Wilson v. Dows

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING pro se pltf's motion for relief from final jdgmt pursuant to FRCP Rule 60 52 . (See order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 07/15/11. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TONY A. WILSON,
Plaintiff
v.
MARK S. DOWS,
Defendant

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:08-CV-2219
(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is a motion (Doc. 52) for relief from a final
judgment, filed pro se by plaintiff Tony A. Wilson (“Wilson”), pursuant to Rule 60 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court concludes that abstention under
Younger is appropriate in the instant case, and therefore, the pending motion (Doc.
52) will be denied.
I.

Procedural History
Wilson initiated the above-captioned civil case by filing a complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed his
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (see Doc.
46). The Third Circuit applied different reasoning—specifically, it relied on the
Younger abstention doctrine—but ultimately affirmed this court’s judgment. (See
Doc. 51-3); Wilson v. Dows, 390 F. App’x 174 (3d Cir. 2010). Wilson now seeks relief
from said judgment. He invokes Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 60(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

II.

Legal Standard
Under Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment,

order, or proceeding” for certain enumerated reasons, or, under Rule 60(b)(6), “any
other reason that justifies relief.” FED . R. CIV . P. 60(b). Rule 60(d) clarifies that the
court retains “other powers to grant relief.” Hence, the provisions of Rule 60 do not
“limit a court’s power to . . . entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order or proceeding[.]” FED . R. CIV . P. 60(d)(1).
III.

Discussion
The court notes at the outset that Wilson’s reliance on Rule 60(d)(1) is

misplaced, because Wilson is not bringing “an independent action” for relief from
judgment. The court will therefore construe the pending motion as a motion
invoking only Rule 60(b)(6).
Wilson sets forth two reasons for the court to grant the relief he seeks. First,
he argues that “significant changes in law”—specifically, the Supreme Court’s
holding in Skinner v. Switzer, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011)—have “now made
clear” that his underlying claims “are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. 52
at 1-2). Second, he argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to his
case. (Id. at 3-4, 7, 9). The court will address the latter of these issues first.
When Wilson appealed the instant case to the Third Circuit, the Third Circuit
agreed with his position that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable;
however, it affirmed this court’s judgment on other grounds. See Wilson, 390 F.
App’x 174. Therefore, Wilson’s arguments concerning the inapplicability of the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine are essentially moot. They do not establish that the court
should relieve Wilson of the judgment that has been entered—and affirmed by the
Third Circuit on other grounds—in the above-captioned case.
The Third Circuit affirmed this court’s judgment on the basis that, under the
Younger abstention doctrine, this court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over Wilson’s case. The Younger abstention doctrine “espouse[s] a strong federal
policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings
absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
Sstate Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Abstention under Younger is warranted
when (1) there is a pending state judicial proceeding, (2) the state proceeding
implicates important state interests, and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate
opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges in the state proceeding.1 See id. at
432. The Third Circuit found all three factors present in Wilson’s case. See Wilson,
390 F. App’x 174.
The undersigned concludes that Younger abstention remains the appropriate
course of action for the court. Significantly, Wilson does not dispute that the
circumstances warranting Younger abstention are present in the instant case, nor

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Abstention under Younger would not be appropriate if: “(1) the state
proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment; or
(2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to
a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, such that deference to the state proceeding
will present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the
federal interests asserted.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). Wilson
has neither argued nor presented any evidence to show that any of these
circumstances are present. The court therefore concludes that Younger exceptions
are inapplicable to the instant litigation.
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does he contend that the circumstances have changed since the time when the
Third Circuit directed this court to abstain under Younger.2 Instead, Wilson
focuses on the Supreme Court’s holding in Skinner v. Switzer, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct.
1289 (2011). Wilson cites Skinner for the holding that Skinner’s complaint satisfied
the pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and therefore, it was “sufficient to cross the federal court’s threshold[.]”
(See Doc. 52 at 2, 9 (quoting Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1296). Wilson argues that his
complaint likewise satisfies Rule 8(a)(2), and therefore, this court should permit him
to proceed with his case. (Id. at 9).
The holding of Skinner does not compel this court to exercise jurisdiction
over Wilson’s claims. Unlike the Skinner Court, this court never addressed the
sufficiency of Wilson’s complaint under Rule 8(a)(2), in reaching the judgment at
issue, and it need not do so now. Even if the court assumes, arguendo, that the
allegations of Wilson’s complaint are sufficient to state a claim, the court would
nevertheless refrain from exercising jurisdiction over Wilson’s case, in accordance
with the Younger abstention doctrine, until the state concludes his bar admission
proceedings.
The Skinner Court also held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar
Skinner’s case. This holding is of no consequence to the instant case. As previously
noted, the Third Circuit found Rooker-Feldman to be inapplicable to the instant

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For instance, Wilson has not informed this court that the state proceedings
concerning his admission to the bar have concluded. Nor has Wilson disputed his
ability to raise his constitutional claims before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
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case, but it nevertheless affirmed this court’s judgment. The Third Circuit directed
this court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Wilson’s case, pursuant to
Younger. Wilson’s pending motion fails to establish that Younger is not applicable
to the instant case, or that any other circumstances entitle him to relief under
Rule 60. The court will therefore deny the motion.
IV.

Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Wilson’s motion (Doc. 52) will be denied.

An appropriate order will follow.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge

Dated:

July 15, 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TONY A. WILSON,
Plaintiff
v.
MARK S. DOWS,
Defendant

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:08-CV-2219
(Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of July, 2011, upon consideration of the Rule 60
motion (Doc. 52), filed pro se by plaintiff Tony A. Wilson, and for the reasons set
forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion
(Doc. 52) is DENIED.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge