Cieniawa v. White et al

Filing 129

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER construing pltf's motion to close case 125 as motion for voluntary dismissal, granting motion & dismissing action w/ prejudice, directing Clrk of Ct to close case, & deeming any appeal from this order as frivolous & not in good faith. (See order for complete details.)Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 11/30/12. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JASON CIENIAWA,
Plaintiff
v.
DR. DENTIST DAVID WHITE, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09-CV-2130
(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
On November 2, 2009, plaintiff Jason Cieniawa (“plaintiff” or “Cieniawa”), a
state inmate formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp
Hill (SCI-Camp Hill), Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various employees at SCI-Camp Hill. Presently pending is
Cieniawa’s “Motion to Close Case.” (Doc. 125.) This filing will be construed as a
motion to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(2). The motion will be granted and, for the reasons that follow, the
dismissal will be with prejudice.
I.

Background
The complaint in this action was filed more than three years ago against

various employees at SCI-Camp Hill. The Court issued a memorandum and order
on July 13, 2010, addressing defendants’ motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motions to
amend and for pre-trial discovery. (Doc. 39.) Some of the claims and defendants
were dismissed, plaintiff’s motions to substitute parties and for pre-trial discovery
were granted, and a pre-trial schedule was set. (Id. at 15.) Discovery was to be

completed by November 15, 2010, and dispositive motions were to be filed on or
before December 15, 2010. (Id.) Following the issuance of this Order, Cieniawa
moved to amend his complaint. The motion was granted and he was afforded until
August 20, 2010, to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 42.) However, prior to filing
the amended complaint, he appealed the July 13, 2010 memorandum and order to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (Doc. 47.) The matter was
subsequently stayed pending resolution of the appeal. (Doc. 56.) The appeal was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on August 24, 2011. (Doc. 58.) On return from the
Third Circuit, the stay was lifted and Cieniawa was again afforded the opportunity
to amend his complaint. (Doc. 61.) He filed an amended complaint (Doc. 64) on
October 5, 2011, which defendants moved to dismiss. (Doc. 71.) Shortly thereafter,
he moved to withdraw the amended complaint. (Doc. 76.) On November 30, 2011,
the motion to withdraw was granted, defendants’ motion to dismiss was rendered
moot and a pretrial schedule was set with regard to the remaining claims contained
in the original complaint. (Doc. 81.) All discovery was to be completed by March 21,
2012, and dispositive motions were to be filed by April 4, 2012. (Doc. 81.) The
parties actively pursued discovery. On May 7, 2012, the dispositive motion deadline
was extended to June 1, 2012. (Doc. 106). Although the deadline was extended
again, an amended scheduling order was not issued because Cieinawa filed an
interlocutory appeal challenging the Order granting defendants’ motion to conduct
his deposition. (Docs. 115, 120-123.)

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During the pendency of the appeal, he filed a “motion to close case.” (Doc.
125.) On October 24, 2012, the appeal was dismissed for failure to timely prosecute.
(Doc. 126.) On November 5, 2012, an order was issued directing plaintiff to notify
the court on or before November 16, 2012, of whether he intended to proceed with
the prosecution of this matter. (Doc. 127.) He filed a “Notice to Court to Close
Case” on November 13, 2012. (Doc. 128). He states that defendants have obstructed
his ability to obtain declaratory statements and other discoverable evidence, that
this Court has ignored his claims of assaults and abuse and ruled “biasly and
prejudicely [sic] against near every motion/issue plaintiff presented,” that he has
had threats on his life and well-being and was physically assaulted, and that his
legal materials have been seized and placed in the trash by coworkers of the
defendants. (Doc. 128.) He states that he “is forced to involuntary [sic] close this
case. . .” (Id.)
II.

Discussion
As noted supra, Cieniawa’s “Motion to Close Case” (Doc. 125) will be

construed as a request for voluntary dismissal of this action. Rule 41 which
addresses the dismissal of actions provides as follows:
(a) Voluntary Dismissal.
(1)

By the Plaintiff.
(A)

Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c),
23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal statute, the
plaintiff may dismiss an action without court order
by filing:

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(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party
serves either an answer or a motion for summary
judgment; or
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared.
(B)

(2)

Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states
otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if
the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or
state-court action based on or including the same
claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits.

By Court Order; Effect. Except as provided in Rule 41(a) (1),
an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by
court order, on terms that the court considers proper....
Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal under this
paragraph (2) is without prejudice.

FED . R. CIV . P. 41(a).
Procedurally, Rule 41(a)(1) is not available to Cieniawa because defendants
have filed their answer to the complaint. (Doc. 110.) Consequently, his motion will
be construed as a request for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) and
requires a court order. Every appellate court has held that the main purpose of the
requirement of court approval is to prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly
affect the rights of the defendant. See 27A Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 62:509 (collecting
cases from First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); 9 Charles A. Wright
et al., at § 2364 (collecting cases from First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits). It is, therefore,
well within a court’s discretion to grant the dismissal with prejudice where it would
be inequitable or prejudicial to defendant to allow plaintiff to re-file the action. See

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Chodorow v. Roswick, 160 F.R.D. 522, 523 (E.D.Pa. 1995). Factors to be considered
in deciding whether to grant the dismissal with prejudice include: (1) the excessive
and duplicative expense of a second litigation; (2) the effort and expense incurred
by the defendant in preparing for trial; (3) the extent to which the current suit has
progressed; (4) the plaintiff's diligence in bringing the motion to voluntarily dismiss
and his explanation therefore; and (5) the pendency of a dispositive motion by the
non-moving party. See Dodge–Regupol, Inc. v. RB Rubber Products, Inc., 585 F.
Supp.2d 645, 652 (M.D.Pa .2008).
If the court dismissed this matter without prejudice, and plaintiff were to
resurrect the action at some unspecified point in the future, there can be no doubt
that defendants would be significantly prejudiced by the excessive and duplicative
expense of a second litigation. Moreover, it is clear from the procedural history
contained in the background section, supra at “I. Background,” that significant
judicial and other legal resources have already been expended on this litigation and
that there has been significant forward progress.
With respect to Cieniawa’s diligence in seeking dismissal, after more than
three years of litigating this matter, he now claims, in a conclusory fashion without
reference to time, date, or place, that defendants and their co-workers are
obstructing his ability to litigate this action by failing to cooperate with the
discovery process, threatening and physically assaulting him, and seizing and
destroying his legal materials. As concerns defendants’ alleged obstruction of the
discovery process, as plaintiff is well aware, such issues are able to be addressed
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through a properly filed motion to compel discovery. His allegations that
defendants are hindering his ability to litigate by threatening and assaulting him
and seizing and destroying his legal property are bald conclusory accusations and
are baseless considering that he has not been incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill since
before the inception of this action.
Finally, his contention that this Court is biased because I have ruled against
him on “near every motion/issue presented to this court and has ruled in favor of
defendants” is without merit. (Doc. 128, at 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “any
justice, judge or magistrate [judge] of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Recusal
is required “if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect
that the judge would have actual knowledge” of his/her interest or bias in a case.
Lilieberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988); In re
Kensington Intern., Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). The mere fact of adverse
rulings does not establish bias under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). McDaniel v. Lanigan, Civil
No. 12-3834 (AET), 2012 WL 5880371 *8 (Nov. 21, 2012, D.N.J.) (collecting cases).
This is true even if the judge consistently made adverse rulings against the party,
see McCalden v. California Library Assoc., 955 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir.1990):
United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 877 (10th Cir. 1989), because
an adverse decision, even if it is adverse on all issues raised, is not evidence of bias,
especially when it is supported by the law and facts. See Gleason v. Welborn, 42
F.3d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994). Review of the lengthy docket in this case reveals
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that throughout this litigation plaintiff filed a significant number of motions and
that each motion, when properly filed, was considered by this Court and ruled on,
whether in his favor or not, in accordance with the facts, prevailing law and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Due to the extent to which this matter has been litigated, and taking into
consideration the judicial and other legal resources that have been invested to this
point, the Court finds that it is appropriate that such dismissal shall be with
prejudice.
III.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s “Motion to Close Case” (Doc. 125) will be

granted. An appropriate order follows.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
Dated:

November 30, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JASON CIENIAWA,
Plaintiff
v.
DR. DENTIST DAVID WHITE, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09-CV-2130
(Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2012, upon consideration of plaintiff’s
“Motion to Close Case” (Doc. 125), and in accordance with the foregoing
memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s “Motion to Close Case” (Doc. 125) is CONSTRUED as a
motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(2).

2.

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED and this action is dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to FED . R. CIV . P. 41(a)(2).

3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

4.

Any appeal from this order is DEEMED frivolous and not in good faith.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge