Weaver v. Beveridge et al

Filing 89

ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1) Plaintiff's objs. are OVERRULED; 2) The R&R is APPROVED and ADOPTED. 3) Defendant's mtn for S/J is GRANTED; 4) The Clerk is directed to mark this case CLOSED. Signed by Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel on 4/18/13. (jc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT WEAVER,
Plaintiff,

LAURA BEVERIDGE, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 09-2357

ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th

day of April 2013, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s

Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 87) and
Defendant’s Response thereto (Doc. No. 88), and following an independent review of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63), Plaintiff’s Response thereto
(Doc. No. 75), Defendant’s Reply (Doc. No. 80), and Magistrate Judge Martin C.
Carlson’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 82), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Objections are OVERRULED;1

1

I review de novo timely and specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Goney v.
Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6 (3d Cir. 1984). In doing so, I may rely on the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations to whatever extent I deem proper, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. U. S. v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).
The sole claim before the magistrate judge was plaintiff Robert Weaver’s Fourth Amendment-based malicious
prosecution claim against defendant Laura Beveridge. “To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983 when
the claim is under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and
(5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007). Failure to satisfy any one of these elements is
fatal to the claim. Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2009).
“[A] prior criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused in order to
satisfy the favorable termination element.” Id. at 187. Accordingly, “[a] nol pros signifies termination of charges in
favor of the accused only when their final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.” Donahue
v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A nol pros is not

2.

The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;

3.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;

2.

The Clerk is directed to mark this case CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lawrence F. Stengel
LAWRENCE F. STENGEL, J.

indicative of the accused’s innocence where “[t]he prosecutor simply reason[s] that [the accused is] not likely to
receive any additional jail time if convicted in a retrial.” Id. at 384.
Relying on Donahue, the magistrate judge concluded that Weaver failed to satisfy this element, among others,
because the “evidence of record indicates that ADA Moore elected to nol pros the charges in 2009 because he
concluded that Plaintiff was unlikely to receive anything other than a sentence for time already served, and because
he believed it was unnecessary to put Ms. Nispel through the burden of testifying against Plaintiff in a new criminal
proceeding.” Doc. No. 82 at 29. Weaver objects to this finding, contending that “Moore obviously feared losing a
re-trial of plaintiff.” Doc. No. 87 at 14.
Weaver’s objection is without merit. Neither party has produced the motion and order to nol pros Weaver’s case,
and the only record evidence regarding the matter is Moore’s testimony. Moore summed up his reasons for
recommending a nol pros:
I remember adding up [Weaver’s] time and he had already had his time served at that point for that
particular charge. And given where, I believe, Loretta Nispel was at in her life, she had just gotten
an apartment, I think she had a boyfriend and everything was going really well, I didn’t see the
point in going and dragging her back through a trial if it was unnecessary since he already had his
time in. Whether he had a conviction on his record at that point was kind of immaterial.
Doc. No. 69 at 8:11-23; see also id. at 18:15-20:9. Weaver conflates Moore’s reasons for declining to prosecute
another case involving Nispel with Moore’s reasons for moving to nol pros Weaver’s case. Doc. No. 76 ¶ 64.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Moore reconsidered the evidence against Weaver, in light of the
Superior Court’s remand, and concluded that a conviction at retrial was unlikely. The magistrate judge correctly
determined that Moore’s request for a nol pros did not reflect Weaver’s innocence, Donahue, 280 F.3d at 384, and
his malicious prosecution claim fails for this reason alone. Because Weaver’s failure to satisfy the favorable
termination requirement is dispositive of his claim, I do not reach his remaining objections.