Knopick v. Connelly et al

Filing 172

MEMORANDUM re dft's MOTION to Bifurcate 144 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 04/03/14. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NICHOLAS KNOPICK,
Plaintiff
v.
PHILIP A. DOWNEY,
Defendant

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Civil No. 1: 09-CV-1287

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
In this civil action, Plaintiff has sued, inter alia, his former attorney,
Defendant Philip A. Downey (“Defendant”) for legal malpractice related to
Defendant’s representation of Plaintiff in connection with a prior legal malpractice
suit against a set of Plaintiff’s former attorneys who have already been dismissed
from this suit by application of the two-year statute of limitation applicable to tort
actions in Pennsylvania. Presently before the court is Defendant’s motion to
bifurcate this trial into two phases, wherein Defendant requests that the court order
structure trial so that the parties would first present evidence to the court regarding
whether the Connelly Attorneys1 committed malpractice in the underlying lawsuit
before presenting evidence to the jury regarding whether Defendant committed
malpractice by not initiating a lawsuit against the Connelly Attorneys. (See Doc.
144.) Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion in a single-page brief in opposition.
(Doc. 153.) Despite the perfunctory nature of Plaintiff’s response, the court will
deny Defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff initially sued John J. Connelly, Jr., Esquire, Susan M. Kadel, Esquire, and James,
Smith, Durkin & Connelly, L.L.P., (collectively “the Connelly Attorneys”) due to their actions related to
the representation of Plaintiff in his divorce proceedings. The Connelly Attorneys, however, were
dismissed as defendants from this action on the basis of the statute of limitation on December 29, 2009.
(Doc. 29.)
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I.

Background
The court has little doubt that the parties are familiar with the facts and

procedural history of this case and finds no reason to repeat it here beyond the
general structure of this layered legal malpractice action. Specifically, Plaintiff
claims that Defendant committed malpractice for failing to timely file a malpractice
lawsuit against Plaintiff’s former attorneys, the Connelly Attorneys, who represented
him during his divorce proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that the Connelly Attorneys
committed legal malpractice by failing to call certain witnesses at a hearing
regarding the validity of a property settlement agreement he had entered into with his
wife, Darlene Knopick (“Ms. Knopick”). The parties recognize that, to prevail
against Defendant, Plaintiff must first prove that a meritorious legal malpractice
claim existed at the time he sought the services of Defendant. Thus, as aptly
acknowledged by Defendant, Plaintiff must prove that, had the witnesses been called,
Judge Kathy A. Morrow of the Perry County Court of Common Pleas would have
upheld the property settlement agreement on July 7, 2005, rather than invalidating
the agreement for lack of full and fair disclosure. Assuming the trier of fact finds
that Judge Morrow would have upheld the agreement but for the actions – or rather,
non-actions – of the Connelly Attorneys, Plaintiff would then have to prove that
Defendant’s conduct fell below the appropriate standard of care when he failed to
initiate a lawsuit against the Connelly Attorneys before the expiration of the twoyear statute of limitation. Defendant’s motion requests the first issue be decided by
the court rather than the jury.

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II.

Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, a trial court may, in its

discretion, bifurcate a trial. The rule provides as follows:
For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or
more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or
third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the
court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The decision to bifurcate, and the manner in which bifurcation
should be ordered, is left to the trial court’s informed discretion and must be decided
on a case by case basis. See Idzojtic v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 456 F.2d 1228, 1230
(3d Cir. 1972) (“The district court is given broad discretion in reaching its decision
whether to separate the issues of liability and damages.”). In exercising its
discretion, the court “must weigh the various considerations of convenience,
prejudice to the parties, expedition, and economy of resources.” Emerick v. U.S.
Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1984). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that bifurcation is appropriate. See Innovative Office Prods.,
Inc. v. Spaceco, Inc., Civ. No. 05-cv-4037, 2006 WL 1340865, *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15,
2006).
The Third Circuit has noted that “this court has heretofore cast its lot
with the views expressed by the Advisory Committee that bifurcation ‘be encouraged
where experience has demonstrated its worth,’ but that ‘separation of issues for trial
is not to be routinely ordered.’” Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d
Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit has also noted that “bifurcation is appropriate where
litigation of one issue . . . may eliminate the need to litigate a second issue.” In re
Bayside Prison Litig., 157 F. App’x 545, 547-48 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
original). However, bifurcation is certainly not required in circumstances where the
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“issues are so closely interwoven that the plaintiff would have to present the same
evidence twice in separate trials.” Id. at 548. Indeed, bifurcation “remains the
exception rather than the rule.” Spinturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indust.,
Inc., Civ. No. 01-cv-7158, 2004 WL 96751, *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2004) (citing Real
v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
III.

Discussion
Defendant’s motion requests that the court exercise its discretion to

bifurcate trial on the issue of the Connelly Attorneys’ actions and to conduct a bench
trial on the underlying case within the instant lawsuit prior to conducting a separate
jury trial on Defendant’s alleged malpractice. Defendant contends that the court is
“in a better position than a jury to review the underlying transcripts and perform the
required legal analysis” to determine whether, if certain witnesses had been called,
Plaintiff would have prevailed at the hearing regarding the validity of the property
settlement agreement. Defendant heavily relies on Pennsylvania civil practice that
provides for family law motions to be “exclusively decided by judges and not
juries.” (Doc. 145, p. 2 of 3.) Defendant further argues that the case is “far too
complex for a lay jury to read the hearing transcripts of Darlene[’s] and [Plaintiff]’s
testimony, listen to additional testimony, and perform legal analysis to determine
whether the [Perry County Court of Common Pleas] judge would have decided in
[Plaintiff’s] favor.” (Id. at pp. 1-2 of 3 (emphasis in original).)
Plaintiff responds that bifurcating the issue of the Connelly Attorneys’
conduct is inappropriate because “[w]hether Plaintiff would have prevailed is clearly
an issue of fact and, as such, should be left to the jury.” (Doc. 153.) The court
agrees with Plaintiff that whether the Connelly Attorneys committed malpractice is
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an issue of fact that can be decided properly by the jury and concludes that
Defendant has failed to sustain his burden to show that bifurcation is warranted.
Defendant’s contention that bifurcation is appropriate is grounded on
the basis of Pennsylvania civil practice dealing with family law matters.
Establishing causation in a legal malpractice case arising from a divorce action
presents unique conceptual difficulties. Contested divorce cases in Pennsylvania are
decided by a judge sitting in equity, guided by statutes, and to a lesser extent, the
common law. The essence of Defendant’s argument is that, because an assessment
of causation in a legal malpractice case stemming from a contested divorce involves
issues of law that are within the exclusive province of the courts, a judge rather than
a jury must decide whether Plaintiff has proved causation.
This case is not one that hinges on the application of law. Instead, this
case requires a determination of whether additional factual evidence presented by the
Connelly Attorneys at the hearing before Judge Morrow may have supported
Plaintiff’s position that his wife was fully aware of the couple’s assets. The jury is
competent and able to assess the conduct of the Connelly Attorneys. The case of
Hess v. Hess, 580 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), involved, as here, an action by an
ex-wife against an ex-husband for fraud in connection with husband’s nondisclosures
as to the value of certain marital property in negotiating a marital property settlement
agreement. The Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County entered judgment on
the jury’s verdict. Similarly, in Nathan v. Nathan, 49 Pa. D. & C. 4th 260 (Phila.
Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. July 24, 2000), an action by an ex-wife against her ex-husband for
fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with the value of shares of a closely held
corporation, the jury found that husband had misrepresented the value of the shares
to wife. Indeed, the type of scenario presented in this lawsuit here is more akin to
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fraud in the inducement of a contract rather than a divorce case typically placed
before a judge. Thus, that Pennsylvania matrimonial law issues are typically handled
by a judge rather than a jury does not compel the court to bifurcate this case and hold
a bench trial.
Moreover, Defendant fails to support his argument that this case is “far
too complex” to be tried by a jury. As stated, this case hinges on whether the
Connelly Attorneys could have presented evidence to establish that Ms. Knopick was
fully engaged in the couple’s financial affairs and demonstrate that the circumstances
indicated that Ms. Knopick had knowledge of the general value of the couple’s
assets. Thus, the determination of whether the Connelly Attorneys could have
presented evidence to defend the validity of the property settlement agreement will
be based on the jury’s acceptance or rejection of the testimony proffered by certain
witnesses. See Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“[T]he
case law provides that where the circumstances indicate that a spouse has knowledge
of the general value of the couple’s assets, an agreement will be upheld.”). This is
not a case that hinges on the application of legal principles that are properly reserved
for the court, and factual determinations remain the province of a jury. Indeed, this
court has previously acknowledged the factual nature of the contested issue
regarding the Connelly Attorneys’ actions:
When a disclosure clause is present, a court is bound to
accept that full and fair disclosure was made, absent a
showing of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. The party
asserting that fraud, duress, or misrepresentation was
present bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Witness testimony that [Ms. Knopick] was
aware of the stock, and the approximate value thereof, may
have acted as a counterweight against any evidence [Ms.
Knopick] put forth to prove fraud. This presents a genuine
issue of material fact.
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Knopick v. Downey, 91 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 400, *20 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2013)
(emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). Thus, this factual question is within the
province of a jury, and Defendant has not convinced the court that the jury will be
unable to weigh the evidence presented and determine whether the Connelly
Attorneys committed malpractice during the property settlement agreement
proceedings. Thus, Defendant has not demonstrated that this case is inappropriate
for the jury’s consideration.
Importantly, Defendant fails to convince the court that the various
considerations of convenience, prejudice to the parties, expedition, and economy of
resources weigh in favor of bifurcating trial. Indeed, Defendant does not address any
of these considerations in his brief. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that
Defendant has sustained his burden in demonstrating that bifurcation is appropriate.
Lastly, Defendant’s analogy to an appellate malpractice case for the
proposition that the underlying case would be best resolved by the court rather than
the jury is unconvincing. This is a legal malpractice action and, as in most legal
malpractice cases, proximate cause is determined by the jury: if the malpractice
action is not one focused exclusively on the appellate process or issues of law, but is
focused on malpractice that occurred during litigation, then proximate cause often is
an issue of fact. It is logical that, because appeals are generally based on and
resolved as a matter of law and not fact, in a legal malpractice case arising from a
missed opportunity to appeal – the type of case cited by Defendant in the instant
motion – proximate causation must be decided by a judge rather than a jury. The
same is not true when, as here, the legal malpractice case arises from the failure of
the attorney to investigate and properly present the case in the first instance. That
Pennsylvania civil procedure favors judges to resolve domestic relations cases does
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not change this logic. Thus, Defendant’s argument that this case should follow the
procedure employed in appellate malpractice cases remains unconvincing and
certainly does not require the court to grant Defendant’s motion for bifurcation.
(Contra Doc. 161, p. 2 of 2 (“Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to
bifurcate must be granted.” (emphasis supplied)).)
IV.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Defendant has failed to

demonstrate that the considerations of convenience, prejudice to the parties,
expedition, and economy of resources weigh in favor of bifurcating trial.
Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion and deny Defendant’s motion to
bifurcate trial. The entire matter will be submitted to the jury.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: April 3, 2014.

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