CATERBONE v. TRUMP et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM/OPINION THAT THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS PURPORTED PETITION AND WILL DISMISS THE PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDWARD G. SMITH ON 10/4/17. 10/4/17 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE'. ( ky, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STANLEY J. CATERBONE, PRO SE, and
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES PRESIDENT DONALD
TRUMP; NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY, or NSA; DEFENSE
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT
AGENCY, or DARPA; DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE; DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, or DIA;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, or
CIA; FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, or FBI; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL; PENNSYLVANIA STATE
POLICE; PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY
GENERAL; LANCASTER COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; LANCASTER
COUNTY CRISIS INTERVENTION;
LANCASTER COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT; LANCASTER MAYOR
RICK GRAY; LANCASTER CITY
BUREAU OF POLICE; DETECTIVE
CLARK BEARINGER, LANCASTER
CITY BUREAU OF POLICE;
FAIRMOUNT BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SYSTEM; DR. SILVIA GRATZ,
MEDICAL DIRECTOR, FAIRMOUNT
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM;
LANCASTER GENERAL HOSPITAL;
LANCASTER REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER; MEDEXPRESS, URGENT
CARE, Rohrerstown Road, Lancaster, PA;
SOUTHEAST MEDICAL CENTER,
Brightside Baptist Church, Lancaster, PA;
and PATIENT FIRST URGENT CARE,

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-4000

Butler, Avenue, Lancaster, PA,
Respondents.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Smith, J.

October 4, 2017

The instant case is a purported petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, filed by a pro se petitioner who does not appear to have been convicted of a crime for
which he is serving any aspect of a sentence. It also does not appear that his liberty is restrained
in any way which would be a proper ground to seek habeas relief. Instead, the petitioner appears
to allege that he is entitled to habeas relief because, in retaliation for him acting as a
whistleblower in 1987, various entities – private and public – are constantly harassing him. He
further alleges that he has “been a victim of organized stalking since 1987 and a victim of
electronic and direct energy weapons since 2005.” While the court recognizes that the Supreme
Court has broadly defined what it means to be “in custody” under the habeas statutes, the Court
has not defined it so broadly as this court would have to define it to find that the petitioner is “in
custody.” Accordingly, the court will dismiss the petition without a hearing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The pro se petitioner, Stanley J. Caterbone (“Caterbone”), commenced this action by
filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis (the “IFP Application”) and a purported
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under “28 § 2242” on August 28, 2017. 1 Doc. No. 1.
Caterbone summarizes his claim of an entitlement to habeas relief as follows:
The Plaintiff alleges that he has been a prisoner of the “state” since 1987, and that
the activities surrounding the PETITIONER’S life has escalated into a daily
1

Caterbone also references Advanced Media Group in the caption as a petitioner.

2

occurrence of assaults. Unfortunately while the PETITIONER has made many in
person complaints to just about every law enforcement agency, the most recent to
the Manheim Township Substation in Lancaster Township regarding an assault at
the Manor Shopping Center minutes previously (December 9, 2015 9:00 pm), the
pleas for help and assistance have yielded nothing but more attacks to the
PETITIONER’S person, property, electronics, home, auto, reputation, intellectual
property, and lastly his mental state-of-mind – A BRUTAL ARRAY OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE. The PETITIONER has already made claims of
COINTELPRO-like tactics in his filings in the U.S.C.A. Case No. 15-3400
against these same actors and perpetrators. The PETITIONER will provide
evidence to support this writ and offer a final remedy and redress in accordance
with federal law.
Due to the actions and criminal activity of the above named
DEFENDANTS, it is reasonable to prove that every aspect of the Complainant’s
life, Stan J. Caterbone, is subject to undue influence; harassment; torture;
obstruction; etc. thus resulting in irreparable harm and injury. This situation and
set of circumstances as outlined here, and in Part II, Finding of Facts, and all
previous filings; reports; and statements, is a prescription for only one endgame –
death or suicide. There is no life action or activity that is immune from this
horrendous HATE CRIME. The precedent and landmark elements that make this
so appalling is that the Complainant has never done anything to set these
circumstances in motion but to be right regarding International Signal & Control
back in 1987; as well as many other proclamations and forecasts. That being said,
it is also widely reported that many Targeted Individuals and Victims of U.S.
Sponsored Mind Control are lead to death and/or suicide. The Lancaster
Community-At-Large is guilty of creating; abetting; fostering; and executing this
tragedy. The fact that local; state; and federal law enforcement induce and
encourage this environment of hate is landmark.
Doc. No. 1 at ECF p. 2-3.
While very much unclear due to the verbose and repetitive nature of Caterbone’s filing, it
appears that he relates back all of his allegations to retaliation that occurred after he acted as a
whistleblower in 1987 with respect to a “local company” that was “indicted for selling arms and
weapons to Iraq via South Africa with the aid and support of the CIA and NSA.” Doc. No. 1 at
ECF p. 9. The retaliation occurred in the form of a “widespread wholesale cover-up through an
elaborate slander campaign that included 29 false arrests, multiple false imprisonments, and a
fabricated mental illness record that to this day is still resonating.” Id. (internal quotation marks

3

omitted).

He references being illegally detained while in the barracks of Fort Meade in

Maryland in March 2016; an illegal detention that occurred in July 2005 while he was at a
military museum; and a January 2006 illegal detention by Homeland Security in the Houston
airport after he returned from Mexico. Id. at ECF p. 11. Despite these references to false arrests,
false imprisonments, and illegal detentions, it does not appear from the petition that Caterbone is
raising claims regarding a conviction or sentence that he is currently serving or an arrest for
which he is awaiting the completion of his prosecution.
As indicated above, Caterbone asserts that he is a “targeted individual,” which appears to
essentially be someone “declared an ‘enemy of the State’” by various law enforcement and
government entities. Id. at ECF p. 13. He provides some information describing “targeted
individuals,” and he also provides information on “COINTELPRO,” which stands for “COunter
INTELligence PROgram.” Id. at ECF pp. 13-29 (emphasis in original). Then he goes on to
provide information about CIA mind control experiments. Id. at ECF pp. 30-43. Finally, he
provides a resume and biography, which covers events that have occurred in Caterbone’s life
since his graduation from Millersville University in 1976 through his proposal of an
“ORGANIZED STALKING AND DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS HARASSMENT BILL”
to a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and City of Lancaster Mayor Richard
Gray (a respondent in this case) in 2009. Id. at 44-48.
In addition to the aforementioned information included in the habeas petition, Caterbone
has attached various documents to the petition, which appear to include, inter alia: (1) a
September 19, 2016 order entered by the undersigned in another of Caterbone’s cases, Caterbone
v. United States President Barack Obama, et al., No. 16-cv-4641; (2) a September 1, 2017 letter
to the clerk of this court; (3) a “press release” from Caterbone in which he describes what

4

purportedly occurred before the undersigned in another of Caterbone’s cases, In re Stanley
Caterbone, No. 17-cv-1233 (a bankruptcy appeal); (4) another copy of Caterbone’s resume and
biography; (5) Caterbone’s “pro se billings” notice (in the amount of $1,217,382.00) for In re
Stanley Caterbone, No. 17-cv-1233, which appears to cover events that occurred since May 2005
until March 2007; (6) a copy of Lyn Batzar Boland’s 2012 article for the St. John’s Law Review
titled: “Pro Se Litigant’s Eligibility for Attorney Fees Under FOIA: Crooker v. United States
Department of Justice;” (7) a copy of a 2012 article for the William Mitchell Law Review by
Dan Gustafson, Karla Glueck, and Joe Bourne, titled: “Pro Se Litigation and the Costs of Access
to Justice;” and (8) a list of active court cases that Caterbone has in various jurisdictions. 2
In addition to the petition and exhibits, which total almost 130 pages, Caterbone has
submitted additional documentation in support of his purported habeas petition. Caterbone filed
the first exhibit on September 13, 2017, and it is titled: “OPENING STATEMENT re
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IMPEDIMENTS,” which is 48 pages in length, but it also
contains two DVDs containing numerous documents. Doc. No. 2. Without referencing the
documents contained on the DVDs (which pertain to Caterbone’s claims here), the Exhibit that is
docketed on ECF is almost a word-for-word copy of a large portion of Caterbone’s habeas
petition. 3 Compare Doc. No. 1 at ECF pp. 8-48, with Doc. No. 2 at ECF pp. 2-41. The only new
2

With regard to Caterbone’s civil action docketed at No. 16-cv-4641, he filed a very similar action that he also
characterized as a habeas petition. In the September 19, 2016 order, the court addressed Caterbone’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis and, as part of that analysis, had to determine whether he was actually seeking habeas
relief or if he was instead attempting to bring a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purposes of determining the
relevant filing fee. The court determined that it appeared that the court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction over
any habeas claim (because Caterbone was not “in custody”), but nonetheless gave him the opportunity to (1) identify
the type of action he was bringing, and (2) insofar as the court was denying the application to proceed in forma
pauperis in that case, to pay the filing fee (since there is a significant difference between the filing fees for habeas
cases and regular civil actions). See Order, Caterbone v. United States President Barack Obama, et al., No. 16-cv4641, Doc. No. 3. Caterbone never timely paid the filing fee (or identified the type of action he was seeking to
prosecute) and the court dismissed the action without prejudice. See Order, Caterbone v. United States President
Barack Obama, et al., No. 16-cv-4641, Doc. No. 4.
3
It may very well be an identical copy but the court did not review every word to confirm.

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document

is

a

“REQUEST

FOR

HEARING

OBSTRUCTION

OF

JUSTICE

IMPEDIMENTS” that appear to relate to Caterbone’s bankruptcy appeal that was docketed at
No. 17-cv-1233. See Doc. No. 2 at ECF pp. 43-46 (emphasis in original). In this document,
Caterbone describes that although he had a net worth of over $1 million dollars in 1987, his
activities as a whistleblower that year caused the “Lancaster Community-at-large” to “thwart[]”
him from obtaining income through his business or other employment opportunities. Id. at ECF
p. 43 (alteration to original). He also describes being forced to remain inside of his home due to
the presence of a black pit bull, which had previously bitten him in June 2016 and appears to be
owned by his next door neighbors. Id. at ECF p. 44. In addition, he claims that his neighbors
subject his home to vandalism, steal items from inside of his home, and infest his home with
cockroaches. Id.
Caterbone also filed another exhibit in support of the habeas petition on September 20,
2017, which is a 40-page document he apparently drafted and is titled “Terrorism Used as a
Political Tactic to Justify Warrantless Surveillance and the Erosion of our Civil Liberties.” Doc.
No. 3. While the document covers numerous topics, Caterbone appears to be concerned with the
potential reauthorization of Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Id. at ECF p.
1. He also appears to be concerned with the current presidential administration “using the old J.
Edgar Hoover COINTELPRO Program while at the same time expanding the powers of
local law enforcement through 3 Executive Orders in order to Militarize Local Police
Departments.” Id. at ECF p. 4 (emphasis in original). He claims that he is being targeted in
numerous forms such as, inter alia, (1) computer hacking of all of his electronic equipment, (2)
stalking and harassment by residents, neighbors, law enforcement, and others, (3) a plan
designed to drain him of all of his cash resources, (4) falsified complaints by his neighbors which

6

resulted in summary offenses; (5) threats of physical harm in public spaces, (6) instances of
breaking and entering into his home to vandalize, steal, poison his food, and strategically place
cockroaches in various locations in his home, and (7) steal and manipulate his court filings and
evidence. Id. at ECF pp. 4-5. He further asserts that “U.S. Sponsored Mind Control Systems”
in the nature of “Synthetic Telepathy Coupled with Electromagnetic Weapons used for
pain” have been used against him since 2005. Id. at ECF p. 5 (emphasis in original).
Caterbone filed yet another document on September 25, 2017, which is 260 pages in
length and titled: “Statement re Torture Case Law Evidence-Case Law-Compensatory Damages
for Remedy September 25, 2017.” Doc. No. 4. In this voluminous submission, Caterbone
includes, inter alia, (1) purported case law relating to the right to sue for torture and the
potentially recoverable damages, (2) purported news articles about torture victims receiving
damages, (3) House Report 110-844 dealing with the Justice for Victims of Torture and
Terrorism Act, (4) yet another copy of his background profile, which he had included in his prior
submission, (5) other documents and purported articles relating to mind control, (6) documents
related to another of his civil matters, which is before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, (7) a
purported copy of a motion for a preliminary injunction (seeking in home spa and pain
medications) with attached exhibits filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, (8)
some of his medical documentation including, inter alia, clinical summary reports, medical
reports, prescription information, and receipts, (9) a copy of a criminal complaint he seemingly
filed against Southeast Medical Clinic at Brightside Church on January 27, 2016, and (10) a

7

completed Pennsylvania Department of Transportation application to obtain a disability parking
placard. 4 See Doc. No. 4 at ECF pp. 3-50, Doc. Nos. 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4.
The final submission by Caterbone thus far in support of his habeas petition is a 100-page
document

titled:

“REQUEST

FOR

HEARING

OBSTRUCTION

OF

JUSTICE

IMPEDIMENTS.” Doc. No. 5 (emphasis in original). The main portion of this document is
almost an identical copy of a document Caterbone previously filed with the only apparent
changes being the numbering used and the reference to the date. Compare Doc. No. 5 at ECF
pp. 3-6, with Doc. No. 2 at ECF pp. 43-46. Caterbone attaches various documents to this
request, including, inter alia: (1) an article in “truthdig” titled: “Trump’s Making Good on One
of His Many Campaign Promises: Promoting Unfettered Police Power’” (2) an August 6, 2016
document he seemingly drafted and titled: “STATEMENT OF FACT re Lancaster City Police
Department v. Caterbone Family,” which appears to refer to, inter alia, (a) incidents where
Lancaster City Police Detective Clark Bearinger had Caterbone involuntarily committed to a
mental health institution on three occasions: in 2010, 2015, and 2016, (b) his arrest in 1987 for 4
felonies and 3 misdemeanors, with the charges eventually being dismissed in March 1988, and
(c) a 2006 incident where he was sent to Lancaster County Prison for a period of 60 days; (3)
copies of documents related to another of his prior civil actions in this court: Caterbone v.
Lancaster City Police Bureau, et al., No. 08-cv-2982; (4) a June 22, 2016 document titled,
“THEY WANT TO KILL ME DECLARATION BY STAN J. CATERBONE re
LANCASTER CITY POLICE ACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF LATE;” (5) more of his
medical documentation; and (6) another biography. Doc. No. 5 (emphasis in original).

4

The court identifies the case law and news articles as “purported,” because they are not copied in a traditional
format and appear to have, at best, been either copied by retyping or cut-and-pasted.

8

II.
A.

DISCUSSION
The IFP Application

Regarding applications to proceed in forma pauperis, the court notes that
any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an
affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the
person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This statute
“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal
courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338
(1989). Specifically, Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative
court costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone else who files
a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from pursuing meaningful
litigation. Deutsch[ v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward
this end, § 1915(a) allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in
federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among
other things, that he is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.
Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x. 130, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (footnote
omitted).
Concerning the litigant’s financial status, the litigant must establish that he or she is
unable to pay the costs of suit. Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d
Cir. 1989). “In this Circuit, leave to proceed in forma pauperis is based on a showing of
indigence. We review the affiant's financial statement, and, if convinced that he or she is unable
to pay the court costs and filing fees, the court will grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”
Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.5 (internal citations omitted).
The Third Circuit does not define what it means to be indigent. Nonetheless, “[a]
plaintiff need not ‘be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute.’” Mauro v. New

9

Jersey Supreme Ct., Case No. 56, 900, 238 F. App’x 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)); see also Potnick
v. Eastern State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1983); Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1980). Some courts have explained that all a plaintiff needs to show is that because of his or her
poverty, he or she cannot afford to pay for the costs of the litigation and provide himself or
herself (or his or her family) with the necessities of life. See, e.g., Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F.
Supp. 879, 880 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (“An affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner cannot, because
of his poverty, provide himself and any dependents with the necessities of life is sufficient.”);
Jones v. State, 893 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“An affidavit to proceed in forma
pauperis is sufficient if it states that one cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of
litigation and still provide for him- or herself and any dependents.”).
Here, after reviewing the application to proceed in forma pauperis, it appears that
Caterbone is unable to pay the costs of suit. Therefore, the court grants him leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.
B.

Analysis

Preliminarily, the court notes that Caterbone purports to bring this habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2242. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2. Section 2242 addresses only the
requirements for an application seeking habeas relief, and does not provide a substantive basis
for seeking relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (pertaining to “[a]pplication[s] for a writ of habeas
corpus” (alteration to original)). The court will presume that Caterbone is seeking to pursue
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because he does not allege that he is “in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court” or “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress,” such that he could seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255. See

10

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing that, inter alia, “a district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (providing that it applies to “[a] prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress”).
Section 2241 limits available habeas relief to individuals “in custody,” Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 374-75 (1963), and this “custody requirement is jurisdictional,” see
Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 125 F. App’x 406, 412 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Maleng v.
Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)); see also
United States ex rel. Dessus v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1971) (“[C]ustody is the
passport to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.”). Despite section 2241’s “in custody” limitation,
“the statute does not attempt to mark the boundaries of ‘custody’ nor in any way other than by
use of that word attempt to limit the situations in which the writ can be used.” Jones, 371 U.S. at
375. Thus, “in the United States the use of habeas corpus has not been restricted to situations in
which the applicant is in actual, physical custody.” Id. Further, “[h]istory, usage, and precedent
can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s
liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the
English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.” Id. at 376.
However broadly the Supreme Court has construed the “in custody” requirement for
individuals seeking habeas relief, this court has located no decision (in any jurisdiction) that
would extend it to claims that Caterbone raises here. Although Caterbone references having
prior interaction with law enforcement in the nature of being involuntarily committed to a mental
health institution on three occasions, spending 60 days in prison in 2006, some purported false
arrests, and issues with summary offenses, he does not claim to be serving any aspect of a

11

sentence – incarceration, probation, or parole – after being convicted. He does not claim to have
been charged with a crime and is still awaiting its ultimate disposition. Instead, he appears to
claim that his neighbors and other individuals in Lancaster, Pennsylvania are restricting his
movement through their constant harassment and are doing so in conjunction with mind control
sponsored by various agencies of the United States government. He alleges that individuals are
prohibiting him from earning money by constantly trying to drain his available cash reserves;
that individuals are hacking all of his electronic devices; and that people are breaking into his
home to do nefarious things such as poison his food. Despite all of these claims, it does not
appear that Caterbone’s liberty is actually being restrained in any manner and, more importantly,
the purported restraints are not the types of restraints that have “been thought sufficient in the
English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.” 5 Id. Accordingly, the court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the instant petition and will dismiss the petition
without prejudice. 6
C.

Certificate of Appealability

To be entitled to a certificate of appealability, Caterbone would have to show that, inter
alia, reasonable jurists would debate whether this court was correct in its ruling. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“To obtain a COA under § 2253, a habeas petitioner must

5

The cases Caterbone cites in his petition (at least those that pertain specifically to habeas corpus) all involve
individuals seeking habeas relief after conviction. See Doc. No. 1 at ECF pp. 6-10.
6
If the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this petition, the court would nonetheless dismiss the petition for
the failure to state a claim under which habeas relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In this regard,
although Caterbone’s inability to show that his is “in custody” would be sufficient in itself to warrant dismissal, the
court notes that Caterbone seeks numerous forms of relief that are inconsistent with habeas relief, such as damages
(for such things as reimbursement for all of his pro se billing invoices) and injunctive relief (in the nature of
awarding him summary judgment on all of his claims filed in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas and in
this court). See Doc. No. 1 at ECF p. 12. The court further notes that it does not appear that any of the respondents
would be proper respondents in a habeas petition in any event because “[i]n federal habeas proceedings, the proper
party-respondent is “‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’” Saunders v. United States Parole Comm’n,
665 F. App’x 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004)).

12

make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that . . .
includes a showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement further.” (internal citations and question marks omitted)). The court does not
find that a reasonable jurist would disagree with the court’s assessment of Caterbone’s claims;
accordingly, the court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
III.

CONCLUSION

In this purported section 2241 habeas petition, Caterbone has not set forth allegations that
would allow this court to find that he is “in custody” to be potentially eligible for habeas relief.
Accordingly, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this purported petition and will
dismiss the petition without prejudice.
A separate order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Edward G. Smith
EDWARD G. SMITH, J.

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