James v. Sutliff Saturn, Inc.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - AND NOW, this 23rd day of April, 2012, upon consideration of deft.'s mtn. for SJ 19 , filed 8/20/10, & pur. to the accompanying Memorandum, it is ordered that: 1. Deft.'s mtn. for SJ is granted. 2. The Clerk of Crt. shall enter jgm. in favor of deft. Sutliff Saturn, Inc. & against plf. Stephen Corey James. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 4/23/12. (am, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEPHEN COREY JAMES,
Plaintiff
vs.
SUTLIFF SATURN, INC.,
Defendant
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: CIVIL NO. 1:09-CV-1081
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MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
On June 6, 2009, Plaintiff, Stephen Corey James, filed an employment
discrimination action against Defendant, Sutliff Saturn, Inc., alleging race and disability
discrimination. We granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on November 24,
2010. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the
race discrimination claim, but vacated the grant of summary judgment on the disability
discrimination claim. The Court disagreed with our conclusion that Plaintiff failed to
properly bring his disability claim before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
(“PHRC”), and remanded the case for determination of the summary judgment motion on
that claim.
II.
Background
James began working at Sutliff’s Carlisle Pike facility on September 13,
1999 as an appearance technician. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 2-4). Plaintiff was disciplined on three
occasions. The first incident involved Plaintiff’s use of Sutliff materials to detail a friend’s
vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 5). The second and third incidents involved Plaintiff’s failure to maintain
the prep shop area in a clean, presentable manner. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7, 10). As a result of
these incidences, Sutliff transferred Plaintiff to its Harrisburg, Pennsylvania facility.
On November 7, 2005, Plaintiff underwent knee surgery to correct
meniscus and cartilage damage. (Id. at ¶ 12); see also doc. 28, Ex. A at pg. 20-21. As a
result of this surgery, Sutliff granted Plaintiff twelve weeks of Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) leave, which expired on February 1, 2006. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14). After expiration of
the FMLA leave, Sutliff granted Plaintiff an additional leave of absence. (Id. at ¶ 15); see
also doc. 28, Ex. A at 72-73.
Prior to his leave, Plaintiff was the only full-time appearance technician at
Sutliff’s Harrisburg facility. (Doc. 28, Ex. A at 67.) As a result of his leave, Sutliff
promoted another employee to replace Plaintiff while he was recuperating. (Doc. 20, Ex.
E.) However, Plaintiff’s replacement resigned on February 2, 2006. Id. Sutliff promoted
another employee, James Sulzer, to fill the vacant position until such time as James
could return to work. Id. However, when Plaintiff returned to work on March 7, 2006,
Sutliff terminated his employment allegedly because Sulzer was performing well and
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there was not enough work to support two positions. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 21, 22, 24, 32-33).
Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated as a result of disability discrimination.
III.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We will examine the motion under the well-established standard. Lawrence
v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d. Cir. 2008). We “must view all evidence
and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and may
affirm a grant of summary judgment only if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant.” Id.
B. ADA and PHRA Claim1
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits employers from
discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must
show that he “(1) has a ‘disability,’ (2) is a ‘qualified individual,’ and (3) has suffered an
1
We note that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) and the ADA are
"basically the same.” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002)
“‘Pennsylvania courts . . . generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal
counterparts.’” Id. (quoting Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also
Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004) (the
analysis of an ADA claim applies equally to a PHRA claim). Thus, our analysis of an ADA
claim applies to the PHRA claim.
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adverse employment action because of that disability.” Turner v. Hershey Chocolate
U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006). ADA disparate treatment claims are analyzed
under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. Shaner v. Synthes,
204 F.3d 494, 500 (2000). If the plaintiff is able to demonstrate a prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant to identify a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas at 802. If a defendant
meets this requirement, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the legitimate
non-discriminatory reason articulated by the defendant is a pretext for discrimination. Id.
at 804.
1. Whether Plaintiff Has a Disability Under the ADA
Defendant contends that Plaintiff does not have a disability. Since the
events giving rise to this claim occurred in 2006, we will use the definitions and
provisions provided by the ADA in effect at that time.2 In 2006, the ADA defined the
term “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
2
In September 2008, Congress enacted legislation that amended the definition of
“disability” under the ADA. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4,122 Stat.
3553 (2008). Since the events giving rise to the instant suit occurred prior to the effective
date of this legislation, we will apply the pre-amendment definition. See Amorosi v. Molino,
2009 WL 737338, *4 (E.D. Pa 2009) (explaining the amendments do not apply retroactively);
Britting v. Sec’y VA, 409 Fed. Appx. 566, 569 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the ADAAA is not retroactively
applicable.”).
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42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990). In determining whether an individual has an “impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,” the first step is to identify
the major life activity that Plaintiff alleges his impairment substantially limits. Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 1998). Once identified, factors to be
considered include: the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected
duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long-term impact of the impairment. Id.
(applying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). In Toyota v. Williams, the Supreme Court explained
that a plaintiff must offer evidence regarding the extent of the limitation of a major life
activity, not merely submitting a diagnosis of an impairment. 534 U.S. 184, 198, 151 L.
Ed. 2d 615, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he has an impairment, derangement of the
lateral meniscus and degenerative joint disease. (Doc. 1, ¶ 39). Both parties agree that
Plaintiff took leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act in order to have knee
surgery to correct meniscus and cartilage damage in his right knee. (Doc. 21, ¶ 12). To
the extent this is an impairment, Plaintiff fails to identify any major life activity that is
substantially limited by it. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony explains that he was having
“minor problems” with his knee in October 2005, which led him to visit his doctor. (Doc.
20, at 5).
Plaintiff’s testimony shows that his impairment did not substantially limit any
major life activity. Specifically, James stated:
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Q. What major life conditions do you contend that your knee surgery
prohibited you from doing?
A. Prior to [the surgery] or afterwards?
Q. At any time.
A. It doesn’t prohibit me from doing anything.
(Doc. 28, Ex. A at 21-22).
Plaintiff was able to return to work on March 7, 2006 with limited
restrictions, and by March 13, 2006, he was able to work without any restrictions. (Doc.
1, ¶¶ 16, 21). Plaintiff argues that “he has a permanent and lifelong condition affecting
his musculoskeletal system.” (Doc. 27, at 22). This assertion does not overcome
Plaintiff’s failure to specify any major life activity that is substantially limited. Thus, we
find that Plaintiff does not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
2. Whether Defendant Regarded Plaintiff as Having a Disability
Plaintiff argues that even if he does not have a disability, he is still entitled
to the protection of the ADA because management at Sutliff perceived him as having a
disability. To be “perceived” as disabled means that a defendant “mistakenly believed
that [the plaintiff has] a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities or mistakenly believed that an actual non-limiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities.” Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir.
2007).
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There is no dispute that management knew Plaintiff was on medical leave.
Plaintiff, however, does not provide evidence to suggest that anyone employed at Sutliff
Saturn believed his knee problem prevented him from engaging in any major life
activities. All employees involved with the decision to terminate Plaintiff believed the
November 2005 surgery corrected the problem. (Doc. 21, ¶ 23). Further, Plaintiff
provided his supervisor at Sutliff with a note from his physician indicating that he could
return to work on March 13, 2006 with no restrictions. (Doc. 28, Ex. A at 71). Plaintiff
has failed to provide any evidence that Defendant mistakenly believed he was impaired
within the meaning of the statute. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s disability discrimination
claim must fail.
IV.
Conclusion
Plaintiff has not provided evidence to support a disability discrimination
claim and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
We will issue an appropriate Order.
/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEPHEN COREY JAMES,
Plaintiff
:
:
:
vs.
: CIVIL NO. 1:09-CV-1081
:
SUTLIFF SATURN, INC.,
Defendant
:
:
:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of April, 2012, upon consideration of Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment (doc. 19), filed August 20, 2010, and pursuant to the
accompanying Memorandum, it is ordered that:
1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Sutliff
Saturn, Inc. and against Plaintiff Stephen Corey James.
3. The Clerk of Court shall close this file.
/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
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