Laborers Local Union 158 et al v. Fred Shaffer Concrete et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 1)Pltf's 10 MOTION for Default Judgment is GRANTED. 2)The Clerk of Court is directed to enter jgm in favor of pltfs and against dfts Fred Shaffer Concrete and Fred Shaffer in the amount of $10248.76 with post judgment interest in acc w/ 28 USC 1961(a) until the jgm is fully paid. 3)The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file. Signed by Chief Judge Yvette Kane on April 13, 2011. (sc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LABORERS LOCAL UNION 158,
LABORERS LOCAL UNION 158
HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND and
LABORERS LOCAL UNION 158
PENSION FUND,
Plaintiffs
v.
FRED SHAFFER CONCRETE and
FRED SHAFFER,
Defendants

:
: Civil No. 1:CV-10-1524
:
: (Chief Judge Kane)
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM
Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. (Doc. No.
10.) As Defendants have yet to appear or defend in this action, there is no opposition to the
motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2010, Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to sections 502 and 515 of the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1145, and
the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260, et seq. Plaintiffs alleged
that Defendant Fred Shaffer Concrete is a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement (“the
Agreement”) which requires Defendant Fred Shaffer Concrete to make contributions to the
Laborers Local Union 158 Health and Welfare Fund and the Laborers Local Union 158 Pension
Fund (“the Benefit Funds”) and requires Defendant Fred Shaffer Concrete to pay liquidated

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damages and interest in the event that it fails to make timely contributions.1 (Doc. No. 13-1 at
5.) Plaintiffs aver that Defendant failed to make contributions under the terms of the Agreement
for the months of April, May, June, and July 2010, and therefore they are entitled to liquidated
damages, interest, and attorney’s fees. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 3.)
The record shows that although Defendant was properly served with the summons,
complaint, and other pertinent documents, (Doc. No. 6), Defendants have not appeared,
answered, moved, or otherwise responded to the pleading. After several months without
response from Defendants, Plaintiffs requested, and the clerk entered, default against the
Defendants pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. Nos. 9, 11.)
Plaintiffs also moved for the clerk to enter default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b)(1) and
included an affidavit showing the amount due. (Doc. No. 10.) However, Plaintiffs’ motion for
entry of default judgment could not be entered by the clerk under Rule 55(b)(1) because
Plaintiffs do not merely seek a “sum certain;” they also seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$1,720.00. (Id. at 3.) Thus, in a memorandum order issued on March 17, 2010, the Court
construed Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. No. 10) as an application for default judgment pursuant to
Rule 55(b)(2). (Doc. No. 12.) The Court also ordered Plaintiffs to provide a brief in support of
their motion and further documentation in support of their damage claims and claims for
attorneys’ fees. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed the requested brief and documentation on April 1, 2011.
(Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 15.)

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The Agreement states, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is also agreed that interest may be
assessed by the Trustees against delinquent contractors at the rate of 10% per annum and
liquidated damages may be charged in accordance with the law under ERISA.” (Doc. No. 13-1
at 5.)
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II.

DISCUSSION
Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for entry of default judgment

against a defendant who has not appeared and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Entry of default does not entitle a claimant to default judgment as matter
of right. 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 55.31 (Matthew Bender ed.
2010). Even when a party has defaulted and all of the procedural requirements for a default
judgment are satisfied, the decision to either render default judgment or refuse to render default
judgment rests in the discretion of the district court. See Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834
F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1987). In undertaking this evaluation, the Court must consider: (1) whether
the plaintiff will be prejudiced if the default is denied; (2) whether the defendant has a
meritorious defense; and (3) whether the defaulting defendant’s conduct is excusable or
culpable. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1984)). However, when a
defendant has failed to appear or respond in any fashion to the complaint, this analysis is
necessarily one sided; entry of default judgment is typically appropriate in such circumstances at
least until the defendant comes forward with a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant
to Rule 55(c). As the Third Circuit has explained:
In most instances where a party’s right to prosecute or defend would
be terminated as a sanction, the moving party has the burden of
creating a record showing the appropriateness of this ultimate
sanction and the district court has the responsibility of making a
determination on that issue in light of considerations like those
articulated in Poulis. When a defendant fails to appear and perhaps
under other circumstances covered by Rule 55, the district court or its
clerk is authorized to enter a default judgment based solely on the
fact that the default has occurred. Even in those situations, however,
consideration of Poulis type factors is required if a motion to lift the
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default is filed under Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b) and a record is
supplied that will permit such consideration.
Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990).
Here, it is clear that the factors weigh in favor of granting a default judgment. First, there
is a risk of prejudice to the beneficiaries of the Benefit Funds if Defendant Fred Shaffer
Concrete’s contributions are not made. Second, Defendants have not asserted any defense, either
by answering the allegations in the complaint or by opposing the present motion for entry of
default judgment. Finally, the Court can find no excuse or reason for Defendants default other
than its own conduct. Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants were personally served with all of
the required documents several months ago. (Doc. No. 6.) Despite this, Defendants have neither
engaged in the litigation process nor offered any reason for their failure to appear. The Court
therefore finds that Defendants are personally culpable for their failure to appear and that there is
no basis in the record to excuse this conduct. Accordingly, the Court finds that default judgment
is due.
Because default judgment will be entered, “the factual allegations of the complaint,
except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Comdyne I, Inc. v.
Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). The allegations in the complaint, taken as true, are
sufficient to show a violation of ERISA section 515 and section 260.9a of the Pennsylvania
Wage Payment and Collection Law. See 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (“Every employer who is obligated to
make contributions to a multi-employer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a
collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such
contributions in accordance with terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.”); 43 P.S.
§ 260.a (“Any employe or group of employes, labor organization or party to whom any type of
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wages is payable may institute actions provided under this act.”). The complaint sufficiently
alleges that Defendant was obligated to make timely contributions to Plaintiffs but to do so for
the months of April, May, June, and July 2010. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶5-11.)
If a court enters judgment in favor of the plan fiduciary, the court shall award (1) unpaid
contributions; (2) interest on the unpaid contributions; (3) liquidated damages provided for under
the plan in amount not in excess of twenty percent of the unpaid contributions; (4) reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs; and (5) other relief the court deems appropriate. 29 U.S.C. §
1132(g)(2). As damages, Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to an award of $10,248.76, consisting of
$6,491.60 in unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, and interest for the months of April,
May, June, and July 2010; $3,320.00 in attorney’s fees; and $437.16 in costs of this action.
(Doc. No. 15 at 6; Doc. No. 13-1 at 10.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently
supported their claim and that these categories of damages are properly recoverable under
section 1132(g)(2) and the Agreement. (See Doc. No. 13-1, Ex. D ¶ 6.) The Court also finds
that Plaintiffs have submitted adequate support to demonstrate their request for attorney’s fees is
reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment.

An order consistent with this memorandum follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LABORERS LOCAL UNION 158,
LABORERS LOCAL UNION 158
HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND and
LABORERS LOCAL UNION 158
PENSION FUND,
Plaintiffs
v.
FRED SHAFFER CONCRETE and
FRED SHAFFER,
Defendants

:
: Civil No. 1:CV-10-1524
:
: (Chief Judge Kane)
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
ORDER

NOW, on this 13th day of April 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment (Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED.

2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against
Defendants Fred Shaffer Concrete and Fred Shaffer, in the amount of $10,248.76,
with post-judgment interest in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) until the
judgment is fully paid.

3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file.

S/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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