Sanders v. Rose et al

Filing 85

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 1)Pltf's mtns for injunctive relief ARE DENIED AS MOOT. 39 33 2)Pltf's 64 MOTION to Alter Judgment is construed to be a motion for reconsideration and is DENIED. SEE MEMORANDUM FOR DETAILS. Signed by Chief Judge Yvette Kane on March 27. 2013. (sc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CYRUS R. SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
EMANUEL ROSE, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-10-1241
(Chief Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Cyrus Sanders (“Sanders”) is an inmate currently confined at the State Correctional
Institution at Somerset (SCI-Somerset), Pennsylvania. He initiated this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while confined at the Dauphin County Prison, Pennsylvania. In the
complaint, he set forth numerous claims against members of the DCP staff with respect to
incidents occurring at DCP. The claims set forth included the denial of access to the courts, mail
interference, excessive force, the issuance of false misconducts, and the denial of an adequate
grievance procedure. (Doc. No. 1.) The Court will address motions that are presently pending
on the docket.
I.

Procedural Background
In conducting a preliminary screening of the complaint, the Court found procedural

deficiencies that precluded service of the complaint in its original form. (Doc. No. 11.) On
March 1, 2011, a Memorandum and Order was issued directing Sanders to file an amended
complaint within fourteen (14) days. On March 16, 2011, an amended complaint was filed, and
service on the Defendants named therein was directed. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15.) Thereafter,
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis of Sander’s failure to
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 20(a), the basis for the dismissal of the

original complaint. In permitting Sanders to file an amended complaint, he was specifically
advised that any amended complaint must comply with Rules 8 and 20, and that the failure to do
so would result in the Court dismissing all but the first count of the amended complaint. (Doc.
11.)
In addressing Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court issued a
Memorandum and Order on October 11, 2012, finding that Sanders again violated Rule 20(a) by
submitting a complaint that set forth many unrelated claims not arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences. (Doc. No. 63.) In fact,
Sanders basically resubmitted his original complaint, but divided it into separate counts and
labeled each cause of action. As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted to the extent
that all counts of the amended complaint, with the exception of Count One (Denial of Access to
the Courts), were stricken. With respect to Count One, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was
granted due to Sanders’ failure to state a claim due to his failure to identify a nonfrivolous,
arguable underlying claim that was lost as well as his failure to set forth which Defendants
violated his right to access to the courts. However, the Court provided him with the opportunity
to file a second amended complaint within fourteen (14) days to attempt to state a viable access
to the courts claim against specific Defendants to meet the guidelines set forth in Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996). (Doc. No. 63.) Sanders submitted his second amended complaint on
January 28, 2013. (Doc. No. 74.) Defendants have filed a motion to strike/dismiss the second
amended complaint and a brief in support thereof. Plaintiff has not yet filed his brief in
opposition thereto.
Pending on the docket and ripe for consideration at this time are two motions for

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injunctive relief filed by Sanders while he was confined at the Dauphin County Prison. (Doc.
Nos. 33, 39.) Also pending is a motion filed by Sanders seeking to alter or amend the Court’s
decision of October 11, 2012, granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint
(Doc. No. 64).
II.

Discussion
A.

Motions for Injunctive Relief

While still confined at the Dauphin County Prison, Sanders filed two motions requesting
injunctive relief. In the first motion he claims that it can “take up to forty (40) days before an
inmate at DCP is provided with an envelope and pencil for legal postage” and that inmates are
“limited to twenty minutes of law library computer access to research updated case information
per week, at best, at times bi-weekly.” (Doc. No. 33 at 1.) He also argues that he has been
denied “extra pro se law library time” by the DCP administration, and that reasonable access to
the law library is denied to inmates and no reasonable policy has been established. (Id. at 2.) He
seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order from the Court directing eight (8) hours of pro se
full law library access a week.
In the second request for injunctive relief, Sanders claims that he was issued a bogus
misconduct on December 13, 2012, and sets forth various claims related to this incident. (Doc.
No. 39.) He maintains that the misconduct was issued for his allegedly having forged
documentation for authorization to possess boxes to store legal materials. He also claims that he
was verbally harassed following the issuance of the misconduct and strip searched, during which
time he was humiliated. In addition to these claims, he states that he was placed on a block with
no functioning pencil sharpeners and that his right to due process was violated with respect to his

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misconduct hearing. He claims that all of the foregoing amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment. He requests an order from the Court protecting him from the above actions and
ordering the DCP staff to provide him with a legible copy of his misconduct report, a witness
form for the misconduct hearing, and an impartial hearing examiner. He further seeks an order
directing that he be provided with eight (8) hours a week access to the law library.
A request for preliminary injunctive relief is governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and judged against exacting legal standards. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained: “Four factors govern a district court’s decision
whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable
probability of success on the merits: (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial
of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even grater harm to the
nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.”
Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994)(quoting SI Handling Systems, Inc., v.
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985)). See also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan,
Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001).
A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz,
670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982)(affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction
seeking greater access to legal materials). It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the
extraordinary nature of this form of relief, a motion for preliminary injunction places precise
burdens on the moving party. As a threshold matter, it is a movant’s burden to show that the
preliminary injunctive relief sought is the only way of protecting the Plaintiff from harm. See
Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992).

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For an inmate to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction
under Fed. .R. Civ. P. 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits, and that he will be irreparably harmed if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v.
Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. If the movant fails to carry
this burden on either of these elements, the motion should be denied since a party seeking such
relief must “demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of
irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.
1989)(emphasis in original)(quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The power of this Court to issue preliminary injunctions is also limited and
circumscribed by the mootness doctrine. The mootness doctrine recognizes a fundamental truth
in litigation: “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a
plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the
requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77
F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). In this particular case, Sanders seeks preliminary injunctive
relief against officials at the Dauphin County Prison. However, it is undisputed that Sanders was
transferred from DCP to SCI-Somerset on November 2, 2012, and is currently confined there.
He is no longer in the custody of the DCP Defendants.
“A federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” Preiser v. Newkirk,
422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). An inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of generally moots
the equitable and declaratory claims. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197, 206 (3d Cir.
1993); Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003). As previously observed by this

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Court, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief against his jailers but is no longer housed at the
prison where these injunctive claims arose:
[H]is request [ ] to enjoin the defendants from interfering with his [rights] is
academic. See Muslim v. Frame, 854 F. Supp. 1215, 1222 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In
other words, [the prisoner-plaintiffs] transfer to another institution moots any
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d
195, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1993); Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981).
Fortes v. Harding, 19 F. Supp. 2d 323, 326 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
The foregoing principles control here and compel denial of the pending motions for
preliminary injunctive relief in this action as moot. Sanders is no longer confined at the Dauphin
County Prison and there is no indication that he will be housed at that facility in the foreseeable
future.
B.

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Plaintiff has filed a motion to alter or amend judgment with respect to the Court’s
Memorandum and Order of October 11, 2012. In said decision, the Court granted Defendants’
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint to the extent that all counts, with the exception
of Count One of the amended complaint (Denial of Access to the Courts) were stricken in
accordance with this Court’s Memorandum and Order of March 1, 2011. (Doc. No. 63.) In his
motion, he disagrees with the conclusions reached by this Court and goes on to summarize all of
the claims he set forth in the amended complaint. In so doing, he further illustrates the basis for
the Court’s finding that he failed to abide by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 20. In
addition, he argues that the Court failed to consider declarations with respect to his allegations of
excessive force, and also requests that the Court allow him to conduct discovery to support his
claims.

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Sanders files his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), but this Rule applies only to
final orders. For this reason, the Court will construe his motion as one for reconsideration
pursuant to M.D. Pa. Local Rule 7.10. The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). A judgment may be altered or amended if the party
seeking reconsideration establishes at least one of the following: “(1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café, by LouAnn, Inc., v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). “A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a means to reargue
matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement
between the Court and the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606
(M.D. Pa. 2002). “[R]econsideration motions may not be used to raise new arguments or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” McDowell Oil Serv. Inc. v.
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 817 F. Supp. 538, 541 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Lastly, the reconsideration of
a judgment is an extraordinary remedy, and should be granted sparingly. D’Angio v. Borough of
Nescopeck, 56 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
Sanders fails to present any basis for reconsidering the Memorandum and Order of
October 11, 2012. He merely reasserts the claims set forth in his amended complaint that have
been found by the Court to be in violation of Fed. R. of Civil Procedure 8 and 20(a) and the
directive of this Court’s Memorandum and Order of March 1, 2011. Any requests by Sanders to
conduct discovery is unwarranted in that all claims with the exception of Count One have been

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stricken from this action. Moreover, Count One was dismissed and Sanders was provided the
opportunity to file a second amended complaint to present his access to the courts claim in
compliance with the Court’s directive as set forth in the October 11, 2012 Memorandum and
Order. As such, any discovery with respect to such claim would be premature. Because Sanders
has presented no grounds for this Court to reconsider its decision of October 11, 2012, his
pending motion will be denied. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CYRUS R. SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
EMANUEL ROSE, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-10-1241
(Chief Judge Kane)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of March, 2013, in accordance with the accompanying
Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief (Doc. Nos. 33, 39) are denied as moot.

2.

Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment (Doc. No. 64) is construed to be a
motion for reconsideration and is denied.

S/ Yvette Kane
YVETTE KANE, Chief Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania