Hagan v. Beard et al

Filing 230

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND (Order to follow as separate docket entry) ORDER - AND NOW, this 31st day of January, 2014, for the reasons set forth in theaccompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the plaintiffsMotion to Alter Judgment, (Doc. 215), is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on January 31, 2014. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMONT HAGAN,
Plaintiff
v.
NATHAN GOSS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:10-CV-0883
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case comes before the Court for consideration of a motion to alter
judgment, (Doc. 215), filed by the plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, following a defense
verdict at a jury trial. In this motion Hagan makes a novel request: Despite the
defense verdict on his Eighth Amendment claims against the defendants named in his
complaint, Hagan now asks us post-trial permit him to pursue new and different
Eighth Amendment claims against individuals that were never previously named as
defendants on his prior Eighth Amendment claims, but were simply witnesses at this
trial.
For the reasons set forth below this request will be denied.

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This is a civil rights action which was brought by the plaintiff, Damont Hagan,
a state prisoner formerly housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) of the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI-Camp Hill), through the filing of a
complaint on April 26, 2010. (Doc. 1) Over the course of this litigation, Hagan filed
a number of amended complaints which added various claims and parties to this
litigation. (Docs. 31, 45) Among these claims were allegations of retaliation brought
by Hagan against a correctional officer, Brandon Phelps, and a nurse, Kristen Roach.
(Id.) These retaliation claims were dismissed by the district court, Conner, J., on
September 30, 2011. (Doc. 68)
Eighteen months later, in May of 2013, this matter was reassigned to the
undersigned for trial upon the consent of the parties, for trial. (Doc. 176) At the time
of this reassignment, the only claims that remained in the case were claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(2), against several present and former SCI-Camp Hill SMU
staff, alleging: (1) that staff used excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment when the plaintiff was assaulted on August 1, 2008, during a cell
extraction, Amended Complaint ¶¶1-2, 19; and (2) that the defendants conspired
against the plaintiff to intimidate him to prevent him from testifying in violation of
42 U.S.C. §1985(2), Amended Complaint ¶¶6-8, 23. None of these claims related to

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Correctional Officer Brandon Phelps, or Kristen Barbacci, a Physician Assistant who
examined and treated Hagan after this August 1, 2008 incident.
This case proceeded to trial on June 3-6, 2013. (Doc. 203-205) During the
trial Officer Phelps, who was no longer a party, appeared as a witness and testified
that he had observed Hagan apparently inflicting injuries upon himself shortly after
this August 1, 2008 cell extraction. Phelps immediately reported this episode. Hagan
was then seen by Kristen Barbacci, a prison Physician Assistant, who also was not a
party in this case, but who testified as a witness that she examined and treated
Hagan’s superficial injuries. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of
the defendants on Hagan’s Eight Amendment excessive force and conspiracy claims.
(Doc. 210-213)
Hagan then filed this motion to alter judgment. (Doc. 215) 1 In this motion,
Hagan alleged that the testimony of these two non-parties, Officer Phelps and
Physician Assistant Barbacci, demonstrated that they displayed deliberate
indifference to his safety. Therefore, he sought leave of court to now bring Eighth
Amendment claims against these non-party witnesses, despite the fact that five years

We note that Hagan has also filed a separate motion for a hearing. (Doc. 222)
This motion remains pending and we will address this pleading separately.

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have passed since this incident and all of Hagan’s Eighth Amendment claims against
the parties named in his complaint had been rejected by the jury.
Presented with this motion, and Hagan’s request for an extension of time in
which to submit a brief in support of this motion, (Doc. 219), we set a specific
briefing schedule for this novel request, stating that: “With respect to this motion, the
plaintiff shall file a brief in support of this motion on or before August 20. 2013. The
defendants shall file a response to the motion on or before September 3, 2013. The
plaintiff may then file a reply brief on or before September 17, 2013.” (Doc. 221)
Hagan never filed a brief in support of this particular motion. Therefore, this
motion is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be
denied.
II.

DISCUSSION

In our view this motion to alter judgment fails for at least two reasons.
First, Hagan has not filed a brief in support of this motion, despite being
instructed to file some brief explaining the legal basis for this request. This failure
to file a brief has consequences for Hagan since we are entitled to deem the plaintiff
to have withdrawn a motion when he fails to properly support that motion by filing
a brief in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Salkeld v. Tennis, 248 F. App'x 341 (3d
Cir.2007) (affirming dismissal of motion under Local Rule 7.5); Booze v. Wetzel,
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1:12-CV-1307, 2012 WL 6137561 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012) report and
recommendation adopted, 1:CV-12-1307, 2012 WL 6138315 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11,
2012); Breslin v. Dickinson Twp., 1:09–CV–1396, 2011 WL 1577840 (M.D.Pa.
Apr.26, 2011) Prinkey v. Tennis, No. 09–52, 2010 WL 4683757 (M.D.Pa. Nov.10,
2010) (dismissal under Local Rule 7.5); Griffin v. Lackawanna County Prison Board,
No. 07–1683, 2008 WL 4533685 (M.D.Pa.Oct.6, 2008) (dismissal under Local Rule
7.6).
More fundamentally, this motion fails on its merits because nothing about the
conduct of these two witnesses as described at trial would give risk to an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim. These Eighth Amendment claims are
judged against settled legal principles, principles which set precise and exacting
standards for asserting a constitutional infraction. All of these claims, however, are
governed by the same overarching and animating constitutional benchmarks,
benchmarks that require proof of the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by
government officials acting with a culpable state of mind. As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishment.” However, “not every governmental action affecting the
interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89
L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and
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wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation and internal
quotations omitted). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence
or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in
connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying
medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.”
Id. Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore “mandate[s] an
inquiry into a prison official's state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Two considerations
define that inquiry. We must first determine if the deprivation was
sufficiently serious to fall within the Eighth Amendment's zone of
protections. Id. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321. If not, our inquiry is at an end.
However, if the deprivation is sufficiently serious, we must determine
if the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In
other words, we must determine if they were motivated by a desire to
inflict unnecessary and wanton pain. “What is necessary to establish an
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...’ varies according to the
nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2000).
While prison officials may violate an inmate’s rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by displaying “deliberate indifference”
to the inmate’s medical needs, to sustain such a claim, an inmate must plead facts
which:
[M]eet two requirements: (1) “the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official must have
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). In prison conditions cases, “that state of mind is one
of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. “Deliberate
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indifference” is a subjective standard under Farmer-the prison officialdefendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk
to inmate safety.
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel,256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
These principles apply with particular force to Eighth Amendment claims
premised upon inadequate medical care. In the medical context, a constitutional
violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs only when state officials are
deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate
medical care in accordance with this standard, an inmate is required to point to
evidence that demonstrates (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by
prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier,
182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Such indifference may be
evidenced by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed provision of medical
treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, denial of
reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v.
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of

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resultant pain and risk of permanent injury,” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109
(3d Cir. 1990).
However, it is also clear that the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical
need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth
Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. “Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67
(citations omitted). Furthermore, in a prison medical context, deliberate indifference
is generally not found when some significant level of medical care has been offered
to the inmate. Clark v. Doe, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14999, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2
(E.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 2000)(“courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims
where an inmate has received some level of medical care”). Thus, such complaints
fail as constitutional claims under § 1983 since “the exercise by a doctor of his
professional judgment is never deliberate indifference. See e.g. Brown v. Borough
of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir.1990) (‘[A]s long as a physician
exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's
constitutional rights.’)”. Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
Applying this exacting standard, courts have frequently rejected Eighth Amendment
claims that are based upon the level of professional care that an inmate received; see,
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e.g., Ham v. Greer, 269 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2008); James v. Dep’t of Corrections,
230 F. App’x 195 (3d. Cir. 2007); Gillespie v. Hogan, 182 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir.
2006); Bronson v. White, No. 05-2150, 2007 WL 3033865 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2007);
Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833 (E.D. Pa. 1997), particularly where it can be
shown that significant medical services were provided to the inmate but the prisoner
is dissatisfied with the outcome of these services.
Judged against these benchmarks, Hagan simply is not entitled to the postjudgment relief he seeks in this motion, since the evidence at trial did not demonstrate
deliberate indifference by either of these non-party witnesses, Officer Phelps or
Physician Assistant Barbacci. Quite the contrary, for his part, Officer Phelps’
conduct reflected concern for Hagan, since he promptly reported what he observed
regarding self-inflicted injuries suffered by Hagan, thus enabling Hagan to receive
immediate medical care for those injuries. Similarly, Physician Assistant Barbacci
did not display deliberate indifference to Hagan’s medical concerns; rather, she
assessed and treated his injuries. On these facts, no Eighth Amendment claim lies
against either of these prison officials, and Hagan may not now seeks to bring such
claims against these officials following his unsuccessful litigation of other Eighth
Amendment claims against different correctional staff.

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III.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 31st day of January, 2014, for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the plaintiff’s
Motion to Alter Judgment, (Doc. 215), is DENIED.

/s/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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