York International Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: 1) Dfts mtn for summary judgment 23 is DENIED.2) Pltfs cross motion for partial summary judgment 25 is GRANTED as to Count I as follows: in that Liberty Mutual will be required to defend or indemnify York International for a sbestos-related claims attributable toYork Corporation during the time period from October 1, 1952, through October 1, 1956, during which York Corporation was covered under the Liberty Mutual policies in question. However, only complaints which bring allegations against York Corporation or York International as a successor-in-interest to York Corporation, during this time period, are to be considered.3) Pltfs cross motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 25) is DENIED as to Count I with respec t to any claims that fall outside the policy periodsmentioned above.4) Pltfs cross motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 25) is MOOT with regard to Count II to the extent the relief requested is the same ascontemplated by Count I. To the extent t he claim is based on additional facts not clearly outlined in the complaint or the briefings, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days to file sur-reply briefs to the respective motions for summary judgment to more fully address the breach of contract cause of action. Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 05/26/11 (ma, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YORK INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-0692
The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
23) and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 25). For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and
Defendant’s motion will be denied.
Background1
I.
A.
History of York International Corporation
This is an insurance indemnification action and breach of contract case
brought by York International Corporation (“York International”) against Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) whereby York International is
1
The following facts, for the most part, are either stipulated to, or there is no genuine
dispute. Therefore, the court will provide citations to the parties’ submitted stipulation of fact or their
respective statements of material facts. For all genuinely disputed facts, the court will provide citations
to the record.
seeking indemnification and defense from Liberty Mutual for over one thousand
underlying asbestos complaints.2
Liberty Mutual, from October 1, 1952, through October 1, 1956,
provided general liability insurance to York Corporation — not to be confused with
York International, Plaintiff here, although the parties agree that through a series of
corporate transactions, York International eventually acquired all of the assets of
York Corporation. (Stipulation, Doc. 22, ¶ 2.)
On or around June 30, 1956, all assets and liabilities of York
Corporation were transferred to Borg-Warner Corporation (“Borg-Warner”), as
evidenced by an Agreement of Exchange of Assets for Capital Stock dated May 9,
1956, and a Bill of Sale dated June 30, 1956. (Id., ¶ 5.) The Bill of Sale contained
the following relevant language:
[York Corporation] does hereby sell, grant, convey, assign,
transfer and set over to Borg-Warner Corporation, its
successors and assigns, all of its property and assets, real,
personal, and mixed, both tangible and intangible,
whatsoever in nature and description and wheresoever
situated . . . including without limitation of the foregoing
. . . insurance policies of every kind . . . .
(Bill of Sale, Ex. 3 to Stipulation, at YORK/LM 00001.)
. . . however, that nothing in this bill of sale and
conveyance shall be construed as an attempt hereby to
assign any contract, claim, demand or right that is nonassignable but York Corporation covenants to use its best
effort to obtain any and all consents necessary to the
assignment of any contract, claim, demand or right not now
assignable . . . .
2
It is not disputed that prior to 1956, York Corporation used asbestos-containing products
in the air conditioning units it sold. This practice continued after York Corporation dissolved, but the
parties are not sure for how long asbestos-containing products were used. (Def.’s Statement of Material
Facts (“SMF”), ¶¶ 43-44; Pl.’s Counter SMF, ¶¶ 43-44.)
2
(Id., at YORK/LM 00002 (“Non-Assignment Clause”)).
The assets obtained by Borg-Warner were placed in the York Division
of Borg-Warner which operated until the early 1980s. (Stipulation, Doc. 22, ¶ 6.)
Meanwhile, in 1972, York International Corporation was formed in Delaware and
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Borg-Warner. (Id., ¶ 12.) In 1981, BorgWarner also acquired and operated the following companies: Luxaire, Inc.;YorkLuxaire, Inc.; and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. (Id., ¶¶ 13-14.) Luxaire, Inc.
manufactured products under the brands Luxaire, Fraser-Johnston, Westinghouse
and Moncreif. (Id., ¶ 14.)
Through a series of events not pertinent to this action, in December
1985, Borg-Warner — which at this time was called Borg-Warner Air Conditioning,
Inc. — changed its name to York International Corporation, not the same company
as Plaintiff. (Id., ¶¶ 15-21.) Through another convoluted series of corporate
transactions and acquisitions, in 1991, York International, Plaintiff here, was formed.
(Id., ¶¶ 22-31.) Notably, the parties stipulate that Plaintiff York International
acquired all assets of the predecessor companies.
B.
Liberty Mutual Policies
Between October 1, 1952, and October 1, 1956, Liberty Mutual issued
four general comprehensive liability policies to the original York Corporation. (Id.,
¶ 34.) Each policy contained an assignment clause that stated the following3:
“Assignment of interest under this policy shall not bind the company until its consent
is endorsed here-on. . . .” (Liberty Mutual, Comprehensive General Liability Policy
3
Only the policies for years 1952-1953 and 1954-1955 could be located by the parties.
However, the parties stipulate that the language contained in all four policies was substantively identical
for purposes of summary judgment.
3
Nos. CGL20-301369-52PA & LB20-201369-53NY, Exs.. 26 & 27 to Stipulation.)
York International stipulated that they have no facts or information available to
indicate York Corporation obtained Liberty Mutual’s consent when they assigned all
of their assets and liabilities, including insurance contracts, to Borg-Warner.
(Stipulation, Doc. 22, ¶ 47.)
C.
Procedural History
On March 30, 2010, York International filed this declaratory judgment
and breach of contract cause of action against Liberty Mutual in federal court based
on diversity of citizenship.4 (Doc. 1.) On March 8, 2011, both parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment and briefs in support, along with statements of
material facts not in dispute.5 (Docs. 23 - 28.) On March 29, 2011, the parties filed
their respective briefs in opposition to the motions for summary judgment and
answers to the statements of material facts. (Docs. 30 - 33.) On April 12, 2011,
reply briefs were filed (Docs. 39 & 42.), and Plaintiff also filed a response to
Defendant’s answer to Plaintiff’s statement of material facts, (Doc. 40). The motions
are now ripe for disposition.6
4
The original complaint also sought relief for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and statutory bad faith. (Doc. 1, Counts III & IV.) However, on March 2, 2011, York
International agreed to withdraw those claims. (Doc. 21, ¶ 3.)
5
Plaintiff’s motion is titled a “partial” motion for summary judgment because they are
only moving for summary judgment on Counts I and II of the complaint. However, because Plaintiff
has withdrawn Counts III and IV, the motion is considered to be a complete motion for summary
judgment.
6
Plaintiff requested leave to file a sur-reply brief to Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 44), however, this request was denied by the court in an order dated April 25, 2011
(Doc. 50).
4
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); accord Saldana v.
Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2001). A factual dispute is “material” if
it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if there is
a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248. The court must resolve all doubts as to
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the non-moving party.
Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232; see also Reeder v. Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D.
607, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence
of a disputed issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986). Upon such a showing, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
present “specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party may not simply sit back and rest on the
allegations in its complaint; instead, it must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its]
own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotations omitted); see also Saldana, 260 F.3d at
232 (citations omitted). Summary judgment should be granted where a party “fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
5
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-23. “‘Such affirmative evidence – regardless of whether it is direct or
circumstantial – must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the
evaluation of the court) than a preponderance.’” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).
The court is permitted to resolve cross-motions for summary judgment
concurrently. InterBusiness Bank, N.A. v. First Nat’l Bank of Mifflintown, 318 F.
Supp. 2d 230, 235 (M.D.Pa. 2004) (describing concurrent resolution of
cross-motions for summary judgment as “a formidable task”); 10A Charles Alan
Wright et al., FED. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720 (3d ed.1998). When doing so,
the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party with respect to each motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Raymond Proffitt Found. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 930 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Because subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of
citizenship, the court looks to the substantive law of Pennsylvania to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77
(1938). The law of the Commonwealth is declared by “its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court.” Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the best authority on
Pennsylvania law, but when the Supreme Court has not issued a clear
pronouncement in a particular area, the court “must consider relevant state
precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other
reliable data” to determine what the law is. McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622
F.2d 657, 661, 663 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456, 465 (1967). Opinions from lower Pennsylvania courts are not controlling, but
6
they are entitled to significant weight when there is no indication that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule otherwise.
III.
Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that Liberty Mutual has a duty to defend or indemnify
York International for injuries alleged to have occurred due to asbestos exposure
from products manufactured by York Corporation. Defendant filed for summary
judgment arguing that the 1956 Bill of Sale between York Corporation and BorgWarner contained a non-assignment clause which effectively bars assignment of
claims under the Liberty Mutual policies absent Liberty Mutual’s consent.
Plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment arguing it is
entitled to coverage under the Liberty Mutual policies for the time period of October
1, 1952, through October 1, 1956. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that: 1) the parties
have stipulated that, through a series of corporate transaction, York International
acquired all of the assets of York Corporation, and this includes the Liberty Mutual
policies; 2) the non-assignment clause is unenforceable because the injuries for
which coverage is sought pre-date the assignment; and 3) for these same reasons,
Liberty Mutual has not only a duty to indemnify York International, but also a
broader duty to defend against future claims. Plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief
and relief under a breach of contract theory.
A.
Choice of Law
Both parties in their supporting briefs argue that either Pennsylvania or
New York law should control the outcome of this case. However, both further
7
acknowledge that a choice of law analysis is not necessary because the result would
be the same under either states’ applicable law. (See Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. for
Summ. J. at 2, “With respect to the issues presented in this motion, however, because
the laws of the potentially applicable jurisdictions would produce the same result,
‘there is no conflict at all, and a choice of law analysis is unnecessary.’” (quoting
Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2007)); (See Pl.’s Br.
Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 12, “In this case, there is no material difference in the
laws of any of the states that are potentially applicable regarding the operative issues
of (1) assignment of insurance policies and rights and (2) an insurance company’s
duty to defend its policyholder against underlying claims for asbestos bodily
injury.”) The court agrees with the parties that under either — New York or
Pennsylvania laws — the result in this case would be the same and therefore no
choice of law analysis need take place. See Hammersmith TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d
220, 230 (3d Cir. 2007); Elgin Sweeper Co. v. Melson Inc., 885 F. Supp. 641, 648
(N.D.N.Y 1995) (explaining “where no material difference in state substantive law
exists, the court need not determine which state law to apply.”);
B.
Non-Assignment Clause
8
In its motion, Liberty Mutual argues that, under the plain meaning of the
contracts,7 because the 1956 Bill of Sale between York Corporation and BorgWarner contained a non-assignment Clause, as well as the assignment language
contained in the actual policies themselves, and no facts or evidence suggest that
consent was ever obtained to assign the rights of the Liberty Mutual policies, no
transfer of rights under these policies ever occurred, and York International,
therefore, should not be allowed to assert such rights.
Although the general rule is to look to the intent of the parties and the
plain language of a contract, both Pennsylvania and New York courts, as well as
multiple other jurisdictions, have declined to enforce non-assignment clauses where
the injury or occurrence took place before the actual assignment. See Viola v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 965 F. Supp. 654, 658-59 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (referencing
Nat’l Memorial Serv. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 335 Pa. 155 (1946); Cont’l Casualty
Co. v. Diversified Indus., 884 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1995); COUCH ON INSURANCE
7
The fundamental rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of
the contracting parties. Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 462,
480 (Pa. 2006); see Slatt v. Slatt, 477 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 1985). In cases of a
written contract, the intent of the parties is determined by the writing itself. Ins.
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 905 A.2d at 480. Under ordinary principles of contract
interpretation, the agreement is to be construed against its drafter. See Shovel Transfer &
Storage, Inc. v. PLCB, 739 A.2d 133, 139 (Pa. 1999); Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v.
U.S. Balloon Mfg. Co., Inc., 782 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (N.Y. 2004). When the terms of a
contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the
document itself; however, when an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is admissible to
explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of whether the ambiguity is
patent, created by the language of the instrument, or latent, created by extrinsic or
collateral circumstances. Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 905 A.2d at 480; Computer
Associates Int’l, Inc., 781 N.Y.S.2d at 118. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one
sense. Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004); see Computer Associates Int’l,
Inc., 781 N.Y.S.2d at 118. While unambiguous contracts are interpreted by the court as a
matter of law, ambiguous writings are interpreted by the finder of fact. Kripp, 849 A.2d
at 1163.
9
2d, Vol. 16, § 63:40 (1983)); see also Texaco v. Comm. Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J.,
1995 WL 628997, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1995) (referencing Brunswick Corp. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (showing outcome is
the same under Delaware, Pennsylvania or Maryland Law)); Chatham Corp. v.
Argonauts Ins. Co., 334 N.Y.S. 2d 959 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1972); Elliott Co. v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 483, 490-91 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (compiling
cases).
These cases base their reasoning along two avenues. Some cases argue
that non-assignment clauses only limit an insured’s ability to assign the actual policy,
and not claims thereunder, and thus, allowing a party to assign claims already
accrued under the policy does not actually contravene the non-assignment clause.
Elliott, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (citing Viola, supra and Fiorentino v. Lightening Rod
Mut. Ins. Co., 682 N.E. 2d 1099 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)).
[T]he great weight of authority supports the rule that
general stipulations in policies prohibiting assignments
thereof except with the consent of the insurer apply to
assignments before loss only, and do not prevent an
assignment after loss, for the obvious reason that the clause
by its own terms ordinarily prohibits merely the assignment
of the policy, as distinguished from the claim thereunder,
and the assignment before loss involved a transfer of a
contractual relationship while the assignment after loss is
the transfer of a right to a money claim.
Viola, 965 F. Supp. at 659.
Other cases focus on the fact that the insurer is not actually harmed by
the assignability of claims because “the assigned risk is the same risk it initially
agreed to insure.” Id. (compiling cases). The purpose of non-assignment clauses is
to prevent an insurer from being forced to undertake increased risks without the
insurers consent. See Texaco, 1995 WL 628997 at *6; Viola, 965 F. Supp. at 659.
10
“Stipulations in policies forbidding assignments have no effect on the ‘assignment of
the policy or rights after the occurrence of the event, which creates the liability of the
insurer.’” Viola, 965 F. Supp. at 659.
Because court’s have declined to enforce non-assignment clauses, the
presence of which forms the basis of Defendant’s argument, the court will deny
Defendant’s motion. York International’s request for indemnification does not seek
to increase or expand the risk that Liberty Mutual contracted to insure because the
alleged injuries took place during the applicable coverage period which was before
the contracts were assigned. To the extent York International’s complaint is read in
such a way as to increase or expand coverage that Liberty Mutual agreed to provide
York Corporation, it will be denied.
Because the parties have stipulated to the fact that York International
acquired all of the assets of York Corporation, and because the court has declined to
enforce the non-assignment clause, York International is permitted to “stand in the
shoes of [York Corporation] with respect to the rights under the” Liberty Mutual
policies at issue here. See Gen. Refractories Co., et al. v. Travelers Ins. Co., et al.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1998, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1998) (relying on Gen.
Refractories Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 7 (3d Cir. 1996), reh’g held, (3d Cir.
Jan. 17, 1997)).8 Other than the non-assignment clause, there is no language in the
1956 Bill of Sale that would limit York International from acquiring the rights of
York Corporation, and notably, the parties have stipulated that York International did
8
General Refractories was based on facts substantially similar to those alleged here,
however, the policies and transfer of assets did not contain non-assignment clauses. However, because
the court has determined that the non-assignment clauses are not enforceable, the reasoning of the Third
Circuit, that successors to the policies have the right to sue for injuries alleged to have occurred
thereunder, becomes applicable.
11
in fact acquire all of the assets of York Corporation. Liberty Mutual provided
general liability coverage to York Corporation for the period from October 1, 1952,
through October 1, 1956. York International, therefore, is permitted to seek
indemnification from Liberty Mutual for asbestos related injuries alleged to have
occurred during the policy period. However, York International may only seek
defense or indemnification for complaints that name York Corporation or York
International as a successor-in-interest to York Corporation.9 York International will
not be permitted to “piggy back” additional claims that occurred outside the policy
periods and/or do not name York Corporation or York International as a successorin-interest to York Corporation. As such, summary judgment for York International
will be granted in part and denied in part. Thus, Liberty Mutual will be responsible
to defend or indemnify York International for the October 1, 1952, through October
2, 1956 policy periods. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief will be
granted.10
9
The issue is not before the court, and thus, no determination will be made as to how
Plaintiff intends to show that York Corporation, and not the various other entities, was responsible for
the asbestos-related injuries of the individual complainants. By way of example, Defendant outlines an
instance of a complaint where a plaintiff alleges asbestos-related injuries occurring from 1945 into the
1990s. Throughout this time, the plaintiff worked in both the United States Navy, and as a boiler
inspector at various companies. This complaint names York International as a defendant, but does not
mention York Corporation or York International being a successor-in-interest to York Corporation. (See
Doc. 42, Def.’s Reply Br. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 6.) The underlying plaintiffs alleging asbestos
injury will have a significant burden of proving that York Corporation, from October 1, 1952, through
October 1, 1956, caused the asbestos-related injuries they are alleging.
10
As mentioned above, Plaintiff also brings a claim for breach of contract. However,
neither party expands on this claim, and the complaint appears to base this claim on the same facts as
those for defense and indemnification. To the extent that the claim is based on the same allegations as
those for declaratory relief, in light of the court’s determination that declaratory relief will be granted,
this claim would appear to be moot. To the extent the claim is based on facts not apparent to the court,
additional briefing will be ordered so that the parties may fully address the breach of contract cause of
(continued...)
12
C.
Allocation
Liberty Mutual goes to great length to explain other asbestos litigation
suits taking place across the nation. Specifically, Liberty Mutual addresses
allocation schemes used by other courts in the event that it be found liable for any of
the underlying asbestos complaints.
The court will decline to address these arguments as it would appear
that “no actual case or controversy exists” and the court would thus, be improperly
issuing an advisory opinion. See Gen. Refractories, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *17
(declining to determine an allocation scheme at declaratory judgment state of
litigation). At this point in the litigation, neither the court nor the parties are aware
of how many, if any asbestos-related complaints Liberty Mutual will be required to
cover. As such, there is no actual case or controversy at this juncture and the
conditioning of an allocation scheme which may or may not ever need to come to
fruition “would be tantamount to an improper advisory opinion.” Id. at 18
(referencing U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl.1 and compiling cases)
IV.
Conclusion
Although the filings in this case are substantial, the facts are not greatly
disputed. To the extent that an underlying asbestos complaint properly alleges that
York Corporation, or York International as a successor-in-interest to York
Corporation, caused asbestos-related injuries during the policy periods, Liberty
10
(...continued)
action.
13
Mutual will be required to defend or indemnify York International in those cases.
An appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: May 26, 2011.
14
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YORK INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-0692
The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum of law, it is
HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23) is DENIED.
2) Plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 25) is
GRANTED as to Count I as follows: in that Liberty Mutual will be required to
defend or indemnify York International for asbestos-related claims attributable to
York Corporation during the time period from October 1, 1952, through October 1,
1956, during which York Corporation was covered under the Liberty Mutual policies
in question. However, only complaints which bring allegations against York
Corporation or York International as a successor-in-interest to York Corporation,
during this time period, are to be considered.
3) Plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 25) is
DENIED as to Count I with respect to any claims that fall outside the policy periods
mentioned above.
1
4) Plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 25) is
MOOT with regard to Count II to the extent the relief requested is the same as
contemplated by Count I. To the extent the claim is based on additional facts not
clearly outlined in the complaint or the briefings, the parties shall have fourteen (14)
days to file sur-reply briefs to the respective motions for summary judgment to more
fully address the breach of contract cause of action.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: May 26, 2011.
2
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