Ferguson v. Sniezek et al

Filing 51

ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1) The 49 Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 2) Plaintiff shall file a brief in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, on or before 1/30/12. No further extensions of time will be granted by the court absent extraordinary circumstances.Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 12/29/11. (pjr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN FERGUSON,

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Plaintiff
v.
T.R. SNIEZEK, et al.,
Defendants

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-10-02638
(Judge Rambo)

ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
Before the court is Plaintiff John Ferguson’s motion for reconsideration of the
court’s order denying his motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 49.) Upon consideration
thereof and for the reasons set forth below, the motion (Doc. 49) will be denied and
Plaintiff will be directed to file a brief in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action with a counseled complaint filed on
December 27, 2010. (Doc. 1.) In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims of inadequate
medical care by a number of employees of the Federal Correctional Institution at
Schuylkill (“FCI-Schuylkill”) in Minersville, Pennsylvania and the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”).

By order dated January 3, 2011, the court directed service of the complaint on
all Defendants named therein. (Doc. 5.) On July 18, 2011, Defendants Ask-Carlson,
Christeleit, BOP, Rush, Sniezek, and Steffan filed a motion to dismiss and for
summary judgment. (Doc. 20.) A brief in support and statement of facts were filed on
August 5, 2011. (Docs. 30 & 31.) Pursuant to M.D. Pa. Local Rule 7.6, Plaintiff had
fourteen (14) days from the service of Defendants’ motion and brief to file a brief in
opposition to the motion. Plaintiff failed to file any opposition within that time
period. Therefore, by order dated September 7, 2011, the court directed him to file a
brief in opposition on or before September 20, 2011. (Doc. 33.) The order also
forewarned that if Plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the court would deem the
motion to dismiss unopposed and dismiss the actions without a merits analysis. (Id.)
On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff’s counsel, Larrick Stapleton, Esquire, filed a
motion for an extension of time to file a response to the motion to dismiss and for
summary judgment. (Doc. 36.) By order dated September 21, 2011, the court granted
the motion and directed Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition on or before October 4,
2011. (Doc. 37.) Prior to that date, Attorney Stapleton filed a motion to defer
judgment on Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, (Doc. 39),
and a motion to withdraw as Plaintiff’s counsel, (Doc. 40). By order dated October 3,

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2011, the court granted the motions. (Doc. 41.) Specifically, the court granted
Attorney Stapleton leave to withdraw as counsel, and afforded Plaintiff until
November 15, 2011, to acquire new counsel and have new counsel enter an
appearance on his behalf. (Id.) Importantly, the court noted that if new counsel was
not obtained, Plaintiff would be deemed to be proceeding pro se. (Id.) Further, the
court granted Plaintiff an extension of time to December 15, 2011, to file his brief in
opposition to the pending motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. (Id.) The
court noted that this deadline takes into account Plaintiff’s possible pro se status and
also gives any new counsel ample time to for a response. (Id.) It also declared that
the deadline would not be extended absent extraordinary circumstances. (Id.)
Following the issuance of this order, Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel
on October 18, 2011. (Doc. 43.) Because this motion was filed prior to the court’s
November 15, 2011, deadline for Plaintiff himself to acquire new counsel, the court
denied Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel as premature. (Doc. 46.) After the
November 15, 2011, deadline passed, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order denying as premature his motion to appoint
counsel. (Doc. 49.) In this motion, Plaintiff claims that Attorney Stapleton
mistakenly asserted that Plaintiff was attempting to acquire new counsel when in fact

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he was not because of financial constraints. (See Doc. 50.) Thus, Plaintiff now asks
the court to reconsider its order denying his motion to appoint counsel.
A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility. Its purpose is to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, a party seeking
reconsideration must demonstrate at least one of the following grounds prior to the
court altering, or amending, a standing judgment: (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court entered judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice. Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration is appropriate in instances where
the court has “patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of
reasoning but of apprehension.” Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F.
Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration,
915 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan
Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983). It may not be used as a means to

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reargue unsuccessful theories, or argue new facts or issues that were not presented to
the court in the context of the matter previously decided. Drysdale v. Woerth, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001). “Because federal courts have a strong interest in
the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.”
Continental Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
Applying the standard used when a party seeks reconsideration, the court
concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated any of the applicable grounds for
reconsideration. Initially, the court finds no intervening change in controlling law and
no error of law or fact. Clearly Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, filed on October
18, 2011, was premature in light of the court’s order affording him until November
15, 2011, to acquire new counsel. Additionally, while Plaintiff claims that Attorney
Stapleton mistakenly indicated to the court that Plaintiff was seeking to acquire new
counsel, this fact alone does not warrant reconsideration of the court’s order denying
appointment of counsel. As previously stated, in the court’s order granting the motion
to withdraw as counsel and motion to defer judgment on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and for summary judgment, Plaintiff was afforded until November 15, 2011,
to acquire new counsel, and expressly informed that if counsel was not obtained, he

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would be deemed to be proceeding pro se. (See Doc. 41.) Further, the court granted
Plaintiff an extension of time to December 5, 2011, to file a brief in opposition to the
motion, regardless of his potential pro se status. (See id.) Thus, as the court has
already set forth in a previous order, Plaintiff is expected to proceed with or without
counsel. Moreover, simply stated, it is not the province of this court to acquire new
counsel for a plaintiff simply because his counsel withdraws his appearance.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1) The motion for reconsideration (Doc. 49) is DENIED.
2) Plaintiff shall file a brief in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss and
for summary judgment, on or before January 30, 2012. No further extensions of time
will be granted by the court absent extraordinary circumstances.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: December 29, 2011.