Dumas et al v. Arnold et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is ordered that: 1. Defendants motions to dismiss (docs. 8, 13, & 15) are granted. 2. Plaintiffs motion to amend (doc. 21) is denied. 3. The Clerk of Court shall close this file. Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 5/9/11. (pw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM J. DUMAS,

:

Plaintiff

:
:

vs.

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-10-2152
:

LISA ARNOLD, Clerk of Court, et al.,
Defendants

:
:

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff, William J. Dumas, filed this civil action alleging, among other

things, that he was wrongly detained past his release date. Each of the defendants has
filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff responded by filing a motion to amend his complaint. For the following reasons,
we will deny plaintiff leave to amend and will dismiss his complaint.

II.

Background
While inartfully pled, we glean from the four corners of the complaint that

plaintiff believes he was improperly detained in SCI-Fayette beyond his release date. On
July 7, 2005, in a trial before Judge Tylwalk, plaintiff was convicted of driving under the
influence in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 11.) On September 2, 2005, he
was sentenced to a period of incarceration of one to two years, but Judge Tylwalk
granted bail pending appeal of his sentence. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.)
On December 19, 2005, plaintiff was incarcerated at SCI-Fayette because
of an unrelated matter in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 13.) In January of

2007, he was to be transferred to a residential treatment center for the remainder of his
sentence on the Dauphin County matter, but the transfer did not occur because of a court
commitment received by SCI-Fayette, sent and completed by defendant Arnold,
regarding plaintiff’s convictions in Lebanon County. (Compl. ¶¶14, 15, 32, 33.)
Consequently, the bail that plaintiff posted in September was refunded. (Compl. ¶20.)
Plaintiff contends that he should have been released in January of 2007, and thus any
additional time at SCI-Fayette violated the U.S. Constitution.

III.

Discussion
A.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we
must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d
Cir. 2008)). Public records may also be considered. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1197 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Sutton v. Royal
Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac-Buick, Inc., No. 03-cv-1825, 2004 WL 90071, at *3 n3
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2004).1

While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not
required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167

1

“Courts have defined a public record, for purposes of what properly may be
considered on a motion to dismiss, to include criminal case dispositions such as convictions or
mistrials, letter decisions of government agencies, and published reports of administrative
bodies.” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 998 F.2d at 1197 (internal citations omitted).

2

L.Ed.2d. 929 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 at 1974. “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - - - U.S. - - - -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). Instead, this requirement
“calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element.” West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC,
627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)(citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234). “[L]abels and
conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65, and a
court “‘is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”
Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (quoted case omitted).
B.

Discussion
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, alleging violations

of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Section 1983 provides, in
pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the violation
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987);
Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).

3

1. Judge Tylwalk
We will start by addressing the allegations against Judge Tylwalk. Plaintiff’s
allegations against this defendant relate to actions and orders that occurred during his
criminal proceedings before the judge. As a member of the Pennsylvania judiciary,
Judge Tylwalk has absolute immunity from suit unless “he has acted in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennyslvania, 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir.
2000) see also Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F.App’x 80 (3d Cir. 2006). Judge Tylwalk clearly
was acting within his jurisdiction to hear criminal cases as judge on the court of common
pleas. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003); see also 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 102; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931. Furthermore, while we normally must grant leave
to amend, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008), we need not
do so if amendment would be futile. Since Judge Tylwalk is protected by absolute judicial
immunity, plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his complaint. Thus, we will not give him an
opportunity to amend.
We also find that plaintiff’s claims against Judge Tylwalk are time barred.
For claims brought pursuant § 1983, federal courts must apply the statute of limitations
for analogous state actions. Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 457
n.9 (3d Cir. 1996). Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury tort actions and
are subject to the state statute of limitations governing such claims. 287 Corporate Ctr.
Assocs. v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 323 (3d Cir. 1996). The governing
law here is Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. The
statute begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the violation of his
rights. Bougher v. Univ. Of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989). A statute of
limitations defense may be raised through a 12(b)(6) motion only if it is clear from the
face of the complaint that the action would be time barred. Benak v. Alliance Capital

4

Mgmt., L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the final action taken by Judge
Tylwalk occurred on January 25, 2007. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff did not commence this
action until October 16, 2010, over three years after he learned of Judge Tylwalk’s
actions. Thus, his claims against the judge are also barred by the statute of limitations.
2. Lisa Arnold
Plaintiff claims that defendant Arnold prepared and sent the commitment
form that resulted in his continued incarceration at SCI-Fayette. He contends that this
commitment was prepared without a court order to do so. In addition, he also avers that
defendant Arnold failed to docket a notice of appeal in January of 2007. (Compl. ¶¶ 3235.)
Quasi-judicial immunity protects individuals from civil liability who perform
functions that are an integral part of the judicial process. Wicks v. Lycoming County, No.
09-cv-1084, 2010 WL 456776, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Fed. 2, 2010)(Conner, J.). This doctrine
applies to court staff to prevent “the danger that disappointed litigants...will vent their
wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.” Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d
594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992); Ball v. Hartman, No. 09-0844, 2010 WL 146319, at *6 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 11, 2010)(Kane, J.)(quoting Kincaid for same proposition); Wicks, 2010 WL 456776,
at *3.
After a search of the public docket for plaintiff’s criminal proceedings in
Lebanon County, it is clear that the plaintiff was sentenced to a period of imprisonment
on September 21, 2005. (doc. 16, Ex. A.) A court commitment form, DC-300B, is
required whenever an inmate enters the custody of the Department of Corrections, and it
is generated from the Common Pleas Criminal Court Case Management System. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9764(a). This form, while it must be issued by the court of common pleas,
does not require the signature of the sentencing judge. Evans v. Beard, 639 F.Supp.2d
5

497, 499 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2009)(citing Boyd v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 831 A.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003). Defendant Arnold as the Lebanon County Clerk of Courts had the
authority and was required to prepare and issue the commitment. Since she was acting
as an extension of the court, she is protected from suit by quasi-judicial immunity.
Finally, plaintiff’s claim that defendant Arnold failed to docket his appeal is
without merit. A review of the public docket shows that defendant’s appeal was filed on
February 12, 2007. (doc. 16, Ex. A. at pg. 22.) Furthermore, even if the defendant failed
to docket the appeal, this claim is timed barred since it occurred more than 3 years
before the filing of this action. Thus, based on the preceding, we will dismiss the claims
against defendant Arnold and not grant plaintiff leave to amend because any amendment
would be futile.
3. Brian Colemen and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
We presume plaintiff included defendant Coleman in this action because of
his position as superintendent of SCI-Fayette. However, since plaintiff failed to plead any
facts indicating Coleman’s involvement in any constitutional violation, we will dismiss him
from the action,2 and we will not grant leave to amend because any amendment would be
futile.
Finally, the claims against the Department of Corrections will be dismissed
since it is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983. Adams v. Hunsberger, 262
F.App’x 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2008)(citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989)).
2

We also note that respondeat superior is not a basis for imposing liability under §
1983 against Coleman. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir.
1997). A defendant in a § 1983 action “must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988)(emphasis added).
Personal involvement can be shown “through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence...must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id.

6

We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
Date: May 9, 2011

7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM J. DUMAS,

:

Plaintiff

:
:

vs.

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-10-2152
:

LISA ARNOLD, Clerk of Court, et al.,
Defendants

:
:

ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of May, 2011, upon consideration of the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying
memorandum, it is ordered that:
1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (docs. 8, 13, & 15) are
granted.
2. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (doc. 21) is denied.
3. The Clerk of Court shall close this file.

/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge