LITCHFIELD v. LEHIGH COUNTY PRISON et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE JOSHUA D. WOLSON ON 5/6/22. 5/6/22 ENTERED AND COPIES NOT MAILED TO PRO SE. (amas)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CLARENCE VAIDEN LITCHFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
KYLE RUSSEL, et al.
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:21-cv-5068-JDW

MEMORANDUM
Clarence Vaiden Litchfield complains for a second time about Covid-19related lockdowns at Lehigh County Prison (“LCP”). After review, the Court
concludes that his Amended Complaint does not state a plausible claim of
constitutional violation, so the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint with
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Mr. Litchfield has been confined at LCP as a pretrial detainee since August

31, 2021. Throughout his time at LCP, he has been subjected to a “super restrictive
lockdown procedure in the name of covid measures” and that “restrictive
confinement by nature is a punishment used to deter negative behavior.” (ECF
No. 8 at § V.) The lockdown follows Covid-19 guidelines that the Bureau of Prisons
issued COVID, which included a restrictive cell confinement upon the
identification of COVID for a period of “14 to 21 days, 22 to 23 hrs. a day.” (Id.)
LCP has had the restrictive lockdown procedure “in place for two years” as
opposed to the guideline period of fourteen to twenty-one days. (Id. at p. 5.)

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Mr. Litchfield suffers from pre-existing mental health disorders that have the
restrictive confinement at LCP has exacerbated. He suffers from nightmares,
extreme paranoia, suicidal ideations, homicidal thoughts, extreme depression,
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress. Mr. Litchfield claims that at least three prisoners
have been unresponsive after suicide attempts and that Warden Russel and
Director Donate “should have been aware of the devastating effects of imposing
involuntary long term confinement.” (Id.)
After the Court dismissed his original Complaint, Mr. Litchfield filed an
Amended Complaint on March 2, 2022. He names as defendants Warden Russel,
Director Donate, and the Lehigh County Commissioner and the Lehigh County
executive. He seeks monetary relief in the amount of $10,000,000, as well as
injunctive relief, because of the “metal anguish, pain and suffering, [and] duress”
he has suffered from the “tourturous [sic] lockdown.” (Id. at § VI.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Mr. Litchfield is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the amended complaint if it fails to
state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (quotations omitted). Mr. Litchfield is proceeding pro se, so the Court
construes his allegations liberally. See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
III.

DISCUSSION
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in

federal court is Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, which provides
in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In a §1983 action, the
personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is
a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant
was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).
As it appears that Litchfield was confined as a pretrial detainee at the time
of the events in question, the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth
Amendment, governs his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir.
2005).
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A.

Individual Capacity Claims

Mr. Litchfield seems to claim that Defendants are responsible for the “super
restrictive lock down” conditions that amounted to unconstitutional punishment.
(ECF No. 8 at § 5.) But he has not alleged that the lockdown measures amounted
to unconstitutional punishment and, even if he had, he has not alleged how these
Defendants were personally responsible for the conditions upon which his claims
are based.
1.

Unconstitutional punishment

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial
detainees from punishment.
Unconstitutional
components.

punishment

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
includes

both

objective

and

subjective

See Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007).

The

objective component requires an inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious,” and the subjective component asks whether “the officials
act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]”

Id. (cite omitted).

A

particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of express
intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or
condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government
purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.” Bistrian v.
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (quote omitted). In assessing whether a
detainee’s conditions of confinement amount to punishment, courts should
consider the totality of the circumstances, while keeping in mind that conditions
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generally do not amount to punishment unless inmates are required to endure
“genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time.” Hubbard,
538 F.3d at 233 (quotes omitted).
“In determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to
the Government’s interest in maintaining security and order and operating the
institution in a manageable fashion,” courts must keep in mind that “such
considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of
corrections officials . . . .” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68 n.3. The deference to prison
officials’ judgment is especially strong in the context of an “unprecedented”
situation like COVID-19, where “responsive measures [were] specifically
implemented to detect and to prevent spread of the virus.” Hope v. Warden York
County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 327 (3d Cir. 2020).
Where a prison has taken concrete steps towards mitigating the medical
effects of COVID-19, a prisoner will fall “well short” of establishing that the facility
and its staff were deliberately indifferent toward his medical needs in light of the
virus, even if a prisoner had serious preexisting medical conditions the prisoner
may have. See Id. at 330-31. Mr. Litchfield does not overcome this high bar. He
alleges that the lockdown at LCP exacerbated his pre-existing mental health
disorders. But he has not alleged facts to establish that the conditions that prison
authorities imposed were anything other than what was necessary to arrest the
spread of the virus. He has not alleged facts that might establish that anyone was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
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2.

Personal involvement of the County Executive

Mr. Litchfield does not assert facts supporting an inference that the Lehigh
County Executive was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation. “A
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs” to be liable. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. The Amended Complaint does
not include any facts about the County Executive. And Mr. Litchfield’s use of the
terms “LCP staff” and “they” does not attribute any conduct to any individual
defendant. See Lawal v. McDonald, 546 F. App’ x 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2014). Because
Mr. Litchfield does not allege how the Executive was involved in the alleged
violation of his constitutional rights, the claims against him are not plausible.
3.

Supervisory Liability

Mr. Litchfield’s claims against Warden Russel, Director Donate, and the
Lehigh County Commissioner appear to rest on a theory of supervisory liability.
There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc.,
766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575
U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice
or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or,

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as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s
unconstitutional conduct.” Id.
Mr. Litchfield has not alleged facts to state a plausible claim under either
theory of supervisory liability. In fact, other that naming them as Defendants, Mr.
Litchfield has not set forth any allegations that plausibly allege any Defendant,
though a particular action or inaction, violated his constitutional rights. He has
not specified any personal conduct, nor has he alleged that any Defendant
directed their subordinates to violate his rights or knew of but acquiesced in
constitutional violations committed by their subordinates. A mere claim that one
or more Defendants did not train, supervise, or discipline subordinates does not
show that a defendant was aware of the violations that Mr. Litchfield alleges. See
Argueta v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011).
There are also no allegations in the Amended Complaint supporting an
inference that any Defendant established and maintained a policy that directly
caused Mr. Litchfield’s constitutional harm. A Warden or Director cannot be held
liable “simply because of [their] position as the head of the [agency].” Saisi v.
Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quote omitted). In other
words, Litchfield needs to allege more than just “naked assertions” that Russell
and Donate “should have known” or that the Commissioner as “the employer” is
generally responsible for the policies at the facility and, by default, were
deliberately indifferent to the consequences of their policies.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Santiago v.

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The allegations against these Defendants are brief and conclusory and do
not provide enough factual development to support a plausible claim that their
actions resulted in the conduct that allegedly violated Litchfield’s constitutional
rights. Without further factual allegations about what these Defendants did or did
not do, Litchfield is unable to state a plausible § 1983 claim against Warden
Russell, Director Donate, and the Commissioner.
B.

Official Capacity Claims

To the extent Mr. Litchfield intends to pursue claims against the Defendants
in their official capacities, these claims fail. Claims against municipal and county
officials named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims against
the entity that employs them. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
Lehigh County employed Defendants, so any claim against them in their official
capacities is really a claim against the County.
To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional
violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict.” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789,
798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quote omitted). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven
by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed
or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute
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law.” Id. (quote omitted). A plaintiff may also state a basis for municipal liability
by “alleging failure-to-supervise, train, or discipline . . . [and alleging facts
showing] that said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of those affected.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019).
Nothing in the Complaint alleges that the conditions or conduct of which
Mr. Litchfield complains was the result of a municipal policy or custom. Although
he generally alleges that “they [have] fail[ed] to adequately train their staff on
the protection of civil rights,” this unsupported conclusory allegation is insufficient
to allege a plausible basis for municipal liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court will dismiss Mr. Litchfield’s Amended Complaint for failure to state

a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court has given Mr. Litchfield
an opportunity to file an amended pleading, and that amendment did not cure
the problems with this case. In addition, the Court has reviewed the docket in its
entirety and concludes that further attempts at amendment would be futile. See
Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.
2019). The Court will therefore dismiss the claims with prejudice. An appropriate
Order follows
BY THE COURT:

May 6, 2022

/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.

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