ELLIS v. PRIME CARE MEDICAL, INC. et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY DISTRICT JUDGE JOHN M. YOUNGE ON 1/3/25. 1/3/25 ENTERED AND COPIES NOT MAILED TO PRO SE. (rf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DIMITRIUS BASHIR ELLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRIME CARE MEDICAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-6741

MEMORANDUM
YOUNGE, J.

JANUARY 3, 2025

Plaintiff Dimitrius Bashir Ellis, a convicted and sentenced parole violator,1 initiated this
civil action by filing a pro se Complaint against Prime Care Medical, Inc., the Lehigh County
Jail, and two Lehigh County Jail employees, Cliff Knappenberger and Josh Leadbetter, asserting
constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2.) Ellis seeks leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Ellis leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his Complaint upon screening.

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Ellis does not allege whether he was held as a pretrial detainee or as a convicted prisoner at the
time of the events described in the Complaint. However, according to the state court dockets,
Ellis pled guilty to receiving stolen property on June 24, 2019 and was granted immediate parole.
See Commonwealth v. Ellis, CP-39-CR-0000790-2019 (C.P. Lehigh). On April 26, 2021, Ellis
was found to have violated the conditions of his parole, and he was required to serve the
remaining balance of his sentence at Lehigh County Jail, to be followed by one year of
probation. (Id.) Ellis is currently incarcerated at the Lehigh County Jail awaiting a revocation
decision with his Gagnon II Hearing currently scheduled for January 3, 2025. (Id.)
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
The allegations in Ellis’s Complaint are brief. Ellis alleges that on April 17, 2024, Cliff

Knappenberger issued a misconduct against him for “‘[e]ngaging/[e]ncouraging a group activity
without prior approval & conspiracy to commit [a]ggravated [a]ssault’ when an inmate was
stabbed on 2C in Lehigh County Jail.” (See ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”) at 4.) Ellis avers that he was
wrongfully accused of “orchestrating an attack on inmate Cesar Ruiz” and asserts that he does
“not know that inmate any where outside or inside of jail.” (Id.) Ellis contends that he was
found guilty “for a situation that [he] wasn’t involved in” and sentenced to sixty days of
segregation, from May 9, 2024 through July 6, 2024. (Id.) Ellis asserts that he requested proof
of his involvement, but nothing was provided to him. (Id.) He seeks an unspecified amount of
monetary damages. (Id.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Ellis leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is

incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Ellis’s Complaint (ECF No. 2). The
Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available state court records, of which
this Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d
Cir. 2006).
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However, as Ellis is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in
accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
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determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). ‘“At this early stage
of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’
‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]
complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds
recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. As Ellis is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Ellis brings claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which federal constitutional claims

may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A.

Claims Against Prime Care Medical, Inc.

Ellis names Prime Care Medical, Inc. as a Defendant but does not assert any allegations
against it. Prime Care, as the private corporation under contract to provide medical services at
Lehigh County Jail, may be liable under § 1983 in certain circumstances. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “a private health company providing

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services to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’” Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. App’x 16,
20 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575,
583 (3d Cir. 2003)). Rather, in order to hold a private health care company like Prime Care
liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, Ellis must allege the provider had “a relevant . .
. policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation [he] allege[s].” Natale,
318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (citing Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997)); see also Lomax v. City of Philadelphia, No. 13-1078, 2017 WL 1177095,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Because [defendant] is a private company contracted by a
prison to provide health care for inmates, . . . it can only be held liable for constitutional
violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs.”) (citations and quotations omitted). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the
plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York,
PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Ellis has not identified any policy or custom of Prime
Care that caused him to be deprived of proper care or that caused any other constitutional
deprivation. Accordingly, any claim against Prime Care is not plausible.
B.

Claims Against Lehigh County Jail

Ellis names Lehigh County Jail as a Defendant. The Court will dismiss with prejudice
any claims he attempts to lodge against Lehigh County Jail because a prison is not a “person”
under Section 1983. Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL 2854149,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010); Miller v. Curran-Fromhold Corr. Facility, No. 13-7680, 2014
WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Mitchell v. Chester Cnty. Farms Prison, 426
F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976)). In any event, even if Ellis had sued the correct municipal entity,

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he has not stated a claim because he has not alleged that a municipal policy or custom caused the
constitutional violation of which he complains. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
C.

Claims Against Josh Leadbetter

While Ellis lists Josh Leadbetter as a Defendant in his Complaint, he asserts no
allegations against this individual. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Jutrowski v. Twp.
of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)
(emphasis in original)); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal
involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). Because Ellis does not allege how Defendant
Leadbetter was personally involved in a violation of his constitutional rights, any claims against
him are not plausible and will be dismissed.
D.

Claims Against Cliff Knappenberger

Ellis brings a claim against Knappenberger for falsely charging him with disciplinary
infractions that resulted in Ellis having to serve sixty days in segregation. His allegations on this
point are best construed as a due process claim. It is well-settled that prisoners have no inherent
constitutional right to any particular security classification or to any particular housing
assignment. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (“We have held that the

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Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse
conditions of confinement.”). Rather, in the prison context, “[d]ue process protection for a state
created liberty interest is . . . limited to those situations where deprivation of that interest
‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.’” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). “[C]onfinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely
be sufficient, without more, to establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary
to implicate a liberty interest.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486).
“When considering whether an inmate’s placement in segregated housing triggers a
legally cognizable interest courts should consider: (1) the amount of time spent in segregation;
and (2) whether the conditions of segregation were significantly more restrictive than those
imposed on other inmates in segregation.” Allah v. Bartkowski, 574 F. App’x 135, 139 (3d Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (citing Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000)). In Sandin, the
Supreme Court concluded that placement in disciplinary segregation for thirty days did not
deprive the inmate of a protected liberty interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “[p]lacement in administrative
segregation for days or months at a time . . . do[es] not implicate a protected liberty interest.”
Arango v. Winstead, 352 F. App’x 664, 666 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Torres v. Fauver,
292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, Ellis alleges that he was held in administrative segregation for sixty days. (See
Compl. at 4.) That is not the type of atypical or significant hardship sufficient to trigger due
process concerns. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 654 (no liberty interest triggered by seven-month

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placement in disciplinary confinement); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that “exposure to the conditions of administrative custody for periods as long as 15
months falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed [. . .] by a court of law”
and does not constitute a due process violation (quotation omitted)); see also Williams v.
Armstrong, 566 F. App’x 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (prisoner failed to allege liberty
interest based on four-month placement in the RHU); Williams v. Bitner, 307 F. App’x 609, 611
(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (no liberty interest triggered by 90-day placement in disciplinary
segregation). Since Ellis’s sixty-day placement in administrative segregation is not sufficient to
establish the kind of “atypical” deprivation of prison life that would trigger due process
protections, the due process claim against Defendant Knappenberger does not give rise to a
plausible basis for a constitutional claim.
Furthermore, “the filing of a fraudulent misconduct report and related disciplinary
sanctions do not without more violate due process,” Seville v. Martinez, 130 F. App’x 549, 551
(3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), as “[d]ue process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly false misconduct reports.” Thomas v.
McCoy, 467 F. App’x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also Smith, 293 F.3d at 654 (“[S]o
long as certain procedural requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or
misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due process claim.”). Thus, to state a
plausible claim based on the filing of the misconduct report, Ellis must allege that he was denied
an “opportunity to confront and challenge the allegedly perjured testimony offered in support of
the misconduct reports.” See Smith, 293 F.3d at 654. Ellis does not specifically allege that he
was denied an opportunity to challenge the allegedly false misconduct report. Rather, Ellis
asserts that he submitted a grievance on April 20, 2024 requesting screenshots as proof that he

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“orchestrat[ed] an attack” but was instead told to “follow the misconduct appeal process.”
(Compl. at 3.) It appears, therefore, that Ellis had the opportunity to challenge and confront the
allegedly false misconduct report, satisfying the procedural due process requirements. See
Thomas v. McCoy, 467 F. App’x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Due process is satisfied
where an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly false
misconduct reports.”). Accordingly, Ellis’s due process claims against Defendant
Knappenberger based on the allegedly false misconduct report will be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Ellis leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and dismiss his Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Ellis will not be given leave to file an amended complaint because the Court
concludes that amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002). An Order follows, which dismisses this case.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ John Milton Younge
JOHN M. YOUNGE, J.

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