Hall v. Rahodes et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 1. Plaintiffs motion to compel (Doc. No. 46) is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted only with respect to Halls requests for any medical records contained in his prison medi cal file concerning post-surgical orders and care, as well as a copy of any DOC policy in existence at the time of the incident addressing the matter of wheelchair van transport of inmates. Defendants shall provide any such documents within twenty (20) days from the date of this order. The motion is denied in all other respects. 2. Dispositive motions may be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter. Signed by Honorable Yvette Kane on Oct. 1, 2013. (sc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. RHOADES, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-09-1907
(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Ronald Hall (“Hall”) filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Two
Defendants remain in this action, Sergeant Rhoades and Officer Stagl, Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections employees involved in Hall’s transport on October 3, 2007 from the State
Correctional Institution at Smithfield to the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale.
Presently pending before the Court is Hall’s motion to compel discovery. (Doc. No. 46.) For the
reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Relevant Background
Hall alleges that on October 3, 2007, following knee surgery, he was placed under orders

from the surgeon to place minimum weight on his leg by using two (2) crutches for four (4)
weeks. Because no crutches were available, Hall was given a wheelchair to use. On the same
date, while waiting to be transferred from SCI-Smithfield to SCI-Houtzdale, Hall claims that
Defendants Rhoades and Stagl forced him out of his wheelchair, shackled his legs and hands,
and directed him to walk up the stairs into the bus. When Hall complained of pain he was told to
“stop crying like a baby.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 3.) When Hall arrived at SCI-Houtzdale, he
states his knee was swollen due to Defendants’ actions, and that he had to be helped from the
bus. He states that he was placed in the infirmary for two (2) months and provided with pain

medication. According to Plaintiff, Defendants had the option of transporting him to SCIHoutzdale in a wheelchair accessible transport van, but when Hall made this suggestion to
Defendants he was ignored. Based on the foregoing, Hall claims that Defendants Rhoades and
Stagl were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition when they “denied and delayed and
interfered with the Doctor’s prescribed treatment for medical.” (Id. at 3.)
Defendants filed an answer to the complaint on October 3, 2011. (Doc. No. 34.) A
scheduling order was issued on October 4, 2011, directing that all discovery in this matter be
completed within six (6) months, and any dispositive motions filed within thirty (30) days
thereafter. (Doc. No. 35.) Defendants were granted leave to depose Hall during the discovery
period. (Doc. No. 41.) On May 3, 2012, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and
the documents in support thereof. (Doc. Nos. 42-45.)
Hall did not file any opposition to the summary judgment motion. Rather, on May 18,
2012, he filed a motion to compel discovery. (Doc. No. 46.) In reviewing the motion, he claims
that Defendants failed to provide him with documents requested pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
While Hall did not file a separate brief in support of his motion, the Court issued an order
directing Defendants to respond to Hall’s motion. (Doc. No. 48.) An opposition brief has been
submitted, and the Court will now address the motion.
II.

Legal Standard
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines both the scope and

limitations governing the use of discovery in a federal civil action:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense–including the existence, description, nature,
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custody, condition, and location of any documents or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know
of any discoverable matter. For good cause the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 addresses the matter of failure to make disclosures or to cooperate in
discovery and the possibility of sanctions. Specifically, if a party served with discovery fails to
respond adequately, the serving party may file a motion to compel under Rule 37(a). Issues
relating to the scope of discovery permitted under the Rules rest in the sound discretion of the
court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). A court’s decisions
regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of
discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This discretion is
guided, however, by certain basic principles. One crucial component of the court’s discretion is
that the court must set schedules for the completion of discovery. When a party fails to abide by
those schedules the court has the right, and the duty, to impose sanctions for that failure. Those
sanctions may, in the discretion of the court, include declining a party’s request to compel
compliance with untimely and improper discovery demands. As such, where a party has
submitted an untimely request, the court can, and in the exercise of its discretion often should,
refuse to compel compliance with that request. See, e.g., Maslanka v. Johnson & Johnson, 305
F. App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2008)(affirming denial of pro se litigant motion to compel where
discovery demands were untimely); Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F. App’x 991 (3d Cir.
2006)(same); Bull v. United States, 143 F. App’x 468 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). These benchmark
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standards will now be applied to Hall’s pending motion to compel discovery.
III.

Discussion
Hall states that he served a discovery request upon Defendants to produce documents and

that they failed to produce documents in response to ten (10) of his requests. (Doc. No. 46.) In
his motion, he sets forth the following challenged requests (including all grammatical errors):
1.

All documents that contain, mention or refer to policies on health care and
conditions in Pennsylvania prison

2.

All documents that contain, mention or refer to policies on prison officials
guards with out medical training on providing medical care

3.

All documents that contain, mention construe policies on transport wheelchair
vans

4.

All the complete contents of plaintiff incident reports medical and health records

5.

All records that contain mention or construe to plaintiff complaint filed at
the department of corrections that relate to all defendants

6.

All medical documents pertaining to plaintiff surgery that occurred at
Somerset Hospital in October of 2007

7.

All written reports orders statements that contain mention construe or refer
to medical orders for the plaintiff and the department of corrections to
follow from the surgeon Dr. Kates sent from Somerset Hospital during the
month of October 2007

8.

All rules and requirements for S.C.I. Houtzdale usage of wheelchair vans

9.

All reports and documents on the complaint by plaintiff that was filed with
the D.O.C. office of professional responsibility

10.

All documents that contain mention construe or refer to policies on staff
supervision of inmates in the department of corrections

(Doc. No. 46 at 1.)
In responding to the motion to compel, Defendants state that they responded to Hall’s

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written discovery requests on April 20, 2012 and April 23, 2012. Attached to their opposition
brief are copies of Hall’s discovery requests and Defendants’ responses thereto. (Doc. No. 49,
Exs. A-C.) In reviewing Defendants’ responses to the challenged requests for production of
documents, the Court must agree with Defendants’ objections to the bulk of the requests on the
basis that the documents requested are overbroad in scope and mostly irrelevant. Specifically,
the Court finds that the document requests identified by Hall in his motion to compel numbered
1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 are overbroad and irrelevant, and Defendants will not be directed to supplement
their response to said requests. The Court further finds that Defendants have adequately
responded to request #9 in that they did provide to Hall all reports and documents related to this
complaint that were filed with the DOC Office of Professional Responsibility.
The remaining requests (#3, #6, #7 and #8) pertain to Hall’s medical records and to DOC
policies existing that address the use of transport wheelchair vans. These requests certainly seek
information relevant to the issues remaining in this action. Defendants objected to these
requests, but state they did provide Plaintiff with medical records. However, in reviewing the
medical records provided, all that is included is a copy of the Medical Incident/Injury Report
prepared following Hall’s transport from SCI-Smithfield, and several photographs taken of his
knee. The medical documents sought by Hall concerning any post-surgical orders from the
doctor are clearly relevant to his claims. Also relevant are any DOC policies in effect at the
time of the incident addressing the issue of the use of wheelchair vans for the purpose of
transporting inmates. As such, Hall’s motion to compel will only be granted with respect to said
requests. Defendants will be directed to provide to Hall within twenty (20) days, any medical
records contained in Hall’s prison medical file concerning post-surgical orders and care, as well

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as a copy of any DOC policy in existence at the time of the incident addressing the matter of
wheelchair van transport of inmates. Dispositive motions may be filed within thirty (30) days
thereafter. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. RHOADES, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-09-1907
(Judge Kane)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of October, 2013, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying
Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. No. 46) is granted in part and denied in
part. The motion is granted only with respect to Hall’s requests for any
medical records contained in his prison medical file concerning post-surgical
orders and care, as well as a copy of any DOC policy in existence at the time of
the incident addressing the matter of wheelchair van transport of inmates.
Defendants shall provide any such documents within twenty (20) days from the
date of this order. The motion is denied in all other respects.

2.

Dispositive motions may be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter.

S/ Yvette Kane
YVETTE KANE
United States District Judge