmed dismissal. 21

In Sutton, two inmates sued the commissioner of

corrections, among other defendants, alleging deprivation of religious materials. 22 Because the
inmates did not allege personal involvement by the commissioner, our court of appeals held the
district court "properly dismissed" the inmates' damages claim. 23
In his Statement of Claim, Mr. Medina alleges the County Prison denied him religious
materials and kosher and halal meals but does not allege conduct by Ms. Donate. 24 Because Mr.
Medina does not allege conduct by Ms. Donate, he does not state a claim against her under §
1983.
Even if Mr. Medina sues the County Prison, he fails to allege the prison policy or practice
substantially burdened his exercise of religion. Our court of appeals instructs, "[t]he threshold
question in any First Amendment or RLUIPA [§ 1983] case is whether the prison's challenged
policy or practice has substantially burdened the practice of the inmate-plaintiffs religion." 25 Mr.
Medina does not claim the alleged denial of religious materials and kosher and halal meals
substantially burdened his exercise of religion. Mr. Medina only alleges the denials occurred
without alleging specific facts to support a plausible claim of a substantial burden on his exercise
of religion.

4

C. Mr. Medina fails to plead Ms. Donate retaliated against him for exercising his
First Amendment right to file a grievance. 26
Mr. Medina fails to allege Ms. Donate's personal involvement in alleged retaliation.
While Mr. Medina alleges "being written up" in retaliation for his grievance proceedings, Mr.
Medina does not allege facts indicating Ms. Donate's involvement. Because Mr. Medina does
not allege Ms. Donate' s involvement, he does not state a claim against her under § 1983. 27
Even if Mr. Medina alleges Ms. Donate's involvement, he fails to allege his grievance
proceedings served as "substantial or motivating factor[ s]" leading to retaliation. 28 Our court of
appeals directs, to establish a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must allege: "(1) that he was
engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that he suffered some 'adverse action' at the
hands of the prison officials; and (3) that the protected activity was a substantial motivating
factor in the prison officials' decision to take the adverse action."
Mr. Medina successfully alleges the first two prongs.

Grievance proceedings are

protected exercises of a prisoner's First Amendment rights. 29 Claiming the County Prison
retaliated against him for formally grieving, Mr. Medina satisfies the first prong. Alleging the
County Prison issued him an infraction, Mr. Medina also successfully alleges suffering some
adverse action. 30 Mr. Medina fails, however, to allege his grievances served as substantial or
motivating factors leading to retaliation. Mr. Medina alleges he "quit his job[,] thus causing a
write up[,] due to the fact [he] knew [praying before beginning his job] would be a reoccurring
issue."

31

Mr. Medina seemingly concedes the County Prison issued the infraction for quitting

his job. Assuming the County Prison issued him an infraction for quitting his job, even if Mr.
Medina correctly lists the County Prison as a defendant, failing to allege all elements, he fails to
state a retaliation claim under § 1983.

5

D. Because Mr. Medina fails to state a retaliation claim while proceeding in forma
pauperis, we dismiss the retaliation claim, sua sponte, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Under § 1915, we must "dismiss the case at any time if [we] determine that ... the
action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 32 "[T]he standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to this subsection is identical to the
legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss." 33
While Ms. Kuykendall and Ms. Donate do not address Mr. Medina's retaliation claim,
because Mr. Medina fails, informa pauperis, to plead a claim, we must dismiss.

III.

Conclusion

In our accompanying order, we grant Defendants' motion to dismiss, but give Mr.
Medina leave to amend his complaint consistent with this Memorandum no later than August 28,
2017.
1

See Complaint, ECF Doc. No. 3 at V. Statement of Claim; Order, ECF Doc. No. 2.

2

See id.

3

Affidavit of Laura Kuykendall, ECF Doc. No. 10-2 at if2; see ECF Doc. No. 3 at V.

4

See ECF Doc. No. 3 at V.

5

See Complaint, ECF Doc. No. 3 at V. Statement of Claim; Order, ECF Doc. No. 2.

6

See ECF Doc. No. 3 at V.

7

See id.

8

See ECF Doc. No. 3 at V. ("I've recently been written up in retaliation to my grievance
procedures in a biased manner.").
9

See id. ("I quit the job thus causing a write up due to the fact I knew would be a recurring
issue.").

6

10

"In reviewing a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Warren
Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). We grant a motion to dismiss "only if,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiffs claims lack facial plausibility." Id.
11

See id. at 146 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) and Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)).
12

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011).

13

See generally Complaint, ECF Doc. No. 3 at V. Statement of Claim. Our court of appeals
instructs: "Our policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the understanding
that [i]mplicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make
reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights
because of their lack of legal training." Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the US., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
14

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 ("No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.").
15

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

16

Freeman v. Miller, 615 F. App'x. 72, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2015) ("Only extreme deprivations meet
this standard.") (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
17

See ECF Doc. No. 3 at V.

18

McCargo v. Camden County Jail, No. 17-1387, 2017 WL 2226573 at *1 (3d Cir. May 22,
2017).
19

Jones v. Davidson, 666 F. App'x. 143, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Evancho v. Fisher, 423
F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) and Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).
20

See generally ECF Doc. No. 3.

21

See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003).

22

See id at 244.

23

Id at 249.

24

See ECF Doc. No. 3 at V.

7

25

Robinson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, No. 16-3893, 2017 WL 888229 at *3 (3d Cir. Mar.
6, 2017).
26

Neither party addresses whether Mr. Medina formally grieved the alleged retaliation. Our
court of appeals directs, "[f]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead
and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff." Small v. Camden County,
728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013). Because Ms. Kuyendall and Ms. Donate do not argue Mr.
Medina failed to exhaust, we review his claim on the merits.
27

See Jones v. Davidson, 666 F. App'x. 143, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he plaintiff must allege
that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation.").
2s

Id.

29

See id. (concluding pro se plaintiff satisfied first prong of a First Amendment retaliation claim
by filing a grievance).
30

See ECF Doc. No. 3 at V.

31

See id.

32

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

33

Rodenbaugh v. Santiago, No. 16-2158, 2017 WL 194238 at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (citing
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).

8