Gardner et al v. Barry et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER remaining Defendants Sally A. Barry, Richard Worley, and John Leahy, flied a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39). For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, NOW, on this 1st day of MARCH, 2012, IT IS HEREBY ORDER ED THAT: 1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) is GRANTED. 2. The Court enters judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE the case.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 3/1/12. (jfg)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIN M. GARDNER and JEFFREY
M.GARDNER
Plaintiffs
v.
1:10-CV-0527
(JUDGE MARIANI)
SALLY A. BARRY, RICHARD WORLEY,
JOHN LEAHY, and LEBANON COUNTY
Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Erin M. Gardner ("Erin") and Jeffrey M. Gardner ("Jeffrey")
(together, "Gardners" or "Plaintiffs") filed this federal civil rights lawsuit
alleging that Defendants violated their constitutional right to associate
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Upon the close of discovery,
remaining Defendants Sally A. Barry ("Barry"), Richard Worley ("Worley"),
and John Leahy ("Leahy") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be
granted.
BACKGROUND
This action arises upon the Complaint of Plaintiffs for alleged
violations of their associational rights as guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Plaintiffs raise their
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constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and establish proper
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The state law claims
are properly brought before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1357(c).
Plaintiffs are now husband and wife, but at all times relevant to the
events giving rise to this matter, they were unmarried. This case concerns
the circumstances surrounding the genesis of their relationship and the
propriety of certain actions undertaken by Defendants to prevent Plaintiffs
from associating with one another.
Erin began working for the Lebanon County Adult Probation
Department ("Probation Department") in February 2005. (See Erin Gardner
Dep. 19:4-10, Feb. 2, 2011.) Erin admits signing an employee code of
conduct forbidding fraternization with probationers, although she could not
remember reading it. (See Erin Dep. 20:1-22.) Erin understood that her
supervisors did not approve of such fraternization, but says that she was
not aware that it was an official policy. (See Erin Dep. 22:4-6.) Erin further
testified that she thought it would be inappropriate for a probation officer to
have "intimate relations" with a probationer over whom she had supervisory
authority. (See Erin Dep. 25: 1-11.)
In 2005, Jeffrey was charged with several criminal acts including
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burglary, receipt of stolen property, criminal mischief, and criminal
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conspiracy. (See Jeffrey Gardner Dep. 15:1-6, Feb. 2, 2011.) He pleaded
guilty, but prior to sentencing Jeffrey received two citations for driving while
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intoxicated. (See Jeffrey Dep. 15:7-18.) The charges were combined and
Jeffrey was sentenced to a term of 22 months at an in-patient rehabilitation
program called Crossroads, which is administered by the Veterans' Affairs
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Hospital in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. (See Jeffrey Dep. 15:25, 16: 1-5.) He
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was also sentenced to an additional twelve months of probation. (See
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Jeffrey Dep. 16:-1.) For the duration of Jeffrey's sentence, he was
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supervised by the Probation Department for a total of 34 months. (See
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Jeffrey Dep. 16:7.) Jeffrey was released from the VA Hospital in August of
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2007, after only 15 months. (See Jeffrey Dep. 17:19-21.) Jeffrey's
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probation required him to sleep at home unless he received permission
from his probation officer to do otherwise. (See Jeffrey Dep. 19:10-20.)
Jeffrey was supervised by Erin from the time of his release from the VA
Hospital in August 2007. (See Jeffrey Dep. 20:4-8.) During the first six
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months following Jeffrey's release from in-patient care, he was placed on
electronic monitoring. (See Jeffrey Dep. 21 :22-23.) Jeffrey understood
that a violation of his probation, including a failure to report his
whereabouts if he was not spending the night in his home, would subject
him to a mandatory term in prison. (See Jeffrey Dep. 23: 13-25.) Jeffrey
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further understood the role of the Probation Department as an institution
tasked with keeping probationers "on the straight and narrow for ... as
long as they could, so hopefully that they would continue doing what they
were supposed to be doing." (See Jeffrey Dep. 24:10-17.)
According to Jeffrey, his relationship with Erin turned physical in
December 2007. (See Jeffrey Dep. 25:1-6.) Jeffrey admits that he spent at
least several nights at Erin's home without asking for permission from the
Probation Department. (See Jeffrey Dep. 25:7-25,26:1-9.) Jeffrey further
admits that he and Erin made false representations to another probation
officer, Meghan Fertenbaugh ("Fertenbaugh"), in order to conceal a trip
they had planned to Atlantic City, New Jersey. (See Jeffrey Dep. 38:2-14;
Erin Dep. 72:12-24.) Although Erin recorded the Atlantic City trip in
Jeffrey's log book as a "family" visit, Jeffrey testified that he had no
intention of seeing family on that trip. (See Jeffrey Dep. 39:2-12.) Erin
testified that she believed that Fertenbaugh would have objected to his
Atlantic City trip if she knew Jeffrey would be accompanied by Erin. (See
Erin Dep. 85:4-11.) Erin also knew that if she did not keep her relationship
with Jeffrey a secret that she would be fired. (See Erin Dep. 60:2-16,
63:12-20.)
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On March 6, 2008, Jeffrey requested leave from the Probation
Department to visit Erin in Maryland, where she had taken a job with the
federal government at Fort Meade. (See Jeffrey Dep. 39:25-40:5.)
Although Jeffrey placed a call to Fertenbaugh, he was unable to speak with
her, and instead left a message in which he requested a travel pass to see
Erin. (See Jeffrey Dep. 40:8-12.) Fertenbaugh did not return his call. (See
Jeffrey Dep. 40:24.) Jeffrey did, however, receive a call the following
Thursday night from Defendant, Sally Barry ("Barry"), the Chief of Adult
Probation. (See Jeffrey Dep. 40:24-25.) Barry inquired as to why Jeffrey
wanted to visit Erin in Maryland, and further asked about their relationship.
(See Jeffrey Dep. 41 :8-22.) Barry asked Jeffrey if he ever kissed Erin, and
when Jeffrey showed reluctance to answer, Barry informed him that they
had a problem and that Jeffrey should come to the Probation Department
on Monday for a meeting. (See Jeffrey Dep. 42:1-12.) Barry also denied
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Jeffrey his travel pass. (See Jeffrey Dep. 42:13-17.) When Jeffrey
informed Erin of his conversation with Barry, she told him not to worry and
that she would come to Pennsylvania to visit him. (See Jeffrey Dep. 42:1825,43:1-13.) Erin arrived at Jeffrey's home the next day between 6:00
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p.m. and 6:15 p.m., and shortly afterwards, Barry and Richard Worley
("Worley") knocked on Jeffrey's front door. (See Jeffrey Dep. 43: 10-25,
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44: 1-2.) Plaintiffs maintain that Barry and Worley did not ask to enter the
residence, but pushed their way inside. (See Jeffrey Dep. 43: 15-18.)
When Barry and Worley saw Erin, Barry turned to Jeffrey and ordered him
to tell Erin to leave or else he would be in violation of his probation. (See
Jeffrey Dep. 44:24-25.) Plaintiffs allege that Barry told them that Jeffrey
needed to tell Erin to leave, as they were unable to do so themselves.
(See Jeffrey Dep. 45:1.) They informed Plaintiffs that Erin was the subject
of an internal investigation and that she needed to leave immediately. (See
Jeffrey Dep. 45:3-11.) The fact that Erin was the target of an internal
investigation was repeated several times. (See Jeffrey Dep. 46:4-7.) Erin
left the premises after objecting strenuously about Barry and Worley's
authority to give such an order to Jeffrey. (See Jeffrey Dep. 45:11-25.)
The following Monday, Jeffrey went to the Probation Department to
meet Barry and Defendant Detective John Leahy ("Leahy"). (See Jeffrey
Dep.48:18-23.) Jeffrey testified that Leahy asked him very personal
questions about his relationship with Erin, including whether and when the
couple had sexual relations. (See Jeffrey Dep. 49:18-19.) Jeffrey was
interviewed on a subsequent occasion, and was required to memorialize
the circumstances of his relationship with Erin in writing. (See Jeffrey Dep.
53:1-17.) Jeffrey was told to have no contact with Erin. Plaintiffs did not
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see each other between March 12, 2008, and the end of May 2008. (See
Jeffrey Dep. 60:2, 61 :1-2.) However, after speaking with a lawyer, Plaintiffs
married on June 17, 2008. (See Pis.' Ans. To Statement of Facts,
1r 10,
ECF Dkt. 42.)
Erin was charged, and found guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of
Lebanon County, of falsifying public records in connection with Plaintiffs'
trip to Atlantic City. (See Erin Dep. 128:7-10.) Erin was acquitted of
another charge for obstruction of justice. (See Erin Dep. 128:11-15.) Erin
was also forced to resign from her position with the federal government and
relinquish her security clearance. At all times relevant to these events,
Jeffrey was under the direct supervision of the Probation Department.
STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary
judgment shall be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A district court
may grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff
fails to provide any genuine issue of material fact. See Rule 56(c); see also
Krouse v. Amer. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494,500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). The
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moving party has the burden to establish before the district court that the
non-moving party has failed to substantiate its claims with evidence. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986); see also Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner
and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). 'The burden then shifts to
the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine
issue for triaL" See Book v. Merski, 2009 WL 890469, at *4 (W.O. Pa. Mar.
31, 2009)(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Company v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348,89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Williams v. Borough
of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)("the non-movant
must present affirmative evidence-more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance-which supports each element of his claim to defeat a
properly presented motion for summary judgment.")). The non-moving
party is then charged with providing evidence beyond the pleadings to
show specific facts by affidavit or by information contained "in the filed
documents (Le., depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions) to
meet his burden of proving elements essential to his claim." Book, 2009
WL 890469, at *4 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Country Floors, 930
F.2d at 1061).
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Material facts are those whose resolution will affect the outcome of
the case under applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Although the Court
is required to resolve any doubts as to the existence of material facts in
favor of the non-moving party for summary judgment, Rule 56 "does not
allow a party resisting the motion to rely merely upon bare assertions,
conclusory allegations or suspicions." Firemen's Ins. Company of Newark,
N.J. v. Du Fresne, 676 F.2d 965,969 (3d Cir. 1982). Summary judgment,
therefore, is only precluded if a dispute about a material fact is "genuine",
viz., if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict in
favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-249.
DISCUSSION
Associational interests arising under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments are carefully guarded by the Courts; however, the right to free
association is not without limits. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), the Supreme Court found
that U[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed."
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!51 at 622.
''The
right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute."
kl at
623. "Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms."
kl
In the context of convicted criminals, the Third
Circuit is clear that "those convicted of crimes lose a measure of their
liberties." United States v. Rodriguez, 178 Fed. Appx. 152, 158 (3d Cir.
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2006). Accordingly, probationers do not enjoy the same constitutional
freedoms as those granted to the general population.
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The Courts of Appeals have recognized several areas in which
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"compelling state interests" serve as a sound basis to enact restrictions on
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associational rights. In Lape v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 157 Fed.
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Appx. 491 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit upheld the termination of a
female employee of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections after she
married a former inmate. The Court held that the prison's antifraternization rule in its Code of Ethics bore a reasonable connection to
legitimate state interests in protecting the sanctity and security of the prison
system. See id. at 6. Furthermore, in Lape, the Court found the former
prison guard's termination to be constitutional even though the prisoner
with whom she was involved had been released from state custody prior to
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the commencement of their intimate relationship.1 In the present matter,
Jeffrey was still under the direct supervision of the Probation Department,
and his physical relationship with Erin admittedly began prior to Erin's
voluntary separation from the Probation Department. In addition, the rule
articulated in Lape illustrates that only one of the constrained parties need
be subject to some valid associational restriction in order for it to pass
constitutional muster. In Lape, the prison guard was prohibited from
fraternizing with a former inmate even though she was no longer in a
position to provide special treatment or create a security issue at the
prison. No future security issue could foreseeably arise from their
relationship, but the Court still found their associational rights subject to
restriction. The facts presented in the present matter are similar to the
degree that Erin was no longer in a position to provide special treatment to
Jeffrey since she had resigned her position as a Probation Officer.
Nevertheless, following Lape, supra, the prohibition is proper. The
Defendants, like the prison officials in Lape, have a compelling interest in
protecting the reputation and integrity of the Probation Department.
I The Plaintiff in Lape had been charged with violating the Code of Ethics applicable to her as a
Corrections Officer "as a result of a relationship between herself and a resident at the Penn Pavilion Contract
Community Corrections Center." Id. at 495. The Court noted that the Plaintiff responded to these charges and
"confinned that she had received letters from Lape while he was at Penn Pavilion and that she had sent him a
Christmas card," and that "as a result ofthe letters she received from him while he was at Penn Pavilion, ... 'seeds
were planted' that led to her having 'romantic feelings toward him and this led to her accepting his telephone calls
and the invitation to dinner once he was paroled'." Id. The Plaintiff met with the inmate, Lape, after he was paroled
and while vacationing together, Plaintiff and Lape were married. Id. at 493. During this time period, Plaintiff
continued to be employed as a Corrections Officer.
II
Prohibiting Plaintiffs from associating with one another during the pendency
of an investigation into Erin's conduct was rationally calculated and
narrowly tailored to accommodate such interests.
Similarly, in Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir. 2004), the
Sixth Circuit upheld a rule instituted by the Michigan Department of
Corrections which banned all employees from fraternizing with prisoners,
parolees, probationers, their relatives, or their visitors. Specifically, the
Court held that the anti-fraternization rule "easily meets the rational basis
test for the non-public association restrained by the RUle."
kL. at 1039.
The
Court continued that U[t]he MDOC has a legitimate interest in preventing
kL.
fraternization between its employees and offenders and their families."
The Court recognized the willingness of offenders to break the law, and
noted that the MDOC employees may be vulnerable and assist former
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inmates with regard to the commission of other offenses. The rule is a
rational means for advancing a legitimate state interest.
kL.
The Akers Court, supra, also noted that a "direct and substantial
interference," with intimate association was subject to strict scrutiny, while
lesser interferences merely merited rational basis review.
kL. at 1040.
The
Court held that as a "general rule" it will find "direct and substantial burdens
only where a large portion of those affected by the rule are absolutely or
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largely prevented from marrying, or where those affected by the rule are
absolutely or largely prevented from marrying a large portion of the
otherwise eligible population of spouses."
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In the present matter,
Plaintiffs were free to date and marry almost any other person, and the
restriction limiting their interaction did not pose such a significant burden so
as to constitute an absolute or "large" ban on their potential spousal pool.
As the Sixth Circuit noted in similar circumstances, "[t]his is far from the
absolute bar against marrying a majority of the jurisdiction's population said
in Loving to be a direct and substantial interference." Akers, 352 F.3d
1040-41.
In Flaskamp v. Dearborn Public Schools, 385 F.3d 935 (6th Cir.
2004), the Sixth Circuit held that: (1) rational basis review applied to a
substantive due process claim involving the prohibition of high school
teachers from dating former students; (2) the decision to discharge a
teacher did not violate the teacher's substantive due process right to
intimate association; (3) a principal's questioning of a teacher about her
relationship with a former student did not violate the teacher's right to
privacy. Not only did the Sixth Circuit find that a rule prohibiting high school
teachers from having physical relationships with their former students was
constitutionally sound, but it upheld the district court's ruling that qualified
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immunity was proper for those who enforced the regulation because "the
contours of the [teacher's privacy] were not sufficiently clear to have put
Defendants on notice that they violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights."
kl
at 940. Thus, not only was the policy sound, but those enforcing the policy
were entitled to qualified immunity even if the particular teacher's rights
were violated.
At present, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have violated their
fundamental right to intimate association. Plaintiffs married on June 17,
2008, and have one biological child. Nevertheless, the broad protections
constitutionally granted under the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the
right of free association do not extend to circumstances where, as here,
one of the Plaintiffs, at all times relevant, was on probation and subject to
limitations that would otherwise not be applicable to a United States citizen,
and where the restriction imposed on him resulted from a determination
that his conduct, together with the conduct of the other Plaintiff in her
capacity as his probation officer, were in violation of their respective
obligations as probation officer and probationer. Accordingly, Defendants
acted with reasonable and legitimate justification in requiring Jeffrey to ask
Erin to leave his house and in ordering Jeffrey to refrain from engaging in
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any contact with Erin "until there was a disposition or that internal
investigation was resolved." (Barry Dep. 47:21-23)
In their Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 43), Plaintiffs argue that the "no-contact order was cruel,
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vindictive, and unnecessary in addition to being an unconstitutional
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violation of their rights ...." (See Pis.' Br. in Opp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 12,
ECF Dkt. 43.) Plaintiffs further aver that "they had a right to associate
under the First Amendment and also a right under the 14th Amendment to
plan and consummate their marriage." (kl) Plaintiffs, however, fail to
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accurately, and completely, identify the legal issue that must be addressed
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by this Court under the facts presented in Plaintiffs' own papers: namely,
whether a probationer can be restricted from associating with a specific
person even if an intimate relationship exists between the probationer and
that person. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the rights to marry and "fall in
love" are not at issue in this case. As Plaintiffs stated in their opposition
brief, U[t]he essence of [P]laintiff's [sic] argument is that whether Erin
violated the parole department's policy or not there was no lawful
justification or lawful purpose for unlawfully ordering the pair to not have
contact for months on end." (kl at 13.) Framing the question in these
terms obfuscates the true issue of whether a probationer is entitled to full
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and unrestricted associational rights. The case law overwhelmingly
provides that a probationer's right to free association can be abridged
under circumstances similar to those presented by Plaintiffs in their own
submissions to this Court. Thus, in Lape, supra, the Plaintiff alleged that
the Department of Corrections had "violated her First Amendment
association rights when it fired her because she was married to a parolee."
~
at 498. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument and affirmed the
finding of the District Court that the action taken against the Plaintiff had not
been taken because of her marriage to a parolee, but rather because she
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had had a "private relationship with an inmate had failed to report her
,
receipt of correspondence from the inmate and had "intentionally withheld
information regarding her fraternization with an inmate, her marriage and
the change in her husband's status when he was reincarcerated as a
parole violator."
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Here, the actions complained of by Plaintiffs were
undertaken because the Plaintiffs began a "private relationship" while
Jeffrey was on probation and Erin was his Probation Officer, in violation of
a no-fraternization rule and for the further reason that Erin, in complicity
with Jeffrey, falsified records to conceal their relationship in violation of her
office's no-fraternization rule and the criminal law of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. See discussion of Lape, supra, at page 12. Jeffrey's
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continuing status as a probationer at the time of the actions complained of
prevents Plaintiff from asserting a valid claim of deprivation of a
constitutional right as a result of the Defendants' actions.
Plaintiffs' assertion that Barry and Worley threatened Jeffrey with
prison if he did not instruct Erin to leave his home, and that Plaintiffs were
"forbidden to see one another in violation of the law" do not alter the Court's
analysis. Again, Plaintiffs do not account for Jeffrey's probationer status,
which subjects him to constitutionally valid associational restrictions. As
the Courts of Pennsylvania have routinely held, "an implied condition of any
sentence of probation" is that the defendant will not be involved in the
commission of another crime. See Com. v. Mallon, 406 A.2d 569, 571 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979)(citing Com. v. Martin, 396 A.2d 671 (1978); Com. v. Duff,
192 A.2d 258, rev'd on other grounds, 200 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1963)). The
probation department can act to prevent a probationer from participating in
criminal activity without a specific court order. In fact, the Third Circuit
upheld the imposition of such "special conditions" in United States v.
Rodriguez, 178 Fed. Appx. 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2006)("special conditions that
restrict constitutional rights are upheld so long as they (1) are directly
related to deterring the [probationer] and protecting the public and (2) are
narrowly tailored"). At present, although the Defendants required Plaintiffs
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to disassociate without a specific court order, the need to include a formal
condition of probation prohibiting Jeffrey from fraternizing with Erin, under
normal circumstances, was completely unforeseeable. Accordingly, it was
not unreasonable, under the then developing circumstances, for
Defendants to order Plaintiffs to have no contact pending a resolution of the
investigation into Erin's activities. Furthermore, Jeffrey's participation in the
Crossroads program, which is designed to rehabilitate substance abuse
users in lieu of prison sentences, was well served by Defendants'
prohibition.
In Commonwealth v. Koren, 435 Pa. Super. 499, 646 A.2d 1205
(1994), the Superior Court held that associational rights were not
threatened when the probation department ordered a woman to have no
contact with her fiancee for two years while on probation because the
fiancee was the reason for her underlying criminal conduct. Similarly, in
Wheeler v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 862 A.2d 127 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2004), the Commonwealth Court found that a restriction
imposed upon a parolee that he have no contact with his wife, because of
his past record of domestic abuse, was constitutionally sound. In the
present matter, Defendants had a compelling interest in preventing Jeffrey,
as a probationer, from associating with Erin, as Jeffrey was complicit in the
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commission of prior criminal activity for which Erin was later convicted. The
Defendants possessed compelling reasons to require Jeffrey's
disassociation with someone with whom he was a collaborator in prior
criminal activity and to whom he was not at that time married. Jeffrey
participated in Erin's criminal conduct, and as a result, he became her
accomplice. Defendants had a reasonable and good faith belief that their
order prohibiting Jeffrey from associating with Erin served to protect the
purposes and integrity of the state probation system, and was a valid
exercise of their power.
The undisputed facts in this case, taken from the submissions and
exhibits provided to the Court by Plaintiffs, indicate that Plaintiffs suffered
no constitutional deprivation. While Jeffrey was on probation, he was not
entitled to the same constitutional rights to association that he would
otherwise enjoy absent his conviction. The Defendants acted reasonably
and legitimately to protect the integrity of the probation system, and did so
in an effort to further the state's compelling interest in rehabilitating
convicts. The Defendants' purpose in keeping Plaintiffs apart was to
vindicate the principle that probation officers are not to have intimate
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relationships with probationers, and that they are not to engage in criminal
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conduct to conceal such activity. Defendants' actions, therefore, are
constitutionally sound.
Plaintiffs' claims in this case cannot be evaluated without recognizing
the dispositive fact that, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs' case, Jeffrey was
a probationer and subject to associational restrictions that would not
otherwise be applicable to him. The additional fact that certain directives
were given to Jeffrey resulted from Defendants' determination that Erin, in
her capacity as Jeffrey's probation officer, had not only violated her duties
as a probation officer, but also engaged in criminal conduct, which was
subsequently confirmed by Erin's conviction for falsifying public records.
The order for Plaintiffs to remain apart was not predicated upon Erin's role
as Jeffrey's former probation officer; rather, the order was based upon the
fact that Erin was under investigation for certain acts for which she would
later be convicted and in which Jeffrey was complicit. See, e.g., Lape, 157
Fed. Appx. at 498 (finding that in the absence of evidence showing that
plaintiff was discharged because she was married to a parolee, the court
need not address the claim; rather, it is apparent that plaintiff was fired as a
prison official because she began an intimate relationship with a former
inmate).
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Finally, because the Court is resolute in its determination that
Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and that the law
supports the propriety of the Defendants' actions, we find it unnecessary to
resolve the issue of qualified immunity. If we were to hold otherwise,
however, we would find Defendants' actions to be undertaken in a good
faith attempt to vindicate the important public policy of, and compelling
state interest in, preserving the integrity of the probation system, which
would warrant the application of the qualified immunity defense.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) will be granted. An appropriate Order will
follow.
DATE: March 1, 2012
Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIN M. GARDNER and JEFFREY
M.GARDNER
Plaintiffs
v.
1:10-CV-0527
(JUDGE MARIANI)
SALLY A. BARRY, RICHARD WORLEY,
JOHN LEAHY, and LEBANON COUNTY
Defendants
ORDER
On September 16, 2011, remaining Defendants Sally A. Barry, Richard Worley,
and John Leahy, flied a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39). For the reasons set
forth in the accompanying memorandum, NOW, on this 1st day of MARCH, 2012, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) is GRANTED.
2. The Court enters judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs.
3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE the case.
obertn:Mariani
United States District Judge
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