Huber v. Little et al

Filing 21

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS DENIED AS OUTLINED HEREIN. CLERK OF COURT SHAL MARK THIS CASE CLOSED. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE GERALD J. PAPPERT ON 6/5/24. 6/5/24 ENTERED AND COPIES NOT MAILED TO HUBER AND E-MAILED.(rf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES HUBER,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION

SCOTT KLINEFELTER, et al.,

NO. 22-3931

Defendants.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of June 2024, upon consideration of the Report and
Recommendation filed by United States Magistrate Judge Craig M. Straw, (ECF No.
20), and given that petitioner has not objected to the report, 1 it is hereby ORDERED
that:

When no objection is made to a Report and Recommendation, the Court should, as a matter
of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept
the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee notes; Oldrati v. Apfel, 33 F. Supp.
2d 397, 399 (E.D. Pa. 1998). No clear error appears on the face of the record and the Court
accordingly accepts Judge Straw’s Recommendation.

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Huber brings three claims in support of his habeas petition: (1) his guilty plea was
unlawfully compelled by the state and “deliberately ineffective and collusive” defense counsel; (2) the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment against him because he was never
given formal and specific notice of the charges against him; and (3) the post-conviction collateral
review process was ineffective in protecting his rights and violated the Constitution. (ECF No. 9, at
5, 30, 34).
“A district court ordinarily cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arising from a
petitioner’s custody under a state court judgment unless the petitioner first has exhausted his
available remedies in state court.” Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2010); 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). As such, federal habeas claims must first be “fairly presented” to the state courts.
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). A claim is “fairly presented” when its “factual and legal
substance” is put before the state courts “in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim
is being asserted.” Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001). “[S]tate prisoners must give
the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete
round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999). A petitioner must present each claim through the Superior Court but need not seek review
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to give the Pennsylvania courts a “full opportunity to resolve
any constitutional claims.” Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2004).

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1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED;
3. There is no probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability; and
4. The Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed for statistical purposes.

Where a claim is not properly presented to the state courts, the petitioner has procedurally
defaulted that claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749 (1991). Such a claim cannot provide
the basis for federal habeas relief unless the petitioner can show “cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or [unless he] demonstrates that failure to
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1976); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
Huber’s first claim that the state “unlawfully compelled and induced his guilty plea” and that
defense counsel was “deliberately ineffective and collusive” is not fully exhausted because he failed to
present it through the Superior Court. (ECF No. 9, at 5, 22–24). Huber’s PCRA counsel discussed
the effectiveness of Huber’s trial counsel in his No Merit Letter. (ECF No. 15-2, at 63–71). But in
his pro se response to the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss, Huber focused on his PCRA
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. When he appealed to the Superior Court, Huber complained of
errors made by the PCRA court, further allegations of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and contended
the PCRA judge was biased. (ECF No. 15-3, at 10–16, 170–71, 206–10). Because Huber failed to
raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel through the Superior Court, his claim is not fully exhausted.
Huber’s second federal habeas claim—that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to enter judgment against him because he was not given any formal or specific notice of the
charges—is also not exhausted because Huber never presented it through the Superior Court. (ECF
No. 9, at 30).
These claims are procedurally defaulted because any attempt to bring them in a subsequent
PCRA petition would be untimely. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(1). Nor does Huber show cause
to excuse the default of his claims. See Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1993); Buckley v.
Smith, No. 21-2405, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91009, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2022); Weathers v.
Kauffman, No. 20-1098, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12981, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2021). And denying
review of Huber’s claims would not constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he fails
to present any new evidence of actual innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
Huber’s final claim, that the post-conviction collateral review was ineffective in protecting
his rights and violated the Constitution, also fails. Regardless of whether he exhausted any the
underlying allegations supporting this claim, Huber’s grievances concern what occurred during his
pursuit of PCRA relief, and such a claim is not a valid basis for habeas relief. “[T]he federal role in
reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or
federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner’s conviction; what occurred in the petitioner’s
collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d
941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). See also Lambert, 387 F.3d at 247 (“[H]abeas
proceedings are not the appropriate forum for [a prisoner] to pursue claims of error at the PCRA
proceeding . . . . It is the original trial that is the ‘main event’ for habeas purposes.”).

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BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
Gerald J. Pappert, J.

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