Robles v. Casey et al

Filing 23

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the report and recommendation (Doc. No. 20) is ADOPTED IN PART as follows: 1) All claims against Defendants Lucas, Sowga, Walsh, and Varner are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 2) The con ditions of confinement claim against Defendants Davis and Jones are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 3) The Eighth Amendment claims arising from the 7/25/10 eye injury against Defendants Davis and Jones may proceed; 4) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deni al of proper medical care claim against Defendants Bohinski and Leskowski arising from the 7/25/10 eye injury may proceed; 5) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim against Defendant Bohinski regarding Defendant Bohinski' s failure to treat Plaintiff's pre-existing eye conditions may proceed; 6) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment state-created danger claim against Defendant Casey may proceed; 7. To the extent that Plaintiff raises a claim for money damages against any named Defendant in his official capacity, those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and 8) To the extent that Plaintiff raises a claim based on any Defendant's handling of the grievance procedure, those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This case shall be recommitted to Magistrate Judge Blewitt for further proceedings, including directing service of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 17) on the remaining Defendants.Signed by Chief Judge Yvette Kane on 06/08/11. (pjr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARLOS ROBLES,
Plaintiff
v.
J.J. CASEY, et al.,
Defendants

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1:10-cv-2663
(Chief Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the courts must conduct screening of complaints filed by
prisoners against a government entity or official. Magistrate Judge Blewitt conducted the
screening of Plaintiff’s amended complaint and issued a report and recommendation
recommending that the complaint be dismissed in part. (Doc. No. 20.) The parties fully briefed
the issues, and the matter is now properly before the Court. For the reasons stated more fully
herein, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s report and recommendation in part.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas, filed a complaint

against various prison officials raising Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff’s original complaint was confined to injuries suffered by Plaintiff when, on the direction
of prison staff, he was cleaning the prison kitchen and the chemical cleaner splashed into his
eyes causing severe burning. This Court dismissed the complaint in part, but granted Plaintiff
leave to amend. In Plaintiff’s amended complaint he adds conditions of confinement claims and
denial of medical care claims. The factual details surrounding Plaintiff’s claims are
comprehensively set forth in Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s report and recommendation, and
Plaintiff does not object to Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s recitation of the facts. Accordingly, the
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Court will not reproduce the factual allegations here.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must dismiss any civil action filed by a

prisoner against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity where the
complaint fails to state a claim or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Vega v. Kyler, 90 Fed. Appx. 437, No. 03-1936, slip
op. at 3 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998). In reviewing
whether the prisoner has failed to state a claim under Section 1915A the Court applies the
standard of reviewed used in motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Brown v. Kelsey, No. 04-316, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7345, at *3 (D.
Del. Apr. 27, 2005)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court
may “consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters
of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum, 361 F.3d at 221 n.3. The
motion will only be properly granted when, taking all factual allegations and inferences drawn
therefrom as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Markowitz v. Ne.
Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to show that no
claim has been stated. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, the moving
party must show that Plaintiff has failed to “set forth sufficient information to outline the
elements of his claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that those elements exist.” Kost, 1
F.3d at 183 (citations omitted). A court, however, “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald

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assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion
Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906, 908 (3d Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that while
the 12(b)(6) standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” there must be a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief. . . . ‘[F]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32 (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Put otherwise, a civil complaint must “set
out ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955
(2009)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Magistrate Judge Blewitt recommended, without objection from either party, that the

following claims be permitted to proceed: (1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment denial of proper
medical care claim against Defendants Bohinski and Leskowski arising from the July 25, 2010
eye injury; (2) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim against Defendant
Bohinski regarding Defendant Bohinski’s failure to treat Plaintiff’s pre-existing eye conditions;
and (3) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment state-created danger claim against Defendant Casey.
(Doc. No. 20 at 22.) The Court finds no error with these recommendations and will adopt them
without further discussion. In addition, Plaintiff files no objection to Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s
recommendation that all claims for money damages against all named Defendants in their
official capacities be dismissed. (Id.) The Court previously ordered that such claims be
dismissed with prejudice; accordingly, the Court will adopt this recommendation without further
discussion. Finally, to the extent that any claims are based on Defendants’ handling of the

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grievance procedure, Plaintiff apparently agrees that such allegations cannot support a claim.1
As such, the Court will dismiss these claims with prejudice.
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s Report and Recommendation arguing that
the claims against Defendants Lucas, Sowga, Walsh, Varner, Davis, and Jones (“Supervisory
Defendants”) were improperly dismissed. (Doc. No. 21.) The objections appear to focus
primarily on Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim; however, the Court will also discuss the
claims against these Defendants as they relate specifically to the July 25, 2010 kitchen accident.
For ease of reading, the Court will consider these issues in reverse order.
A.

Kitchen Accident Claim Against Supervisory Defendants

Plaintiff’s first claim arises from injuries he suffered as a result of the July 25, 2010
kitchen accident. None of the Supervisory Defendants are alleged to have been present when
Plaintiff was injured in the kitchen. Nor does Plaintiff allege that any of these Defendants
denied him safety equipment or ordered him to work without such equipment on this occasion.
Instead, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged a claim of supervisory liability by pleading that
Defendants had knowledge of their subordinates’ violations and acquiesced in the same. (Doc.
No. 21 at 2-3.) The Third Circuit permits Section 1983 claims to proceed based on a theory of
supervisory liability where a plaintiff can show defendants had knowledge of their subordinates’
violations and acquiesced in the same.2 See Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d

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Plaintiff includes an objection, which states: “The plaintiff is not basing his arguments
against any defendant simply because they denied his grievance.” (Doc. No. 21 at 6.)
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In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court questions the
continuing validity of the Third Circuit’s supervisory liability jurisprudence. As stated by the
Supreme Court:
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Cir. 1995) (permitting plaintiff to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s Section 1983
violation provided plaintiff is able to show “the person in charge . . . had knowledge of and
acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations”). To impose liability on a supervisory official there
must be “both (1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior
pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor’s assertion could
be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.” Colburn
v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3d Cir. 1988). Allegations of actual knowledge and
acquiescence must be made with particularity. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988). None of the Supervisory Defendants are alleged to have had contemporaneous

[Respondent] argues that, under a theory of “supervisory liability,”
petitioners can be liable for “knowledge and acquiescence in their
subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make classification
decisions among detainees.” That is to say, respondent believes a
supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory
purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We
reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory
liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners
may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a
[Section] 1983 suit or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer
for the torts of their servants – the term “supervisory liability” is a
misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his
or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (emphasis added). However, although the Third
Circuit has acknowledged Iqbal’s potential impact on Section 1983 supervisory liability claims,
it has declined to hold that a plaintiff may no longer establish liability under Section 1983 based
on a supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a violation. Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 130 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010); Bayer v. Monroe, 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, the Court follows the other courts in this district that have continued to apply the
Third Circuit’s traditional supervisory liability analysis. Brickell v. Clinton Cnty. Prison Bd.,
658 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625-26 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (questioning the continuing viability of Baker v.
Monroe Twp., but applying its holding to the facts of the case).
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knowledge of the incident. Accordingly, Plaintiff is only able to state a claim to the extent that
he is able to show knowledge of a prior patter of similar incidents coupled with circumstances
indicating a message of approval.
Regarding Defendants Walsh, Sowga, Lucas, and Varner, Plaintiff only alleges that they
became aware of the conditions which led to the July 25, 2010 kitchen accident via his grievance
filings.3 However, participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance or appeal is
insufficient to establish personal involvement on the part of those individuals reviewing
grievances. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208 (finding the filing of a grievance insufficient to show the
actual knowledge necessary for personal involvement); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x. 923, 925
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (allegations of inappropriate response to grievances does not
establish personal involvement required to establish supervisory liability). Accordingly, the
Supervisory Defendants cannot be held liable for Plaintiff’s July 25, 2010 kitchen injury.
Defendants Jones and Davis are alleged to have had prior knowledge of other occasions
on which Plaintiff was forced to use hazardous chemicals in the kitchen without safety
equipment. (Doc. No. 17 ¶¶ 19-20, 28.) Defendants dismiss these allegations as naked
assertions that do not satisfy Iqbal’s plausibility requirements. (Doc. No. 22 at 9.) Defendants
further cite Santiago v.Warminster for the proposition that a plaintiff may not state a claim for

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Defendants Sowga, Varner, and Lucas are alleged to have had prior knowledge of
hazardous conditions as a result of grievances filed by other inmates. (Doc. No. 17 ¶¶ 46, 47,
52.) However, Plaintiff gives no indication regarding what specifically those grievances alleged
or how many grievances were filed. Accordingly, there is insufficient information to support an
allegation of these Defendants’ knowledge of a pattern. Further, Plaintiff’s allegation that all
Defendants except Defendant Varner “enter[ed] into the back area of the kitchen at some time
during the period that he worked there at which time inmates were clearly working without
safety equipment and using hazardous materials” is insufficient to establish personal
involvement in the July 25, 2010 kitchen injury. (Id. ¶ 70.)
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supervisory liability by simply describing a constitutional violation “and appending the phrase
‘and the Chief told them to do it.’” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 133. The claims against Defendants
Jones and Davis are less than compelling. However, they rise above the level of implausibility
described in Santiago. Here, Defendants are alleged to have been aware of a pattern of behavior
in which inmates including Plaintiff were ordered to use hazardous materials without safety
equipment and that they in fact ordered Plaintiff to do so “on numerous occasions.” (Doc. No.
17 ¶¶ 19-20, 28.) At this very early stage the Court is satisfied that these allegations are
sufficient to plausibly give rise to a supervisory liability claim.
B.

Conditions of Confinement Claim

In evaluating a conditions of confinement claim, a court must determine whether the
totality of the conditions within the institution constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Tillery
v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1990). To state a “conditions of confinement” claim
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged deficiencies in
his confinement were “sufficiently serious,” such that they “result[ed] in the denial of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
General allegations of harm will not suffice; a plaintiff must establish some personal deprivation
or harm. North v. White, 152 F. App’x. 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Griffin v. Vaughn, 112
F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997)). In addition, the plaintiff must show that the prison official
responsible acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991). As the Supreme Court explained:
A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
In the present matter the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s finding that
Plaintiff has failed to properly state a conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff lists a litany of
alleged conditions that may well violate the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 17 ¶¶ 96(a)-96(h).)
However, Plaintiff fails to explain the extent to which he personally suffered any deprivation or
when the alleged deprivation occurred. Further, Plaintiff fails to clearly state the personal
involvement of any named Defendant beyond conclusory statements of their knowledge of an
acquiescence in the conditions in the prison. Accordingly, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge
Smyser’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims be dismissed as to
all Defendants.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff raised objections to Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s Report and Recommendation

arguing that the claims against Defendants Lucas, Sowga, Walsh, Varner, Davis, and Jones were
improperly dismissed. (Doc. No. 21.) Specifically, Plaintiff argued that he properly stated both
Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims and Eighth Amendment claims arising
from the July 25, 2010 kitchen accident based on the knowledge and acquiescence of the
Defendants in these alleged violations. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a
conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Lucas, Sowga, Walsh, Varner, Davis, and
Jones. The Court further agrees that Plaintiff has failed to plead an Eighth Amendment violation
arising from the July 25, 2010 kitchen accident as to Defendants Lucas, Sowga, Walsh, and
Varner. The Court further agrees with the report and recommendation that permitting Plaintiff to
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amend his complaint would be futile. Plaintiff has been given two opportunities to file amended
complaints and the Court is persuaded that, if given yet another opportunity, Plaintiff would be
unable to state a claim. However, Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to plausibly state a claim
based on the knowledge and acquiescence of Defendants Davis and Jones as to the July 25, 2010
kitchen accident. Accordingly, at this early stage, the Court will permit this claim to proceed.4

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In his objections, Plaintiff also argues that “never in the history of civil law has the
court made the screening of a case so blatantly biased as to actually take it upon [itself] to screen
a plaintiff’s complaint” and objects to Magistrate Judge Blewitt “requir[ing] the plaintiff to go
through . . . rigorous screening.” (Doc. No 21 at 8-9.) Plaintiff has not been “subjected” to this
screening because it is Magistrate Judge Blewitt’s wont to do so. Nor is Plaintiff in a uniquely
aggrieved position as he apparently believes himself to be. Rather, Magistrate Judge Blewitt has
screened Plaintiff’s complaint because he is required to do so by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court further assures Plaintiff that “the history of civil law” is
replete with cases of judicial screening of complaints from prisoners against government
officials.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARLOS ROBLES,
Plaintiff
v.
J.J. CASEY, et al.,
Defendants

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1:10-cv-2663
(Chief Judge Kane)

ORDER
NOW, on this 8th day of June 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the report and
recommendation (Doc. No. 20) is ADOPTED IN PART as follows:
1.

All claims against Defendants Lucas, Sowga, Walsh, and Varner are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

2.

The conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Davis and Jones are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

3.

The Eighth Amendment claims arising from the July 25, 2010 eye injury against
Defendants Davis and Jones may proceed;

4.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment denial of proper medical care claim against
Defendants Bohinski and Leskowski arising from the July 25, 2010 eye injury
may proceed;

5.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim against Defendant
Bohinski regarding Defendant Bohinski’s failure to treat Plaintiff’s pre-existing
eye conditions may proceed;

6.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment state-created danger claim against Defendant
Casey may proceed;

7.

To the extent that Plaintiff raises a claim for money damages against any named
Defendant in his official capacity, those claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; and

8.

To the extent that Plaintiff raises a claim based on any Defendant’s handling of
the grievance procedure, those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This case shall be recommitted to Magistrate Judge Blewitt for further proceedings, including
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directing service of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 17) on the remaining
Defendants.
S/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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